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CONSTRUCTING ONE ANOTHER: 
PHILODEMUS AND PAUL ON INTERDEPENDENCE IN MORAL FORMATION
JUSTIN REID ALLISON
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 




In this thesis, I argue that one gains fresh perspective on Paul’s understanding of believers’ 
interdependence in ‘constructing’ each other in 1 Corinthians by comparison with 
Philodemus’ vision for interdependence in reciprocal ‘therapy’. Pauline construction and 
Philodemean therapy are analogous instances of interdependent moral formation, both in 
concept and practice. Beyond previous comparisons, however, such a pairing is only fruitful if 
it is methodologically reoriented to both similarities and differences. This reorientation 
requires expanding the comparison to include additional dimensions of both figures’ 
perspectives, namely, their socio-economic locations (including their views of economic 
interdependence) and their theologies.
 In the first half (chs. two to four), I examine Philodemus’ socio-economic location and 
theology in the course of describing interdependence in reciprocal moral therapy via frank 
criticism among friends (drawing from his treatise On Frank Criticism). 
 In the second half (chs. five to seven), I examine Paul’s socio-economic location and 
theology in the course of describing interdependence in reciprocal construction among 
believers in 1 Cor 8n10 and 12n14.
 In the final chapter (ch. 8), I bring Paul and Philodemus into comparative perspective. 
I argue that, alongside their similarities (esp. in the practices of reciprocal formation), the two 
have qualitatively different understandings of moral formation and moral interdependence 
among community members. For Philodemus, one grows out of one’s need to receive 
formation from others into moral self-sufficiency. This trajectory correlates with the assumed 
economic self-sufficiency of Epicurean friends, and the moral self-sufficiency of the gods, 
which Epicureans can reach by means of perfected human character. For Paul, however, 
believers constantly depend on one another for moral formation, as they also do for economic 
support in their poverty. Paul cannot champion Philodemus’ moral self-sufficiency, because 
the moral life of a believer is one of interactive relationship with God, who continually reveals 
himself through other believers for their formation, yet always transcends all human moral 
character.
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τη,ñ γνωστηñ,  υ  πο` θεουñ,
εν ηð,  ενεργειñ τα` πα' ντα ο   κυ' ριος,
δι ηðς ζηñ,  ουðτος ο λιγο' πιστος
κατοπτριζο' µενος το` µυστη' ριον
πεσω`ν επι` προ' σωπον,
Α νδρει'α, .
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
‘Let all be done for construction’ (πα' ντα προ`ς οικοδοµη`ν γινε'σθω, 1 Cor 14:26). Paul thus 
summarizes his goal for all Corinthian believers’ speech and behaviour toward one another in 
gathered worship. As seen with special clarity in 1 Corinthians 12n14, reciprocal 
‘construction’ (οικοδοµη' , οικοδοµε'ω) is fundamental to believers’ lives in community, for 
Paul (see also, e.g., 1 Thess 5:11; Rom 15:2). God gives all believers different gifts to be 
shared for others’ ‘benefit’ (το` συµφε'ρον, 12:7). Construction is central to this benefit, 
particularly through gifted speech (14:1n5, 12). No believer can claim not to stand in need of 
the benefit which others offer through their gifts (1 Cor 12:21), including the varieties of 
constructing speech discussed throughout 1 Cor 12n14. Not only does Paul envision believers’ 
sharing in reciprocal construction, but he also understands such sharing as a form of 
interdependence among believers. 
 The present thesis is an investigation of this constructive interdependence. How is 
reciprocal construction conceived and practised such that believers need one another, 
according to Paul? What kind of interdependence does Paul envision for this construction, and 
why? Put succinctly, how and why do believers need one another for construction?
1.1. Central Claims
In the present thesis I make two interwoven claims. First, I argue that one may give a fruitful 
answer to these questions by comparing Paul’s vision for reciprocal construction to that of the 
Epicurean philosopher Philodemus. Paul’s construction is a kind of moral formation that is 
distinctively analogous to that which Philodemus envisioned among Epicureans. Making this 
claim involves critical appropriation of the landmark comparisons between the two by 
Abraham J. Malherbe and Clarence E. Glad.1 Malherbe has drawn repeated attention to the 
  10
________________________
1. See especially Abraham J. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of 
Pastoral Care (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987); Abraham J. Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989); Clarence E. Glad, Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early 
Christian Psychagogy, NovTSup (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995). Malherbe’s contributions are foundational to 
Glad’s work (see Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 1–12). The comparison of Paul and Epicurus by Norman W. 
DeWitt is less focused upon Philodemus, and too often makes wildly unsubstantiated claims to be particularly 
useful for this thesis. See Norman W. DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1954).
similarities between Paul and Philodemus, but it is Glad who has offered the only monograph-
length work to date comparing the two in detail. The focus of this study differs from Glad’s 
and Malherbe’s work. This study concerns Paul’s vision for believers’ own practices of 
construction among one another (particularly shown in 1 Cor 8n10, 12n14). This reciprocal, 
communal construction has received only passing treatment by both scholars, for they 
primarily aimed to understand Paul’s own attempts to form believers.
 Second, gaining this new perspective requires a methodological reorientation of the 
comparison between Paul and Philodemus. For all their important contributions, Malherbe’s 
and Glad’s comparisons have distorted the picture of Pauline construction by interpreting his 
texts almost as though he were Philodemus, i.e., by interpreting Pauline construction as 
virtually identical to Philodemean philosophical therapy. This thesis, on the other hand, 
attends to similarities and differences. While they share distinctive similarities, I argue that 
Paul and Philodemus have qualitatively different understandings of interdependence in 
reciprocal moral formation, both conceptually and practically. These differences do not nullify 
the usefulness of the comparison, but are essential to it. In fact, the reorientation performed in 
this thesis is necessary for the PaulnPhilodemus comparative project to bear further exegetical 
fruit. Furthermore, by allowing Paul and Philodemus to be different from one another, this 
comparison illuminates both figures anew as they stand in one another’s contrasting light.
 These two claims require further elaboration as to their context and content. In what 
follows, I first provide context and initial justification for comparing Paul’s reciprocal 
construction and Philodemus’ reciprocal moral formation (1.2). Next, I review previous 
comparisons by Malherbe and Glad in greater detail (1.3) in order to prepare for the 
methodological discussion that follows (1.4). Finally, I offer an overview of the thesis chapter 
by chapter (1.5).
1.2. Context and Initial Justification
This study is an episode in the winding history of scholarly struggle to understand Paul’s texts 
by reading them in relation to Greco-Roman philosophy.2 The method and results of such 
comparison have been and remain deeply contested. Scholars have variously construed Paul’s 
relationship to philosophy. Some studies claim radical similarity;3 others claim 
  11
________________________
2. See, e.g., introductory discussions in Abraham J. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New 
Testament,” in ANRW II.26.1, eds. Wolfgang Haase and Hildegard Temporini (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992), 267–
333; Richard S. Ascough, What Are They Saying About the Formation of Pauline Churches? (New York: Paulist, 
1998), 29–49; L. Michael White and John T. Fitzgerald, “Quod Est Comparandum: The Problem of Parallels,” in 
Early Christianity and Classical Culture, eds. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White, 
NovTSup 110 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003), 13–39; Joseph R. Dodson and Andrew W. Pitts, Paul and the 
Greco-Roman Philosophical Tradition, LNTS 527 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 1–11. 
3. See, e.g., Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000).
incommensurable difference.4 Some compare Paul across philosophical traditions,5 while 
others focus on Paul’s relationship to a particular philosophical tradition.6
 Despite this cloud of witnesses, the burden of justification weighs no less upon this 
study. Why compare? What makes it plausible that another comparison between Paul and 
Philodemus can be fruitful? Ultimately, the justification of any comparative project depends 
upon the helpfulness of its results. The proof is in the eating. Nevertheless, a number of 
considerations lend initial plausibility to the present project.
 Several scholars have noted striking similarities between the nature of Pauline 
communities and that of ancient philosophical schools. In a seminal study which remains one 
of the best expressions of this view, Stanley Stowers argued for seven characteristics shared 
distinctively between the two:7 (1) these communities revolved around totalizing, exclusive 
worldviews with a unitary conception of ‘the good’; (2) the communities possessed an ethos 
  12
________________________
4. See, e.g., C. Kavin Rowe, One True Life: The Stoics and Early Christians as Rival Traditions (New 
Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2016).
5. Among monographs, see, e.g., Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers; Stanley K. Stowers, A 
Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1994); George 
H. van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in 
Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, and Early Christianity, WUNT 232 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); 
David M. Litwa, We Are Being Transformed: Deification in Paul’s Soteriology, BZNW 187 (Berlin; Boston: De 
Gruyter, 2012); Laura B. Dingeldein, “Gaining Virtue, Gaining Christ: Moral Development in the Letters of 
Paul,” PhD Diss. (Brown University, 2014).
6. For Stoicism, see, e.g., Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology 
and Self in the Apostle Paul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Runar Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity 
and Roman Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Timothy A. Brookins, Corinthian Wisdom, Stoic 
Philosophy, and the Ancient Economy, SNTSMS 159 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Joseph R 
Dodson and David E. Briones, eds., Paul and Seneca in Dialogue, Ancient Philosophy & Religion 2 (Leiden; 
Boston: Brill, 2017); Susan Grove Eastman, Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017). For Cynicism, see, e.g., Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘Gentle as a Nurse’: The Cynic 
Background to 1 Thessalonians 2,” NovT 12 (1970): 203–17; F. Gerald Downing, Cynics, Paul, and Pauline 
Churches (London; New York: Routledge, 1998). For Pythagoreanism, see Annette Bourland Huizenga, Moral 
Education for Women in the Pastoral and Pythagorean Letters, NovTSup 147 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013). For 
Epicureanism, see, e.g., Glad, Paul and Philodemus; Peter Eckstein, Gemeinde, Brief, und Heilsbotschaft: Ein 
phänomenologischer Vergleich zwischen Paulus und Epikur, Herders Biblische Studien 42 (Freiburg: Herder, 
2004). For Platonism, see, e.g., Emma Wasserman, The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law 
in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology, WUNT 2,256 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Stanley K. Stowers, 
“The Dilemma of Paul’s Physics: Features Stoic-Platonist or Platonist-Stoic?” in From Stoicism to Platonism: 
The Development of Philosophy, 100 BCEn100 CE, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 231–53.
7. See Stanley K. Stowers, “Does Pauline Christianity Resemble a Hellenistic Philosophy?” in Paul 
Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (London; Leiden: Westminster John Knox, 
2001), 81–102. Stowers brings cogency and nuance to a view shared by, e.g., Arthur D. Nock, Conversion: The 
Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo (Oxford: Clarendon, 1933), 202–3; 
Edwin A. Judge, “The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community,” in The First Christians in the Roman World: 
Augustan and New Testament Essays, ed. James R. Harrison (1961; repr., Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 526–
52; David Sedley, “Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World,” in Philosophia Togata, eds. Miriam 
Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 97–119; Loveday Alexander, “Paul and 
the Hellenistic Schools: The Evidence of Galen,” in Paul in His Hellenistic Context, ed. Troels Engberg-
Pedersen (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 60–83; Claire S. Smith, Pauline Communities as ‘Scholastic 
Communities’, WUNT 2,335 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).
that was often counter-conventional (e.g., asceticism, ambivalence to civic virtue); (3) 
membership involved conversion, a radical reorientation of the self according to the 
community’s totalizing worldview; (4) this conversion required a ‘technology of the self’ by 
which this personal transformation happened; (5) central figures provided norming models for 
the community (e.g., Epicurus, Jesus); (6) the central practices of the community were 
‘intellectual’ practices for articulating self-identity, among other functions (e.g., speaking, 
reading, writing, teaching, learning; even ritual meals entailed interpretation and use of a 
technology of the self); (7) the communities often exhibited nontraditional or radical social 
formations. Stowers does not claim that the ancient philosophical school is the best model for 
understanding Pauline communities (there was no uniform ‘school’ model anyhow),8 but that 
philosophical communities can be fruitful as comparanda for Pauline communities because of 
these similar characteristics.
 Among various philosophical groups, Epicurean communities distinctively share a 
number of characteristics with Pauline communities. It seems Epicurean communities had a 
more robust communal life as an ‘alternative community’ than other philosophical schools.9 
The best life involves leisured withdrawal with friends, perhaps involving cohabitation. 
Unlike most other philosophical schools, Epicurean communities held regular cultic 
celebrations and common meals as a constitutive part of communal life, like Pauline 
communities.10 
 Particularly important for the present study is the communal practice of reciprocal 
moral formation via frank criticism (known especially via Philodemus’ treatise Περι` 
Παρρησι'ας, or On Frank Criticism). This practice was relatively distinctive among 
philosophical schools in that it was a communal affair: all members were to take part 
reciprocally, giving and receiving critique from one another, even to the point of reporting one 
  13
________________________
8. See Loveday Alexander, “IPSE DIXIT: Citation of Authority in Paul and in the Jewish and 
Hellenistic Schools,” in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2001), 103–27.
9. For this judgement see, e.g., Norman W. DeWitt, “Epicurean Contubernium,” TAPA 67 (1936): 55–
63; Diskin Clay, “Individual and Community in the First Generation of the Epicurean School,” in Paradosis and 
Survival (1983; repr., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 55–74; Wayne A. Meeks, The First 
Urban Christians, 2nd ed. (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2003), 83–84; Malherbe, Paul and the 
Thessalonians, 40–43, 84; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 8; Thomas Schmeller, Schulen im Neuen Testament? Zur 
Stellung des Urchristentums in der Bildungswelt seiner Zeit, Herders Biblische Studien 30 (Freiburg: Herder, 
2001), 81–82; Michael Erler, “Epicureanism in the Roman Empire,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Epicureanism, ed. James Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 61–62; Dirk Obbink, “Craft, 
Cult, and Canon in the Books from Herculaneum,” in Philodemus and the New Testament World; John T. 
Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland, NovTSup 111 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004), 76.
10. See Diskin Clay, “The Cults of Epicurus,” in Paradosis and Survival (1986; repr., Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1998), 75–102; Sedley, “Philosophical Allegiance”. Note the hesitations toward 
seeing similarity on the point of religious observance and religious authority in Obbink, “Craft, Cult, and Canon”.
another’s mistakes to the leaders of the community.11 Glad (following Malherbe) observes ‘a 
basic congruity between the Pauline communities and the Epicureans as it relates to the 
communal pattern of mutual participation by community members in exhortation, edification, 
and correction.’12 Glad has in mind 1 Corinthians 8n10, 12n14, Romans 14n15; 1 Thess 5; 
and Gal 6:1n4. In order to clarify my understanding of this analogy and its orienting role in the 
comparison of the present thesis, it is necessary first to review Malherbe’s and Glad’s 
comparisons in detail (1.3), and then outline the methodological reorientation of this study 
(1.4).
1.3. Malherbe and Glad on Reciprocal Psychagogy in Paul
Malherbe and Glad interpret Paul’s texts as though he drew from a Hellenistic tradition of 
philosophical therapy which they label ‘psychagogy’. Malherbe’s work has been influential in 
establishing the concept of this ancient tradition of therapy in New Testament studies. Thus, 
when Glad observes a similar pattern of ‘mutual participation by community members in 
exhortation, edification, and correction’, he interprets Paul to have a psychagogic 
understanding of these practices.13 Both view Paul as one who ‘is thoroughly familiar with the 
  14
________________________
11. For this reconstruction of Epicurean moral formation in Philodemus, see, e.g., Marcello Gigante, 
Ricerche Filodemee, 2nd ed. (Naples: Gaetano Macchiaroli, 1983), 55–113; Voula Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 7–8, 101–81; Malherbe, Paul 
and the Thessalonians, 81–88. 
Julie Giovacchini has rightly pointed to a number of continuities between Philodemus’ portrait of frank 
criticism and that of other figures (esp. Plutarch) which rule out the idea that Epicurean frank criticism was 
entirely distinct from that of other schools (Julie Giovacchini, “La Nouvelle Reconstruction du Rouleau du 
Franc-Parler de Philodème: Permet-Elle Encore de Postuler l’Existence d’une ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ spécifiquement 
Épicurienne?” in Miscellanea Papyrologica Herculanensia, eds. A. Antoni, et al. (Pisa: Fabrizio Serra, 
2010), 294–314). Her arguments do not erase Philodemus’ relative distinctiveness, in my judgement.
12. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 8. Several studies, including many of those already noted, have 
interpreted Pauline texts in terms of Greco-Roman moral formation, even if they do not draw explicitly on 
Philodemus to do so. Beside Malherbe and Glad, see especially Larry L. Welborn, “Paul and Pain: Paul’s 
Emotional Therapy 2 Corinthians 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 in the Context of Ancient Psychagogic Literature,” NTS 57 
(2011): 547–70; Dingeldein, “Gaining Virtue, Gaining Christ”; David Charles Aune, “Passions in the Pauline 
Epistles,” in Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 221–37; Stanley K. Stowers, “Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,” in Greeks, 
Romans, and Christians, eds. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1990), 253–86. Other scholars concern themselves with moral formation in Paul without thoroughgoing 
comparison to ancient Greco-Roman concepts. See, e.g., James W. Thompson, Moral Formation According to 
Paul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011); James G. Samra, Being Conformed to Christ in Community: A 
Study of Maturity, Maturation and the Local Church in the Undisputed Pauline Epistles (London; New York: 
T&T Clark, 2006); Daniel J. Harrington S.J. and James F. Keenan S.J., Paul and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges 
Between New Testament Studies and Moral Theology (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010). 
13. Note the thesis statement of Glad’s monograph concerning Paul’s psychagogy in 1 and 2 
Corinthians: ‘My thesis is that 1 Corinthians 9:22b, “I have become everything in turn to men of every sort,” is 
part of a tradition in Greco-Roman society which underscores, in the light of human diversity, the importance of 
adaptability in conduct and speech in the unreserved association with all and in the psychagogic adaptation to 
different human dispositions’ (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 1).
traditions of his philosophic contemporaries and who knows these traditions first-hand.’14 As 
Malherbe states with reference to 1 Thessalonians, ‘The letter reveals that in his founding and 
nurturing of a church, Paul followed the methods of the moral philosophers.’15 Paul’s 
dependence on this tradition is general, not specific to a particular representative of the 
tradition. Glad, for example, does not argue for Paul’s direct genealogical dependence upon 
Philodemus, but for his dependence on the widespread tradition of psychagogy, from which 
Philodemus drew as well.16
  Malherbe defines psychagogy as a ‘well developed system of care’ for ‘intellectual, 
spiritual, and moral growth,’ involving ‘spiritual exercises, psychotherapy, and psychological 
and pastoral counseling,’ which a mature teacher uses to treat the illnesses of the immature.17 
The tradition begins in Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, and Isocrates and lives on in the first 
centuries BCE and CE in, e.g., Philodemus, Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus, Musonius Rufus, and 
Dio Chrysostom.18 Within philosophical texts concerned with this therapy, a routine topos is 
the adaptation of philosophical therapy to the needs and dispositions of the recipient, 
especially those of immature students. Philodemus is especially important for the 
reconstruction of psychagogy, especially that which is analogous to practices among believers 
in Paul’s texts, for Philodemus’ treatise On Frank Criticism provides a distinctive portrait of 
psychagogic techniques used reciprocally by students of varying maturity, not just those used 
by a sage. 
 It is helpful to clarify how Malherbe and Glad understand reciprocal psychagogy in 
particular Pauline texts. As noted above, both scholars focus on Paul’s own psychagogy 
toward believers, though they occasionally comment on communal practices of psychagogy. 
Their portraits of reciprocal psychagogy share essentially the same characteristics as those of 
Paul’s psychagogy toward other believers.
 Malherbe identifies 1 Thess 5:12n15 as a key witness to reciprocal psychagogy among 
believers.19 According to his analysis, several similarities with psychagogic conceptions and 
practices emerge: (a) Paul commands all Christians in Thessalonica to engage in reciprocal 
moral formation (νουθετειñτε, παραµυθειñσθε, α ντε'χεσθε, µακροθυµειñτε), recalling particularly 
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14. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 4. See also Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers, 8.
15. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 303.
16. See Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 9, 213–14 n. 93, 336.
17. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 301. See Glad’s similar descriptions in 
Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 2, 10.
18. See discussion also in Clarence E. Glad, “Frank Speech, Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus,” in 
Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech, vol. 82, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Supplements to Novum 
Testamentum (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1996), 31f.
19. For this summary I draw from three relevant publications, Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians; 
Abraham J. Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, 
AB 32B (New York: Doubleday, 2000); Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘Pastoral Care’ in the Thessalonian Church,” 
NTS 36 (1990): 375–91. To my knowledge, this passage is the only one that Malherbe develops at length on the 
subject of reciprocal psychagogy among believers.
the rotational psychagogy of Philodemus but also psychagogic practice in general;20 (b) Paul 
assumes that this care adapts to various psychological/emotional conditions of particular 
persons (5:14);21 (c) Paul assumes the category of weak persons, likely referring to those who 
are weak in terms of moral immaturity (5:14);22 (d) Paul calls believers to respect and love 
those who lead others in the community, much like Philodemus would, assuming that the 
more mature play a greater psychagogic role (5:12n13);23 (e) Paul assumes that leaders 
demonstrate love and care for those led, and that this love grounds believers’ trust in them, as 
does Philodemus (5:13);24 (f) Paul calls all to be at peace in themselves and not to return evil 
for evil, both of which are relevant for the tense situations involved in psychagogy, especially 
involving the immature (5:13b, 15).25
 Glad interprets that Paul, like Philodemus and other Hellenistic moral philosophers, 
encouraged mature believers to treat weaker, less mature believers by means of adaptive, 
rational therapy. In Glad’s reading of 1 Cor 8n10,26 those believers who ‘have knowledge’ 
were already at work in this task. They were attempting to correct the weak’s immature 
‘conscience’ by harsh rational persuasion and by presenting themselves as models of the free 
consumption of idol food, pressuring the weak to do likewise.27 As in philosophical texts 
which discuss immature students (esp. those of Philodemus), Glad diagnoses the weak as 
‘akratic’: they made decisions which created strife and uncertainty within themselves, i.e.,  
they assented to the non-existence of idols, but could not eat food with cultic ties without a 
guilty self-perception, as if they had committed idolatry.28 Paul endorsed the more mature 
believers’ position on idol food in theory, along with their pedagogical role and intent, but did 
not endorse their destructive behaviour.29 Instead, Paul called those with knowledge not to 
criticize the weak harshly and to abstain from consumption of idol food which put pressure on 
the weak. Paul thus had a gentler, long-term therapeutic project in mind to lead the weak out 
of their weakness, i.e., to develop the weak’s immature character. Like Philodemus, Glad 
argues, Paul required adaptation to the weak in light of their instability as newly converted 
Christians who lacked a strong sense of Christian identity and the ability to endure harsh 
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20. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 91; Malherbe, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 311, 326.
21. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 93.
22. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 93 Malherbe, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 318–19.
23. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 89; Malherbe, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 325–26.
24. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 89–90.
25. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 89, 93; Malherbe, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 326.
26. I have chosen to rehearse Glad’s reading of 1 Cor 8n10, because this thesis studies 1 Cor 8n10 as 
well, and because he develops his reading of these chapters in greatest detail. Glad’s reading of 1 Cor 8n10 is 
basically the same as his reading of Rom 14n15, on which he also offers extended comment (see Glad, Paul and 
Philodemus, 213–35, 249–95). Glad only briefly discusses the other passages in which he identifies reciprocal 
psychagogy among believers (1 Thess 5; Gal 6:1n4; 1 Cor 12n14). 
27. Glads reads τυ' πτοντες (8:10) and οικοδοµηθη' σεται (8:12) as indicating such behaviour (Glad, Paul 
and Philodemus, 277–95).
28. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 284–89.
29. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 278.
criticism. Those with knowledge should continue to instruct the weak on this issue, but should 
be gentle, patient and willing to sacrifice their freedom, bearing with the weak’s 
vulnerabilities as they grow out of them more gradually.
 Both Malherbe and Glad use psychagogy as an explanatory matrix for Paul’s texts, and 
thus minimize differences between Paul and psychagogy. Paul uses the same ‘system of care’, 
shares the same ‘basic, self-orienting goal’ to ‘help people better themselves’ as, e.g., 
Philodemus.30 Malherbe thinks Paul and Philodemus are co-participants in psychagogy, even 
if they ‘differ in their own self-understandings and the consequences thereof for the ways in 
which they go about their shared task.’31 In the first sentence of his Paul and the 
Thessalonians, Malherbe clarifies that his book ‘deals with Paul’s practice rather than his 
theology.’32 Malherbe recognises that ‘Paul’s ministry cannot be fully understood apart from 
his theology’ but desires to focus only on the pastoral practice in itself in one locale.33 In light 
of his later methodological comments, it seems likely that Malherbe did not want Paul’s 
theology to prematurely shut down the possible gains of seeing Paul as a participant in 
psychagogy alongside philosophers (who had different theologies).34 Whatever the differences 
between them, they still have a shared task in a shared tradition. Both scholars would not deny 
that there are fundamental differences between Paul and Philodemus, particularly in theology, 
but both do not consider these differences to be obstacles for explaining Paul’s texts according 
to psychagogy.
 Any comparison must relativise some differences in order to begin. The grave problem 
for Malherbe and Glad, however, is that the differences which they identify and marginalise 
are, arguably, differences of fundamental importance to Paul’s vision of moral formation, and 
of fundamental importance to what psychagogy means, by their own definitions.
 Malherbe enumerates several differences between Paul and psychagogy in 1 Thess 
5:12n15, several of which are theologically oriented. These include: (a) Paul issues 
universally reciprocal commands toward mutual care, and does not appeal to a defined class of 
teacher, in partial distinction with Philodemus (for whom teachers played a more structured 
role);35 (b) Paul has no expectation that one who receives care should express gratitude to the 
carer, for it is instead given to God (1 Thess 2:13);36 (c) psychagogic work is grounded in faith 
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30. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 300–301.
31. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 300.
32. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 1.
33. Ibid., 2.
34. Malherbe is a champion of seeking similarity in comparisons between Paul and Hellenistic 
philosophers, not in order to exclude difference, but so that those similarities become a wider frame in which to 
understand Paul. Jan N. Sevenster’s work on Paul and Seneca would have been more fruitful, in his view, if he 
had not focused so much on difference, and brought other philosophers into view. He concludes upon Sevenster’s 
failure, ‘Dissimilarity as the decisive criterion in comparison does not enrich our understanding of Paul’ 
(Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 300).
35. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 89.
36. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 90; Malherbe, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 327.
and ‘in the Lord’ (εν κυρι'ω, ; 1 Thess 1:3; 5:12), making the care itself a work of God;37 (d) the 
community itself is bound together in Christ as α δελφοι' (1 Thess 5:12, 14);38 (e) Paul does not 
show a medical model by which some members cure others by virtue of personal maturity and 
skill;39 (f) Paul provides a theological basis for care in light of the coming Day of the Lord 
(5:1n11);40 (g) the goal of care is to live worthily of God in light of the coming Day of the 
Lord, not ‘the development of character or the fulfillment of human potential’ (5:1n11).41
 Glad’s monograph hardly discusses differences between Paul and Philodemus, but he 
briefly acknowledges two. These are essentially the same differences Malherbe identifies in 
(a) above, i.e., a more flexible participation by all in psychagogy, and (e) above, i.e., the lack 
of a therapeutic view of reason.42 Glad draws on an important essay by Stanley Stowers which 
argues the latter point. Put basically, Stowers argues that Paul cannot share a therapeutic view 
of reason, nor the therapeutic relationships it underwrites, because of his pessimistic 
epistemology and anthropology, and his prioritizing of community-building over individual 
therapy of the passions.43 
 Malherbe and Glad maintain that Paul’s texts can be explained in terms of 
psychagogy, but both acknowledge that Paul’s conception does not fit psychagogy in a 
fundamental way: he does not have the therapeutic view of reason by which psychagogy 
operates (i.e., curing moral illnesses by philosophical argument).44 Malherbe acknowledges 
that this means Paul also does not have a therapeutic view of the relationships between 
believers involved in psychagogy (i.e., in which those who are more mature in reason and 
character care for the less mature), because God is also involved. Malherbe is also willing to 
concede, in the same trajectory, that the goal is not the development of character, but living 
worthily of God, though he does not spell out how these are distinct. 
 For his part, Glad untenably ascribes a therapeutic set of relationships to Pauline texts, 
and then, simultaneously, denies that Paul has a therapeutic view of reason, in agreement with 
Stowers (and Malherbe). On one hand Glad claims, ‘Paul does not elevate reason as the 
dominant criterion of community interaction as the therapeutic model does,’ and ‘Paul does 
not, like the wise Corinthians, use reason as a principle of social hierarchy.’45 On the other, he 
argues for social hierarchy in Pauline communities on the basis of personal maturity and 
instances of psychagogic function (both of which involve reason), and interprets that Paul 
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37. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 90.
38. Ibid., 93.
39. Malherbe, “‘Pastoral Care’,” 389.
40. Malherbe, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 326–27.
41. Ibid., 308.
42. See Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 213, 233–35.
43. See Stowers, “Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,” 284–86.
44. See discussion in Malherbe, “‘Pastoral Care’,” 389; Malherbe, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 326; Glad, 
Paul and Philodemus, 234–35.
45. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 234.
expected more mature believers to care for the immature ‘weak’ by gradually leading them out 
of their weakness, a softer form of psychagogy, but psychagogy nonetheless, necessarily 
involving therapy by reason.46 He does not elaborate at all on the inconsistency, and continues 
to claim that Paul can be explained according to psychagogy.
 If Paul does not operate with a therapeutic model of care, in which the more mature 
care for the less mature by therapeutic reason oriented to the goal of their perfected moral 
character, then Paul no longer shares the core characteristics of psychagogy in the first place, 
by their own definitions (and by ample demonstration from Philodemus). Both scholars have 
been led into inconsistency by their failure to reckon properly with difference in their 
identifications of similarity. 
 As an illustration of this inconsistency, note Malherbe’s treatment of the phrase 
µακροθυµειñτε προ`ς πα' ντας in 1 Thess 5:14. Malherbe states, 
 Makrothymein, which does not appear in pagan psychagogy, is thus heavy with   
 theological content. However, the idea that people in need of care should be treated 
 with patience underlies the entire endeavor to benefit people. Just as a physician who 
 diagnoses his patients repeats and modifies his treatment as he progresses, the 
 counselor should be patient and repeat his therapy (Philodemus, On Frankness 63, 64, 
 67, 69; Plutarch On How to Tell a Flatter from a Friend 74DnE).47 
Malherbe does not explain the ‘theological content’ of µακροθυµειñτε, but instead explains the 
meaning in terms of the same therapeutic model he distinguishes as not applicable to Paul. 
 I argue that this slip is representative of Malherbe’s and Glad’s entire project. To 
identify Paul’s texts with psychagogy apart from consideration of fundamental differences is 
like saying the shoe fits when it’s only half-way on. This is a critical error that leads to the 
distortion of Pauline texts. Explaining Paul in terms of psychagogy without due consideration 
of differences is effectively to assume that Paul operated, e.g., with Epicurean theology, 
anthropology, and social history when it came to moral formation among believers 
(Epicurean, that is, given Philodemus’ foundational role in defining reciprocal psychagogy for 
Malherbe and Glad). I do not claim that Glad and Malherbe do not know the difference 
between Pauline and Epicurean theology. Rather, I claim that their comparative projects make 
an identification between Paul and psychagogy that practically assumes Paul was an 
Epicurean, for they do not allow Paul’s differences to factor properly into that identification.
 One could still make the case that Paul is similar enough to be compared to 
psychagogy, but do so with the acknowledgement that Paul has qualitatively different 
conceptions of formation than those evidenced in psychagogy. This is precisely the project of 
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46. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 200–213, 277–95.
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the present thesis. Stanley Stowers’ essay ‘Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason’ has already 
made strides in this direction, and the present thesis seeks to contribute further. The goal is to 
understand Paul and Philodemus afresh by attention to both their similarities and differences. 
The questions of how and why the two differ are productive, not obstructive, of greater 
understanding.
1.4. Methodological Framework
My own comparison of Philodemus and Paul has much in common with that of Malherbe and 
Glad. My comparison launches from a similar analogy between Paul and Philodemus, as Glad 
puts it, ‘the communal pattern of mutual participation by community members in exhortation, 
edification, and correction.’48 I limit myself to just Paul and Philodemus in an effort to take as 
full an account as possible of each, avoiding a superficial consideration of ‘parallels’.49  
Nevertheless, the comparison needs methodological reorientation if it is to provide further 
illumination of both Paul and Philodemus.
1.4.1. General Methodological Reorientation
The goal is to compare Paul and Philodemus again, this time allowing differences to shape the 
understanding of similarities. Accounting for these differences also requires expanding the 
comparison to include material which Malherbe and Glad left to one side. Accordingly, there 
are two main aspects of this reorientation: (1) the use of polythetic categories which allow 
differences to factor into similarities, and (2) the inclusion of theology and socio-economic 
location as dimensions of the comparison. Recent discussions of comparative method in the 
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48. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 8.
49. Malherbe is well-known for his concerns in this regard. See Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the 
New Testament”. See also White and Fitzgerald, “Quod Est Comparandum: The Problem of Parallels”. In 
making this choice (which was partially constrained by the space limitations of this thesis), I do not claim that 
more wide-ranging comparisons are necessarily superficial. Rather, ideally this thesis can be integrated into wider 
comparative work between early Christian literature and Hellenistic/Post-Hellenistic philosophy. I have judged 
the limitations of a one-to-one comparison less important than avoiding the danger of superficiality in my own 
work that could arise from including other figures in the comparison.
study of religion provide helpful concepts for this reorientation, even if the present thesis does 
not have a thoroughgoing analytic framework derived from that field.50
  Malherbe and Glad use psychagogy as a ‘monothetic’ category, i.e., a category 
defined by members sharing the same characteristics.51 They claim that Pauline formation has 
the same set of characteristics that psychagogy exemplifies, particularly as evidenced in 
Philodemus. Using psychagogy as a monothetic category is unhelpful because it renders 
differences beyond the allegedly shared psychagogic features to be irrelevant for comparative 
purposes. These differences are critically important to incorporate if the comparison is not to 
end in distortion, as noted above.
 Instead, the comparison should operate by means of a polythetic category, i.e., one in 
which members fit into the category by their similarity to one another, by ‘family 
resemblance’,52 not by the possession of a set of identical characteristics. A polythetic 
category is far more helpful for present purposes as it allows for differences and similarities to 
exist side-by-side in the comparison.53
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50. In what some call a ‘new comparativism’, scholars engage in comparative religion afresh in response 
to widespread criticisms of the project. See, e.g., William E. Paden, “Elements of a New Comparativism,” in A 
Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age, eds. Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. 
Ray (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2001), 182–92; Robert A. Segal, “In 
Defense of the Comparative Method,” Numen 48 (2001): 339–73; Corinne G. Dempsey, Bringing the Sacred 
Down to Earth: Adventures in Comparative Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9; Fitz J. P. 
Poole, “Metaphors and Maps: Towards Comparison in the Anthropology of Religion,” JAAR 54 (1986): 411–57; 
Kimberley C. Patton, “Juggling Torches: Why We Still Need Comparative Religion,” in A Magic Still Dwells: 
Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age, eds. Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray (Berkeley; Los 
Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2001), 153–71. 
Clifford Geertz is a well-known critic of cross-cultural anthropological comparison. See, e.g., Clifford 
Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (1973; repr., New York: Basic Books, 2000), 1–30. The essence of the 
challenge is that comparing across cultures according to scholarly categories and discourse separated from those 
cultures inherently eliminates cultural particularity, resulting in a misinterpretation of meaning. This 
misinterpretation is viewed as at least an intellectual mistake, but could also be construed as an unethical 
imposition. The problem of whether and how one identifies particular religious phenomena as members of a 
larger class has some analogies with the perennial metaphysical problem of the one and the many and its 
opposition of realists and nominalists. See introductory chapter by Loux and the following essays in Michael J. 
Loux, ed., Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings (London; New York: Routledge, 2001), 3–91; see also 
discussion in Jeppe Sinding Jensen, “Universals, General Terms, and the Study of Religion,” Numen 48 
(2001): 242–43; Richard J. Bernstein, “Incommensurability and Otherness Revisited,” in Culture and Modernity: 
East-West Philosophic Perspectives, ed. Eliot Deutsch (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 85–103; 
Gabriele Galluzzo and Michael J. Loux, eds., The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
51. See discussion of monothetic and polythetic categories in Poole, “Metaphors and Maps,” 423–28; 
Benson Saler, “Comparison: Some Suggestions for Improving the Inevitable,” Numen 48 (2001): 269–93.
52. A term from Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose work is fundamental for the notion of a polythetic 
category (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe [1953; repr., 
New York: Macmillan, 1958], §65f).
53. Surely Malherbe and Glad would agree that Greco-Roman philosophers would differ in the details of 
their psychagogic programs. Perhaps they envisioned psychagogy as a polythetic class in this sense. However, 
when it comes to the practice of comparing Paul and Philodemus, I argue that they operate as though psychagogy 
were a monothetic class, for they do not account robustly for the ways in which Pauline texts do not fit within the 
category of psychagogy.
 Apart from the problematic use of a monothetic category, the choice of the neologism 
‘psychagogy’ as a label seems ill-suited as well. The Greek term from which psychagogy 
derives (ψυχαγωγι'α) does not refer to a singular program in the ancient world known as 
such.54 Moreover, ψυχαγωγι'α does not have positive value for either Paul or Philodemus vis-
à-vis moral formation. It seems irrelevant to Paul, and Philodemus does not use it as a key 
term for moral formation, but rather to describe, e.g., the diverting effect of poems or music, 
both of which, for him, are not necessary to moral formation.55 It seems to me that the 
technical nature of the term psychagogy contributes to its use as a monothetic category.56 I 
have changed the name of the category to reinforce the methodological distinctions of this 
thesis. 
 In this thesis I replace ‘psychagogy’ with the polythetic category ‘moral formation’.  I 
define ‘moral formation’ loosely as the development of individual moral character in 
accordance with a moral framework (involving, e.g., behavioural, affective, and volitional 
dispositions). Unlike psychagogy, ‘moral formation’ does not specify precisely, e.g., how such 
moral development works, the nature of moral character or dispositions, nor the shape of the 
wider moral framework.57 Instead, the category situates members in relation to one another so 
that a common set of questions can be asked of them, to which they can speak as much as 
possible in their own voice. In this way, the comparison can shed light in both directions, 
illuminating Paul and Philodemus anew by their similarities and differences from one another. 
Previous comparisons blocked this mutual illumination because they excluded differences in 
the effort to identify Paul with psychagogy. Shortly below I specify further how moral 
formation operates as a category for this thesis (1.4.2).
 This comparison thus involves analogy, not genealogy.58 I do not compare because I 
believe that Paul directly appropriated Philodemus’ texts for his own communities, nor that 
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54. As Kolbet notes about Malherbe’s neologism, ‘To use the term “psychagogy” in this manner to refer 
to a “well developed system of care” is to give the term a precise range of meaning that it did not have in 
antiquity.’ See Paul R. Kolbet, Augustine and the Cure of Souls, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 17 (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 8. 
55. Glad acknowledges the ambivalent value of the term, but he does not discuss in detail Philodemus’ 
conception of it (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 17–18). See discussion of the term in Philodemus in Daniel 
Delattre, Philodème de Gadara: Sur la Musique, Livre IV, Tome 1 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007), 74.
56. Though note its polythetic use by Welborn, “Paul and Pain”.
57. Laura Dingeldein uses a generalized, ‘folk’ notion of virtue as a baseline category for comparative 
evaluation of Paul and a range of philosophers (Dingeldein, “Gaining Virtue, Gaining Christ,” 20–31, 323). 
Dingeldein argues that Paul on the whole does not demonstrate a philosophically precise system of moral 
formation in his letters, but he does draw on common philosophical notions and can be aligned conceptually to 
middle Platonism.
58. Glad wants to avoid any claim to direct genealogy from Philodemus to Paul, but he does claim that 
Paul drew upon psychagogy alongside Philodemus and other figures (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 9, 213–14 n. 
93, 336). Effectively, however, his comparison amounts to Paul drawing from Philodemus, for Philodemus plays 
a dominating role in the reconstruction of psychagogy. See discussion of this tension in Glad’s work in Margaret 
M. Mitchell, “Pauline Accomodation and ‘Condescension’ (συγκατα'βασις): 1 Cor 9:19–23 and the History of 
Influence,” in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (London; Leiden: 
Westminster John Knox, 2001), 300 n. 11.
Paul knew of Philodemus, nor that Paul appropriated some general form of ‘psychagogy’ that 
was ‘in the air’. Rather, I compare Paul and Philodemus because the two concern themselves 
with inculcating analogous practices among members of their distinctively similar 
communities in the ancient Greco-Roman world of the 1st centuries BCE and CE.59 
Observing this analogy leads me to pursue the potential fruit of the comparison.
 Alongside the shift to a polythetic category, the second aspect of reorientation is to 
widen the scope of comparison. Doing so provides further context for understanding Paul’s 
and Philodemus’ individual conceptions and practices of moral formation. This move is in 
general continuity with Malherbe’s methodological sensibilities toward deeply contextualised 
comparisons, but making the move provides further evidence that Paul’s conception of 
construction cannot be identified with psychagogy. Theology and socio-economic location are 
the two new areas of exploration. The rationale for both choices follows in turn.
 Theology is a natural choice for the comparison because both Paul and Philodemus 
would claim that moral formation has everything to do with a proper relationship to the 
divine, and both imagine moral formation as a form of growing in moral likeness to God. 
Philodemus has a robust theology that deserves attention in any exposition of his 
understanding of moral formation, attention it has not received from Malherbe and Glad.60 
Again, a polythetic relationship operates here: I do not propose that their theologies are the 
same, nor play the same role, e.g., that ‘relationship to God’ and ‘growing in likeness to God’ 
mean the same thing to both. Rather, I examine their theologies as a site of potential similarity 
and difference.
 Like theology, attention to both similarity and difference in socio-economic location 
sheds further light on interdependence in reciprocal moral formation in both communities. 
Malherbe and Glad both base their comparisons upon similar social features of Pauline and 
Epicurean communities, pre-eminently upon communal practices of reciprocal moral 
formation. However, both do not consider how the two figures’ socio-economic locations and 
policies for sharing material resources might compare, nor how these characteristics might 
colour their individual conceptions of interdependent, reciprocal moral formation. It is 
particularly important to note the difference that being relatively affluent as a community (in 
Philodemus’ case) or relatively impoverished as a community (in Paul’s case) can make upon 
one’s relationships with other members. 
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59. Basing this comparison upon abstractly conceived behavioural features of these two communities, 
rather than on the freighted conception of psychagogy, aligns generally with William Paden’s attempt to base the 
study of religion in common, abstract sets of religious behaviours as sites for similarity and difference (without 
reducing religious belief to such behaviour). See William E. Paden, “Universals Revisited: Human Behaviors and 
Cultural Variations,” Numen 48 (2001): 276–89.
60. Glad makes two insignificant references to Philodemus’ theological works, one reference to the 
character of a frank counsellor in On Piety, and one reference to On Gods, only to note that Philodemus wrote 
such a work (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 37 n. 83, 102 n. 3). To my knowledge Malherbe does not refer to 
Philodemus’ theological works in his expositions of psychagogy.
 My study of socio-economic location does not entail the use of a specific analytical 
theory. Rather, my concern is simply to note how socio-economic location can function 
generally as a ‘plausibility structure’ for a construal of one’s formative relationships with 
others (and vice-versa).61
 The four stages of comparison identified by Jonathan Z. Smith provide a useful tool to 
summarise the goal of this methodological reorientation.62 First, this thesis aims to provide a 
more robust description of moral formation in Paul and Philodemus individually by 
considering their theologies and socio-economic locations (i.e., the second aspect of 
reorientation just reviewed). Second, the fuller description leads into a more complete, 
reordered comparison which accounts for both similarities and differences, not simply the 
former, and not simply in terms of psychagogy (i.e., using a polythetic category). Third, as a 
product of the new comparison itself, the thesis presents a redescription of Paul and 
Philodemus in light of one another, in which both figures receive mutual illumination by the 
other’s contrasting presence. Finally, fourth, the comparison leads to a rectification of 
categories, i.e., in this case, it reveals the inadequacy of the monothetic category ‘psychagogy’ 
and supports the usefulness of the polythetic category ‘moral formation’.
 It is important to note the scope of my methodological claims. These are local claims 
pertaining to the comparison at hand in the field of Pauline studies. I am not necessarily 
arguing that any comparison of Paul and Greco-Roman philosophers must always account for 
differences in the same way and to the same degree to which they are accounted for in the 
present project. Yet, I do hope that this comparison would serve as a case study that could lead 
to the improvement of other comparisons insofar as they suffer from similar problems, and I 
briefly indicate how this might happen in the conclusion.
 In many ways the comparison presented here operates like two other recent 
comparisons: Jonathan A. Linebaugh’s comparison of Wisdom of Solomon and Paul’s letter 
to the Romans, and C. Kavin Rowe’s comparison of a handful of ancient Stoics and early 
Christians (Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Paul, Luke, Justin Martyr).63 Linebaugh’s 
comparison brings together Wisdom of Solomon and Romans according to a number of topoi 
which arise from the concerns of both authors considered on their own terms (e.g., the relation 
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61. See discussion in Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (1966; repr., New York; London: Penguin, 1991), 174–82. My concern is 
roughly similar, e.g., to Dale Martin’s, though I do not use the concept of class (Dale Martin, The Corinthian 
Body [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999], xv-xvii).
62. See Jonathan Z. Smith, “The ‘End’ of Comparison: Redescription and Rectification,” in A Magic 
Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age, eds. Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray 
(Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2001), 237–41. The stages receive helpful 
exposition in Burton Mack, “On Redescribing Christian Origins,” MTSR 8 (1996): 247–69. My local use of this 
comparison schema is not the same as the use envisioned by Smith and Mack to build a theory of comparative 
religion.
63. Rowe, One True Life; Jonathan A. Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of 
Solomon and Paul’s Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation, NovTSup 152 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013).
of Jews to non-Jews, the relation between God’s justice and his grace, the interpretive logic 
behind the reading of scripture). Rowe’s comparison also brings together Stoic and Christian 
figures according to topoi central to the worldviews of each (e.g., God, death, humanity, 
nature, society, philosophy). Both scholars use these topoi as polythetic categories (even if 
they do not use this term) which function as sites for the observation of similarity and 
difference. They allow each text compared to speak to the particular issues from their own 
perspective, and then observe the similarities and differences.
 Like Linebaugh, my comparison does not simply juxtapose two isolated readings of 
Paul and Philodemus, but provides a new, exegetically fruitful perspective for understanding 
the two in relation to one another in a way that would not be possible apart from the 
comparison.64 Philodemus’ central concerns in the conception and practice of reciprocal 
formation provide an exegetical vantage point from which to investigate Paul’s texts anew, 
tracking similarities and differences. 
 Rowe has a less sanguine view of the mutual illumination that emerges from his own 
comparisons and of the possibility that these results can contribute to any unitary scholarly 
project of comparing Stoicism and Christianity.65 This is due to his understanding of the limits 
of scholarly knowing.66 
 My view of the PaulnPhilodemus comparative project is more optimistic, even if I 
remain sympathetic to Rowe’s arguments. I intend this thesis to be a contribution to this 
project, even though my contribution involves a substantial reorientation of it as previously 
led by Malherbe and Glad. The project of comparing Paul and Greco-Roman philosophers 
necessarily involves interaction among scholars with varying perspectives, some of which 
may be irreconcilable (e.g., ‘interaction’ in the form of contest and dispute, as that between 
Rowe and Engberg-Pedersen). All participants sift through work that is inevitably bound to 
particular perspectives, but it is through dialogue with these perspectives that individual 
construals and contributions emerge. These construals may remain qualitatively different from 
one another (as my own construal is from Malherbe’s and Glad’s). There will be no 
measurable progress toward final completion that all can agree upon for all time. Yet, 
contributing to this idealized  phantom of progress is not a condition of making a contribution 
to the project.
 Also unlike Rowe, I am not advancing a philosophical argument about the limitations 
of scholarly comparison involving Paul and Philodemus, though again I have sympathies with 
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64. Linebaugh, God, Grace, and Righteousness, 20–22.
65. For example, he observes that, in the light of Stoicism, Christianity does not have an adequate 
concept of fate in analogy to Stoic fortuna, and that Stoicism does not have an adequate concept of the ‘Fall’ in 
the light of Christianity. See Rowe, One True Life, 202–3.
66. See the third part of his book, Rowe, One True Life, 175–262.
his work in this trajectory.67 I leave open the question of whether and how mutually exclusive 
traditions of thought can eventually come to understand one another. Leaving this unresolved 
is possible for my project because I do not make claims that would require an answer to that 
question. Unlike, e.g., Troels Engberg-Pedersen, I do not claim to have discovered any 
fundamental identity between Philodemus and Paul, even if there is an abstract analogy 
between their conceptions and practices of reciprocal moral formation. I do not claim that I 
can transcend my own limited hermeneutical perspective, come to fully understand Paul and 
Philodemus, and then incorporate that understanding into an objective, encyclopaedic 
knowledge-base structured according to a rationality that is neither Stoic nor Christian, as 
Rowe claims that some scholars, including Malherbe, effectively do (whether they do or do 
not is a matter of interpretation).68
 Much of my concern in this thesis is to read Paul’s and Philodemus’ texts in an ‘emic’ 
mode, i.e., by inhabiting, as much as possible, the different worlds in which their texts mean 
what they mean for the communities they were trying to influence.69 However, in making this 
comparison, I unavoidably operate in an ‘etic’ mode, i.e., I am attempting to understand and 
communicate the meaning of Paul’s and Philodemus’ texts as a person who is not a member 
of a Pauline or Philodemean community for others who are not as well.70 My location as an 
interpreter inevitably colours my own frame of reference. I am a 21st century interpreter 
speaking in a specialised idiom to an audience constituted mainly by those who participate in 
the academic study of ancient texts (particularly Pauline texts). Yet I am also a Christian, 
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67. An unresolved question for Rowe’s project is how one knows whether one is dealing with a conflict 
between ‘strong traditions’ (like Stoicism and Christianity, in his view), or just a conflict between traditions 
which share enough to allow for more understanding and possible development. 
68. See Rowe, One True Life, 175–205. Rowe critiques Engberg-Pedersen for this, but Engberg-
Pedersen denies the claim. See the discussion in a forthcoming volume The New Testament in Comparison, based 
upon the proceedings of a conference held at Durham University (June, 2017), entitled ‘Comparing Traditions’ in 
which Rowe and Engberg-Pedersen participated.
On Malherbe’s work, Rowe comments (Rowe, One True Life, 187), ‘to what degree difference in 
content means difference in thing — to whom is a spiritual exercise directed, for example? or in light of whom is 
it conducted? — is not given any extended thought.’ Malherbe certainly gives Paul’s theology extended thought, 
but this does not lead him to recognize the core problem of his comparative work which this discussion has 
highlighted.
69. On the issue of emic and etic perspectives, see Thomas N. Headland and Kenneth L. Pike, eds., 
Emics and Etics: The Insider/Outsider Debate, Frontiers of Anthropology 7 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1990).
70. The inevitability of some kind of etic perspective in any academic study receives emphasis in Paul 
Roscoe, “The Comparative Method,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion, ed. Robert A. Segal 
(Malden; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 25–46; Clifford Geertz, “‘From the Native’s Point of View’: On the Nature 
of Anthropological Understanding,” in The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion: A Reader, ed. 
Russell T. McCutcheon (London; New York: Cassell, 1999), 50–63. It seems even Kavin Rowe must speak in 
some kind of etic mode, for he speaks as a modern Christian about ancient Christians and Stoics, and he assumes 
some form of shared rationality between himself and those who might read his book, who may stand in different 
traditions than his own. It is at least clear that Rowe wants to distance himself from any attempt to speak as a 
scholar in distinction from his identity as a Christian. This is a concern I also share. Rowe would attempt to 
respond to this critique by drawing upon resources from his tradition which make sense of how he can speak as 
he does.
living within a tradition identified with Paul and his texts, not Philodemus.71 The need for 
critical self-awareness of the dangers of distorting the evidence because of my Christian 
location is ever present.72 
1.4.2. Particular Decisions
Following Malherbe and Glad, the launching point of this study is the identification of an 
analogy between Paul and Philodemus with respect to the conception and practice of 
interdependent reciprocal moral formation. In what follows, I identify the relevant dimensions 
of this analogy.
 Conceptually, a number of similarities arise alongside the basic understanding of these 
practices as a kind of moral formation. Participation in this reciprocal moral formation is 
constitutive of being a member in the community, and is necessary for all members’ 
‘salvation’. In other words, for both Paul and Philodemus, community members are 
interdependent upon one another for salvation, they ‘save one another’ by their reciprocal 
participation in moral formation. Both figures’ conceptions of moral formation receive their 
shape in relation to their respective theologies. Both conceive of moral formation as 
fundamentally concerned with one’s relationship to the divine, to which one grows in likeness 
via moral formation. Both Paul and Philodemus conceive of members’ interdependence upon 
one another for moral formation like they conceive of members’ economic interdependence. 
In these ways, Paul and Philodemus have abstractly similar conceptions of similar practices. 
 With respect to practice, both Paul and Philodemus view formation as reciprocal, 
involving every member in giving and receiving. In both communities, members practise 
formation by, e.g., adaptation to the condition of others, the exercise of love, and the use of 
specialized, formative discourse involving a full range of formative effects, from 
encouragement to rebuke.
 Each dimension of the analogy just sketched is a point of loose similarity from which 
one might trace differences to better understand Paul and Philodemus’ individual voices in 
comparative perspective. The scope of the analogy is vast, and I could not hope to reconstruct 
an exhaustive account of both figures here. This thesis focuses upon how both describe 
formative reciprocity and interdependence among members. Discussions of the nature of 
moral formation (e.g., its practices of giving and receiving, its relation to theology) serve to 
provide greater understanding of the interdependent reciprocity envisioned by Paul and 
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71. Despite my Christian location, I do not assume those who stand to benefit from my work must be 
Christian in order to do so. This is the case even if the ‘benefit’ gained from my work is judged and appropriated 
differently based on one’s perspective.
72. See the seminal discussion of this issue in Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison 
of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
Philodemus (i.e., the nature of formative reciprocity, the nature of interdependence on one 
another for ‘saving’ moral formation, the relation between formative and economic 
reciprocity/interdependence). I have chosen to focus on the nature of reciprocity and 
interdependence because Paul and Philodemus share a distinctive similarity on this point in 
comparison to other ancient communities. This similarity provides the opportunity to ask 
detailed questions of two figures who already have a lot to say about formative 
interdependence between community members. Focusing on these questions is thus not an 
imposition of one figure’s concerns upon the other.
 The choice of texts to compare reflects this focus. The main texts for comparison are 
Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians (particularly chs. 8n10 and 12n14) and Philodemus’ 
treatise On Frank Criticism. I adduce other texts from both figures insofar as it is exegetically 
helpful to do so (e.g., drawing upon other undisputed letters of Paul, and drawing upon 
Philodemus’ theological, economic, and other ethical works).73 The choice of On Frank 
Criticism is obvious as it is the text which directly witnesses to Philodemus’ conceptions of 
moral formation and its reciprocity among interdependent members.
 In any exposition of Philodemus’ fragmentary texts, one must engage to some extent 
with other Epicurean texts, especially Epicurus’ own. Often other sources provide essential 
context for Philodemus’ discussion, and are vital for the restoration of lacunae. Given that 
Philodemus often helpfully interprets and applies early Epicurean texts in the course of his 
writing as he deems necessary, this study attempts to proceed from Philodemus’ 
understanding of Epicurean texts, where possible. Two other late Epicurean sources alongside 
Philodemus are Lucretius’ didactic poem De Rerum Natura (ca. mid first century BCE) and 
the text of an immense inscription carved into a stoa wall in Oenoanda by Diogenes (ca. mid 
second century CE). I have chosen not to integrate Lucretius’ or Diogenes’ texts with this 
study, given the complexity of such a task, and my intent to give Philodemus priority (one 
could say the same about non-Epicurean sources that are important witnesses as well, such as 
Cicero and Plutarch). Nevertheless, where references beyond Philodemus help to elaborate his 
perspectives, I include them.
 There are a number of possible choices for a Pauline text beyond 1 Corinthians. I have 
chosen two texts from 1 Corinthians for a number of reasons. First, the choice of two texts 
from the same letter allows my presentation of Paul’s view to have greater exegetical depth. 
Second, unlike other texts that mention reciprocally formative practices among believers (e.g., 




73. For the purposes of this thesis I have limited myself to the undisputed Pauline letters out of a 
pragmatic concern to simplify the argument.
 Among many viable choices within 1 Corinthians,74 chs. 8n10 and 12n14 seemed most 
relevant. Taken together, these chapters provide the opportunity to glean a coherent set of 
answers to the questions posed by this study. Chapters 8n10 concern how believers should 
relate to idol food so as to construct other believers, not destroy them. The choice of this 
passage is perhaps not obvious because it does not strictly deal with reciprocally formative 
speech. Yet the passage does offer an important window into Paul’s conception of believers’ 
constructive practices toward one another. First of all, these chapters provide his most detailed 
discussion of believers’ constructive adaptation to others, a key topic also for Philodemus. 
Second, these chapters provide important evidence for Paul’s theology of construction and the 
nature of believers’ interdependence upon one another for construction. Third, because these 
chapters feature importantly in Glad’s work (though focused on Paul’s own adaptation), re-
examining them in this thesis offers the opportunity to display the differences in interpretation 
which my methodological reorientation enables. There are qualitative differences in what 
‘moral formation’ and ‘adaptation’ mean between Paul and Philodemus on display here, I 
argue.
 1 Corinthians 12n14 provide the greatest amount of relevant material. First, chs. 12n14 
concern the reciprocal practice of constructing one another with gifts mediated by speech, 
some of which speech is similar in form and function to frank criticism (i.e., it involves 
exhortation, comfort, instruction, conviction, judgement, see 14:3, 19, 24n25). Of course not 
all of the gifts concern speech, and not all speech has the same form as frank criticism. 
Nevertheless, these chapters are the most sustained discussion of believers’ speech toward one 
another in Paul’s letters (disputed or undisputed), and he arguably has morally formative aims 
for such speech throughout. Second, these chapters contain Paul’s most sustained discussion 
of love as a constitutive element of constructing others. Third, these chapters provide central 
evidence for believers’ interdependence upon one another for receiving construction as the 
body of Christ. Fourth, these chapters witness to Paul’s theological construal of reciprocal 
construction. Fifth, Glad deals with these chapters only in passing in his monograph, though 
he reads them as involving reciprocal psychagogy, much like he does for 1 Cor 8n10 and Rom 
14n15. On the contrary, these chapters contribute heavily toward my argument for qualitative 
difference between reciprocal moral formation in Paul and Philodemus. Chs. 12n14 show that 
the two have qualitatively different understandings of love, of reciprocity and interdependence 
in moral formation, and of the relationship of moral formation to the divine.
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74. E.g., one might compare the morally formative aspects of communal meals, drawing 1 Cor 11:17n34 
into comparison with evidence for similar meals in Philodemus and other Epicurean texts. 
1.4.3. Limits of the Project
Inevitably this study has a number of limits. First, the narrow focus on 1 Corinthians limits its 
results. Despite this focus, I would argue that the results are central to Paul’s vision for 
reciprocal construction across his letters, even if I cannot demonstrate this claim here. Second, 
as noted above, the thesis does not present an exhaustive portrait of moral formation for both 
Paul and Philodemus. Paul and Philodemus would both have much more to say about 
practices of reciprocal formation beyond the use of speech and adaptation to others (such as 
formation by modelling/imitation, formation via shared participation in worship, common 
meals, and collaborative study of texts).75 For all that this thesis leaves unsaid (e.g., 
concerning the precise relationship between moral formation and Paul’s concept of salvation, 
the relationship between Paul’s and believers’ involvement in construction,76 the similarities 
and differences in moral psychology between Paul and Philodemus), it provides sufficient 
detail to support the conclusions made. Third, while I argue that the comparison leads to 
greater understanding of both Paul and Philodemus, the advance in understanding is different 
for both. On one hand, the comparison leads to a creative re-reading of Pauline texts. On the 
other, the comparison largely affirms current scholarly readings of Philodemus (with some 
specifications and adjustments), and corroborates those readings via similarity and difference 
in relation to Paul.
1.5. Thesis Overview
This thesis divides roughly into two halves, the first concerning Philodemus (chs. 2n4), the 
second concerning Paul (chs. 5n7). Each half discusses its respective figure on his own terms 
as much as possible, without direct comparison to the other. After an investigation of both 
figures, the thesis concludes with a final chapter bringing Paul and Philodemus into 
comparative perspective.
 In the first half (chs. 2n4), chapters two and three prepare for the discussion of chapter 
four. Chapter two concerns Philodemus’ relatively elite socio-economic location and his 
conception of economic interdependence among Epicurean friends. The results of this chapter 
assist the exposition of formative interdependence between Epicurean friends in chapter four, 
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75. Glad’s monograph is also limited in its portrayal of Epicurean psychagogy by his focus on discourse 
as a means of moral formation. Of course speech is integral to Epicurean psychagogy, but it is not sufficient to 
account for the whole picture.
76. I do not consider Paul’s own efforts to construct believers in this thesis. By examining believers’ 
reciprocal construction without a detailed reconstruction of Paul’s own involvement in construction, I am not 
claiming that Paul’s own involvement is irrelevant. Rather, I focus on believers’ construction of one another 
because it has been far less studied. I assume that the results of this study could then be properly integrated into 
the wider picture of Pauline construction.
for I argue that economic and formative interdependence closely correlate. Chapter three 
concerns two main subjects: Philodemus’ conception of the gods’ involvement in moral 
formation, and his conception of human assimilation to the gods. The results of this chapter 
serve the exposition of moral formation generally in chapter four, and particularly the 
exposition of formative interdependence among Epicureans who strive after the model of the 
gods’ friendship. The fourth chapter offers an exposition of Philodemus’ view of reciprocal 
moral formation, i.e., its conception and practice via frank speech, adaptation, and love, with 
special attention to his understanding of formative reciprocity and interdependence among 
friends. 
 In the second half (chs. 5n7), chapter five prepares for the discussion of two case 
studies of reciprocal moral formation in Paul (ch. six on 1 Cor 8n10, ch. seven on 1 Cor 
12n14). Chapter five discusses two main subjects: the relatively impoverished socioeconomic 
location of Paul and believers in his communities, and Paul’s vision for their economic 
interdependence. The results of this chapter prepare for tracing the correlation between 
economic and formative interdependence in chs. six and seven. Chapter six then examines 
Paul’s vision for reciprocal formation in 1 Cor 8n10, focusing on the nature of formation, the 
nature of adaptation as a means of forming the weak, and the nature of formative reciprocity 
and interdependence between both sides of the dispute (the weak and those with knowledge). 
Chapter seven concerns reciprocal formation in 1 Cor 12n14, again concerning the nature of 
formation, its reciprocity and interdependence among believers, with special attention to the 
practical role of speech and love in formation. Attention throughout to Paul’s theological 
construal of reciprocal moral formation is a centrepiece of both chapters six and seven.
 The two halves of this thesis aim to bring the same set of questions to Philodemus and 
Paul, but the approach is slightly different to each, as one may have noticed. I have chosen to 
give Philodemus a separate chapter for his theology, while for Paul I trace his theology during 
a close reading of two texts. In part this difference is due to the nature of the texts involved. 
Philodemus has written extensive theological treatises separate from his discussion of moral 
formation in On Frank Criticism, and these deserve special attention both to appreciate their 
important role in his thinking and to remedy the lack of attention they have received in 
previous comparisons. Moreover, in what remains of On Frank Criticism, Philodemus does 
not comment extensively on theology, perhaps primarily because he did not view the gods as 
directly involved (this should not be taken as evidence of the irrelevance of his theology for 
moral formation). Paul on the other hand did view God as directly involved, and the passages 
examined here have sufficient theological material in them for present purposes.
 Finally, in chapter eight, I place Philodemus and Paul side by side in comparative 
perspective. This chapter traces similarities and differences with respect to socio-economic 
location, economic interdependence, theology (esp. the involvement of the gods in moral 
formation and moral assimilation to the divine), formative practice (e.g., frank speech, 
adaptation, love), and lastly, formative interdependence among members. In this last chapter 
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(and indirectly throughout the thesis) I argue that Philodemus and Paul have qualitatively 
different understandings of moral formation and its reciprocity among interdependent 
members, differences which allow both to illuminate one another. Though there are several 
areas of qualitative difference which cannot be reduced to one, the heart of the difference 
between Paul and Philodemus is theological. 
 For Philodemus, I shall argue that moral formation is a matter of receiving moral 
resources from others in order to develop the individual moral character that sustains a life of 
α ταραξι'α, the greatest pleasure via the absence of pain. As one grows more mature, one grows 
into moral self-sufficiency, and needs formative help from others less. One grows to share 
qualitatively the same moral character, knowledge and pleasure which the gods themselves 
have. For Paul, moral formation involves the development of an individual’s character by 
receiving moral resources from others, but it cannot be described solely in those terms, 
because Paul does not have the same understanding of ‘character’ and ‘moral resources’ 
received from others. Moral formation fundamentally involves response to the transcendent 
God’s self-revelation to believers through others. This ongoing relationship with God and 
others constitutes a believer’s moral life, a relationship that can never be encompassed in an 
individual’s moral character or in moral resources received from others. A believer’s 
knowledge and moral character are always ‘in part’, qualitatively different from God’s on this 
side of the eschaton. Believers do not become morally self-sufficient. Rather, they always 
need to receive formation from others because to do so continually constitutes their moral 
lives in relation to God.
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CHAPTER TWO:  PHILODEMUS IN HISTORICAL 
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
This chapter, like the chapter following, prepares the way for chapter four’s discussion of 
reciprocal moral formation in Philodemus’s perspective. Before broaching that subject, it is 
important first to contextualise Philodemus historically. Who was Philodemus, and who were 
his Epicurean friends? After an initial answer to these questions, the bulk of this chapter 
focuses upon a particular dimension of Philodemus’ historical context. In the interest of 
illuminating Philodemus’ conception of morally formative interdependence in chapter four, I 
focus upon his conception of economic interdependence between friends in the present 
chapter. That Philodemus envisioned economic interdependence is uncontroversial. This 
chapter pursues the nature of this interdependence by exploring the socio-economic location 
of those involved. What was the socio-economic location of Philodemus and his friends, and 
what kind of economic interdependence did Philodemus envision for them? 
 In the course of this thesis (esp. in ch. four), I shall argue that Philodemus’ relatively 
affluent life of economic interdependence among relatively affluent friends reinforces his 
broadly similar conception of morally formative interdependence among friends (and vice-
versa). This correlation between economic and formative interdependence receives discussion 
in chapter four, while the present chapter prepares for this discussion by specifying 
Philodemus’ vision for economic interdependence between friends in their particular socio-
economic situation.
 In the present chapter I argue that Philodemus and his philosophical friends exemplify 
characteristics typical of the Roman elite of their day. They lived well above the subsistence 
level, secure from the concerns of poverty, substantially leisured without the requirement to 
engage in labour themselves. Some of Philodemus’ Epicurean friends may have been more 
affluent than he was (e.g., his patron Piso). The poor, on the other hand, were excluded from 
full participation in this community, unless they were sponsored by someone of means.1 
Philodemus assumed that he and his friends would give and receive gifts from one another, 
and that this reciprocity entailed economic interdependence. Yet because of their relative 
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1. Here I disagree with Elizabeth Asmis’ view that Philodemus follows Epicurus in leaving the door 
open to the poor, so to speak, even as he expands Epicurus’ teaching to allow for greater degrees of wealth for his 
Roman clientele (see Elizabeth Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” in Philodemus and the New Testament World, 
eds. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland, NovTSup 111 [Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004], 133–
76). The argumentation for my position unfolds throughout this chapter.
affluence, Philodemus also assumed that every friend was economically self-sufficient, and 
would only depend on the help of others in the rare case of financial disaster.
 In what follows, I first provide a basic historical overview of Philodemus’ life (section 
2.1), then, second, discuss Philodemus’ and his friends’ socio-economic location (section 2.2), 
and third, examine his view of economic interdependence among these friends (section 2.3). 
 
2.1. Historical Overview of Philodemus
Philodemus of Gadara was born around 110 BCE.2 Assuming from Philodemus’ dependence 
on the Epicurean sage Zeno of Sidon, and his expressed love for Zeno,3 Philodemus moved 
early in life from his native Gadara (modern Umm Qais in Jordan)4 to Athens, where he 
studied under Zeno, then scholarch of the Garden (who likely died around 75 BCE, with 
Phaedrus as his successor). 
 From Athens, Philodemus eventually made his way to Italy. In 55 BCE, Cicero, in his 
Against Piso (68n72), describes Philodemus as a Greek, Epicurean teacher and friend of L. 
Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, who was consul in 58 BCE, proconsul of Macedonia from 57n55 
BCE, and Julius Caesar’s father-in-law. According to Cicero, Philodemus met Piso in the 
latter’s adolescentia, and was a close friend from then on (Cicero, Pis. 68, with adolescentia 
possibly ranging from age fifteen to mid thirties, perhaps placing their meeting in the 70s 
BCE).5 Aside from this testimony, the following points of evidence witness to a patron/client 
relationship between the two: Philodemus wrote an epigram inviting Piso to an Epicurean 
dinner at Philodemus’ home, and gently asking Piso for his patronage (epigram 27 Sider); 
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2. For this section, I am particularly dependent on the excellent discussions in David Sider, The 
Epigrams of Philodemos: Introduction, Text, and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3–24; 
Elizabeth Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” in ANRW II.36.4, ed. Wolfgang Haase (Berlin; New York: De 
Gruyter, 1990), 2370–72; Marcello Gigante, Philodemus in Italy: The Books from Herculaneum, trans. Dirk 
Obbink (1990; repr., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 49–90.
3. Philodemus described himself as a ‘faithful lover’ ([ου κ] α»πιστ[ος] εραστη' ς) and ‘untiring singer of 
his praises’ (α κοπι'ατος υ  µνητη' ς; translations Elizabeth Asmis, PHerc. 1005, col. 14.8n9 Angeli [A. Angeli, 
Filodemo. Agli Amici Di Scuola, La Scuola di Epicuro 7 [Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988]]). See Asmis, “Philodemus’ 
Epicureanism,” 2371.
4. Strabo, Geogr. 16.2.29 lists Philodemus with Meleager, Menippus, and Theodorus the rhetor as 
notable Gadareans.
5. Sider, Epigrams, 6–7. Yet Cicero in Pis. 70 also describes that Piso was a senator (or imperator) 
whom Philodemus could not resist. The difference between Piso as senator and imperator is a textual issue. David 
Sider favours the reading of senator due to Piso’s reported adolescentia (assuming adolescentia would be 
incompatible with a role involving imperium, given the minimum age for consulship was 42), while Marcello 
Gigante favours imperator, making the date at which Philodemus met Piso significantly later, during the time of 
his consul/proconsulship in 58n55, and thus beyond his adolescentia. See discussion in Asmis, “Philodemus’ 
Epicureanism,” 2371, n. 7; Sider, Epigrams, 7, n. 17; Gigante, Philodemus in Italy, 68.
Philodemus dedicated his work On the Good King according to Homer to Piso.6 Among the 
papyri found in the enormous Villa dei Papiri in Herculaneum, near Naples, Philodemus’ 
works are the most numerous, and given the close connection between Philodemus and Piso, 
scholars have supposed that the villa belonged to Piso.7 Piso was likely not the only elite 
Roman with whom Philodemus shared friendship, as we know that Philodemus’ fourth book 
of his On Rhetoric was dedicated to C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, who was consul in 43 
BCE.8
 Philodemus likely spent most of his life as a philosopher on the Bay of Naples, and 
perhaps some time in Herculaneum at Piso’s villa. In PHerc. 312 col. 14 (discussed below in 
section 2.2.2), there appears to be a reference of uncertain date to Philodemus’ move to 
Naples and to Herculaneum, particularly to live alongside Siro, a fellow Epicurean teacher, 
and to engage in philosophy together.9  In 45 BCE Cicero finished his work On Ends, in 
which he pairs Philodemus with Siro, as ‘finest and most learned’ associates of Cicero’s 
literary Epicurean spokesperson, Torquatus (cum optimos viros tum homines doctissimos, Fin. 
2.119). One may assume that Philodemus lived in the Villa dei Papiri in Herculaneum when 
Piso owned it, given Philodemus ties to Piso and to nearby Naples, though an epigram of 
Philodemus (ep. 27 Sider) seemingly refers to a separate home to which Piso is invited, one 
that Philodemus describes as a ‘simple hut’ (λιτη` καλια' ς, ep. 27.1, 8), like Siro’s pauper 
agellus in Naples (perhaps referred to by Vergil, Catalepton 8).10 Philodemus’ dedication of 
his work On Flattery to Plotius, Varius, Vergil, and Quintilius (PHerc. Paris. 2), and Horace’s 
own association with Vergil, Varius, and Plotius (Sat. 1.5.40n43; 1.10.81), suggest a union of 
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6. See Sider, Epigrams, 5, n. 11; Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2372. Sider also lists two further 
pieces of evidence: Philodemus argues that the best financial way of life is to be a philosopher supported by those 
grateful for his teaching, i.e., a patron/client relationship (On Household Management, col. 23, 23n32); Catullus, 
in epigram 47, seems to refer to Philodemus as Socration, who frequently dines at Piso’s home. Piso was not the 
only patron of Philodemus, as Philodemus dedicated his On Rhetoric to C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, but 
clearly the most significant relationship described by our sources is that between Philodemus and Piso (Sider, 
Epigrams, 7–8).
7. Though this claim has certainly not been without its opponents, given that the dedication to Piso on 
the manuscript of On the Good King according to Homer found in the villa is the only physical evidence linking 
Piso with the villa; see Sider, Epigrams, 14, n.7; Mario Capasso, “Who Lived in the Villa of the Papyri at 
Herculaneum n a Settled Question?” in The Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum, ed. Mantha Zarmakoupi (Berlin: 
De Gruyter, 2010), 89–113.
8. See PHerc. 1007/1673 col. 42a.5, and discussion in W. Benjamin Henry, ed., Philodemus, On Death 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), xiv.
9. Discussion in Sider, Epigrams, 22.
10. On the discussion of this poem’s authenticity as Vergil’s, see Sider, Epigrams, 15, n.11. Marcello 
Gigante interprets that this home must have been in Rome, separate from the villa, given that he interprets 
another epigram to refer to Philodemus’ preferred meeting place at the villa’s belvedere overlooking the sea (ep. 
29 Sider, referencing the α κτη' , and location εν α'πο'ψει; Gigante, Philodemus in Italy, 55, 79). Sider agrees that 
the home referred to here must be separate from the villa, much like Siro’s home in Naples, but not that it must be 
in Rome; moreover, Sider disputes the reference to the belvedere in ep. 29 Sider, as α κτη'  could refer to 
Herculaneum itself, which had a promontory, as Strabo records (Geogr. 5.4.8; Sider, Epigrams, 154, 167).
literary and philosophical interests in Philodemus’ Epicurean environment in Naples.11 
Philodemus may have continued teaching and writing after the reference from Cicero’s On 
Ends in 45 BCE, as one witness suggests,12 but the evidence for his remaining years runs dry 
after this point.
 Philodemus was an important, prolific teaching figure within the Epicurean 
community in and around Naples in the first century BCE. The only writings known by a wide 
audience were his poetic and historical works; none of his dogmatic works have been 
explicitly cited by any ancient source, nor is it clear they were actually published.13 Generally, 
he sought in his work to bring Epicurean philosophy to his elite Roman audience (an audience 
discussed further below), and wrote widely on several subjects, focusing heavily on Epicurean 
ethics (subjects of his books included, e.g., history of philosophy, music, the character of a 
good ruler).14
 It seems Philodemus was a conservative Epicurean (as most Epicureans were), given 
his reverence for Epicurus and his frequent reliance on canonical texts,15 yet it is difficult to 
know just how ‘orthodox’ Philodemus was as an Epicurean in comparison to others, given the 
lack of data.16 It is clear that in some areas Philodemus constructively innovated in light of his 
context, as in On Property Management, in which he argues that a wise man would naturally 
prefer more wealth than just the little which Metrodorus and Epicurus taught.17 It seems best 
to interpret, based on the limited evidence, that Philodemus operates within Zeno’s 
interpretation of Epicurean teaching.18 As typical for an Epicurean, Philodemus frequently 
engaged in exegetical interpretation of these canonical texts and other founding figures, both 
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11. Sider, Epigrams, 18–24. See also references to Vergil in PHerc. 253 fr. 12.4; PHerc. 1082 col. 11.3 
(cited in Henry, Philodemus, On Death, xiv). On Philodemus’ influence upon these poets, see the essays in David 
Armstrong, et al., Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004).
12. In his treatise On Signs, Philodemus refers to Antony, specifically to his bringing pygmies from 
Hyria to Rome, a reference used to date this work to 40 BCE, though Sider casts doubt on this witness (Sider, 
Epigrams, 11, n. 31). Smith and Asmis both treat 40 BCE as the end point of our evidence for Philodemus’ life 
(Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2372, n. 13; Martin Ferguson Smith, “Herculaneum and Oinoanda, 
Philodemus and Diogenes: Comparison of Two Epicurean Discoveries and Two Epicurean Teachers,” Cronache 
Ercolanesi 33 [2003]: 271).
13. Cicero’s Epicurean doxography in On the Nature of the Gods seems to depend on Philodemus’ On 
Piety, though Cicero and Philodemus could have drawn from a common source; see discussion in Holger Essler, 
“Cicero’s Use and Abuse of Epicurean Theology,” in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, eds. Jeffrey Fish 
and Kirk R. Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 129–51; Sedley, “Philosophical 
Allegiance,” 103.
14. See discussion of Philodemus’ work as a whole in Gigante, Philodemus in Italy, 20–45; Asmis, 
“Philodemus’ Epicureanism”.
15. For example, in On Frank Criticism, Philodemus explains that the most important thing for 
Epicureans is to obey Epicurus (fr. 45.7n10). See further examples of his reliance on founding Epicureans below.
16. Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2377–78; Sedley, “Philosophical Allegiance,” 108–9.
17. See col. 16 of the same work, although Philodemus is clear that the sage will be able to live with 
little should that be necessary. See further discussion below in section 2.2.3, and discussions in Asmis, 
“Epicurean Economics”; Voula Tsouna, ed., Philodemus: On Property Management, WGRW 33 (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2013), 95.
18. As expressed in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 31.
in confronting the arguments of non-Epicurean opponents, and in intra-Epicurean disputes.19  
Several points of evidence illustrate disputes among Epicureans in which Philodemus 
engaged, often surrounding interpretive issues of canonical texts.20
2.2. The Socio-Economic Location of Philodemus and his Friends
The following discussion of Philodemus’ socio-economic location proceeds in three stages. 
First, I argue that Philodemus’ position as a philosopher on the Bay of Naples suggests a 
cultural and social location among the Roman elite (section 2.2.1), with strong implications 
for an affluent socio-economic location for Philodemus and his friends. Second, I argue from 
a selection of Philodemus’ texts and other evidence that he and his friends had substantial 
education and a leisured lifestyle (section 2.2.2). Third, I examine Philodemus’ philosophical 
discussion of wealth, in which he indirectly locates himself and his friends as relatively 
affluent (section 2.2.3).
2.2.1. 
In the first century BCE, and especially after the Mithridatic Wars, it became far more 
common for elite Romans to spend time studying philosophy in Athens, while educated 
Greeks came in greater numbers to Italy to teach and seek patronage.21 Engaging with 
philosophy and literature was an important part of elite culture, and was a popular leisure 
activity for upper class Romans, whether via discussion, lectures, reading, writing, or 
performing or listening to poetry.22 Often such engagement occurred in the homes of the elite, 
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19. Sedley, “Philosophical Allegiance,” 106–9.
20. E.g.: in PHerc. 1005 (Προ`ς του`ς ...), Philodemus argues against opponents (some of whom were 
Epicureans) who misinterpret canonical Epicurean writings, and argues that Epicureans should be taught to read 
these works properly (see overview in Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2378–80); Philodemus followed 
Zeno of Sidon in interpreting Epicurus’ teaching against rhetoric to apply only to political and forensic rhetoric, 
not sophistic, epideictic rhetoric, against the interpretation of other Epicureans in Rhodes and Cos (Rhetoric 2 
col. 52.11n53.14; Martin Ferguson Smith, “Herculaneum and Oinoanda,” 271; Sedley, “Philosophical 
Allegiance,” 108–9); in On Anger col. 45.5n23, Philodemus claimed that other Epicureans, who supposedly 
‘wanted to be faithful to the books’ (τοιñς βυβλιακοιñς ειòναι θε'λουσιν), taught contrary to the works of Epicurus, 
Metrodorus, and Hermarchus when they maintained that the wise man will become fully enraged, rather than feel 
only natural anger with minimal disturbance (Philodemus’ preferred interpretation; translation by Tsouna, The 
Ethics of Philodemus, 229); Cicero in Fin. 1.25, 30n31, 66n70, witnesses to differences of Epicurean opinion 
over friendship, the virtues as ends, and proving the good.
21. See further discussion in Elizabeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (London: 
Duckworth, 1985), 7–18, 50–51; David Sedley, “Philodemus and the Decentralisation of Philosophy,” Cronache 
Ercolanesi 33 (2003): 31–41.
22. John H. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay of Naples, and Other Essays on Roman Campania, ed. Fausto 
Zevi (1970; repr., Bari: Edipuglia, 2003), 67–68.
and involved the participation of educated Greeks (whether as slaves or free clients).23 While 
philosophy was likely known widely, if only partially, among the general public,24 it seems 
that the investment of time and effort in pursuing Greek philosophy and literature was limited 
to the elite.25
 In the same century, the bay of Naples26 was likely the single most popular area 
outside Rome in which elite Romans engaged in seasons of leisure.27 The region’s 
combination of natural beauty, unique luxury amenities, and cultural vibrancy drew such 
visitors.28 Especially in this period, many luxurious, coastal villas built by elite Romans for 
entertainment, rest, and status-enhancement dominated the shoreline.29 Among many others 
attested, the following well-known Romans owned a villa in the area: Pompey (Cumae), 
Cicero (Pompeii, Cumae, Puteoli), Brutus (Cumae), Julius Caesar (Baiae), and Sulla 
(Cumae).30 The massive Herculanean Villa of the Papyri supposed to belong to L. Calpurnius 
Piso, Philodemus’ patron, fits neatly within this setting.
 The bay area became an important philosophical and literary centre during this period, 
in part because of this area’s popularity with the elite.31 Neapolis was important in this regard, 
having retained a particularly Greek culture (including Greek language, clothing, and 
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23. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 63–64; Rawson, Intellectual Life, 38–65.
24. For Epicureanism, Cicero hyperbolically attests that the whole of Italy had been occupied by the 
school (Tusc. 4.3.7) because of the popular teaching (and Latin translation) of Epicureanism by C. Amafinius, 
Rabirius, and (later) Catius (see also Fam. 15.19.2; Acad. post. 1.2.5); Cicero remarks that even the slightly 
educated (mediocriter docti) know the tenets of Epicurus (Tusc. 2.7), and the indocti could follow Amafinius 
(Acad. post. 1.2.5n6); Catherine Castner, Prosopography of Roman Epicureans, Studien zur klassischen 
Philologie 34 [Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1988], 7–11, 32, 63; Rawson, Intellectual Life, 49). Cassius 
likewise speaks of rustici Stoici who are similarly popular and less educated (Fam 15.16; 19). One could also 
note the popular mime with Epicurus, Socrates, Euripides, and Menander as characters, known by Cicero, Pro 
Gallio, fr. 2 Pucciano, cited in Rawson, Intellectual Life, 53.
25. Cicero remarks that his local Campanian friend and businessman Vestorius would be lost in a 
philosophical argument (Att. 14.12.3; D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 63).
26. The ancient bay of Naples includes the towns from Cumae to Surrentum, including (starting from the 
northwest corner of the bay and moving east) Baiae, Bauli, Miseunum, Puteoli, Neapolis, Herculaneum, Pompeii, 
and Stabiae. Herculaneum was approximately 10km from Naples, easily accessible by road (Andrew Wallace-
Hadrill, Herculaneum: Past and Future [London: Francis Lincoln Ltd., 2011], 93).
27. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 90. Cicero remarked that the town of Cumae was like a ‘little Rome’ 
(Att. 5.2; D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 57).
28. See discussion in D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 15–78.
29. Strabo remarks that buildings and plantations crowded the coastline in the bay to such an extent that 
it seemed like one continuous city (Geogr. 5.4.8). It is difficult to assign a specific date to Strabo’s description, 
though it was perhaps before 20 BCE (see discussion in Duane W. Roller, The Geography of Strabo [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014], 1–16). See also the discussion of the ideology of coastal villas in Annalisa 
Marzano, Roman Villas in Central Italy, Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition 30 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 
2007), 13–34; D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 31–78; John H. D’Arms, Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient 
Rome (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 42–47, 78–94, and passim.
30. See the summary appendix catalogue 1 of ancient literary references to villas owned in the area 
during the late Roman republic (ca. 75n31 BCE) in D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 165–91.
31. Strabo mentions that because of its Greek way of life, Neapolis was popular for many Romans and 
seeking rest and retirement in old age, as well as for those who made their living by teaching, τωñν α πο` παιδει'ας 
εργασαµε'νων (Geogr. 5.4.7); see also D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 67; Rawson, Intellectual Life, 21–25.
institutions such as the ephebeia and Greek magistracies) despite its becoming a Roman 
municipium after the social war. Neapolis hosted regular games that had pan-Hellenic 
importance even before Augustus’ later expansion of them.32 Neapolis was thus the town 
closest to Rome with the strongest Greek cultural environment.33 Herculaneum was 
significantly smaller than Neapolis (a few thousand inhabitants within 20 hectares, in 
comparison to 90 hectares for Neapolis), and though many would have spoken Greek there 
given the dominance of Neapolis, it was a more characteristically Roman municipium during 
this period (which it also became after the social war).34 A cluster of philosophical and literary 
figures are known with ties to Neapolis during this period, for example: the peripatetic Staseas 
lived in Neapolis, and the academic Aeschines was a Neapolitan native who later settled as a 
philosopher in Athens (Cicero, De or. 1.45; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 2.64).
 Particularly with respect to Epicureanism, concentrations of adherents stand out at 
Herculaneum and Neapolis. Aside from Piso and the circle involving Philodemus and Siro, we 
know of the following elite Romans with Epicurean sensibilities linked to the area:35 L. 
Papirius Paetus (Fam. 9.16; 9.20, who lived permanently in Neapolis),36 M. Fadius (or Fabius) 
Gallus (Fam. 9.25; 7.26, who owned a fundus near Herculaneum),37 and, less likely, Cassius 
Longinus in Naples (Att. 16.3.6).38 Cicero’s friend L. Papirius Paetus likely attended 
Epicurean lectures in Naples by Siro (cf. Cicero’s letter to Paetus, Fam. 9.26, ‘te consulo, qui 
philosophum audis’).39 
 What was the socio-economic situation of a philosopher in the employ of an elite 
Roman, as Philodemus likely was of Piso, and perhaps Pansa? In this period, philosophers 
involved with Roman elites were usually free, Greek men, and were often dependent on gifts 
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32. Kathryn Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks: 350 BC-AD 200 (London; New York: Routledge, 
1993), 112. On the anomalous Roman/Greek hybrid nature of Naples’ constitution after the social war, see 
Lomas, Rome and the Western Greeks, 150–52. Cicero records that L. Cornelius Sulla and other elite Romans 
wore the Greek chlamys during their time in Naples (Cicero, Rab. Post. 26n27; D’Arms, Romans on the 
Bay, 47). For an archaeological overview of ancient Naples, see Paul Arthur, Naples: From Roman Town to City-
State, Archaeological Monographs of the British School at Rome 12 (London: The British School at Rome, 
2002), 2–10; William D. E. Coulson, “Neapolis,” in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites, eds. Richard 
Stillwell, William L. MacDonald, and Marian Holland McAllister (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976), 614–15.
33. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 47.
34. Wallace-Hadrill, Herculaneum, 93–94.
35. L. Manlius Torquatus, the Epicurean spokesman in Cicero’s On Ends, likely owned property on the 
bay, perhaps at Cumae (D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 181; Castner, Prosopography, 40–42). See now the 
updated and revised prosopography of Roman Epicureanism in Nathan Gilbert, “Among Friends: Cicero and the 
Epicureans,” PhD Diss. (University of Toronto, 2015), 13–115.
36. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 183; Castner, Prosopography, 43–44.
37. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 172; Castner, Prosopography, 34–35.
38. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 66, with n. 102.
39. Rawson, Intellectual Life, 24. This passage refers to lectures by an unknown philosopher with the 
name Dio, which Shackleton Bailey has amended to Siro (Shackleton Bailey, ed., Cicero: Epistulae ad 
Familiares [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977], 2:353).
from their patrons in return for services.40 Concerning roles and tasks, evidence attests that 
philosophers functioned as repositories of philosophical and literary knowledge, often offering 
council or teaching members of the household.41 The socio-economic level of a philosopher 
was basically dependent upon his skill set, his renown, and the support given by his patron(s), 
and could thus vary widely. Some example are illustrative: Suetonius records that M. 
Pompilius Andronicus was an Epicurean grammarian who was unable to find patronage later 
in life, but was yet able to retire to live in otio at Cumae and write prolifically (Suetonius, 
Gramm. 8);42 Siro lived in Naples in a villula and pauper agellus (Catullus, Catalepton 8); 
Philodemus likely had his own home and may have lived in the villa of the papyri in 
Herculaneum under the patronage of Piso; two philosophers, a stoic and an academic, were 
sent by Augustus to govern the city of Tarsus (Strabo, Geogr. 14.675).43 Some philosophers 
may serve a patron until death (as the Stoic Diodotus on behalf of Cicero, see Brut. 309), 
while others might have only temporary relationships, e.g., as an advisor on certain political 
missions (as the Academic Antiochus of Ascalon on behalf of Lucullus).44 Some may live in a 
patron’s home (Diodotus), or in separate housing provided by their patron (Tiro, though a 
grammaticus, not a philosopher, was given an estate by Cicero, Fam. 16.21.7).45
 From this overview it seems clear that Philodemus operated in an elite Roman setting. 
Philodemus engaged in a profession designed to serve the philosophical interests of an elite 
clientele, in a location popular with elite Romans both for its leisure amenities and its Greek 
cultural flavour. Those with whom Philodemus shared his philosophy most likely also shared 
the same elite interests and capacities for learning philosophy in leisure. It is of course 
possible that Philodemus’ community included others drawn to philosophy beyond elite 
Roman circles, especially given the strength of Greek culture in Naples, but there is no direct 
evidence of this. Further evidence points rather in the same, elite trajectory. David Sedley 
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40. As a point of comparison for philosophers, see discussion of grammatici in this period, based 
primarily on Suetonius’ De Grammaticis in Rawson, Intellectual Life, 66–76.
41. For general discussion of philosophers as Roman clients, see M. L. Clarke, Higher Education in the 
Ancient World (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1971), 71–77; Miriam Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics, and 
Politicians at Rome,” in Philosophia Togata I: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, eds. Miriam Griffin 
and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 2–5; John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late 
Academy, Hypomnemata 56 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 21–27; Rawson, Intellectual Life, 79–
83. Miriam Griffin carefully argues that there are very few demonstrable instances in which a Roman politician 
was influenced to specific actions entirely by a particular philosophy (e.g., Cato the younger’s suicide, Marcus 
Aurelius); Griffin instead promotes the interpretation that Romans more often used philosophy as a framework to 
think through various options, whereas their value-system remained on the whole traditionally Roman (see 
Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics,” 32–37, passim). Relatedly, Elizabeth Rawson argues that philosophical advisors 
to Roman rulers did retain a particular (if idealized) role for offering frank speech in accordance with the virtues, 
even if this role was only rarely influential upon ruling Romans (Elizabeth Rawson, “Roman Rulers and the 
Philosophic Adviser,” in Philosophia Togata I: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, eds. Miriam Griffin 
and Jonathan Barnes [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], 233–57).
42. D’Arms, Romans on the Bay, 64.
43. Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics,” 2.
44. Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics,” 2–3.
45. Rawson, Intellectual Life, 24, 81–82.
expresses the situation thus: ‘In settling on the Bay of Naples, rather than at Rome itself, he 
was not banishing himself to an obscure existence in the provinces, but working right at the 
intersection of the Greek and Roman worlds, where, as the example of Piso’s villa illustrates, 
the ear of the wealthy and powerful Roman elite might easily be won.’46
2.2.2. Orienting Evidence regarding Philodemus’ Leisure and Education
Before delving into Philodemus’ teaching on wealth, it is helpful to present a number of 
specific witnesses to the elite level of leisure and education of Philodemus and his friends. 
This evidence provides further context for reading Philodemus’ discussion of wealth and for 
the final analysis of his socio-economic location and his view of economic interdependence 
among friends.47 
 With respect to leisure, first of all, Philodemus’ extensive writing (at least 70 papyrus 
rolls found in the Herculaneum papyri have been ascribed to him by subscript)48 evidences a 
substantial amount of leisure needed to produce such a corpus. Secondly, the fragmentary 
witness of PHerc. 312 col. 14 is especially important as a testimony of the lifestyle of 
Philodemus:49
 ... [εδ]ο' κει δ’ επ[α|νελθειñν] µεθ’ η  µωñν εις| [τη`ν Νεα' ]πολιν προ`ς το`ν| [φι'λτατο]ν 
 Σι'ρωνα [κ]αι` τη`ν| [κατ’ αυ τ]ο`ν εκειñ δι'αιταν| [και` τα`ς φι]λοσο'φους ενεργ[ηñ |σαι 
 ο  µι]λι'ας ‘Ηρκλ[ανε'ωι]| [τε µεθ’ ε  ]τε' [ρων συζητηñσαι] ...
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46. David Sedley, “Epicureanism in the Roman Republic,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Epicureanism, ed. James Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 34.
47. In this analysis, in order to make as strong a case as possible, I do not consider the evidence of the 
extravagant Villa of the Papyri, in which Philodemus’ writings were found, as solid ground for Philodemus’ 
socio-economic position, given (a) Philodemus refers to his own home to which he invited Piso in epigram 27 
Sider, (b) it is not clear whether Philodemus actually lived in the villa, and (c) recent archaeological analysis has 
suggested a date for the villa’s construction in the latter half of the first century, limiting the time available for 
Philodemus to enjoy the villa, assuming he died sometime after 40 BCE. For the construction of the villa, De 
Simone gives a date of 60n40 BCE, Moorman 50n40 BCE based on the wall paintings, and Guidobaldi and 
Esposito  50n25 BCE (see Antonio de Simone, “Rediscovering the Villa of the Papyri,” in The Villa of the 
Papyri at Herculaneum, ed. Mantha Zarmakoupi [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010], 1–20; Eric M. Moorman, “Wall 
Paintings in the Villa of the Papyri,” in The Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum, ed. Mantha Zarmakoupi [Berlin: 
De Gruyter, 2010], 63–78; Maria Paola Guidobaldi and Domenico Esposito, “New Archaeological Research at 
the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum,” in The Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum, ed. Mantha Zarmakoupi 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 21–62). I also do not consider as strong evidence Philodemus’ epigrams (28n29 
Sider) referring to small meals (eranoi) to which Philodemus invited a few friends, despite Gigante’s reading of 
epigram 29 Sider as referring to the villa as the location of the meal (Gigante, Philodemus in Italy, 54–59). The 
overall picture of Philodemus’ socio-economic location does, however, fit very well with his spending time in 
this villa with his circle of friends.
48. Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2373.
49. In my presentation of Philodemus’ texts, square brackets enclose conjectured text, while parentheses 
enclose text that is added in a translation for clarity’s sake, based on the proposed interpretation.
 ... he [Philodemus] decided to return with us to Naples and to dearest Siro and his way  
 of life there and to engage in active philosophical discourse and to live with others in   
 Herculaneum...50 
Here we see Philodemus’ life on the bay of Naples defined as devoted to philosophical 
engagement with other like-minded individuals, entailing a sufficiently high level of leisure. 
Philodemus outlines the necessity of leisure for this way of life in On Property Management, 
col. 23, discussed further below in section 2.2.3.
 With respect to education, firstly, Philodemus studied for several years in Athens 
under Zeno of Sidon before earning the friendship of Piso in Italy. The philosophical and 
literary skill of his writing attests to his elite education.
 Secondly, Philodemus describes his ideals for the educational level of Epicureans, and 
particularly the Epicurean teacher, allowing us to envision the likely educational level of his 
own community. These ideals arise from Philodemus’ critical comments toward other, 
contemporary Epicureans and his portrait of the ideal Epicurean teacher in PHerc. 1005 (a 
work having the partially preserved title, Προ`ς του`ς ...).51 Philodemus bemoans the fact that 
the majority of Epicureans do not know Epicurean writings well enough: α λλα` το` 
σχετλιω' τα|το[ν] εκειñν’ εστι`ν [ε ]πι` τοιñς | πλει'οσιν τωñν Ε πικουρει'|ων ο  τη`ν εν τοιñς βυβλι'[ο]ις | 
α [νε]νεργησι'αν [α ]παραι'τ[η]|το[ν ποιειñ]..., ‘But the most shocking thing among the majority 
of Epicureans is this, namely, their unpardonable inactivity with respect to books...’ (col. 
14.13n18).52 Elsewhere, Philodemus criticises those who consider themselves genuine readers 
of Epicurean texts, but only know extracts (εγλογα`ς, col. 4.13) and summaries (κεφα' λαι[α], 
col. 4.15), and do not have any detailed knowledge of the philosophy (col. 4.2n18).53 Some 
Epicureans reportedly reviled the common philosophical conversation proper to Epicureans 
(και` τα`ς ο  [µ]ιλι'ας | τα`[ς] προ`ς ε κα' στους εκβλ[α]σ|φηµουñσι, col. 15.6n8), and considered texts 
which required explanation to be worthless (πο[νη]ρο`ν, col. 20.2n15).
 The ideal teacher, in contrast, is learned: 
 δ[υ' ]ναν[ται] µ[ε`ν] τοιñς [β]υβλι'οις | παρακολουθειñν οι και` | τετυ[χ]ο' τες α γωγηñς 
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50. Translation Sider, Epigrams, 22; see edition of this text as presented here in Marcello Gigante, “I 
Frammenti di Sirone,” Paideia 45 (1990): 178. Sider thinks the subject of this fragment is Philodemus (Sider, 
Epigrams, 19). Another witness possibly establishing Siro as a philosopher in Naples is Cicero, Fam. 9.26, 
reviewed above. Gigante and Rawson both treat the latter as a possible witness to Siro (Gigante, 
“Frammenti,” 180–82; Rawson, Intellectual Life, 24).
51. Critical edition: Angeli, Filodemo. Agli Amici Di Scuola.
52. Translation in H. Gregory Snyder, Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World, Religion in the First 
Christian Centuries (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 57,
53. So too in On Anger, col. 45.16f., Philodemus refers to Epicureans who do not know the work of 
earlier Epicureans well enough to understand the issue of proper anger correctly.
 Ε« λλη|σι και` [ο]υ  [Πε'ρσαις] πρεπου' |σης και` παι[δευθε' ]ντες | εν µ[α]θη' µασι, 
 δι[δα' ]σκου|σι και` [τ]α` τωñν επιτετη|δευκο' των α σα'φειαν εξ|ευρι'σκειν και` ο  µοειδηñ | γ’, ει 
 µηδε`ν ε«τερον, εκ παι|δι'ου µε'χρι γη' ρως φ[ι]λο|σοφη' σαντες και` τοσαυñ|τα και` τοιαυñτα 
 ταιñς α κρι|βει'αις συντεθεικο' τες. 
 Those who have been fortunate to have had training suitable for Greeks and not for  
 Persians, who have been educated in basic studies, such people are able to 
 understand the books. Having thought deeply about these things their entire lives, 
 [perhaps even] having composed similar treatises themselves, with all the acuity that 
 requires, they can at the very least teach people to uncover obscurities of one kind or 
 another. (col. 16.1n15).54 
While Philodemus does not argue that general education is necessary for being an Epicurean,55 
it is clear that he considers literacy and philosophical education necessary to be an Epicurean 
teacher, given the technical ability needed to explain and write Epicurean treatises, and that 
such a teacher would help others to read, comprehend, and critique philosophical texts (col. 
20.2n15). Philodemus’ comments in this vein are illustrative (col. 20.2n15), ‘... and with 
respect to the reading and the writing of books, it is possible to understand them, and not to 
consider that type of literature which requires explanation as something worthless. With 
proper training, people can be taught to recognize as incompetent a writer who exceeds the 
proper length, or who omits necessary subjects, or someone who conducts himself in a manner 
unbecoming to the argument at hand.’56 These comments witness not only to Philodemus’ 
own educational level, but also to the expectations he had for his circle of friends, for 




54. Translation adapted from Snyder with the help of Angeli’s Italian translation (Snyder, Teachers and 
Texts, 58). Immediately following this, Philodemus turns to discuss the less educated, but unfortunately we only 
possess the following (translation Snyder): ‘But those who serve as manual laborers or are ill-bred, and who have 
not learned letters ...’, ο[ι ] δε` δουλευ' σαντες ερ|γατικωñ ς η  α να' γ[ω]γοι και` | γρα'µµατα µη` µ[α]θο' ντες ..., (col. 
16.16n18). Angeli supposes that Philodemus would likely have commented that these latter people will face 
obstacles to understanding and discussing texts. Angeli refers for similar comments in Epicurus’ discussion of 
similarly involved people. For example, Epicurus wrote his letter to Pythocles to provide an epitome for easy 
memory of his arguments concerning celestial phenomena, and thought they would be useful for those new to the 
philosophy and for those ‘who are involved too deeply in the business of some regular occupation’ (τοιñς εις 
ασχολι'ας βαθυτε'ρας τωñν εγκυκλι'ων τινο`ς εµπεπλεγµε'νοις, Ep. Pyth. 85; see also Ep. Hdt. 35). It does not seem 
that Philodemus’ friends would include the illiterate or manual labourers. See especially below, section 2.2.3.
55. Epicurus was particularly critical of general education, and certainly did not consider education a 
prerequisite for learning philosophy (Ep. Men. 122). 
56. Translation by Snyder. Especially in light of the evidence below concerning the socio-economic 
location of the friends of the ideal philosopher and their capability to receive his teaching, it seems unlikely that 
Philodemus engaged in teaching those who were entirely illiterate to read. See  discussion on the issue of 
education in Michael Erler, “Orthodoxie und Anpassung: Philodem, ein Panaitios des Kepos?” MH 49 
(1992): 177–80; Snyder, Teachers and Texts, 59.
 Thirdly, Philodemus dedicated his work On Flattery to Vergil, Plotius, Varius, and 
Quintilius (PHerc. Paris. 2).57 This witness implies that these elite Roman literati58 were 
likely students (and patrons?) of Philodemus.59 On Flattery (a subject often contrasted with 
frank criticism in ancient discussions) seems to support a reconstruction of Philodemus’ 
Epicurean community as one in which educated poetic performance and mutual literary 
critique were likely prevalent.60 Philodemus’ involvement with these figures (not to mention 
Piso and Pansa) acts as evidence to Philodemus’ elite social location.
 Fourth, and finally, Philodemus attests to the relative scarcity of individuals attracted 
to the Epicurean way of life. In the course of describing the ideal Epicurean’s approach to 
wealth, Philodemus remarks, ‘nor is he lazy in getting for himself what is sufficient for him, 
he whose way of life is moderate and communal and whose reasoning doctrine is healthy and 
true, even if it does not easily attract just anybody’ (On Property Management col. 16.6n12).61 
This is a striking comment to make given the wide popularity of Epicureanism in Italy across 
the social spectrum.62 That Philodemus thinks Epicureans are rare indicates that he assumes 
‘authentic’ Epicureans are a select few, likely referring to high-calibre Epicureans, particularly 
those of the social, cultural, and economic elite, like himself and his patron Piso.
2.2.3. Philodemus’ Discussion of Wealth
Philodemus’ own writing on wealth and its proper use is essential for the present question. In 
what follows, I first offer an overview of Philodemus’ philosophy of wealth, then, second, 
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57. For an edition of this text and discussion, see Marcello Gigante and M. Capasso, “Il ritorno di 
Virgilio a Ercolano,” Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 7 (1989): 3–6.
58. Plotius Tucca likely edited, with L. Varius Rufus, the incomplete Aeneid after Vergil’s death 
(Suetonius, Vita Vergili 39n41). L. Varius Rufus was a renowned Roman poet who wrote a didactic poem De 
Morte, and a highly regarded play, Thyestes. Quintilius Varus was a friend of Vergil, a Roman eques, whose 
literary criticism Horace praised (Ars Poetica 438n444). See discussion in Marcello Gigante, “Vergil in the 
Shadow of Vesuvius,” in Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans, eds. David Armstrong, et al. (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2004), 85–99.
59. There are no other extant references to Philodemus’ students.
60. As argued by Sider on the basis of Philodemus’ own poetry and the prevalence of poetic 
performance in symposia (Sider, Epigrams, 21; Gigante, “Vergil in the Shadow of Vesuvius,” 86–87). See also 
the direct address to Varius, Quintilius, and perhaps Vergil, described as involved in philosophical activity (οι  ... 
φιλοσοφη' σαν[τες]), in another fragment of the same work, PHerc. 1082 col. 11 (Sider, Epigrams, 19–20). For 
further evidence of the conjunction of frank speech and poetic performance, Sider adduces Horace, Ars Poetica 
438n452, which describes Quintilius as the true friend who does not flatter a friend’s poetry, but offers only 
honest criticism (Sider, Epigrams, 21). For a general discussion of the historicity of poetry’s performance at 
symposia of the Hellenistic period, see Alan Cameron, Callimachus and His Critics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 71–103.
61. Translation and text in Tsouna, Philodemus: On Property Management, 44–45.
62. I owe this observation to Professor George Boys-Stones. See discussion in Gilbert, “Among 
Friends,” 13–77.
review evidence within this discussion for the socio-economic location of Philodemus and his 
friends. 
 In Philodemus’ work On Property Management (Περι` οικονοµι'ας, PHerc. 1424), 
Philodemus discusses how one manages wealth with a properly Epicurean set of virtues, 
beliefs, and practices. In the process, Philodemus interacts critically with Xenophon’s 
Οικονοµικο' ς and Pseudo-Aristotle’s Οικονοµικα'  (attributed to Theophrastus by Philodemus), 
while drawing support from Metrodorus and Epicurus on the subject. I will not attempt to 
summarise the entire work, but will instead present evidence relevant for grasping an outline 
of Philodemus’ view of wealth and relevant to his socio-economic location.63
 Philodemus believes there is an easily-obtainable level of ‘natural wealth’ (φυσικο`ς 
πλουñτος, col. 14.19) which should be maintained to provide for the satisfaction of necessary 
and natural desires of the Epicurean (e.g., basic food and clothing, cf. Epicurus’ summary in 
Ep. Men. 130). The one who lives this lifestyle is content with the simple fulfilment of natural 
and necessary desires alone, but naturally desires a more affluent way of living to fulfil natural 
but unnecessary desires (ρ  ε'πει | δε` τηñι βουλη' σει µαñλλον επι` | τη`ν α φθονωτε'ραν, col. 16.4n6). 
This second point is Philodemus’ expansion of Epicurus’ position, adapted to his elite Roman 
audience.64 In the following I will seek to explain this position by tracking how Philodemus 
contrasts his view of wealth with others, and by presenting evidence for the actual level of 
wealth assumed by Philodemus, attending especially to evidence that will allow one to 
establish upper and lower limits of ‘natural wealth’.
 On one hand, Philodemus opposes the Cynic embrace of acquiring only what is needed 
each day.65 Though the Cynic seeks to avoid the stress related to maintaining possessions 
beyond what is needed for each day, Philodemus argues that the increased pleasure of a stable 
economic existence free from the danger of painful deprivation mollifies the extra stress and 
work needed to maintain this higher level of wealth (col. 12n14).66 In what little remains of 
another treatise of his, On Wealth, it seems that Philodemus distinguishes Cynic mendicancy, 
described as deprivation of all things (πτωχει'α), from poverty, the deprivation of many things 
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63. For the following discussion, I draw particularly on Asmis, “Epicurean Economics”; Tsouna, 
Philodemus: On Property Management, xi-xlv.
64. See further discussion in Tsouna, Philodemus: On Property Management, 95; Asmis, “Epicurean 
Economics”.
65. The description of the person who embraces this lifestyle is described as [το` κ]αθ’ η  [µε'ραν 
π]οριζο'µε|[νον], col. 12.39n41.
66. For Epicurus, too, the wise man would not be a Cynic, nor a beggar (ου δε` κυνιειñν ... ου δε` 
πτωχευ' σειν, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.119). Philodemus describes the life of the person who is deprived of basic 
necessities as one which is more disturbed (col. 13.27n29, [βι]ω' σεται | [εµπα]θεστε'ρως, [κα]ι` στ[ερο' ]|µ[ενο]ς 
ενι'ων ο χλειñ[σ]θ[αι]).
(πενι'α).67 Poverty as the deprivation of many things (πενι'α) is not to be feared; Philodemus 
can claim that the difference between wealth and poverty (πενι'α, possessing few things, not 
Cynic deprivation) is small (το` µ[ικ]ρα`ν ειò|ναι τη`ν πλου' του προ`ς πε|νι'αν υ  περοχη`ν, col. 
27.43n45). Along these lines, Philodemus asserts that the wise person’s way of life preserves 
the resources for what is natural and necessary even if one loses one’s wealth (καν πλουñτον 
α ποβα' ληι, col. 16.12n18), which presumably means falling to a state of poverty in which one 
possesses just a few things (πενι'α), but not to the level of Cynic deprivation. In this interaction 
with Cynicism, Philodemus assumes a limit to what he considers acceptable poverty for the 
Epicurean.
 While Philodemus opposes the Cynic repudiation of wealth, he also takes care not to 
promote the love of money. Philodemus opposes the Epicurean’s possession and use of 
natural wealth to the person who engages in unlimited pursuit of wealth, who wastes wealth 
on unnecessary desires, and who has stressful, painful fears founded on false beliefs about 
wealth (exemplified by the lover of money, φιλοχρηµατο' ς, e.g., col. 17.13n14).68 While 
Philodemus thus indicates that the Epicurean will not strive to be maximally wealthy, there is 
no indication of how much wealth is too much in what remains of this treatise.69 We can, 
however, gain further specificity for the lifestyle Philodemus envisions from his discussion of 
the proper use of wealth.
 Philodemus offers numerous illustrations of the ideal Epicurean lifestyle. Because the 
wise man judges all things, even wealth, by a hedonistic standard, he will not work for his 
  46
________________________
67. In this treatise it seems Philodemus discusses varying opinions among Epicureans concerning 
wealth, and appeals to the writings of the founders to support his position; see discussion in David Balch, 
“Philodemus, ‘On Wealth’ and ‘On Household Management’: Naturally Wealthy Epicureans Against Poor 
Cynics,” in Philodemus and the New Testament World, eds. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. 
Holland, NovTSup 111 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004), 177–96; Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” 150–53. The 
following passages are relevant here, translated by Balch: col. 45.15n40, ‘... he means that mendicancy ... is the 
privation not of many, but of all things ... This is why some Epicureans are said to use such calculations on behalf 
of (the notion) that poverty is evil. Epicurus in many other (books) says that poverty is an evil, but in different 
(writings) that have been collected this is not [his] opinion...’ (πτωχει'α[ν...δια]νοειñ τ[η`]ν στε'ρ[ησιν ου ] πολλωñν, 
α λλα` πα' ν[των...] δια` [ταυñτ]α [τωñν] Ε πικουρει'ων λε'γοντα[ι' τι]νες υ  π[ε`ρ τ]ουñ κακο`ν ειòνα[ι τ]η`ν πε[ν]ι'αν 
[ε ]πιλογισ[µοιñ]ς χρηñσθαι τοιου' τοις· ο   Ε πι'κουρος ε»ν τε α»λλοις πο[λλ]οιñς φησι τη`ν πενι'αν κακο`ν ειòναι, και` εν 
τα[ιñ]σδ’ ε  τε'ραις συναχθει'σα[ις] µη` φε'ρεσ[θαι]·); col. 42.26n35, ‘therefore, since mendicancy is called poverty, 
whenever the school of Epicurus says that poverty is an evil, they mean this (i.e. mendicancy)...; they subscribe to 
the common and Epicurean use of language...’ (διο' τι και` τηñς πτωχει'ας πενι'ας [καλ]ουµε'νης, ο«ταν οι  περι` τ[ο`ν] 
Ε πι'[κουρο]ν κακο`ν λε' [γ]ωσι τη`ν πενι'αν, ταυ' την λε'γουσιν...εισι` και` τηñς κοινηñς και` τηñς Ε πικου' ρου συνηθει'ας...); 
col. 43.1n8, ‘They assert that mendicancy alone ... is said to be an evil ... Of the subject [forms of poverty] 
expounded by us, every mendicancy is an evil..., called an evil as by the founders...’ ([πτω]χει'αν µο' ν[ην ... 
λ]ε'γεσθαι κακο`ν ... α ποφαι'νονται· κα[κο`ν δε` π]τωχει'α τις [παñ]σα [τωñν] υ  φ’ η  µωñν εκκειµε'νων ... κακο`ν και` 
λε'γεται ω  ς τωñν καθηγεµο' [νων]...).
68. In col. 19, Philodemus claims that the concern for maximizing one’s income and preserving one’s 
possessions places all adversity in poverty (i.e., πενι'α, the lack of many things, not all things): παñν τιθε[ι'ση]ς εν 
πενι'αι | το` δυσχερε'ς, 19.15n16. Nature, on the other hand, shows that one can be satisfied (ευ κο' λ[ω]ς) with a just 
few possessions (τοιñς ο λι'οις; col. 19.16n19).
69. This may fit Philodemus’ circumstances, especially if he has his patron Piso in mind as he writes. 
Philodemus criticizes false views and unhealthy uses of wealth rather than capping wealth at any identifiable 
figure, allowing the super-rich to participate in this Epicurean vision of wealth.
possessions more than he enjoys them (µη` πλει'ω [π]ονειñν δι|α` τα'  χρη' µατ’ η»περ ευ παθειñν, col. 
18.43–44). The wise man will be generous with his money, especially in giving gifts to 
friends, but will leave himself a large enough amount to live on and preserve his wealth (col. 
18.20n31, translation Tsouna): ‘In fact, if a person has lifted off himself the suffering involved 
in his activities concerning worthless things, and also the vexatious care about his belongings, 
he has not yet failed to leave himself a big enough difference, in the question of his property’s 
being preserved or not preserved, to suffice for the preservation and protection of his wealth.’ 
Yet, wealth is used painlessly (α» |λυπον, col. 15.38n39) and purely (α κε'ραιον, col. 15.40) when 
there is no concern for how one might preserve it (col. 15.37n45); thus the wise man has no 
set budget (col. 24n25). Philodemus recognizes that it is difficult for such a person to acquire 
money starting with little, and difficult to keep it once acquired (col. 18.37n39), but wants to 
maintain that the Epicurean will be able to manage a life of generosity without beggaring 
himself.
 This lifestyle also assumes the possession and management of a household with 
several slaves, especially in order to scrupulously manage one’s affairs (even if this is more 
painful than pleasurable for such a slave) and to contribute to income (col. 9n10; 19; 
26.18n34).70 This ownership would likely require substantial wealth, given the costs of 
purchasing and providing for slaves, especially those highly skilled (a level of wealth akin to 
the middling groups between elite and subsistence level populations in the Roman empire).71 
 Notably, the ideal lifestyle does not involve work at all on the part of the philosopher 
(φιλο' σοφος δ’ ου»τ’ ερ|γα' ζεται, col. 11.16n17) in contrast to the ordinary person (ιδιω' τηι, col. 
11.14n15).72 Philodemus does think it appropriate at times to manage one’s financial affairs 
with the assistance of friends and a skilled slave (col. 26), but it is inappropriate to be overly 
concerned about finances, just as it is inappropriate to engage in labour at all. As we will see 
next, these characteristics of the ideal lifestyle come together in Philodemus’ discussion of the 
best means of income.
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70. Philodemus does seem to allow that the two categories of slaves given by Theophrastus (Pseudo-
Aristotle), the steward and workman (τ[ο`ν] επι'τροπον και` το`ν εργα' |τ[ην]), could both be free men just as well 
(col. 11.16n20), leading Elizabeth Asmis to argue that there is no necessity for the Epicurean to have slaves in 
Philodemus’ discussion (Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” 166–67). Asmis sees this as part of Philodemus’ non-
traditional conception of the household, as Philodemus also does not consider a wife to be necessary. While 
Asmis seems to be correct, this instance seems to be the only indication against the norm of slavery in a work 
which throughout assumes and discusses the proper management of slaves by the ideal Epicurean.
71. Walter Scheidel and Steven J. Friesen, “The Size of the Economy and the Distribution of Income in 
the Roman Empire,” JRS 99 (2009): 91.
72. Philodemus entertains the possibility that the philosopher might work on occasion with a conditional 
sentence specifying how he will work ‘if he ever works’ (αν |ερ[γα' ]σηται' ποτε, col. 11.17n18), namely, by 
allocating resources so that they are not all endangered at once. Given the context from which Philodemus draws 
in Pseudo-Aristotle Oec. 1344b27n1345a17, it is clear that this ‘work’ Philodemus refers to is not personal 
labour with one’s hands or in a particular profession, but the work of managing a productive household of slaves 
and others working on one’s behalf.
 An especially important passage relevant to Philodemus’ socio-economic context 
appears in his discussion of the best means of income in On Property Management, col. 23. In 
the passage, Philodemus interacts with Xenophon’s discussion, from which Philodemus 
quotes. At this point in his treatise, Philodemus has begun to offer some of his own thoughts 
on the best sources of income, following after but improvising beyond the work of 
Metrodorus, his Epicurean forerunner (η  µειñς δε` λε'γωµεν α κολου|θουñντες, ‘let us say, 
following him...’ col. 22.17n18).73 The passage, col. 23.1n36, is as follows (translation 
Tsouna): 
 Γελοι[ο' τατον]| δε` και` το` πορι'ζειν αφ’ ι ππικ[ηñς]| καλο`ν οι»εσθαι, το` δ’ ‘α πο` 
 µε[ταλ]|λικηñς, δου' λων ερ[γ]αζοµε'ν[ων]’| ου κ ευ»κληρον, το` δ’ ‘εξ α µφο|τε'ρων, αυ το`ν 
 ενεργουñντα’| µανικο' ν· ταλαι'πωρον δε` και`| το` ‘γεωργο[υñν]τ’ αυ το`ν ου«τως| ω«στε 
 αυ τουργειñν’· το` δ’ ‘α»λλων,| ε»χοντα γηñν’ κατα` σπουδαιñ|ον· η«κιστα γα`ρ επιπλοκα`ς ε»|χει 
 προ`ς α νθρω' πους, εξ ωð ν| α ηδι'αι πολλαι` παρακολου|θουñσι, και` διαγωγη`ν επιτερ|πηñ και` 
 µετα` φι'λων α ναχω' ρη|σιν ευ»σχολον και` παρα` τοιñς| [σω' φροσι]ν ευ σχηµονεστα' |την 
 προ'σοδον. Ο[υ κ α»]σχ[η]|µον [δ’ ο]υ δε` α πο` συνοικι'α[ς τε]| και` δου' λων εµπειρι'ας η  και`| 
 τε'χνας εχο' ντων µηδαµ[ωñς]| α πρεπειñς. Α λλα` ταυñτα δευ' |τερα και` τρι'τα· πρωñτον δε`| και` 
 κα' λλιστον α πο` λο' γων| φιλο[σο' ]φων α νδρα' σιν δεκτι|κοιñς µεταδιδοµε'ν[ων] 
 α ν|τιµεταλαµβα' νειν ευ χαρι|στο[ν α«µ]α µετα` σεβασµουñ| παντ[ο' ς], ω  ς εγε'νετ’ 
 Ε πικο[υ' ]|ρωι, λο[ιπο`]ν δε` α ληθινωñν και`| α φιλο[ν]ε[ι']κων και` [σ]υ[λ]λη' βδη[ν]| ειpiειñν 
 [α τ]αρα' χων, ω  ς το'  γε δι|α` σοφ[ιστι]κωñν και` α γωνιστι|[κ]ωñν ο[υ δε'ν] εστι βε'λτιον τουñ| 
 δια` δη[µοκ]οποκωñν και` συκο|φαντικ[ωñν]. 
 It is [utterly] ridiculous to believe that it is a good thing to earn an income from   
 practicing the art of horsemanship. Earning an income ‘from the art of mining with 
 slaves doing the labor’ is unfortunate, and as to securing income ‘from both these  
 sources by means of one’s own labor,’ it is a mad thing to do. ‘Cultivating the land  
 oneself in a manner involving work with one’s own hands’ is also wretched, while 
 (cultivating it) ‘using other workers if one is a landowner’ is appropriate for the good 
 man. For it brings the least possible involvement with men from whom many 
 disagreeable things follow, and a pleasant life, a leisurely retreat with one’s friends, 
 and a most dignified income to [those who are moderate]. Nor is it disgraceful to earn 
 an income both from properties rented to tenants and from slaves who have skills or 
 even arts that are in no way unseemly. However, these sources of income come second 
 and third. The first and noblest thing is to receive back thankful gifts with all 
 reverence in return for philosophical discourse shared with men capable of 
  48
________________________
73. Tsouna, Philodemus: On Property Management, xxxvii; Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2388.
 understanding them, as happened to Epicurus, and, [moreover], discourses that are 
 truthful and free of strife and, [in short], serene, since in fact the acquisition of an 
 income through [sophistical] and contentious speeches is [in no way] better than its 
 acquisition through demagogical and slandering ones.
 This passage reveals both the ideal socio-economic position of an Epicurean teacher, 
and the positions of those who are part of his Epicurean community. With respect to the ideal 
Epicurean, here we see again that he does not engage in personal labour, but might receive 
income from slaves and property ownership. Leisure and detachment from unpleasant 
engagement with the general public are essential. An elite level of education is assumed in 
order to share philosophical teaching with others.
 With respect to the friends of the ideal Epicurean, one notices that the receipt of gifts 
in return for philosophical teaching presupposes that these supporters are δεκτικοι', i.e., 
capable of receiving this teaching. It seems there are three aspects of this capability. First, it 
involves a receptive psychological disposition, as indicated in Philodemus’ discussion of the 
dispositions of students receiving treatment in On Frank Criticism (often concerning their 
vicious dispositions, e.g., fr. 30; 65–66).74 In PHerc. 346, the author (likely Philodemus)75 
notes that all the goods following from Epicurean philosophy come to those fit to receive 
them, ([δ]εκτι|κοιñς, PHerc. 346, col. 5.13n14; see too Philodemus’ On Death, col. 18.1n5). 
Philodemus refers in On Rhetoric 8, PHerc. 832, col. 19.7n9 (2.29 Sudhaus) to some who 
‘were not capable of receiving the best life’ (ου κ ε»φυσαν τουñ α ρι'στου βι'ου δεκτικοι').76 
 Second, being ‘capable’ involved some basic level of educational resources to appreci-
ate and learn the complexities of Epicurean philosophy. Thanks to Philodemus’ remarks 
observed above on the qualifications for an Epicurean teacher and his students (section 2.2.2), 
one senses that he had high standards. One remembers as well that the only known students of 
Philodemus were the elite band of poets including Vergil, Plotius, Varius, and Quintilius, to 
whom Philodemus dedicated his treatise On Flattery. At the very least this involved basic lit-
eracy and the ability to engage in complex philosophical argumentation.77
 Third, being a ‘capable’ friend involved possessing the economic resources necessary 
to enable learning from a philosopher in leisured withdrawal. The economic resources must be 
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74. See Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 104–10, and discussion in ch. four.
75. See discussion in Mario Capasso, Trattato Etico Epicureo (PHerc. 346) (Naples: Giannini Editore, 
1982), 31–40.
76. See Henry, Philodemus, On Death, 41, n. 60. Perhaps also Epicurus’ obscure saying preserved in 
Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.117 is relevant here, which excludes the ability of becoming a sage to some based on 
the condition of the body and one’s ε»θνος: ου δε` µη`ν εκ πα'σης σω' µατος ε«ξεως σοφο`ν γενε'σθαι αν ου δ’ εν παντι` 
ε»θνει.
77. It seems unlikely that Philodemus engaged in teaching adults who were entirely illiterate to read, in 
light of the cumulative argument built in this essay. See on the issue of education in Philodemus Erler, 
“Orthodoxie und Anpassung,” 177–80; Snyder, Teachers and Texts, 59.
substantial indeed, for one must not only provide for one’s own leisure, but simultaneously 
provide as well for some portion of the sage’s income. Moreover, assuming the philosopher 
depended heavily on the gifts of such friends, the level of support would be substantially 
large, for it would have to supply adequately the lifestyle Philodemus assumes as natural for 
himself as an Epicurean. Philodemus thus valourises both his own affluent way of life as a 
philosopher and that of his patrons as ideally Epicurean.78
 The contrast of the philosopher’s friends with those people who, by interaction with 
them, bring ‘many disagreeable things’ that counteract the pursuit of philosophy, seems 
instructive (e.g., slaves labouring with their hands in fields and mines). This group of friends 
who are ‘capable’ of receiving philosophical teaching is particularly reminiscent of the elite, 
Roman consumers of philosophy in the Bay of Naples: Philodemus’ patron Piso, and the 
group of literati also involved with Siro.79 
 Philodemus cites Epicurus’ lifestyle as the model of the best means of income. The 
following points of evidence are illustrative of Epicurus’ economic situation: (a) Epicurus 
taught that the sage would love the country life, should make money only from his wisdom;80 
(b) from the possessions held at the end of his life,81 Epicurus was able to provide financially 
for the garden’s monthly festivals (including sacrifices and common meals), and for the ongo-
ing basic living necessities of several friends and some of their children;82 (c) friends of 
Epicurus donated financially in an ad hoc manner to Epicurus and the community (especially 
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78. So too Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2389.
79. Thus Asmis sees this work as adapted to the sensibilities of the Roman elite (Asmis, “Epicurean 
Economics,” 174–76).
80. Preserved in Diogenes’ discussion of Epicurus’ views in Vit. 10.120: on income: χρηµατιειñσθαι' τε, 
α λλ’ α πο` µο' νης σοφι'ας, α πορη' σαντα. και` µο' ναρχον εν καιρωñ,  θεραπευ' σειν; on the country: φιλαγρη' σειν.
81. These possessions at least included: a substantial sum of income (Hermarchus was made κυ' ριον τωñν 
προσο' δων along with Amynomachos and Timokrates in Epicurus’ will, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.20); the 
garden (which Epicurus reportedly purchased for 80 minae, Vit. 10.11); four slaves who were set free in his will 
(Vit. 10.21); Epicurus’ books, of which those he wrote numbered around 300 (Vit. 10.26); and a house in Melite, 
a deme of Athens, also given to Hermarchus (Vit. 10.17).
82. These include (see Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.7, 17n21): (1) the ongoing upkeep of the garden for 
others to live and study in (for which the food may have cost 1 mina per day, perhaps for 100n200 members, see 
Vit. 10.7, as interpreted by Michael Erler, “Epikur,” in Die hellenistische Philosophie, ed. Hellmut Flashar, 
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: Die Philosophie der Antike 4 [Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1994], 70; 
Cyril Bailey, ed., Epicurus: The Extant Remains with Short Critical Apparatus Translation and Notes [Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1926], 405; Horst Steckel, “Epikuros,” in Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft: Supplementband XI, ed. Konrat Ziegler [Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller, 1968], 585); 
(2) funds providing for regular common meals and funeral offerings for Epicurus’ father, mother, and brothers, a 
celebration of his birthday, the meeting of the community every month in honour of Epicurus and Metrodorus, 
and separate days celebrating his brothers, Polyainos, and perhaps Pythocles (see Clay, “The Cults of 
Epicurus,” 88–100); (3) the future dowry and annual provisions for Metrodorus’ daughter after marriage to a 
fellow Epicurean within the community; (4) continued financial support for Nicanor and others who have grown 
old with Epicurus as part of the philosophical community (συγκαταγηρα'σκειν µεθ’ η  µωñν προει'λοντο εν 
φιλοσοφι'α, ).
those from Lampsakos; cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.11;83 PHerc. 176 fr. 5, col. 12.8n10;84 
Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1117B;85 Suav. viv. 1097C),86 and all but the poorest members seem to 
have paid annual contributions (one Philodemean source indicates Epicurus requested 120 
drachmae per person per year; see Philodemus, PHerc. 1418 col. 30, 3n5),87 though property 
was not held in common as a rule (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.11; Epicurus, VS 39).88 
 In addition to his colourful depiction of the ideal Epicurean lifestyle, Philodemus help-
fully provides us with a specific net worth he considers to be too low for the Epicurean. 
Philodemus recalls that in Xenophon’s Οικονοµικο' ς, a debate ensued between Socrates and 
the rich man Ischomachus concerning who was richer, with Socrates claiming that his five 
minae, representing the total worth of his home and all his possessions, made him richer than 
Ischomachus.89 Philodemus assesses this figure in a revealing way (On Property Management 
col. 5.4n14):
 Το` µε`ν ουòν | ου  πραγµατικο`ν α ει` Σωκρα' |της ειòχε, [τ]ο` δ’ ι κανο`ν αυ τωñ ι | πε'ντε µναñς    
 ειòναι προ`ς τα |ναγκαιñα [κ]αι` τα` φυσικα` τωñν α νθρω' πων επιζητη' µατα [και`] | κεν[η' ν 
 ειòν]αι τη`ν εν τωñ ι ζηñν | ευ ετηρι'αν και` µηδε`ν προσ|[δ]ειñσθαι τωñν πλειο' ν[ω]ν επ’ αυ |τη' ν, 
 α»πορον τωñ,  ε»ργω,  και` τωñ,  | νωñ,  µαχο' µενον. 
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83. Epicurus’ request to an unknown recipient concerning cheese: πε'µπον µοι τυρουñ κυθριδι'ου, ι«να ο»ταν 
βου' λοµαι πολυτελευ' σασθαι δυ' νωµαι.
84. In this passage Philodemus describes how the Epicureans of Lampsakos served food to Epicurus and 
Metrodorus: και` δια'  τε τη`ν τηñ[ι] προφ[α'σε]ι| [φιλι'αν] και` τη`ν πα[ρ]ηκολο[υ]θηκυιñαν εκ πλει'[στου]| [χρο' ]νου, 
σφο' δρα σε[µ]νωñ [ς]| [διακ]ει'µενος προ`ς [ε  ]κα[τε' ]|[ρους] εµε'  τε και` Μητ[ρ]ο' δ[ωρο]ν.
85. Epicurus’ appeal to Idomeneus of Lampsakos (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.25), quoted by Plutarch: 
πε'µπε ουòν α παρχα`ς η  µιñν εις τη`ν τουñ ι ερουñ σω' µατος θεραπει'αν υ  πε'ρ τε αυ  τουñ και` τε'κνων· ου«τω γα'ρ µοι λε'γειν 
επε'ρχεται. Here Epicurus seems to refer to the Epicurean community as a ι ερο`ς σωñµα.
86. In this excerpt from a letter to an unknown recipient, Epicurus describes a gift of food from an 
unknown donor in exalted terms: δαιµονι'ως τε και` µεγαλοπρεπωñς επεµελη' θητε η  µωñν τα` περι` τη`ν τουñ σι'του 
κοµιδη' ν, και` ου ρανοµη' κη σηµειñα ενδε'δειχθε τηñς προ`ς εµε` ευ νοι'ας. For brief discussion of the preceding 
citations, see Michael Erler, “Die Schule Epikurs,” in Die hellenistische Philosophie, ed. Hellmut Flashar, 
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: Die Philosophie der Antike 4 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1994), 208.
87. See critical edition in Cesira Militello, Memorie Epicuree, La Scuola di Epicuro 16 (Naples: 
Bibliopolis, 1997). Col. 30 reports a letter written from Epicurus to some disciples, ε κατο`ν γα`ρ | και` ει»κοσι 
[δ]ρ[αχ]µα`[ς µο' ν]ας κα|τ’ ενιαυτο`ν βου' λοµαι παρ’ ε κα|τε'ρου λαµβα' νειν. ‘For I wish to receive only one hundred 
and twenty drachmae each year from each of you.’ This income is probably a major part of the income referred to 
in Epicurus’ will (προ'σοδος; e.g., διδο' τωσαν δ’ Α µυνο'µαχος και` Τιµοκρα' της εκ τωñν υ  παρχουσωñν η  µιñν 
προσο' δων, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.19; cf. 10.18, 20, 21). See discussion in Militello, Memorie Epicuree, 275–
84; Erler, “Epikur,” 70;  Diskin Clay, “The Athenian Garden,” in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, 
ed. James Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 16. Col. 19 of the same work likely contains 
a letter from Epicurus to a disciple exhorting him to allow another Epicurean, Carneiscos to share in a recent 
source of income, but this is not likely referring to regular dues for being a member of the community (following 
Militello, Memorie Epicuree, 230).
88. The text of Epicurus, VS 39: Ου»θ’ ο   τη`ν χρει'αν επιζητωñν δια` παντο`ς φι'λος ου»θ’ ο   µηδε'ποτε 
συνα'πτων· ο µε`ν γα`ρ καπηλευ' ει τη,ñ χα'ριτι τη`ν αµοιβη' ν, ο δε` α ποκο' πτει τη`ν περι` τουñ µε'λλοντος ευ ελπιστι'αν.
89. Xenophon, Oec. 2.4n8. Ischomachus would have been worth far more given his elite status and 
responsibilities for public benefaction. Socrates describes particularly that his house and all his property would 
fetch five minae to a good buyer. 
 Surely, Socrates always had the characteristic of impracticality. Besides, as regards 
 his claim that five minae seem to him sufficient for the necessary and natural needs of 
 men, that prosperity in life is something empty, and that he does not need anything 
 more in addition to those, it is impracticable and conflicts with reason. 
Philodemus cannot equate the ideal life of an Epicurean with such a low net worth, because it 
would not allow a full life of generosity, ‘prosperity’ or ‘plenty’ (ευ ετηρι'α), and freedom from 
basic deprivations. Such a financial limitation is both practically impossible (α»πορον τωñ,  
ε»ργω, ), and irrational (τωñ,  | νωñ,  µαχο' µενον). Based on Socrates’ five minae, Sarah Pomeroy 
notes that in the fifth-century BCE,90 Socrates would have belonged to the lowest class, the 
thetes, too poor to afford armour needed for hoplite service, excluded from holding public 
office, but not destitute (see Aristotle, Pol. 1274a21n22; 1278a).91 
 It is very difficult to assess the value of Socrates’ five minae, not only because the 
value of the mina varied, but also because one cannot be sure how Philodemus assesses the 
value, whether according to Socrates’ fifth-century mina, or some equivalent of Philodemus’ 
own time. The figure of one mina being equivalent to one hundred drachmae is an imprecise 
scholarly generalization, as the ratio would change based on time and place.92 One can only 
place this amount in a general context. Epicurus purchased the original Garden for eighty 
minae (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.11), and may have spent one mina per day feeding those 
who lived at the garden (perhaps 100n200 people; Vit. 10.7). Aristotle, in the fourth century, 
records that five minae was equivalent to five beds, or one house (Eth. nic. 1133b,25f.). In W. 
Scheidel’s analysis of data from Roman Egypt from the late first century CE to the latter half 
of the second century CE, a family of four living at the subsistence level would earn ~ 450–
500 drachmae per year (representing the income of a male unskilled labourer, with his wife 
working as a wet nurse, and their children working as well).93 If one were to suppose that 
Socrates’ five minae were the rough equivalent of five hundred drachmae (one minae to one 
hundred drachmae, noting the imprecision), and that an adult from such a family joined 
Epicurus’ garden, an annual one hundred and twenty drachmae contribution would equal 
~20% of that family’s total annual income, a significant payment that would not be possible 
for this family living at subsistence level.94 
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90. Sarah Pomeroy, Xenophon. Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1994), 19.
91. Pomeroy, Xenophon, 223–24.
92. See Konrad Hitzl, Die Gewichte griechischer Zeit aus Olympia, Olympische Forschungen 25 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996).
93. Walter Scheidel, “Real Wages in Early Economies: Evidence for Living Standards from 1800 BCE 
to 1300 CE,” JESHO 53 (2010): 433–35.
94. This assumes as well that a person of such means would have been required to pay this amount, if 
any at all, given the evidence that some members had been supported directly by Epicurus (e.g. Nicanor, 
Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.20). 
 It seems clear that there is a limit to the poverty possible for an Epicurean on display 
here. This is important evidence for sketching Philodemus’ social location, as it indicates that 
Philodemus excludes from consideration a lifestyle that is at or just above subsistence, and 
anything below. Philodemus restricts the Epicurean life to those who have means to supply 
their own natural and necessary desires (which a subsistence-level budget cannot supply, 
apparently) while also having a life of leisure. Philodemus does not consider in his analysis 
those who must work to provide for basic living necessities, or are compelled to types of work 
that produce pain and do not provide necessary leisure for the Epicurean life. In excluding this 
group of people from consideration, Philodemus excluded the vast majority of the populace in 
the Greco-Roman world. Because there was no formal education requirement to be an Epicu-
rean, it remained possible in theory that anyone could be part of the community, perhaps 
receiving financial help from others to do so. Epicurus’ slave, Mys, is a key representative of 
this possibility. One also cannot preclude the possibility that Philodemus’ circle of friends 
included those who could only partially live the Epicurean life due to restrictions related to 
wealth, education, or lack of leisured time.95 All available evidence, however, points away 
from that possibility, and toward a community of the social and economic elite.
 Other comments from Philodemus also suggest that he was flippantly dismissive of 
those who do not share his own social and economic status. For example, Philodemus was 
willing to allow slaves to work so that the philosopher and his friends might enjoy leisure at 
the expense of their suffering under conditions unfit for a full Epicurean life.96 Furthermore, in 
his treatise On Death Philodemus starkly declares that for the vast majority of people97 who 
have not encountered Epicurean philosophy and remain in the grip of fear and pain due to 
false beliefs (i.e., fools, α»φρωνες, col. 13.14), it would be more profitable (λυσιτελεστερο' ν, 
col. 13.15) for them to die young. It would be ‘not too unfitting’ (ο[υ»τ’] α λλο[τρι]ω' τ[ε]|ρον) 




95. Aristotle, like Philodemus, considers that the life of the lower class, because of the nature of their 
work, cannot realize the best life (ου  γα`ρ οιðο' ν τ’ επιτηδευñσαι τα` τηñς α ρετηñς ζωñντα βι'ον βα' ναυσον η  θητικο' ν), and 
are thus excluded from full participation in some forms of merit-based oligarchies (Pol. 1278a21n22).
96. In his treatise On Frank Criticism, Philodemus refers in passing to slaves (οικε'ται, col. 12a.8), 
though it is not clear from the context that this refers to members of the community (despite the cursory 
affirmation of slaves in the community based on this witness, without further argument, in Glad, “Frank Speech, 
Flattery, and Friendship in Philodemus,” 172, n. 48). Indeed, that this reference is to non-member slaves seems 
more likely given that the ‘slaves’ here are distinct from ‘the others’ (α»λλο[ι], col. 12a.7), a designation often 
marking other, fellow students (as in col. 13a.10, τοιñς α»λλοις φι'λοις). 
97. Following Henry’s translation of πολλα'κι πολλοιñς τ[ωñ ]ν αφρο' νων, ‘a vast number of the foolish’, 
see Henry, Philodemus, On Death, 31, n. 47.
98. Text and translation in Henry, Philodemus, On Death. Philodemus clarifies that dying shortly after 
birth is not his actual recommendation for fools (α[ν]| κα[ι` µη` συ]µβουλευ'ωµεν η  µειñ[ς], col. 19.37n20.1).
2.2.4. Concluding analysis
We must now bring together the preceding strands of evidence in a final analysis of 
Philodemus’ and his friends’ socio-economic location. The expressed ideals of the best eco-
nomic life of the Epicurean philosopher with his friends do not necessarily prove the specifics 
of Philodemus’ circumstances. Philodemus’ On Property Management is first and foremost 
evidence for the lifestyle he valued for himself and his community. It is of course possible that 
Philodemus created this picture to align with the elite Roman values of his patrons, while the 
actual reality of Philodemus’ situation and those of his circle fell far short.99 It seems more 
plausible, however, to read this text as largely indicative of Philodemus’ own circumstances. 
 One can loosely mark upper and lower limits for Philodemus’ own socio-economic sit-
uation. The upper limit is less clear. In light of (a) Philodemus’ polemics against maximizing 
one’s income, against unlimited desires, and against involvement with public life, and (b) 
Philodemus’ ideal to give away his wealth and receive financial benefits from others, this evi-
dence suggests that he did not share the economic level of the ruling Roman elite (e.g., 
decuriones and above). Notably, however, the values concerning wealth expressed here do not 
necessarily contradict the lifestyle of an elite patron with political commitments, though such 
commitments would restrict one’s leisured time with friends. 
 The lower limit seems far more concrete. Philodemus envisions an affluent, slave-
owning lifestyle free from labour (aside from philosophical discussion and casual manage-
ment of one’s household), and free from the deprivations of subsistence-level existence. Par-
ticularly given the ability to sustain this lifestyle without work, and the dismissals of manual 
labour and subsistence living, it seems Philodemus would sit above those who maintain a sta-
ble existence just above subsistence as craftspersons, traders, etc. Philodemus likely held a 
socio-economic position among the middling group consisting of approximately 6n12% of the 
population between the ruling elite and those just above, at, or below the subsistence level.100 
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99. In doing so, Philodemus would essentially criticize himself for failing to live up to this ideal.
100. See the estimates in Scheidel and Friesen, “Size of the Economy,” which defines this middling 
group as consuming between 2.4 and 10 times subsistence levels, and controlling 15n25% of the empire-wide 
income (Scheidel and Friesen, “Size of the Economy,” 84–85). Usage of this data is limited by the fact that it 
does not concern the late Roman republic, during which Philodemus lived. The subsistence levels used here are 
from Scheidel’s analysis of Roman Egyptian data from the first to third centuries CE, suggesting an annual basic 
subsistence cost of the equivalent of 390kg of wheat; see Scheidel, “Real Wages.”. Another way of 
approximating Philodemus’ position would be to assign him to ES 4 in Longenecker’s scale of wealth. 
Admittedly the use of such a scale for Philodemus can only be approximate because the scale is meant to 
represent the early Roman empire. See Bruce W. Longenecker, Remember the Poor: Paul, Poverty, and the 
Greco-Roman World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 53, and his appendix 1. Longenecker’s scale is largely 
based on Steven J. Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” JSNT 26 
(2004): 341. 
 With respect to Philodemus’ community of friends, L. Calpurnius Piso represents the 
zenith of the scale, though it is not especially clear how involved he was in the community. 
Perhaps his political commitments did not permit him to fully realize the life of leisured 
friendship as presented by Philodemus. As to whether there was a lower boundary for involve-
ment in Philodemus’ community, Asmis argues that Philodemus does not exclude the poor 
entirely from his circle, but merely shows that wealth has great advantages for the 
Epicurean.101 One issue here is the definition of ‘poor,’ for while Philodemus would embrace 
the idea that, at times, the Epicurean encounters poverty, and need not fear it, his comments 
elsewhere suggest that ‘poverty’ for him does not mean, like it does for the Cynics, 
subsistence-level living. ‘Poverty’ instead means having ‘a few possessions’ to be able to sus-
tain natural and necessary desires, to have freedom from work, and to pursue philosophy with 
friends, with all of the financial commitments such relationships require. Philodemus’ ‘pov-
erty’ is so rich as to be unattainable for the vast majority of the population. The bulk of the 
evidence suggests that members of Philodemus’ community would fit his description of afflu-
ent, educated friends of the philosopher in col. 23 above, embodied in, e.g., Piso and Vergil.
2.3. Economic Interdependence among Friends
Philodemus envisioned a kind of economic interdependence between Epicurean friends, as 
already hinted at in his portrayal of the philosopher’s ideal lifestyle. Such a position fits gener-
ally with the Epicureans’ willingness to embrace utility wholeheartedly in mature friendships 
(contra, e.g., Aristotle). This interdependence is a function of regular gift reciprocity among 
friends. For Philodemus, the desire to acquire wealth is the same as the desire to share freely 
with friends (col. 14.37n15.6), for life is naturally shared with friends (ωð ι βι'ος ... κοινο`ς, col. 
16.8n9). The ideal Epicurean rouses others to share everything by his confidence in a few pos-
sessions (ε»τι | δε` κατα` το` παραστατικο`ν | α νθρω' πων α πο` τουñ προ`ς τα` | ο λι'α θα' ρσους δια` τωñν 
τουñ σο|φουñ λο' γων εις το` παντο`ς µε|ταδο' τας γι'νεσθαι, col. 18.2n7).102 In Philodemus’ view, 
gifts to friends are not to be viewed as losses to one’s own property, but more valuable pur-
chases than land, because such gifts are ‘the safest treasures with regard to the turns of for-
tune’ (προ`ς τη`ν τυ' χην | αφαλε'στατοι θησαυροι', col. 25.1n4). Lacking friends does not reduce 
one’s expenses, as one might think, but instead causes one to be without help (α συν|εργη' τους, 
col. 24.21n22), to have a bad reputation (υ  πο` | παντο`ς καταφρονουµε'νους), and to receive 
fewer favours ([υ  ]π’ ευ νοι'ας α πολυωρη' τους, col. 24.19n24). This entails that acquiring 
friends is the means to have a substantial income and financial security (col. 24.27n29). One 
should share one’s wealth like one sows seeds in the ground in the hope of a future harvest.  
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101. Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” 172–73.
102. The ‘sage’ here likely refers to Epicurus, but may refer to any authoritative Epicurean teacher.
 One may begin to think that Philodemus has a purely instrumental view of friends, yet 
he also advises generosity to friends even in economic hardship: when a deep shortage of 
money occurs (συµβα'σης α  δραñς κοιλο' τητος, col. 26.5), one should reduce expenditures on 
oneself more than one’s friends (col. 26.54n9), presumably out of concern for them, and/or to 
maintain a sense of decorum.103 He also gives to friends based on the demands of noble char-
acter (καλοκα[γ]αθι'ας, col. 25.44), and indulges in unnecessary but harmless desires on occa-
sion with friends (col. 26.1n4). The Epicurean not only gives generously to friends, but pro-
vides for friends’ lives posthumously (col. 27.5n12; recall Epicurus’ example above).
 Philodemus conceives of Epicurean friendship as involving a form of economic inter-
dependence, yet this interdependence obtains between friends who are relatively self-sufficient 
economically. The good Epicurean is never so constricted financially that he cannot give to 
his friends. Philodemus considers it a relatively straightforward matter to maintain one’s level 
of ‘natural wealth’, and the good Epicurean will do so, even if he does not have special exper-
tise for it, and is not continually concerned for making more (col. 16). No Epicurean discussed 
in this text is destitute or living near the subsistence level, and all are able to withdraw into 
leisure without needing to work. It is just not workable to be poor and live a full Epicurean 
life, for Philodemus, unless one is ‘poor’ in Philodemus’ luxurious sense. Only on a rare occa-
sion would it be absolutely necessary that one relies on one’s friends’ resources to live, for 
Philodemus and his friends do not face the troubles of subsistence-level living. For 
Philodemus, the Epicurean gives gifts mainly because such reciprocity is constitutive of 
friendship, which is essential for the best, most pleasurable life. 
 Giving gifts to others sustains a safety net of interdependence, and its constant pres-
ence in friendship provides freedom from fear and anxiety in the face of the unknown future. 
Yet, the net gets no real use most of the time, nor are Philodemus and his friends in much dan-
ger of falling into it. As I shall argue in chapter four, this kind of interdependence among self-
sufficient friends bears remarkable similarities to Epicurean friends’ morally formative inter-
dependence upon one another.
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103. Tsouna, Philodemus: On Property Management, 101–2.
CHAPTER THREE: PHILODEMUS’ THEOLOGY OF MORAL FORMATION
Epicurean theology is not an oxymoronic sham, so Philodemus argues against his numerous 
detractors. Pious worship of the gods is fundamental to the best human life offered by 
Epicureanism. Accordingly, one must account for the divine in order to grasp properly 
Philodemus’ view of reciprocal moral formation. The burden of this chapter is to answer two 
main questions, ‘How does Philodemus envision the gods’ involvement in moral formation?’, 
and ‘How does Philodemus understand an Epicurean’s assimilation to the gods?’ In chapter 
four I draw upon the theology outlined in this chapter in order to describe Philodemus’ 
conception and practice of reciprocal moral formation.
 As I shall show, the gods do not play a direct role in moral formation, for such a role is 
incompatible with their divine character. Rather, the gods are involved in moral formation 
only indirectly as objects of human thought, i.e., as models of the best life toward which 
humans strive. An Epicurean assimilates to the gods as he adopts their moral character and its 
consequent knowledge of the cosmos, and as he shares in their own perfect pleasure by 
personally attaining α ταραξι'α, the state of highest pleasure due to the absence of pain. It is 
particularly, though not exclusively, through worship that this assimilation to the divine 
occurs.
 In this presentation, I skirt the controversy over whether Epicureans have a ‘realist’ or 
‘idealist’ conception of the gods (see excursus for discussion at the end of this chapter). My 
interests lie in the functions of Philodemus’ theology for moral formation, and the claims I 
make in this respect do not require a particular resolution to that controversy.
 It is important first to offer a few orienting comments upon the texts which 
predominantly express that theology, On Gods and On Piety (section 3.1). Afterwards, I 
discuss Philodemus’ conception of the gods and their involvement in moral formation (section 
3.2), and his conception of Epicurean assimilation to the gods (section 3.3).
3.1. Introduction to On Gods and On Piety
As typical with the Herculaneum papyri, charred fragments remarkably but poorly preserve 
the texts of Philodemus’ On Piety and On Gods, our two best sources for Philodemus’ 
theology. Many of these original fragments are now lost, due either to the method used to 
unroll the papyrus and create the first apographs, and/or to the deterioration of the remaining 
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fragments over time (there are two sets of these first apographs, the Oxonian and Neapolitan 
apographs, now housed in the Bodleian library and Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli 
respectively). In what follows I give a brief description of each work.
. Portions of the first and third books remain from the originally multi-volume work On 
Gods (Περι` θεωñν, abbreviated henceforth as D., from its Latin title De diis). The first book 
discusses the fear of the gods and death, and the third book discusses various aspects of divine 
existence (e.g., their friendship, their blessedness, their conversation [in Greek], their sleep).1 
Hermann Diels produced the most recent complete edition of On Gods in 1916n17.2 Since that 
time no updated edition of the text has been made,3 though Holger Essler is currently working 
on a full edition of book three, of which he has published several sections.4
 The subscript of book one preserves (with partial reconstruction) the title and author as 
ΦΙΛΟ∆ΗΜ[ΟΥ] | ΠΕΡΙ ΘΕΩ[Ν], and the subscript of book three reads, with substantial 
reconstruction, ΦΙΛΟ∆ΗΜΟΥ | [Π]ΕΡΙ ΤΗ[Σ] [ΕΥΣΤΑΘΟΥΣ ΤΩΝ] | [Θ]ΕΩΝ 
∆ΙΑΓΩΓ[ΗΣ].5 Diels attributes the difference in book title from first to third as a function of 





1. See discussion of book one in Hermann Alexander Diels, Philodemos, Über die Götter: erstes und 
drittes Buch (1916–17; repr., Leipzig: Zentralantiquariat der deutschen demokratischen Republik, 1970), 1:49–
101, and overview of book three in Diels, Philodemos, Über die Götter, 2:7–10. The text of the first book stands 
upon fragments labelled under PHerc. 26, 89, 152, 157, 1100n1108, 1577n1579 (Diels, Philodemos, Über die 
Götter, 1:4). For the text of the third book, the relevant papyri are PHerc. 152, 157, which together were 
originally two halves of a single roll (see discussion in Diels, Philodemos, Über die Götter, 2:1–6; Holger Essler, 
“Die Arbeiten an Philodem, De Dis III [PHerc. 152/157]. Der Beitrag der Disegni zur Rekonstruktion der 
Fragmentreihenfolge,” Cronache Ercolanesi 34 [2004]: 153–204). The Oxonian and Neapolitan apographs were 
the first modern copies of On Gods, yet the first published editions follow the Neapolitan apographs: cf. the 
editio princeps of On Gods 3 in Angelo Antonio Scotti, Herculanensium Voluminum quae Supersunt. Tomus 
VINaples, 1839); the editio princeps of On Gods 1 in Iulius Minervini, ed., Herculanensium Voluminum Quae 
Supersunt. Tomus V, Collectio AlteraNaples, 1865). See also the edition of On Gods as a whole in Walter Scott, 
Fragmenta Herculanensia (Oxford: Clarendon, 1885), 93–252.
2. Though see the 11 columns missed by earlier editors and by Diels mentioned in Knut Kleve, “The 
Unknown Parts of Philodemus On the Gods, Book One, PHerc. 26,” in Epicureismo Greco e Romano: Atti del 
Congresso Internazionale, eds. Gabriele Giannantoni and Marcello Gigante (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1993), 671–81.
3. Despite the major contribution of Diels’  work, it was not done in concert with viewing the original 
papyri nor the original Oxonian apographs (a fact he acknowledges). Diels’ edition has drawn strong criticism, 
particularly from Knut Kleve, and for important reasons. Diels neglects break markers, he mistakes the 
transmission of individual letters, and he is overly ambitious in changing the apograph texts. Kleve remarks, 
‘Ohne Übertreibung darf man sagen, dass es im Diels’schen Text kaum eine Zeile gibt, die ohne Fehler ist.’ See 
Knut Kleve, “Zu einer Neuausgabe von Philodemos, Über die Götter, Buch I (PHerc. 26),” Cronache 
Ercolanesi 3 (1973): 89.
4. See Holger Essler, “Falsche Götter bei Philodem (Di III Kol. 8, 5 – Kol. 10, 6),” Cronache 
Ercolanesi 39 (2009): 161–205; Holger Essler, “Die Götterbewegung (Phld., Di III, Kol. 10, 6 – Kol. 11, 7) ,” 
Cronache Ercolanesi 42 (2012): 259–75; Holger Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter und Toten. Mit einer 
Neuedition von Phld., Di III, Frg. 87 und 83,” Cronache Ercolanesi 43 (2013): 95–111; Holger Essler, 
“Ehebruch bei Göttern und Steinen,” Cronache Ercolanesi 46 (2016): 101–8.
5. Diels, Philodemos, Über die Götter, 1:4, 45, 2:41.
6. Diels, Philodemos, Über die Götter, 2:1.
  Turning to On Piety (Περι` ευ σεβει'ας), this work first features a defence of Epicurus 
against charges of atheism and impiety, and second, a criticism of opposing views of piety as 
illustrated by selections from poets and philosophers ranging from Thales to Diogenes of 
Babylon.7 Dirk Obbink’s two-volume edition of the entire work, the first part of which was 
published in 1996, argues for a wide-scale reconstruction of the column order over against 
previous editions.8 Based on stichometric evidence, the work was approximately 10,277 lines, 
or 343 columns long, requiring two papyrus rolls, of which only a portion is preserved (for the 
first part of the text, with which this chapter deals primarily, Obbink estimates that 50% of the 
work remains).9  
 The title of the work is drawn from a comment near the end of the work in PHerc. 
1428, stating that the preceding discussion was ‘an account on the subject of piety according 
to’ or ‘on behalf of Epicurus’ (το`ν περι` τηñς ευ |σεβει'ας λο' γον τηñς | κατ Επικουρον, PHerc. 
1428 col. 15.23 Henrichs).10 Concerning authorship, given that the colophon at the end of 
PHerc. 1428 preserves only ‘Φ...’, scholars have designated either Philodemus 
(Φ[ΙΛΟ∆ΗΜΟΥ]) or Phaedrus (Φ[ΑΙ∆ΡΟΥ]) as the author.11 While there are clear 
similarities between On Piety and Philodemus’ other works, especially in content, diction, 




7. As argued in Dirk Obbink, ed., Philodemus: On Piety, Part 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 3, 94–96.
8. See bibliography and discussion of previous editions in Obbink, On Piety, 24–37. To summarize 
generally, Obbink bases his reconstruction on: (1) a discovery of a physical ‘join’ between two papyri previously 
thought to be separate (particularly PHerc. 1077 and 1098, together forming the outer, initial portion of the first 
scroll of On Piety) and thus the discovery of a framework for ordering all other fragments; (2) a reversal of the 
traditional numbering of the papyri fragments in light of the original method of numbering and transcribing the 
papyrus scroll from the inside out, i.e., from the end of the scroll to the beginning (the original technicians cut the 
charred scroll in half lengthwise, then transcribed the innermost layers of papyrus from the two halves, 
progressively removing further layers as they transcribed). See discussion and lucid explanation in Obbink, On 
Piety, 37–62.
The papyrus fragments preserving most of the text of On Piety are labelled under PHerc. 1077 and 1098 
for the first part of the treatise, and 1428 for the second, though smaller portions of the first part of the text are 
preserved in PHerc. 229, 242, 247, 437 (no longer extant), 452, 1114 (formerly 1788, fr. 9), 1077, 1610. See 
discussion in Obbink, On Piety, 37–58, esp. 54, n. 1; concerning the second part of On Piety in particular, see 
Adolf Schober, “Philodemi De Pietate Pars Prior,” Cronache Ercolanesi 18 (1988): 67, who describes as the 
‘first part’ what Obbink has shown to be the second.
9. Obbink, On Piety, 67, cf. 62–73.
10. The edition of this portion of On Piety is in Albert Henrichs, “Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie 
im PHerc. 1428,” Cronache Ercolanesi 4 (1974): 5–32.
11. Phaedrus was an Epicurean philosopher (138n70 BCE) who took over the leadership of the 
Epicurean school in Athens after Zeno of Sidon, and who also wrote a work (perhaps On Gods or On Piety) 
requested from Atticus by Cicero for the latter’s writing projects in 45 BCE (Cicero, Nat. d. 1.93; Att. 13.39; see 
Kirk Summers, “The Books of Phaedrus Requested by Cicero [Att. 13.39],” ClQ 47 [1997]: 309–11).
absence of Phaedrus’ work as a point of comparison.12 This study follows the traditional 
ascription of On Piety to Philodemus as the best hypothesis given the sparse evidence.13
3.2. The Epicurean Gods and their Role in Moral Formation
During Philodemus’ argument that Epicurean piety leads to the development of a just society, 
he states that justice arises as others strive not to harm anyone, in imitation of the gods’ own 
non-interfering, non-harming happiness (ευ δαιµονι'αν; Piet. col. 71.12n29[2043n2060]). 
Elsewhere he describes the Epicurean gods as ‘most worthy of emulation’ α ξιοζηλωτο' τατον 
(Piet. col. 45.9[1284]).14 In On Gods 3 col. 1.15n18, Philodemus assumes that the wise man 
will strive to approximate (συνεγγι'ζειν), touch (θιγειñν), and associate with (συνειñναι) the 
divine nature and character (see further discussion in section 3.3 below). In an intriguing 
passage, Philodemus affirms that Epicureans, unlike the Stoics, believe in a plurality of 
anthropomorphic gods, ‘not only all the gods of the Greeks, but many more besides’ (Piet. col. 
362).15 Of course, Epicureans have a revisionist take on the gods, and would deny that the 
gods are actually like the way they are portrayed traditionally (see Epicurus, Ep. Men. 
123n124). The present section sketches the character of the Epicurean gods and their role in 
moral formation, depending as much as possible on Philodemus’ texts, but adducing other 
Epicurean texts as needed.
 In Epicureanism, one must have a proper conception of the gods in order to live the 
best life.16 An improper view of the gods, e.g., as directly intervening in the world in response 
to human action, will lead to a life of fear and ignorance, destroying any hope of achieving the 




12. This applies also to the argument for Philodemean authorship from the apparent absence of 
Phaedrus’ works among the books preserved in the library at the Villa of the Papyri (see discussion in Obbink, 
On Piety, 88–99).
13. So too, e.g., Theodor Gomperz, Albert Henrichs, and Dirk Obbink (see Henrichs Henrichs, “Die 
Kritik der stoischen Theologie im PHerc. 1428,” 8–10; Obbink, On Piety, 98–99). Even if Phaedrus is the author 
of On Piety, what we know of Phaedrus seems to cohere with the general trajectory of Philodemus’ 
Epicureanism. This seems true particularly with respect to their relationship to Zeno of Sidon, who likely had a 
formative influence on both of them. Philodemus was his loyal student, and Phaedrus was his successor at the 
school in Athens. The author of On Piety appeals to the work of Zeno of Sidon for demonstrations (συναγωγαι`) 
of Epicurus’ fidelity to oaths and customary sacrifices (Piet. 51.19), while Philodemus’ work On Frank Criticism 
consists of lecture notes from Zeno’s teaching (subscript, PHerc. 1471, cf. Obbink, On Piety, 80).
14. Translation Obbink, ad loc. The citation of On Piety pt. 1 in this chapter features Obbink’s column 
and line number, followed by Obbink’s running line number for the whole work in square brackets.
15. See discussion in Dirk Obbink, “‘All Gods Are True’ in Epicurus,” in Traditions of Theology: 
Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002), 183–221.
16. On the controversy over ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ interpretations of Epicurean gods, see excursus 
below. It does not seem that a commitment on this question will determine the role of the gods in moral 
formation.
17. See Philodemus’ citation of Epicurus’ four-fold cure, or τετραφα'ρµακος in PHerc. 1005 col. 5.8n13: 
‘Nothing to fear in god, nothing expected in death, easily got is the good, easily born the bad’(α»φοβον ο   θεο' ς, 
Conversely, adopting the correct conception of the gods entails adopting the Epicurean view 
of the universe and human life within it (including, e.g., physics, epistemology, cosmology, 
happiness), because the claims of Epicurean theology involve the whole system.18 Theology 
provides an essential piece of the conceptual orientation needed to strive after the best human 
life within this universe, a life which the gods model for humanity.
 In what follows I examine four main characteristics of the gods: (1) their blessedness 
and (2) incorruptibility (taken as a pair in 3.2.1), (3) their lack of involvement with the human 
world (discussed in 3.2.2), and (4) their friendship among themselves (discussed in 3.2.3).
3.2.1. Blessedness and Incorruptibility
The gods have two fundamental characteristics, drawing from the first of Epicurus’ principle 
sayings (i.e., Κυ'ριαι ∆ο'ξαι, or Key Doctrines 1; see also Ep. Men. 123n124): their perfect 
blessedness and incorruptibility. Philodemus follows Epicurus in this respect: his definition of 
a pious person consists of one who preserves (σω' [ιζων], Piet. col. 40.13[1142]) in his 
conception of the divine ‘the immortality and consummate blessedness of God’ ([τ]η`ν 
α θαν[ασι'αν] | κα[ι` τ]η`ν α»κραν µα|κα[ριο' τητ]α τουñ θ[ε]ουñ, Piet. col. 40.10n12[1139n1141]), as 
opposed to the impious person who ascribes to the gods anything that contravenes these 
characteristics.19
 The gods’ blessedness refers to their existence in a perfect state of ευ δαιµονι'α 
according to an Epicurean framework (i.e., they exist in a state of perfect pleasure and 
freedom from all pain),20 while their incorruptibility refers to their natural ability to sustain 
this perfect state indefinitely. Both of these qualities involve the gods’ moral character. They 
are models of moral perfection in the perfect stability of their consummate happiness, for the 
virtues are necessary ingredients of such perfection. Thus, the gods are perfectly self-sufficient 
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α ν[υ' ]ποπτον ο   θα' νατος και` τ’α γαθο`ν µε`ν ευ»κτητον, το` δε` δεινο`ν ευ εκκα[ρ]τε'ρητον, translation Obbink, On 
Piety, 536); see also Epicurus, KD 1n4.
18. See Jaap Mansfeld, “Theology,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, eds. Keimpe 
Algra, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 463–64; Obbink, On Piety, 4–6. Though the issue 
is complex, one may say generally that Epicurean theology arises out of its physics, given that knowledge of the 
gods is based on an atomic, empirical epistemology, as noted in Richard McKirahan, “Epicurean Doxography in 
Cicero,” in Epicureismo Greco e Romano: Atti del Congresso Internazionale, eds. Gabriele Giannantoni and 
Marcello Gigante (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1993), 869, n. 24.
19. Translation Obbink, ad loc. See also references to the gods as τωñν µακαρι'ων [ζω' ]ιων (D. 1 col. 24.6, 
15n16; 2.9n11); as those who are ειδαι'µονας (sic) | κ[αι`] α διαλυ' τους (D. 3 col. 13.37n38). The spelling of 
ειδαι'µονας is mistaken, though whether this is because of Diels’s error or that of his sources is not clear. 
Philodemus also criticizes some who ask the gods in prayer for acts that were unworthy of their incorruptibility 
and blessedness,  αφθα[ρ]σι'α[ς] | αυ τωñν και` παντελουñς | µακαρι[ο' ]τητος, (Piet. col. 10.3n5[263n265]).
20. On freedom from pain, see, e.g., the witness of Philodemus in Piet. col. 7.17n24[189n196], citing 
Epicurus’ work On Gods, ‘And according to Epicurus in On Gods ... divine nature appears to be that which is not 
of the nature that partakes of pains’, with the key phrase being το` µη` τηñς | [φυ'σεως ον] µετεχου' |[σης τωñ ]ν 
α λγηδο' [νων]; translation Obbink, ad loc.
(αυ τα' ρκης) as individuals to provide their own perfect pleasure and maintain such a state (as 
Philodemus affirms in D. 3 fr. 84.4n5; 85.5n7). 
3.2.2. Lack of Involvement in the Human World
Fundamental among the implications of the gods’ blessedness and incorruptibility is that they 
do not intervene in the human realm.21 This must be so because the blessedness of the gods 
(their perfect freedom from disturbance) requires that they be free from work (α λειτου' ργητος, 
Epicurus, Ep. Pyth. 97), and because ‘trouble and care and anger and kindness are not 
consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness 
and fear and dependence on neighbours’ (ου  γα`ρ συµφωνουñσιν πραγµατειñαι και` φροντι'δες και` 
ο ργαι` και` χα' ριτες µακαριο' τητι, α λλ’ εν α σθενει'α,  και` φο' βω,  και` piροσδεη' σει τωñν πλησι'ον 
ταυñτα γι'νεται, Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 77; cf. KD 1; VS 1).22 If they were directly involved, 
entailing the weaknesses described, this would contradict their fundamental characteristics 
according to Epicurean theology, and remove one of the key bases for a human life free from 
pain and fear (cf. Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 73n78; Ep. Men. 123n124). Philodemus shares this basic 
understanding and its application to the issue of the gods’ non-intervention in the world (e.g., 
Philodemus, D. 1 col. 12). The happiness of the gods entails that they do not harm others,23 
and indeed that they have no concern for the human world.24 
 However, Philodemus (drawing explicitly on Epicurus) introduces complexity at this 
point, for while affirming that the gods are not involved directly in human affairs, he 
nevertheless desires to affirm that the gods do cause benefit and harm to humans in a certain 
way, as is typically thought of them. Referring to Epicurus and his founding circle, 
Philodemus remarks, ‘And they allow for the production of benefits from the gods for good 




21. R. W. Sharples sees the Epicureans as following in the wake of Aristotelean theology, in which God 
is similarly separated from the world (R. W. Sharples, “Aristotelian Theology After Aristotle,” in Traditions of 
Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath [Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2002], 1–
40). A. J. Festugiére notices a contrast between the god of Plato’s Laws, who takes pity on the suffering of 
humans and gives them festivals in which humans might communicate with the gods and live better lives as a 
result (Plato, Leg. 2 653dn654a; A. J. Festugière, Epicurus and His Gods, trans. C. W. Chilton [Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1956], 62–63).
22. Translation Bailey, ad loc.; Cyril Bailey, Epicurus.
23. Philodemus states that the gods’ blessedness itself comes from not harming anyone, ε |πειδη' περ εξ 
αβλα|βι'ας ε'θεωρειñτο το[ι']ς | παñσιν ερχοµε'νη, (with the subject of ε'θεωρειñτο and ερχοµε'νη referring to the gods’ 
ευ δαιµονι'αν preceding, Piet. col. 71.19n22[2050n2053]).
24. In D. 3 col. 7.3n10, though heavily reconstructed by Diels, Philodemus seems to apply the 
blessedness of the gods to rule out exercising care over humanity and the world, because such work would harm 
the tranquillity of the gods (ευ δι'ας), who are naturally without work or toil (α π[ο' νους και` α ]κο' [πους] ειò|[ναι] δειñ 
[λε'γειν οι]κει'ω[ς του ς θεου' ς]). See also the similar application by Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman, who criticises 
the over-worked Stoic god in Cicero, Nat. d. 1.52n53; see discussion in Diels, Philodemos, Über die 
Götter, 1:54–55.
βλα' βας] | τοιñς κακ[οιñς κατα]|λει'πουσι[ν], Piet. col. 36.9n13[1023n1027]).25 This affirmation 
is likely motivated by his desire to account for popular conceptions of the gods with his 
Epicurean perspective, and to carve a middle path between two extremes: the less-than-
perfect, interventionist gods of traditional religion, and the god of Philodemus’ often Stoic 
opponents, who is the cause of no harm or benefit to humans at all.26 As part of his defence 
against the charge of Epicurean impiety, Philodemus affirms that there are in fact positive 
benefits and negative consequences for life based on one’s piety or impiety, and that 
Epicureanism offers the way toward the most pious and most beneficial life, both individually 
and for society as a whole (precisely what seemed to be at stake for some opponents of 
Epicureanism, as in Cicero, Nat. d. 1.2).
 In order to resolve this tension between the gods’ involvement and non-involvement in 
Philodemus, it seems that one must interpret that such benefit and harm from the gods refers 
only to the consequences of human conceptions about the gods, whether true or false.27 Thus, 
the gods are not directly involved in human life, as though personally bestowing favours and 
punishing wrongdoers, but they are indirectly involved in that they model the telos of the best 
human life, a life which itself generates benefits as one imitates the gods. The gods indirectly 
harm humans in that they conversely illuminate the opposite of the best life and its self-
generating evils.28
 This interpretation seems likely given that immediately after affirming the indirect 




25. Further examples from On Piety (translations Obbink, ad loc.): citing from Epicurus’ On Gods, 
Philodemus asserts that god is the cause (αιτι'α) of ‘retribution’ (ν[εµε'σεως]) and ‘salvation’ (σωτηρι'α[ς]), col. 
37.1n5[1045n1050]; according to book 6 of Epicurus’ On Nature, those who are just are moved by virtuous 
influences both from themselves and from the gods: [κ]αι` ευ ο'ρκους | [και` δι]και'ους ταιñς α |[ρ]ι'σταις διαδο'σε|[σι] 
κινειñσθαι και` πα|ρ’ αυ  του`ς και` παρ’ ε |κει'νους, col. 38.10n15[1082n1087]; just after defining the pious person as 
one who preserves the gods’ blessedness and immortality, Philodemus assumes that this person believes that good 
and ill are sent to us by god in a manner compatible with such piety, col. 40.18n26 [1147n1155]; Philodemus 
seems to refer to benefits from the gods ‘by which things our life is preserved,’ oιðς ο   βι'ος η  [µ]ωñν | διασω' ζεται, 
col. 49.2n3 [1394n1395]; Philodemus defends against opponents who think that Epicureans ‘deprive good and 
just men of the fine expectations which they have of the gods,’ τα`[ς] καλα`ς | ελπι'δας ας εν τοιñς | [θ]εοιñς ε»χουσι, 
col. 49.19n25 [1412n1418]; see, similarly, col. 81.11n21[2343n2353].
26. Philodemus refers to the Stoics particularly in Piet. pt. 2, PHerc. 1428 col. 12.13n32; see text and 
discussion in Obbink, On Piety, 462–64.
27. As argued by an irrealist understanding of the gods in Obbink, On Piety, 458–64. However, it may 
be argued that a similar function obtains in a realist understanding of the gods, in which the gods send out atoms 
without intention or effort, which then become the basis for right thought about them, as understood by Holger 
Essler, Glückselig und unsterblich: Epikureische Theologie bei Cicero und Philodem, Schwabe Epicurea 2 
(Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2011), 357–58.
28. Dirk Obbink raises the objection that on this reading, there is no reason for Philodemus to use the 
language that the gods cause harm, but should rather say that one’s ideas of them cause harm. By means of his 
idealist interpretation of Epicurean theology, he argues that the false conceptions of the gods have the same 
ontological status as the true conceptions of the gods, as both are thought-constructs (Obbink, On Piety, 464). 
One need not make appeal to the idealist interpretation to explain this, and on both realist and idealist 
interpretations, Philodemus creates difficulties in his use of language indicating that the gods are directly 
involved, which must be interpreted as something other than direct involvement to avoid contradiction.
humans need nothing from the gods: the good receive benefit from them ‘not out of weakness 
or because we have need of anything from God,’ [ο]υ  κατ’ α σθε' [νειαν, ου ]|δε` καθα' περ [η  µειñν 
εκ]| του θεουñ τι[νος δε' ]|ον, col. 36.22n25[1036n1039]). Thus Philodemus seems to say that 
there is nothing humans need from the gods which is not already available for living the best 
life. 
 As an aside recalling the beginning of this chapter, the present discussion helps to 
clarify the mode of the gods’ involvement in moral formation: this mode consists only in 
human conceptions about the gods. Just as the benefit and harm from the gods is based only 
on human conception and appropriation of their model for human life, so too is the gods’ 
involvement in moral formation. Being perfect themselves, the gods obviously do not provide 
a model for how to progress in such formation, though their model does highlight human 
deficiencies. Several passages provide evidence for this role of the gods in human conception, 
foremost being Philodemus’ definition of piety (examined in part above, Piet. col. 40), which 
states that piety is fundamentally a matter of right human conception about the gods: ‘For 
pious is the person who preserves the immortality and consummate blessedness of God 
together with all the things included by us; but impious is the person who banishes either 
where God is concerned.’29
 Recognising that the gods present a model for humans, perhaps even in their non-
intervention in the cosmos beyond themselves, it seems valuable to probe yet further, and 
clarify precisely why the gods’ cannot be involved in human affairs, to clarify what is at stake 
for the gods’ character in excluding direct involvement in the world. By probing further one 
may better understand the model presented for humans, and be in a better position to judge 




29. Translation Obbink, ad loc., [ο«σιος] | γα`ρ ο   τη`ν α θαν[ασι'αν] | κα[ι` τ]η`ν α»κραν µα|κα[ριο' τητ]α τουñ 
θ[ε]ουñ | σω' [ιζων συ`]ν α«πασι[ν] τ[οιñς συ]ναπτοµ[ε' ]|νο[ις η  µιñν· α ]σεβη`ς δε` | piερ[ι` θεο`]ν ος ε κα' [τε]|ρον [εξορ]ι'ζει, 
(Piet. col. 40.9n17[1138n1146]). See also the following: Epicurus’ injunction to Menoeceus to hold, concerning 
the gods, what is able to protect their blessedness and incorruptibility (παñν δε` το` φυλα' ττειν αυ τουñ δυνα'µενον τη`ν 
µετ’ αφθαρσι'ας µακαριο' τητα περι` αυ τουñ δο' ξαζε), Ep. Men. 123); Epicurus’ warning that from failing to think of 
the gods rightly, ‘the inconsistency itself will produce the greatest disturbance in our souls’ (το`ν µε'γιστον 
τα'ραχον εν ταιñς ψυχαιñς αυ τη` η   υ  πεναντιο' της παρασκευα'σει), Ep. Hdt. 77; Philodemus’ reference to ‘our views’ 
on the gods as the ‘true cause of our tranquillity’ (trans. Obbink; η  µειñς δε` π[α' ν]|τες ω  ς α ληθηñ τα` | δο' γµατα και` 
παρ[α]|σκευασ[τικ]α` τηñς η  |µωñν αυ τωñν α τα[ρα]ξι'ας, Piet. col. 47.14n19[1348n1353]); Philodemus’ reference to 
Epicurus’ On Holiness, in which Epicurus calls followers to guard against personal defilement by guarding 
oneself mentally, attending to the best, divine life, and thus comporting oneself to it, col. 
44.17n45.2[1263n1287], with commentary on this heavily reconstructed passage in Obbink, On Piety, 498–500; 
Philodemus remarks in On Music col. 4.6, ‘Let it suffice to say now that the divine needs no mark of honour, but 
that it is natural for us to honour it, in particular by forming pious notions of it, and secondly by offering with 
each individual usage the traditional sacrifices’ (the essential clause in Greek: η  µιñν δε` φυσικο' ν εστιν αυ το` τιµαñν 
µα'λιστα µε`[ν] ο  σι'αις [υ  ]πολη' [ψ]εσιν; translation Obbink, On Piety, 391). See discussion on this general point in 
Obbink, On Piety, 9–11; Festugière, Epicurus and His Gods, 61.
30. One might recognize one possible result of the gods’ non-involvement: if humans imitate them 
strictly, then they too will not be involved in the lives of others beyond their concern for personal pleasure, and 
thus not involved in communal moral formation.
 Immediately after Philodemus sets out his definition of piety as preserving the gods’ 
blessedness and immortality (entailing self-sufficiency and non-involvement with the world), 
he goes on to state, ‘And the person who sees also that the good and ill sent us by God come 
without any unhealthy anger or benevolence, declares that God has no need of human things’ 
(ο   δε` [επινο]ωñν χωρι`ς | ο ργηñ[ς και`] χα' ριτος | α σθενου' σης τα`ς ε |ξ αυ τουñ παρασκε[υα`ς]| τωñν 
α [γα]θωñν κα[ι`]| τωñ [ν κακ]ωñν α πο[φαι']|νετ’ [αυ το`ν τ]ωñν α ν|θρω[πει'ω]ν µηδ[ε]|νο`[ς 
προς]δειñσθαι, Piet. col. 40.18n26[1147n1155]).31 Philodemus’ reference to ο ργη'  and χα' ρις 
recalls the very first of Epicurus’ principle doctrines (KD 1), examined above.
 Based on this passage, it seems the issue at stake for Philodemus is that the gods’ 
cannot be involved in a certain way, i.e., entailing weakness and dependence upon others (esp. 
upon humans), via ο ργη'  or χα' ρις. The nouns in the prepositional phrase χωρι`ς | ο ργηñ[ς και`] 
χα' ριτος | α σθενου' σης (Piet. col. 40.18n20 [1147n1149]) seem to refer to an inner state of the 
gods, corresponding with divine action toward humans, given that the immediate context 
concerns the gods’ sending good and evil to humans. Additionally, this inner state of ο ργη'  or 
χα' ρις and its corresponding action toward humans would seem to be in response to prior 
human action. This responsive anger or benevolence is at play earlier in col. 36 (the same 
context and discussion as col. 40), in which Philodemus reports that Epicurus and his early 
students claim divine benefits and harms correspond to good and bad people (το` δε` 
περ[αι'νεσθαι ω ]|φελι'ας εκ [θεωñν τοιñς] | α γαθοιñς κα[ι` βλα' βας] | τοιñς κακ[οιñς κατα]|λει'πουσι[ν], 
Piet. col. 36.9n13 [1023n1027]).32 I understand the use of χα' ρις here to refer to the gods’ 
feeling of ‘favour’ or ‘gratitude’ toward a human recipient on the basis of some past, pleasing 
behaviour,33 thus in parallel to the feeling of anger or wrath towards humans on the basis of 
some irritating or affronting action. It seems the participle α σθενου' σης would thus refer to 
both nouns.34
 But why is it that ο ργη' , or χα' ρις involve weakness and dependence on others? To 
understand this connection, one must understand how Philodemus conceives of ο ργη'  and 
χα' ρις, which we can glean from Philodemus’ treatises on these very subjects.35
 In the case of anger, even the good, natural anger of the Epicurean sage, the emotion 
depends in large part on the concomitant judgements one makes concerning the magnitude of 




31. Translations Obbink, ad loc.
32. See also the Epicurean expectation of the greatest benefit from the gods for the pious recorded later 
in Piet. col. 81.11n21[2343n2353].
33. I.e., the meaning corresponding to LSJ, s.v. χα'ρις, 2.
34. See discussion in Obbink, On Piety, 485–87; Festugière, Epicurus and His Gods, 61, 71, n.66. 
Nussbaum and DeWitt interpret similarly, though concerning anger and favour in Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 77/KD 1/VS 
1; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994], 249–51); Norman 
W. DeWitt, “The Epicurean Doctrine of Gratitude,” AJP 58 (1937): 320.
35. See On Anger (Περι` ο ργηñς, PHerc. 182), latest edition in G. Indelli, Filodemo, L’Ira, La Scuola Di 
Epicuro 5 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988); On Gratitude (Περι` χα'ριτος, P.Herc. 1414), latest edition in Adele 
Tepedino Guerra, “Filodemo sulla gratitudine,” Cronache Ercolanesi 7 (1977): 96–113.
friends), and the appropriate punishment necessary to protect one’s natural goods (On Anger 
col. 37.20n38.9).36 ‘Empty’ anger (κενη` ο ργη' ), however, judges falsely in these respects, 
either judging the offence to be greater than it actually is (due to a failure to value goods 
appropriately), or judging the appropriate punishment to be harsher than needed. For a god to 
respond in anger to a human must mean that the god has judged some natural, necessary good 
to be harmed by that person, but this judgement must be rooted in a false judgement of ‘need’ 
which cannot obtain for the gods, for they have all they need by definition.37
 In the case of χα' ρις, the connection to weakness and dependence on others seems to 
arise from the fact that expressions of χα' ρις, whether referring to unsolicited, beneficent gifts 
to others (especially friends), or to a grateful return gift, involve interdependence and 
reciprocity based on needs. In On Property Management, Philodemus argues that the sage will 
engage in generous, unsolicited beneficence to his friends as part of his income management, 
expecting a reciprocal gift in return; likewise, being stingy to others leads to poverty (col. 
24n25; 26.3, examined above in ch. two). In On Anger, Philodemus seems to assume that the 
sage will feel gratefulness (ευ χαριστι'α, ευ χαριστε'ω) to those who have given him needed 
gifts, but a gratefulness measured to the value of the gift judged by an Epicurean framework 
(col. 46.18n35; 48.18n37).38 Though Philodemus’ work On Gratitude is very poorly 
preserved, it seems one can discern in it similar themes; the true friend is eager to provide for 
the needs of other friends.39 Thus, a god cannot express χα' ρις, because a god cannot receive 
any benefit from humans that is needed or valuable to them, to which an act of χα' ρις responds, 
nor can they engage in any interdependent relationship of reciprocity with them based on 
need. 
 It is less clear from these passages why a god could not self-sufficiently bestow χα' ρις 
to humans without being implicated in an interdependent, need-based reciprocal relationship 
with them. Yet, in this case, it seems that such an intentional act of χα' ρις would contravene 
the gods’ serene lack of concern beyond themselves, involving them in affairs which would 
proffer no potential pleasure, and generating concern which would detract from their 




36. On healthy and unhealthy, or ‘natural’ and ‘empty’ anger, see discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, 221–30. See also Tsouna’s helpful overview of the dispositional, cognitive and affective nature of 
emotions as ‘content-sensitive states’ in Philodemus, Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 38–44. 
37. In On Anger col. 14.1n6, Philodemus argues that those who exercise empty anger actually imitate 
the traditional gods of Olympian mythology, seeking revenge for their own honour’s sake, naming Zeus (col. 
16.12; 43.3); Apollo and Artemis (16.19n24); and perhaps Dionysius (16.24); see Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, 211–12, n. 55.
38. See discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 231–34. Diogenes Laertius records that the 
Epicurean school taught that the wise man alone will have gratitude to his friends, here using the word χα'ρις: 
µο' νον τε χα'ριν ε«ξειν το`ν σοφο' ν (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.118).
39. See On Gratitude col. 10.6n18, and discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 119–21.
D. 3 col. 7.3n10).40 This issue receives further clarification in the discussion of divine 
friendship below.
 A final text from On Anger provides further assistance in understanding the weakness 
of ο ργη'  and χα' ρις. Helpfully, the passage is an interpretation of Epicurus’ KD 1. In On Anger 
43.14n41, Philodemus rehearses opponents’ criticisms of the Epicurean description of ο ργη'  
and χα' ρις as weak. Opponents argue that if Alexander the Great, the greatest and strongest 
man, ‘was subject to frequent outbursts of anger and did favours for countless men’ 
(’Αλεξα' νδρο[υ] ... ο ργαιñς τε πολλαιñς συν|εσχηµε'νου, και` κεχαρισ|µε'νου µυρι'οις, 43.25n29), 
how can Epicureans describe ο ργη'  and χα' ρις as weak (α σθενηñ, 43.18; εν α σθενει'αι, 43.23)?41 
Based on the context, it is difficult to determine precisely what is meant by χα' ρις here, but it 
seems to include both acts of beneficence generally, and favours offered in return for a prior, 
received benefit. Philodemus responds by embracing the idea that ο ργη'  and χα' ρις are natural 
to weakness; every human being has the weakness of ‘a disposition and nature receptive of 
death and pain’ (η   δεκτ[ι]κη` | κατασκευη` και` φυ' σις θανα' |του και` α λγηδο' νων, 43.32n34).42 
One may thus interpret confidently that Philodemus understands the contrast of KD 1 to refer 
to divine existence (blessedness, incorruptibility) and normal human existence (weakness, 
dependence on others, concern, trouble, fear, pain, death).43 Philodemus interprets that the 
presence of ο ργη'  and χα' ρις in human life arises from weakness, in that both involve the 
satisfaction of natural desires in a struggle over against pain and death. On one hand, anger is 
a natural response to another’s intentionally hindering the achievement of one’s natural 
desires; on the other, χα' ρις is either a natural response to another’s intentional satisfaction of 
one’s own needs, or a natural stance of beneficence to others for the reciprocal meeting of 
needs. This passage confirms the previous observations concerning the interrelationship 
between weakness, interdependence, ο ργη' , and χα' ρις, and the exclusion of such from the gods 
in order to maintain their self-sufficiency.
3.2.3. Divine Friendship
The final aspect of the gods’ life analyzed here is their divine friendship. Our main source for 
friendship among the gods is Philodemus’ On Gods 3. As an integral part of their perfect 




40. As argued by, e.g., J. M. Rist, Epicurus: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1972), 148; Mansfeld, “Theology,” 462–64; A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 63.
41. Translation Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 225.
42. Translation Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 225.
43. Thus the human life necessarily involves work, care, anger, gratitude, weakness (subjection to death 
and pain), fear, and dependence on others.
in Greek, or a language similar to it (D. 3 col. 14.6n14). This wise conversation is a means for 
‘unspeakable pleasure’ for them (α»φατον η  δονη`ν, col. 14.6), given their mutually perfect 
character (Philodemus refers to the gods as dialogue partners similar in character, the 
σπουδαιñοι).44 Following the teaching of Hermarchus, Philodemus asserts that the indissoluble 
happiness of the gods cannot be without ‘speaking or conversing with one another,’ but is 
instead like human friendship in this respect (µη` φωνουñντας µηδ’ α λλη' λοις διαλεγοµε'νους, 
α λλα` τοιñς ενεοιñς α νθρω' ποις ο  µοι'ους, D. 3 col. 13.38n40). 
 Knowing Philodemus’ repeated concern to distinguish the gods from human 
weaknesses and needs for others of any kind, it is surprising to find that, as part of this divine 
friendship, Philodemus affirms the sharing of needs (χρει'ας, D. 3 fr. 83.2), feelings (τα` πα' θη, 
fr. 87.27 Essler),45 and mutual gratification (χαρι'ζεσθαι ... α λλη' λοις, fr. 85.2) among the gods. 
Philodemus claims that there is no obstacle against friendship among the gods, and indeed 
without such friendship, the gods would not be perfectly happy (ου κ αν ηòσαν | τε'λειοι κατ’ 
ευ δαιµονι'αν), though cautiously remarking immediately after this statement, ‘if indeed that is 
possible to say’.46 This friendship, Philodemus is eager to point out, does not operate with the 
same conditions as human friendship, for the gods are completely self-sufficient and engage in 
pleasurable friendship only on that basis.47 The gods choose to receive from others what they 
already have in themselves, namely, their own most perfect pleasure, and are not individually 
deficient, or dependent on other gods in any way (fr. 83.2n6; 85.2n7).48
 It seems unclear how to resolve this tension between the gods’ self-sufficiency and 




44. α»[λλως τε] και τηñς | προ`ς του`ς ο  µοι'ου[ς] τοιñς σπουδαι'ο[ις] κοινολογι'ας α» |φατον η  δονη`ν 
καταχεου' σης (col. 14.4n6). See discussion in David Armstrong, “Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship: 
Cicero Vs the Herculaneum Papyri,” in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, eds. Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. 
Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 127–28.
45. See new critical edition of fr. 87.21n83.8 in Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter”.
46. The relevant text, as reconstructed by Diels, with the relative clause beginning with ας being the 
most important portion: [τ]α`ς απ’ α λλη' λων κοµι'ζ[ον]ται χρει'|ας, ας ει µη` α πελα'µβανον, ου κ αν ηòσαν | τε'λειοι 
κατ’ ευ δαιµονι'αν, ε[ι» γ’ ε»]ξεστιν λε' |γειν, και` µηδε` κατα` τουñτ’ εµποδι'ζεσθαι πρ[ο`ς] | τη`ν τηñς φιλι'ας εν αυ τοιñς 
απο' ληψιν; D. 3 fr. 84.2n6.
47. Philodemus approximates this divine friendship in terms of human friendship by comparing it to the 
pleasure derived from one’s memory of a deceased friend, who no longer contributes to one’s external needs, but 
whose memory provides one with pleasure (D. 3 fr. 87.29n83.2 Essler). This passage has been newly edited by 
Holger Essler, making possible this new reading of the passage which was previously obscure (see Essler, 
“Freundschaft der Götter”). The analogy breaks down, however, for the gods are utterly self-sufficient, and do 
not derive any needed benefit from the pleasure of friendship. On the other hand, Epicurus taught that in human 
life, the pleasure from such memories provides needed security against pain (Epicurus, VS 34; 39). As noted 
above, Epicurus himself testifies to this in a letter written from his deathbed, in which he describes the 
pleasurable memory of Idomeneus’ past friendship, which enables him to endure the pain of his dysentery and 
strangury (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.22). 
48. Fr. 85.2n7: καν χαρι'ζεσθαι τοιγαρουñν α λλη' λοις | του`ς θεου`ς τιθωñµεν, ω  ς ενλει'πουσι µε|τα' δοσι'ν 
τινων οικει'ων ποιοιµε'νους ου  | ρ  ητε'ον· α«παντε[ς γ]α`[ρ και`] αυ τα'ρκως ε αυτοιñς | παρασκευαστικοι` τηñς 
τελειοτα' της η  δο|[νηñ]σ ει[σιν]; fr. 83.4n6: ει κ[αι`] δυ' νανται δι’ αυ τωñν παρασκευα' ζεσ|[θαι], καθα'περ η  µειñς ενι'οτε 
παρα` ταυñτ’ εχον|[τω]ν. See David Armstrong, “Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship,” 126–27.
the gods engage in such friendship.49  One answer may be that divine friendship is simply 
assumed; such friendship is an application of idealized human experience to the gods. For 
example, Philodemus supports his claim that the gods cannot lack conversation with one 
another by the argument that the gods cannot be envisioned as less able than humans, who 
enjoy the pleasures of speech and friendship despite their weaknesses (D. 3 col. 13.40n14.6).50 
The tension does not seem to be an issue for Philodemus. It at least seems clear that 
Philodemus denies that the gods have a need for one another rooted in personal, individual 
deficiency, and that Philodemus values (self-sufficient) friendship as a necessary, pleasurable 
component of even the best, divine life.
 Returning briefly to the question of divine expressions of χα' ρις, why may the gods 
show χα' ρις to one another, but not to human beings? It seems that the answer lies in the 
character of the givers and recipients of χα' ρις.51 The gods may do favours for one another in a 
self-sufficient way because they do so effortlessly in a perfectly pleasurable, self-sufficient 
friendship with another god, and because their state of perfect happiness necessarily involves 
such pleasurable friendships with other gods. A god has something that is actually valuable to 
give to another god, unlike human beings. To show χα' ρις to a human being, however, is not 
compatible with divine happiness, because such a relationship by definition involves a 
harmful friendship with someone who is naturally weak, prone to pain, and dependent on 
others (recall Philodemus’ interpretation of human weakness in On Anger col. 43.14n41 
above). It seems that because god and human are unequal in nature, there cannot be friendship 
or acts of χα' ρις between them.52 
3.2.4. Summary
In the preceding discussion we have seen that the gods model the telos of the best life in their 
blessedness and incorruptibility. The gods are utterly self-sufficient, morally perfect, and 
completely lack vulnerability to pain and deprivation. The gods are not directly involved, 
therefore, in the human world because they have no reason to be, as they cannot receive harm 




49. Diels expresses his inability to solve this paradox, Diels, Philodemos, Über die Götter, 4:8.
50. A similar argument supports the statement that the gods speak Greek; Greek is the language of the 
wisest human beings, and thus the gods must speak it as well, or something similar to it.
51. The issue cannot be the act of demonstrating χα'ρις  per se, for the gods show favour to one another 
(χαρι'ζεσθαι ... α λλη' λοις, D. 3 fr. 85.2).
52. This is reminiscent of the contrast between the ideal friendship of the most virtuous and that of 
unequal friends in Aristotle’s conception. In an unequal relationship, the more virtuous side gives in such a way 
that it can never be repaid from the less virtuous (citing examples of parents to children, philosophers to students, 
and gods to men: Eth. nic. 9.1.1164b1–6; Eth. eud. 7.12.1245a15–19). Such a relationship for Aristotle is less 
than an ideal friendship. Philodemus appears to be arguing, roughly, that it is not in the gods’ nature or interests 
to engage in such unequal relationships.
of their existence. By reaching a correct conception of them, an Epicurean begins walking the 
path toward the best life. Conversely, failure to conceive of them properly leads to a life of 
suffering. The gods are not friends with humans, but they are friends with one another as an 
essential part of their own perfect happiness, though without any implication that the gods are 
somehow interdependent upon one another out of personal deficiency.
3.3. Assimilation to the Gods
Having outlined the model which the gods present for Epicureans, the second task is then to 
describe in what ways Epicureans can reach it, and in what ways they cannot. This section 
divides into two subsections, with the first concerning the divine characteristics of the best 
mortal life (3.3.1), and the second concerning the means of orienting oneself to the gods and 
thus living a ‘divine’ mortal life, particularly via worship (3.3.2). The goal here is not to give 
a comprehensive description of human moral maturity, but to illustrate the extent to which the 
divine model is applicable for Epicureans.
3.3.1. Becoming like the Gods, insofar as Mortals Can
In this section, I explain what it might mean to Philodemus to become like the gods. In doing 
so, I must draw on other Epicurean sources beyond Philodemus, for his extant texts do not 
offer a sustained discussion of this. We begin with two particularly lucid references to the 
imitation of the gods in Philodemus, the first from On Gods, the second from On Piety.
 As noted above, in On Gods 3 col. 1, Philodemus assumes that the wise man will 
strive to imitate the gods.53 Philodemus makes such an assumption in the midst of discussing 
whether gods and humans can be called friends. They cannot in any normal sense of the term, 
Philodemus argues (col. 1.6n9 Diels), ‘For it is not possible for those who are unacquainted to 
have knowledge of one another. Therefore, one may not say that the gods are truly friends of 
all of the sages in the world.’ (του`ς γα`[ρ] α πει'ρους [ο]υ  δυνατο`ν α λλη' λο[ις] | [ει]ς γνωñσιν 
αφικνειñσθαι. ∆ιο' περ ουñ [π]α' [ντων] | τωñν ε [ν] τηñι [γηñι σο]φωñν φ[ι']λους α»ν τις ει»ποι | [το]υ`[ς 
θεου`ς] α [ληθ]ωñ [ς]...).54
 Yet, there is a sense in which the sage and the gods could be called friends. 




53. See discussion in Diels, Philodemos, Über die Götter, 3:6–8.
54. See also Armstrong’s translation and discussion in David Armstrong, “Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean 
Friendship,” 127.
 ... τοιñς θεοιñς, και` θαυµα' ζει τη`ν φυ' σιν | [κα]ι` τη`ν δια' θεσιν και` πειραñται συνεγγι'|[ζει]ν  
 αυ τηñι και` καθα' περ ειñ γλι'χεται θιγε[ιñ]ν | [και` συ]νειñναι, καλει'τω και` του`ς σοφου`ς τωñν | 
 [θεωñ ]ν φι'λους και` του`ς θεου`ς τωñν σοφωñν. | [ Α λλ’ ο]υ κ εοικαµε' [ν που] τα` τοιαυñτα τη`ν 
 φι|[λι'αν] ερειñν, ω«στε βε'λτε[ιο]ν αυ τα` τα` πρα' γµα|τα [σκ]οπειñν, τα` δ[ε`] ρ  [ηµατ’ 
 α χρ]η' στως µη` παρα|βια' ζεσθαι·
 [lacuna] ... to the gods (?), and (insofar as) he (the sage) marvels at the (their)  
 nature and disposition, and tries to approximate it even as if he yearns to touch (it) and 
 to be joined with (it), one might call sages friends of the gods, and the gods friends of  
 the sages. But it perhaps does not seem right for us to call these things friendship, so 
 that it is better to consider the same matters, but not to force the words uselessly. 
 (D. 3 col. 1.14nfr. 85.2 Diels)
Philodemus does not want to call it friendship, but he assumes that the sage has a relationship 
to the gods. This relationship is based in the sage’s own marvelling at the gods’ nature and 
disposition (likely involving all of their characteristics outlined above, i.e., their perfect moral 
character, their happiness, their incorruptibility, etc.), and his attempt to ‘draw near to’ or 
‘approximate’ (συνεγγι'ζω) the same.
 Elsewhere, in On Piety, Philodemus argues that imitation of the Epicurean gods best 
leads to justice in society, against Epicureanism’s detractors.55 Philodemus remarks, ‘But 
those who believe our oracles about the gods will first wish to imitate their blessedness in so 
far as mortals can, so that, since it was seen to come from doing no harm to anyone, they will 
endeavour most of all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their 
power...’ (Piet. col. 71.12n27[2043n2058]; translation Obbink). This time the explicitly moral 
dimension of imitating the gods comes to the fore: imitation entails doing no harm to others, 
leading to justice. This imitation has a human limit, as Philodemus adds the qualification, 
‘insofar as mortals can’ (ω  ς θνητοι`, col. 71.16[2047]; cf. Epicurus, Ep. Men. 135; VS 33). In 
what way can the characteristics of the gods be realized in human beings, and in what way can 
they not?
 With respect to blessedness and incorruptibility, Epicureans can hope to attain 
qualitatively similar characteristics, allowing for differences based in humanity’s weak nature. 
As Epicurus promises Menoeceus concerning the benefits of his philosophy, ‘Train yourself 
and another like you in these and similar things night and day, and never, whether awake or 
asleep, will you be disturbed, but you will live as a god among men.’ (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 
10.135). With respect to pleasure, gods and humans are most similar. Epicurus states that the 




55. See discussion in Obbink, On Piety, 566–70.
pleasure which cannot be increased through prolongation of time or the addition of other 
pleasures (Epicurus, Ep. Men. 124; 128n132; KD 3; 18n19). Philodemus seems to use the 
same argumentation in his treatise On Death: because of the limit of pleasure, those who have 
attained such pleasure are thus deprived of nothing by death (On Death col. 3.32n9).56 In this 
way, the fully realized pleasure of an Epicurean life is qualitatively the same as that of the 
gods, though a human life is vulnerable to pain (e.g., hunger), and needs external goods to 
protect and sustain this blessed life of pleasure, unlike the gods.57 
 Despite the limitation of human corruptibility, Epicureans claimed a strong sense of 
self-sufficiency, and made claims to being ‘incorruptible’ as human beings. James Warren 
suggests that humans can be said to be indestructible like the gods in that they have an 
inalienable hold on happiness, like the gods, even if they are not eternal and impervious to 
pain, unlike the gods. One can gain the greatest possible security and control against the pains 
of the world as a mortal by mastering Epicurean philosophy and possessing the few, easily-
procured external goods necessary for happiness (as exemplified by Epicurus’ ability to 
sustain a state of α ταραξι'α during his terminal dysentery and strangury, Diogenes Laertius, 
Vit. 10.22).58 Once attained, the Epicurean has the power to sustain it, for the knowledge and 
moral character on which it is based cannot be taken away from him. As Philodemus says, 
‘the sensible man, having received that which can secure the whole of what is sufficient 
(αυ»ταρκες) for a happy life, immediately then for the rest (of his life) goes about laid for 
burial, and he profits by one day as (he would) by eternity’ (On Death col. 35.14n19; 
translation Henry).59
 The attainment of divine pleasure and incorruptibility necessarily involves assimilation 
to two other divine attributes: the gods’ moral character, and such character’s corresponding 




56. See discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 271–77.
57. As argued by James Warren, “Epicurean Immortality,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18 
(2000): 231–47; David Konstan, A Life Worthy of the Gods (Las Vegas: Parmenides, 2008), 127–33; Michael 
Erler, “Epicurus as Deus Mortalis: Homoiosis Theoi and Epicurean Self-Cultivation,” in Deus Mortalis, in 
Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath, eds. Dorothea Frede and 
André Laks, Philosophia Antiqua 89 (Leiden; Boston;: Brill, 2002), 170. Warren and Konstan interpret in this 
vein Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.121, in which Diogenes explains that there are two kinds of happiness according 
to the Epicurean school, that of the gods, which cannot be increased, and that which involves the addition and 
subtraction of pleasures (implying that this characterizes human happiness). One might also point to Knut Kleve’s 
interpretation of a passage from D. 1, referring to the ‘unspeakable pleasure’ derived from human experience of 
the gods (αφα' τοις [η  ]δ[ο]|ναιñς, B1.28 Kleve); Kleve, “Unknown Parts,” 675), the same phrase used to describe 
the gods’ own pleasure from their wise conversation (D. 3 col. 14.6).
58. Philodemus asserts the self-sufficiency of the sage to maintain his α ταραξι'α against great pain in On 
Anger col. 41.39n42.20, for the sage has a proper (low) valuing of external goods; likewise, the sage can endure 
even a violent, unjust death without falling into distressing grief because of his proper mindset and the pleasure of 
his good life (On Death col. 33.37n34.15); see Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 227–28, 296–97. See also 
Epicurus, Ep. Men. 117, asserting the perfect stability of the wise man’s character (David Konstan, Life, 134). 
For an atomic explanation of the sage’s soul as physically stable, see David Konstan, Life, 140–43.
59. See discussion of Epicurean incorruptibility in Warren, “Epicurean Immortality,” 244–60. See also 
Epicurus’ brief comments praising self-sufficiency by the limitation of desire in Ep. Men. 130.
causing dispositions of character, such as disordered desires, false beliefs, and wild 
emotions.60 If humans can come to share qualitatively the same pleasure as the gods, then this 
must mean that they share a qualitatively similar moral character that eliminates pain and thus 
provides pleasure, with its accompanying set of objectively true conceptions of the cosmos.61 
One comes to hold these self-evident conceptions (προλη'ψεις) either innately, or by repeatedly 
being struck by divine atoms continually streaming from the gods’ bodies.62 There may be 
quantitative differences due to human weaknesses, such as the vulnerability of sustaining such 
pleasure, of unavoidably making incorrect empirical judgements, etc., but these do not negate 
the qualitative similarities between human and divine moral character, knowledge, and 
pleasure. Similarly, Lucretius declared that Epicurus was a god (‘deus ille fuit, deus’, De 
rerum natura 5.8) in virtue of the fact that he discovered the truth of nature without imposing 
false conceptions, he led a life of moral purity, and maintained proper piety toward the gods.63
 Like the gods, blessed and incorruptible human beings provide moral models of the 
best human life. Michael Erler argues that the sage benefits others after he has first 
successfully achieved his own blessedness, entailing the piety, ethical lifestyle, and 
philosophical framework upon which this blessedness is based. Erler observes that Epicurus’ 
divinisation occurs, according to Lucretius, not because of his heroic deeds or beneficence to 
others, but because he pursued his own good through philosophy.64 The case of Epicurus 
shows that only by successfully imitating the gods in pursuit of his own best life was he an 
example for others, just as the gods maintain their own lives and only indirectly benefit 
others.65 In Philodemus, too, the mature are beneficial because of their maturity, and are thus 
examples for the development of others.
 Like the gods, there is a certain limit to the sage’s involvement in the lives of others, a 
limit governed by whether particular engagements would jeopardize the sage’s vulnerable 
blessedness. One thinks of Philodemus’ assumptions that Epicureans will live in leisured 
retreat with friends.66 Here there is significant difference, however. If one held Epicureans 




60. See also ch. four, 4.4.1.
61. Erler, “Epicurus as Deus Mortalis: Homoiosis Theoi and Epicurean Self-Cultivation,” 171–74; 
David Konstan, Life, 137–38; Warren, “Epicurean Immortality,” 251–53.
62. It is heavily debated how the preconception of the gods forms in Epicurean epistemology. For these 
two options, see David Sedley, “Epicurus’ Theological Innatism,” in Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, eds. 
Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 29–52; Essler, Glückselig und 
Unsterblich.
63. Erler, “Epicurus as Deus Mortalis: Homoiosis Theoi and Epicurean Self-Cultivation,” 167–75; 
Warren, “Epicurean Immortality,” 251–60.
64. Erler, “Epicurus as Deus Mortalis: Homoiosis Theoi and Epicurean Self-Cultivation,” 177.
65. Ibid., 177–78.
66. Recall the discussion in ch. two concerning Philodemus’ treatise On Property Management, esp. col. 
22n23, in which he rules out work as unfitting for the ideal Epicurean, and considers associations with people 
who are not elite friends of the philosopher to be unpleasant.
directly.67 Yet Philodemus’ On Frank Criticism shows that such an interpretation cannot 
describe Philodemus’ view of the Epicurean teacher. The wise teacher tames others into love 
for themselves, even when they have no desire to be treated (fr. 86); the teacher attempts 
repeatedly to cure those who seem incurable (fr. 64; 69; fr. 84N); the wise seem to be ‘stung’ 
(δανκω' µεθα, i.e., they have their faults exposed),68 until they can show that their students are 
pure (fr. 16).69 Nevertheless, it does seem there is a limit to this concern and responsibility for 
students who do not respond to treatment. Fr. 21 shows that the wise man uses all tools 
available to him, but at a certain point ‘does not at all labour over how that one will fare in 
life,’ (το` δε` πωñς | εκειñνος ε«ξ[ει] ζωηñς, ου δε`ν | πονε[ιñ], fr. 21.4n6), for a measure of 
responsibility lies also with the patient.70
 With respect to friendship, it seems that Epicureans progress toward an emulation of 
divine, self-sufficient friendship as they seek to achieve the self-sufficiency of the best life.71 
This subject receives further discussion in ch. four. For example, passages in On Frank 
Criticism show that one ideally grows out of one’s need for moral formation from others in 
friendship (e.g., col. 8anb; col. 14a; fr. 30). Like the gods, however, self-sufficiency never 
leads to isolation, for friends are sources of great pleasure,72 and greater pleasure insofar as 
they have achieved Epicurean mastery and share wise conversation among one another (just as 
the gods in D. 3 col. 14.6).73
 Yet there remains a qualitative difference between divine and human friendships, for 
human friendship is based on reciprocal giving and receiving of needed benefit, a weakness 
completely foreign to the gods.74 In On Gods 3 fr. 87, Philodemus contrasts humans to the 
gods on just this point: ‘So that even if association for (the supply of) external needs to make 
them (i.e., the gods) live together is not there, they share their affections, for it is not possible 
to hold together in association without any social intercourse at all. And certainly for us, the 




67. As argued by Adam Drozdek, “Epicurean Gods,” Classica et Mediaevalia 56 (2006): 160.
68. See On Frank Criticism, fr. 26.9; col. 8b.11; 17a.4; 21b.7n8; T4.1.
69. A key interpretive issue in this passage is whether the object of the cleansing work of the wise is the 
students (‘them,’ αυ το[υς]), or ‘themselves,’ (αυ  το[υς]), in fr. 16.5. Voula Tsouna and the editors of On Frank 
Criticism support the ‘student’ reading, which would thus support the use of this passage as evidence of a 
teacher’s constant concern for the progress of his students (cf. David Konstan, et al., Philodemus: On Frank 
Criticism, SBLTT [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998], 37; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 101).
70. Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 102.
71. See discussion in David Armstrong, “Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship,” 126–28.
72. Friendship is an ‘immortal good’(α θα'νατος α γαθο' ς), and is wisdom’s greatest acquisition for the 
blessed life according to Epicurus, VS 78; KD 27, respectively.
73. Essler interprets this passage as applicable also to humans, and interprets that human friendship 
approximates the divine through its pleasures (Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter,” 99).
74. Recall Philodemus, On Property Management col. 23n26, discussed in ch. two. Philodemus’ 
encourages generous beneficence to friends which secures one’s income and well-being through future reciprocal 
gifts from those friends.
have died...’75 The fragment goes on to describe how the gods’ pleasurable relationships apart 
from any supply of needs are analogous to an Epicurean’s pleasurable admiration of a dead 
friend, the memory of whom gives pleasure to his friends even though the deceased cannot 
provide for their material needs.76
 From a divine perspective, friendship with imperfect and weak humans is irrelevant to 
their perfect happiness, and could possibly hinder it, but from a human perspective, friendship 
with other people despite their weaknesses (including moral imperfections) is a necessary 
good which secures the ‘divine’ human life.77 Martha Nussbaum notes this tension in seeking 
to imitate the gods’ detachment from human needs, arguing that truly becoming like the gods 
would result in a sacrifice of one’s humanity, radically changing one’s conception of the 
virtues, such as justice, bravery, generosity, and friendship.78
 One important consequence of this tension between the ideal life of gods and men is 
that the Epicurean sage becomes a nearer model for moral formation than the gods 
themselves. The sage exemplifies the best life of a human being, and can be imitated without 
qualification. Unlike the gods, the sage has grown from immaturity to maturity in the midst of 
human weakness, and can lead others to do the same. As we will see shortly, the morally 
formative worship of the gods championed by Philodemus also includes religious acts 
celebrating Epicurus, who was a ‘god’ in his time, and was honoured as such by his followers.
3.3.2. Worship as a Means of Assimilation to the Gods
Despite the fact that the gods’ model does not precisely fit human life, Epicureans remain 
committed to becoming like them insofar as they can as mortals. Worship is a central, though 
not exclusive, means to progress morally toward the best life, as well as to sustain it, 
according to Philodemus. 
 As a preliminary observation, it is certain that a new Epicurean student would receive 
the proper conceptions of the gods from the teaching and frank speech of other Epicureans, 
especially the more mature (discussed in ch. four). Philodemus explicitly refers to Epicurus as 
an example of this in On Frank Criticism fr. 6: ‘Therefore, Epicurus too, when Leonteus, 
because of Pythocles, did not admit belief in gods, reproached Pythocles in moderation, and 
wrote to him (Leonteus) the so-called ‘famous letter’ (fr. 6.4n11).79 In this way Philodemus 




75. Translation slightly adapted from Armstrong. See discussion in David Armstrong, “Epicurean 
Virtues, Epicurean Friendship,” 126–27; Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter,” 103.
76. See Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter,” 95–99.
77. Essler, “Freundschaft der Götter,” 98.
78. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 226–27.
79. Translation Konstan, ad loc.; David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism.
the only extant reference to the gods in what remains of this work, but given the philosophical, 
ethical, and existential necessities to establish the Epicurean view of the gods over against 
false beliefs, it is certain that frank criticism was applied to this area of life, just as it was to 
anger, envy, and other issues. The existence of Philodemus’ theological works seems to point 
in this direction as well, given that they offer detailed arguments for use in teaching and frank 
criticism.80 Yet, in what remains of Philodemus’ On Piety, frank speech and teaching does not 
feature as significantly as worship for the formation of right conceptions of the gods. It does 
not seem warranted to conclude for this reason that worship was more important than frank 
criticism, for Philodemus’ aim in discussing worship in On Piety is to give an account of 
Epicurean piety to opponents who criticize Epicureans for impiety, rather than to explain 
formation vis-à-vis theology per se.
 Such formative worship includes public worship of the gods, e.g., at civic festivals, as 
well as worship in Epicurean gatherings. Three representative passages from Philodemus give 
witness to the morally formative function of worship (Piet. col. 26, 27, 31).81 The worship of 
the gods provides occasion for improving or maintaining one’s conception of the gods, and 
thus deriving pleasure and other benefits from such conceptions. Philodemus offers these 
remarks on worship in the course of defending Epicurus defending Epicurus and his followers 
from opponents who either deny that they participate in public worship, or criticize their 
participation as disingenuous, given the lack of traditional reasons for worship in Epicurean 
theology.82 
 In On Piety col. 27, drawing from Epicurus’ On Gods, Philodemus describes the wise 
man in the midst of public worship: he ‘holds pure and holy beliefs about the divine and has 
understood that this nature is great and august’ (27.6n12[759n765]),83 and he is ‘progressing 
to an understanding of it [divine nature], having its name the whole time on his lips’ 
(27.12n17 [765n770]).84 Obbink interprets that the occasion of festivals (εν δ[ε`] ταιñς | ε ορταιñς, 




80. This seems to be true even if the purpose of the works is not primarily for use in such instruction.
81. I take these texts out of sequence, with col. 26 examined last, because that column is particularly 
fragmentary, and receives illumination from the other two.
82. See, e.g., Piet. col. 49, containing Philodemus’ rehearsal of an opponent’s view accusing Epicureans 
of despising festivals and mysteries as foolishness because the gods worshipped are not paying attention; see also 
Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1112C, discussed in Obbink, On Piety, 389–91, 397.Of Epicurus, Philodemus explicitly 
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col. 26.5n12[730n737]; 28.8n15[790n797]; see Obbink, On Piety, 389–93.
83. Translation Obbink, ad loc.; καθαρα`ς και` α  |[γι'ο]υς δο' ξας ε»χειν | [περι`] τουñ θει'ου και` | [µεγ]α'λην τε 
και` σε|[µν]η`ν υ  πειληφε' |[ναι] ταυ' την τη`ν φυ' σιν.
84. Translation Obbink, ad loc.; εν δ[ε`] ταιñς | ε ορταιñς µ[α' ]λιστ’ ε[ι]ς | επι'νοιαν αυ τηñς | βαδι'ζοντα δια` το` | 
του»νοµα πα' ντα | α να` στο'µ’ ε»χειν. Τhe pronoun αυ τηñς  refers to its antecedent ταυ' την τη`ν | φυ'σιν of col. 
29.11n12, [764n765], which is the divine nature understood by the wise man. These two clauses are likely 
dependent on a concluding infinitive, as interpreted by Obbink, referring to the wise man’s action as he 
‘embraces [something] with conviction more seriously; (πι'[σ]τει σφοδ[ρο]τε'ρως | κατα[σχειñ]ν τη`[ν]..., col. 
29.17n19[770n772]).
time for ‘sorting out one’s concept of divinity,’ one’s επι'νοια of the gods (see the same 
concept referred to in Piet. col. 26 below).85 The reference to ‘having its name the whole time 
on his lips’ could refer to prayer (see Piet. col. 26 below), singing of cult hymns (PHerc. 1428 
col. 11.15n33 Henrichs),86 or dialogue about the gods during the festivities (perhaps assuming 
other Epicureans are present, either at the public festival or, more likely, as part of Epicurean 
ceremonies).87 Based on the syntax of this passage, it seems that this verbal dimension of 
worship, with the true conceptions of the gods which it assumes, is the means for progressing 
one’s understanding of the divine nature.88 
 However, such public worship is not to be done in conformity with the popular 
conception of the gods. Philodemus makes this clear in On Piety col. 31, as he quotes again 
from Epicurus, 
 ‘Let us sacrifice to the gods,’ he says, ‘devoutly and fittingly on the proper days, 
 and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no 
 way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matters concerning the most excellent and 
 august of beings. Moreover, let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in 
 this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeus, to live like Zeus, as it seems.’ 
 (col. 31.9n26 [879n896]).89 
Here it seems clear that the mature Epicurean takes no part in the popular ‘opinions’ (δο' ξαις) 
about gods even while publicly participating in sacrifice alongside the wider populace, but 
instead worships ‘justly’ (δι'καιοι)  i.e., maintaining internally the correct, Epicurean view of 
the gods.90 
 In this passage we also have reference to the means by which a human Epicurean can 
live like a god, even like Zeus. Obbink interprets that the act of mental discipline against false 




85. Obbink, On Piety, 406–7.
86. These portions of PHerc. 1428, or Piet. pt. 2, are edited by Henrichs, “Die Kritik der stoischen 
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87. Obbink, On Piety, 407.
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ΘΕΩΡΙΑ,” in Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia, vol. 2 (Naples: Centro Internazionale per lo 
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the act of worship or public sacrifice in itself is such a means.91 This mental defence is a form 
of maintaining in one’s mind the correct view of the gods, which is a key ingredient for living 
a divine life as a mortal Epicurean. However, sacrifice remains an important facilitating 
occasion for developing and/or maintaining one’s views of the gods, so Philodemus wants to 
say. It is unclear whether public worship is a necessary condition for maintaining or 
developing views of the gods, but it is clear that public worship outside the Epicurean 
community is a natural part of the mature Epicurean lifestyle, and one that brings pleasure for 
such a life from the opportunity to contemplate the gods.92
 Lastly, in col. 26 of On Piety, Philodemus draws from Epicurus’ work On Ways of Life 
to remark, ‘to pray is natural for us, not because the gods would be hostile if we did not pray, 
but in order that, according to the understanding of beings surpassing in power and excellence, 
we may realize our fulfilments and social conformity with the laws’ (col. 
26.12n26[737n751]).93 If Obbink’s reconstruction of the clause ‘in order that ... we may 
realize our fulfilments’ ([ι«να τα' ]ς τε τελε[ι|ο' τητας] γεινω' σκω|[µεν])94 is correct, this passage 
would then give further support to the notion that in worship (specifically, prayer) with an 
Epicurean mindset (κατα` | τη`ν επι'νοιαν) Epicureans progress toward the ‘fulfilment’ or 
perfection that the gods represent and which is the goal of Epicurean imitation.95 This prayer 
and its result is ‘natural’ (οικειñον) for the Epicurean, in contrast to praying in order to pacify 
the gods.
 This final passage also raises the question of the social nature of such worship, for 
prayer also achieves ‘social conformity with the laws’ (τοιñς νο'µοις | [συνπερι]φορα' ς), 
involving not just prayer but all forms of civic religious observance, as Epicurus encourages in 
col. 31 above. It seems that Philodemus links the achievement of ‘fulfilments’ with social 
conformity. Obbink suggests that such involvement with other, non-Epicurean observances is 
in some way related to forming one’s ideas of the gods properly, for the gods themselves have 
human form and characteristics (as shown in D. 3 col. 12n14). Obbink remarks, ‘Without 
human association, and the knowledge, experience and observation of humans it brings, one 




91. See Obbink, On Piety, 441 One may also point to Piet. col. 27 above, which attests that the sage 
already possesses correct knowledge of the gods before engaging in worship, though he progresses in such 
knowledge during worship (see also the same sequence in POxy. 215, 1.1n2.19).
92. Note ‘particularly,’ (µ[α' ]λιστ’), in reference to the occasion of festivals in which progression in 
understanding of the gods occurs (Piet. col. 27.13[766], above).
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94. Obbink’s translation ‘realize’ is perhaps misleading, in that γεινω' σκω|[µεν] should be understood in 
the sense of ‘perceive’ or ‘discern’ rather than ‘realize’ in the sense of ‘implement,’ or ‘bring about.’
95. Obbink, On Piety, 402.
96. Obbink, On Piety, 402.
explanation is perhaps a good start,97 but a fuller explanation remains unclear. Such an 
explanation will likely also help us to understand Philodemus’ contention, noted above, that 
Epicureans believe ‘not only all the gods of the Greeks, but many more besides’ (Piet. col. 
362).
 It seems clearer that the immature Epicurean stands far more in need of Epicurean 
friends, rather than in need of human society in general, against whose conceptions of the 
gods Epicureans defend themselves in public worship. These friends can teach the immature 
student about the gods and how to worship them rightly, and thus help them to progress in 
their understanding through worship. Once mature, the Epicurean does not seem to need 
others in order to worship the gods rightly, for he will always maintain the correct view of the 
gods (being self-sufficient), though he will still participate with others in public worship as a 
natural, pleasurable part of his lifestyle, thus living out his τελειο' της.
 Apart from public worship, however, Epicureans maintained a hero cult, celebrating 
numerous religious festivals throughout the year, including a monthly festival for Epicurus 
and Metrodorus, his eminent disciple and friend.98 Philodemus once wrote an epigram inviting 
his patron, L. Calpurnius Piso, to this monthly gathering (ep. 27 Sider).99 These festivals, 
provided for by Epicurus in his will (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.18) entailed at least a 
sacrifice, a common meal, and discourse among the community. Friendly outsiders were 
invited, but Philodemus records that Epicurus was wary of turning the Epicurean observances 
into demagoguery (PHerc. 1232 fr. 8 col 1.12n15).  Unlike at public festivals, Epicurean 
participants did not have to protect themselves against corrupting influences from non-
Epicureans. These observances were meant to bind Epicurean communal identity together 
around their philosophy, but also to serve the participants by giving them models to follow 
after, particularly the model of Epicurus.100 Notably, the objects of veneration are never the 
gods, but successfully ‘divine’ models of the best human life striving to be like the gods. The 
character of these observances seems to signal that Epicurean meetings were more formative 




97. This explanation seems incomplete, for one might object that Epicurean friends could provide all 
that was necessary to know about the gods, including their quasi-human characteristics.
98. These observances included an annual birthday celebration for Epicurus, a monthly festival for 
Epicurus and Metrodorus, funerary offerings annually for his parents and brothers, a funerary offering for 
Epicurus’ friend and disciple named Polyaenus, and perhaps a cult of another eminent Epicurean, Pythocles or 
Apollodorus. The twentieth of the month, the day of Epicurus’ annual birthday celebration and monthly 
celebrations with Metrodorus, was typically used in civic religion for the celebration of gods, e.g. Apollo. Key 
sources for our knowledge about these observances are from Philodemus’ works On Epicurus (PHerc. 1232), fr. 
8 col. 1, and Piet. col. 29; 51. Philodemus is our earliest source on the religious observances of Epicureans, 
particularly of the first generation, and other sources give evidence of Epicurean observances up to the time of 
Pliny the elder and Plutarch. See discussion in Diskin Clay, Paradosis and Survival (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1998), 75–101; Sider, Epigrams, 156–57.
99. Sider, Epigrams, 152–60.
100. Clay, Paradosis and Survival, 101–2.
participants than civic worship. Yet qualified involvement in public worship was still a 
normal, beneficial, and necessary part of Epicurean life.
3.3.3. Summary
In section 3.3, we have seen that Epicureans have a relationship to the gods, but one that is 
constituted only by their own conceptions of the gods, not by any intended initiative from the 
gods themselves. Epicureans can indeed assimilate to qualitatively similar ‘divine’ attributes 
as they seek to imitate them. Epicureans can come to have qualitatively similar pleasure as the 
gods possess, and thus similar moral character and knowledge, even if human nature remains 
vulnerable to pain. Self-sufficient incorruptibility is an attainable goal, at least in the sense of 
having an inalienable hold on the best life no matter one’s difficult circumstances (not in the 
sense of having a divine nature impervious to pain). Like the gods, mature Epicureans model 
the best life to others, Epicurus being the central example. In some ways Epicureans mimic 
the gods’ retreat from the human world in their leisured retreat from public life, but it is clear 
that the best human life is radically different from the gods’ lives, in that it involves full 
participation in intimate friendships with other, naturally weak humans, friendships which 
demand intense concern and labour for others (especially for others’ moral formation). 
Epicureans strive toward the model of the gods’ friendship, which involves perfectly virtuous, 
self-sufficient friends, but human friendships remain qualitatively distinct in that they involve 
interdependence upon one another due to human weakness. Worship of the gods and of 
Epicurean heroes provides several occasions for improving or maintaining one’s conception of 
the gods, and thus for living the best Epicurean life. 
 In the next chapter, I draw upon the theology outlined here in order to describe 
Philodemus’ conception and practice of reciprocal moral formation.
Excursus: Realist and Idealist Interpretations of Epicurean Gods
It remains controversial whether the Epicurean gods exist independently in a bodily state 
somewhere in the cosmos (the realist view), or whether they exist only insofar as humans 




101. The ‘thought-construct’ designation is from Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 145 
The first proponent of the idealist perspective was Schömann, Schediasma de Epicuri Theologia (Greifswald: F. 
G. Kunike, 1864); see further idealist-view bibliography from later nineteenth century scholars in Obbink, “‘All 
Gods Are True’ in Epicurus,” 214, n. 104. Recent proponents of the idealist view include, e.g., Dirk Obbink, 
Anthony A. Long; David N. Sedley; J. Purinton; proponents of the realist view include, e.g., Jaap Mansfeld, 
Dominic Scott, David Konstan, Michael Wigodsky, and Holger Essler. See Obbink, On Piety, 11–12, passim; 
Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 144–49; J. Purinton, “Epicurus on the Nature of the Gods,” 
there are gods (θεοι` µε`ν γα`ρ εισι'ν, Ep. Men. 123), and that they are living beings (το`ν θεο`ν 
ζω,ñον α»φθαρτον και` µακα' ριον, Ep. Men. 123), but this and other statements allow varying 
interpretations (e.g., from an idealist perspective, one might argue that these statements 
describe how one should think of them, not how they actually are). Both views seek to address 
two important challenges: there is no adequate explanation extant in Epicurus concerning how 
eternal gods can have atomically composite bodies in a universe in which no atomic 
composite is eternal (cf. Ep. Hdt. 73n74; Lucretius, De rerum natura 3.806n823),102 nor is 
there a full explanation extant concerning the origin and formation of Epicurean knowledge 
about the gods as blessed and incorruptible.103 Central texts for the debate include especially 
the differing portrayals of the gods in KD 1, on one hand (with its scholion, as preserved in 
Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 10.139), and Cicero, Nat. d. 1.49, on the other. Epicurus’ remarks on 
the gods in Ep. Men. 123n124, and later texts from Lucretius and Philodemus play important 
roles as well.104
 We possess more writing about the gods from Philodemus than Epicurus, but even 
Philodemus’ views on the gods can be interpreted with both realist and idealist perspectives. 
Even though Philodemus presupposes that the gods are living beings (cf. α φθα' ρτων και` 
δεχοµ[ε' ]νων [α ει'δι]α ζω' ιων, D. 3 col. 12.22) who, in a divine manner, breathe, rest, eat, and 
converse with one another (D. 3 col. 12n14), one may yet object that this description is only 
how the Epicurean ought to conceive of them, rather than how they actually exist.105 
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Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 21 (2001): 181–231; Jaap Mansfeld, “Aspects of Epicurean Theology,” 
Mnemosyne 46 (1993): 172–210; Dominic Scott, Recollection and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 187–201; David Konstan, “Epicurus on the Gods,” in Epicurus and the Epicurean 
Tradition, eds. Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 53–71; 
Michael Wigodsky, “Emotions and Immortality in Philodemus On the Gods 3 and the Aeneid,” in Vergil, 
Philodemus, and the Augustans, eds. David Armstrong, et al. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 211–28; 
Essler, Glückselig und Unsterblich, passim.
102. Philodemus continues to address objections from opponents concerning the mechanics of divine 
bodily existence in such a universe, citing for support, e.g., Epicurus and Metrodorus; see , e.g. Piet. col. 2.7, and 
discussion in Obbink, On Piety, 287–88.
103. See discussion in Mansfeld, “Theology,” 454–56. E.g., the problem from physics is a counter 
argument against the realist view in, e.g., Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 148; Obbink, “‘All 
Gods Are True’ in Epicurus,” 216. David Sedley in a recent essay seeks to provide further support for the idealist 
view by attempting to explain how knowledge of the gods arises by an innate preconception of the gods, in 
opposition to the realist interpretation that such knowledge comes from the externally existing gods themselves 
(see Sedley, “Epicurus’ Theological Innatism”). These two issues Konstan seeks to address from a realist 
perspective in David Konstan, “Epicurus on the Gods”. See also Holger Essler’s monograph, in which he argues 
throughout for a realist interpretation of the gods, in part by reconstructing the process of gaining knowledge 
about the gods on the basis of their specifically divine atomic composition; Essler, Glückselig und Unsterblich.
104. In his review of the debate, Essler helpfully organizes the realist and idealist views according to 
whether they prioritize KD 1, or Cicero, Nat. d. 1.49, though inevitably the debate involves the full corpus of 
Epicurean witnesses, early and late (see Essler, Glückselig und Unsterblich, 18f).
105. For this idealist objection to Philodemus’ overtly realist language, see Long and Sedley, The 
Hellenistic Philosophers, 149. For further Philodemean evidence in favour of the idealist view, see Obbink’s 
interpretation of Philodemus Piet. col. 12n13 in Obbink, On Piety, 321–35; see in contrast Essler’s realist reading 
of Philodemus, D. 3 col. 8n10, and his objections to idealist views in Essler, Glückselig und Unsterblich. 
 It does not seem that the gods’ mode of existence determines their involvement in 
moral formation, for the gods’ relationship to human morality consists in human conceptions 
about them, as argued above.106 Thus a decision on this knotty issue of their mode of existence 




106. Thus, the gods’ relationship to morality does not consist, e.g.,  in any directly causative, external 
relationship to humanity which might be called into question by their existence only as thought-constructs. Nor, 
however, does this relationship require an idealist view of the gods, as Obbink notes in Obbink, “‘All Gods Are 
True’ in Epicurus,” 214–15. For a realist view of the gods as indirectly related to human moral formation via the 
physics of divine atoms, see Essler, Glückselig und Unsterblich, 357–58.
CHAPTER FOUR: RECIPROCAL MORAL FORMATION IN PHILODEMUS
How did Philodemus envision reciprocal moral formation such that Epicurean friends needed 
to receive it from one another? How and why were Epicureans dependent upon one another 
for ‘salvation’, particularly via frank criticism, in his view? The concern of this chapter is to 
provide an answer for these questions.
 This chapter has four main sections. First (4.1), I offer some introductory remarks on 
the main text considered here, Philodemus’ treatise Περι` παρρησι'ας, or On Frank Criticism 
(henceforth abbreviated Lib., from its Latin title De libertate dicendi). Second, I provide a 
wider context for moral formation practices in Epicurean community, among which frank 
criticism is one particular mode (4.2). Third, I present the core evidence for the reciprocal 
practice of frank criticism by all members of the Epicurean community (4.3) in order to 
introduce, fourth, the wider discussion of frank criticism’s conception and practice (4.4). In 
this fourth and final section, I first offer a brief sketch of the Epicurean framework of moral 
formation (4.4.1), followed by discussions of how Epicureans give and receive frank criticism 
(4.4.2), the nature of frank criticism’s reciprocity (4.4.3), and the nature of Epicurean friends’ 
interdependence upon one another to receive moral formation via frank criticism.
4.1. Introduction to On Frank Criticism (PHerc. 1471)1
It is perhaps best to begin at the end. The subscript of Philodemus’ treatise On Frank 
Criticism is as follows, with slight reconstruction: ΦΙΛΟ∆ΗΜΟ[Υ] | ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤ ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗΝ 
ΕΞΕΙΡ|ΓΑΣΜΕΝΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΗΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΒΙ|ΩΝ ΕΚ ΤΗΣ ΖΗΝΩΝΗ[Σ ΣΧΟ]ΛΩΝ | Ο ΕΣΤΙ 
ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡ[Η]ΣΙΑΣ.2 Translated, it reads: ‘Of Philodemus, of those (topics) treated fully in 
epitome concerning characters and ways of life, from the lectures of Zeno, that is, On Frank 




1. For this overview, I am particularly indebted to L. Michael White, “Ordering the Fragments of 
PHerc. 1471: A New Hypothesis,” Cronache Ercolanesi 39 (2009): 29–70; Gigante, Philodemus in Italy, 24–29; 
Daniel Delattre, “Le Franc-Parler de Philodème (PHerc. 1471): Reconstruction Bibliologique d’Ensemble du 
Rouleau,” in Miscellanea Papyrologica Herculanensia, eds. A. Antoni, et al. (Pisa: Fabrizio Serra, 2010), 271–
91.
2. See Alexander Olivieri, ed., Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), 1.
 First of all, the term piαρρησι'α refers to ‘frank speech’ or ‘frank criticism’ between 
friends who help each other to identify their faults and to grow morally into the best life. The 
practice of piαρρησι'α was a hallmark of friendship, an indicator of honesty, trust, and mutual 
care, in contrast to flattery and insincere friendship.3 Philodemus’ treatise concerns how 
Epicureans engage in piαρρησι'α, both toward other Epicurean friends and to all people (as 
shown by frequent references to teachers and students, as well as occasional references to 
frank criticism involving the rich, the old, and women).4 This papyri is the only extant text 
from the ancient world with the title. Nevertheless, the topic was discussed widely, e.g., in 
other philosophical texts, not just by Epicureans.5 While Epicurean piαρρησι'α was not unique, 
it was relatively distinctive in its openness for all members to engage in it, and for endorsing 
the practice of informing on other friends for their correction (fr. 50).6 Philodemus’ goals in 
writing the treatise, following Zeno, likely involved instructing Epicureans in its use, while 
also defending an Epicurean position from attacks by rival schools.7 
 The work is one episode in Philodemus’ multi-volume series On Characters and Ways 
of Life. Which other books were included is disputed. Scholars have claimed that this series 
included On Slander (PHerc. Paris 2, the same treatise written to Vergil et al.), On Anger, On 
Flattery (PHerc. 1082), and On Not Living according to Chance (PHerc. 168).8 Philodemus 
refers to On Frank Criticism in two of these works (On Anger col. 36; On Flattery [PHerc. 
1082] col. 1).9 Estimations based on handwriting have suggested that the papyrus was written 
between 75n50 BCE, but these estimates are uncertain.10 Perhaps On Frank Criticism was 




3. It is a ‘friendly work’ (φιλικο`ν ε»ργον, Lib. col. 19b.6) to speak frankly to another (for reconstruction 
of this column and its context, see David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 6). For further discussion, see, e.g., 
David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 3–8; David Konstan, “Friendship, Frankness and Flattery,” in 
Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. John T. 
Fitzgerald (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 5–19.
4. In PHerc. 1082, part of the work On Flattery, Philodemus distinguishes piαρρησι'α between friends 
from that shown to all (discussed in Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 109–10).
5. See David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 93–148; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 15–98.
6. Julie Giovacchini disputes the idea of a specifically Epicurean notion of frank criticism (Giovacchini, 
“La Nouvelle Reconstruction”). While she correctly notes these two qualities, she  does not cogently argue 
against them. She identifies a similar concern for teachers to confess their faults in Plutarch (but this does not 
argue against the other elements of Epicurean openness to the participation of all members), and she attempts to 
downplay the importance of informing on others (but to no avail, for Philodemus’ caution toward the dangers of 
such a practice do not remove his endorsement of it).
7. See Giovacchini, “La Nouvelle Reconstruction”; Delattre, “Le Franc-Parler”.
8. See Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 91, n. 4; L. Michael White, “A Measure of Parrhesia: The 
State of the Manuscript of PHerc. 1471,” in Philodemus and the New Testament World, eds. John Fitzgerald and 
Dirk Obbink, NovTSup 111 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004), 108–13; David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 6. 
Cf. Indelli’s ascription of On Anger elsewhere in Indelli, L’Ira, 37.
9. See White, “Measure,” 109.
10. Gigante, Philodemus in Italy, 25; Guglielmo Cavallo, Libri Scritture Scribi a Ercolano, Primo 
Supplemento a Cronache Ercolanesi 13. (Naples: Gaetano Macchiaroli, 1983), 53–54.
11. White, “Measure,” 108–13.
 The work is ‘in epitome’ (κατ’ επιτοµη`ν). Philodemus attempts to provide an overview 
of numerous topoi concerning the use of frank criticism. Several questions posed in the 
treatise offer some structure to his discussion, e.g., fr. 88: ‘How will we recognize the one 
who has endured frank criticism graciously and the one who is pretending (to do so)?, or col. 
24a: ‘Why is it that old men are more annoyed (by frankness)?’12 Philodemus makes reference 
to his epitome format in col. 7b, in which he seems to excuse himself from going into further 
detail concerning how a sage will be disposed to offer frank speech in additional situations, ‘It 
is hard work for those who are handling (a topic) by way of an epitome to be precise about 
every kind, in the manner of those who dispose of each (kind) exhaustively, [for example in 
what] way a wise man will be disposed when some are practising frankness...’ (col. 
7b.6n13).13
 Philodemus indicates that his work draws upon the lectures of Zeno of Sidon which 
we know Philodemus attended in Athens. Yet, in the extant remains, Zeno’s name only 
appears in the subscript. Philodemus does not seem to rehearse precisely what Zeno said, but 
instead to synthesize those lectures for his own presentation, though it is very difficult to 
separate the two from one another with the present evidence. The treatise represents 
Philodemus’ vision for frank criticism among his own students, not only Zeno’s vision for the 
Athenian Garden.14 
 The book is relatively well-preserved among the Herculaneum papyri, as we have the 
physical remains of approximately 50% of the scroll, though of course this does not translate 
into 50% of the text.15 Based on stichometric evidence, the papyrus was originally just under 
12 meters in length, consisting of 205 columns of 33 lines each. This makes it one of the 
longest scrolls found among the Herculaneum library to date (e.g,. Philodemus, On Rhetoric 
book 3 is the longest at 245 columns, and his On Poems book 5 has 203 columns).16 Of course 
the work as a whole was relatively short in comparison, as it did not span more than a single 
scroll.
 ‘Unrolled’ in 1808, the editio princeps of this carbonized papyrus was published in 
Naples in 1835 and 1843 by Antonio Ottaviano (Herculanensium Voluminum quae Supersunt 
V, Pars Prior et Altera), consisting of drawings of the papyrus fragments (Italian: disegni) 
which F. Casanova and his brother, G. B. Casanova, made between 1811m1817. Alexander 




12. In their introduction, Konstan et al. erroneously claim that these questions are underlined in the 
papyrus, but it is rather Olivieri who underlines them (Olivieri, Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus, X; David 
Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 8)
13. Translation Konstan et al. 
14. As also understood by, e.g., Gigante, Philodemus in Italy, 24–26; Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, 92; White, “Measure,” 104;
15. As estimated by White, “Ordering the Fragments”.
16. See papyrological discussion in White, “Ordering the Fragments,” 38–41, 60–61; Delattre, “Le 
Franc-Parler,” 275–76.
and autopsy of the papyrus.17 Despite having access to the papyri fragments in Naples, 
Olivieri’s edition has a number of weaknesses, both in his interpretation of the text, and his 
omission of material.18 Olivieri omitted fragments for which there were available disegni, and 
also omitted fragments which had not been drawn, but could provide important evidence for 
the ordering of fragments.19 Several scholars have made important contributions to the study 
of this text aside from Olivieri,20 but there remains no complete critical edition of the work (a 
task which W. B. Henry has undertaken, the editor of Philodemus’ On Death, book 4). David 
Konstan and others (including Clarence Glad) helpfully produced the first modern translation 
in 1998, operating on the basis of Olivieri’s text (i.e., without viewing the scroll itself, but 
adding several of the fragments he omitted, and drawing upon the textual work of Philippson 
and Gigante).21
 Ordering the extant fragments is a central issue to the interpretation of this text, and 
much work remains to be done. At present we have the last 24 columns of the scroll in their 
proper order. Each of these columns consists of top and bottom fragments (e.g., col. 1a, 1b), 
with lines regularly missing in the middle of the column, because when it was opened the 
scroll was cut in two to aid the process (as is common among the Herculaneum papyri). 
Though these last 24 columns often remain very difficult to interpret, they provide the longest 
secure sequence of fragments that can be found in the extant remains.
 The ordering for the rest of the fragments is far less secure (more than 100, many of 
which remain unedited). However, many of them show physical joins to one another, and 
make up tops or bottoms of columns, sometimes in succession. Recently, L. Michael White 
and Daniel Delattre have proposed reconstructions of many columns preceding the final 24, 
linking top and bottom fragments based on this papyrological evidence, at times with further 
substantiation in the text of the reconstructed columns.22 In this thesis I cannot critically assess 




17. Olivieri, Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus.
18. See, e.g., R. Philippson, “Review of Olivieri, Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus,” Berliner 
Philologische Wochenschrift 36.22 (1916): 677–88; Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 57–62.
19. See White, “Ordering the Fragments.”.
20. E.g., Philippson, “Review of Olivieri, Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus”; Norman W. DeWitt, 
“Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups,” CP 36 (1936): 205–11; Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 55–
113; Glad, Paul and Philodemus; White, “Measure”; White, “Ordering the Fragments”; Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus; Delattre, “Le Franc-Parler”; Giovacchini, “La Nouvelle Reconstruction”; Daniel Delattre, “La 
Pratique Maîtrisée Du Franc-Parler: Philodème de Gadara, Le Franc-Parler (Col 151–162 D.),” in Poikiloi 
Karpoi: Exégèses Païennes, Juives et Chrétiennes, eds. Mireille Loubet and Didier Pralon (Aix-en-Provence: 
Presses universitaires de Provence, 2015), 435–54; Giovanni Indelli and Francesca Longo Auricchio, “Contributi 
inediti di Achille Vogliano sul PHerc. 1471 (Filodemo, La Libertà di Parola),” Cronache Ercolanesi 45 
(2015): 97–145; Giovanni Indelli and Francesca Longo Auricchio, “Achille Vogliano sul Pherc. 1471 (Filodemo, 
La Libertà di Parola): Una Postilla,” Cronache Ercolanesi 46 (2016): 123–25.
21. David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism.
22. See White, “Ordering the Fragments”; Delattre, “Le Franc-Parler”; Delattre, “La Pratique 
Maîtrisée”.
to the scroll in order to do so. Yet I can, at least, engage with the reconstructed texts and 
contexts that they propose.
 Because of the fragmentary nature of this text, the complexity of its text-critical 
problems, and my own lack of expertise, I have sought to found my reading on the best 
evidence available, i.e., those passages which require minimal reconstruction, and which have 
an established sequence (pre-eminently col. 1n24). I have cleaved closely to the consensus of 
other scholars, and have noted where my readings are controversial. This thesis operates under 
no pretensions of offering a critical edition of particular fragments, despite how needed this 
remains. My presentation of Philodemus follows the main interpretive trajectories already 
established (particularly those set by Gigante, Glad, and Tsouna). In general, I follow the text 
and translation as presented in the edition by Konstan et al., unless otherwise noted.
4.2. Reciprocal Moral Formation as Shared Inquiry (συζη' τησις)
By far the majority of evidence concerning reciprocal moral formation in Philodemus involves 
the use of frank criticism to identify a particular fault and to provide the accused person 
assistance toward moral improvement. However, the practice of reciprocal frank criticism is 
just one mode of moral formation among Epicurean friends. In this section, I sketch other 
modes of moral formation among friends in order to provide a context for the particular role 
of frank criticism (examined in section 4.3 below).23
 All interactions between Epicureans could be subsumed under the project of ‘shared 
inquiry’ (συζη' τησις), in which members strive to progress in Epicurean philosophy toward the 
best life together, as seen in the following passage from Philodemus’ treatise On Anger col. 
19.12n28. Here Philodemus continues his description of the irascible person (ο ργι'λος) as in 
the preceding columns,24 and in this instance illustrates how irascibility affects the reception 
of formative efforts by others:
 ... γεγονο' των | εχθρωñν [κωλυ' ον]ται σχο|λα' ζειν. α προβα' τους δ’ αυ |του`ς α να' γκη 
 γι'νεσθαι και` | τωñ ι µη' τε καθηγητα`ς | α νε'χεσθαι µη' τε συσχο|λα' ζοντας, αν επιτιµωñσι | και` 
 διορθωñσιν, ω  ς τα` [θ]η|ριω' δη τωñν ε λκωñν ου δε | τα`ς τωñν η πιωτα' των | φαρµα' κων  
 υ  ποµε'νει | προσαγωγα' ς — α λλα` καν ε  |τε'ροις επιπλη' ττωσιν, | α λογω' τατα προ`ς ε αυτου`ς 




23. Glad does not treat in detail those modes of formation that do not involve the more mature treating 
those less mature by psychagogic frank criticism. Glad does discuss briefly the wider communal life in which 
frank criticism takes place, but less so its formative aspects. See Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 101–60, 175–81.
24. E.g., see symptoms and behaviour outlined in col. 8n18, and discussion in col. 34 concerning how to 
tell the difference between the α οργη' τος and the ο ργι'λος when they appear the same.
 ...having become enemies [they are hindered from] devoting themselves to learning. 
 And it is necessary that they make no progress, and endure neither the teachers nor the 
 fellow-students, should they rebuke and correct, just as terrible ulcers do not endure 
 the administration of the gentlest medicines — rather if they (teachers and fellow-
 students) rebuke others, (it is necessary that) they (the irascible) always suspect 
 everything said toward them to be completely irrational — nor do they share in the 
 good that comes by means of shared inquiry...25
Generally speaking, the teachers’ and fellow-students’ correction of the irascible person in this 
text can be identified as instances of frank criticism. The benefit of such correction and the 
‘good that comes by means of shared inquiry’ seem loosely distinguished in the text, but 
should be considered parts of a whole. Shared inquiry seems to refer rather generally to the 
collaborative study and application of Epicurean philosophy in pursuit of its goods,26 of which 
direct formation through frank criticism is one mode. The ‘good’ of συζη' τησις is the benefit 
which friends contribute to one another in this shared pursuit of the best Epicurean life.
 It is difficult to specify precisely how Epicureans give and receive the ‘good’ of 
συζη' τησις, for Philodemus does not discuss it at length in what remains of his work. 
Συζη' τησις has to do with moral formation, given that sharing in its benefits links contextually 
with making progress (the irascible person makes no progress in that they cannot receive the 
benefits of correction and shared inquiry). Moreover, Epicurus speaks of the benefit of 
συζη' τησις in VS 74: εν φιλολο' γω,  συζητη' σει πλειñον η»νυσεν ο   η  ττηθει'ς, καθ’ ο  προσε'µαθεν, 
‘In philosophical shared inquiry, the inferior one gains more, insofar as he learns more.’ Apart 
from practices of frank criticism, how does Philodemus envision formation via shared 
inquiry? What are the other modes of formation are available, of which frank criticism is one 
instance?
 In the most general sense, Epicurean life in community was συζη' τησις, given that 
‘shared inquiry’ is not just a matter of gaining technical knowledge, but also of living the best 
life together with philosophical rigor. Recalling the discussion of ch. two, the social setting for 
this shared inquiry is the leisured withdrawal from society with friends, with its regular 
symposia and freedom from work. While Philodemus and his friends may not have lived 




25. My translation, developed with the help of Indelli’s translation: ‘... divenuti nemici, sono impediti di 
dedicarsi allo studio. Necessariamente (gli adirati) non riescono a progredire, perché non sopportano né maestri 
né compagni de scuola, qualora li rimproverino e li correggano, come le ulcere maligne non sopportano le 
somministrazioni dei farmaci lenitivi — ma anche se (maestri e compagni) rimproverino altri essi sospettano del 
tutto stoltamente che ogni cosa venga detta sempre contro di loro —, né partecipano del bene che deriva dalla 
ricerca in commune...’ (Indelli, L’Ira, 117).
26. See discussion in Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 100–101; Indelli, L’Ira, 185–86. See also Cicero, 
Fam. 16.21.4.
of Athens, their life together as a community was no less robust.27 The community held 
regular hero cult observances for Epicurus and other eminent forebears, in which a shared 
meal, discourse, and sacrifices enacted and reaffirmed communal identity, and reoriented the 
community toward living in imitation of its humanly divine exemplars.28 By engaging in such 
Epicurean acts together, members led each other to affirm and act upon their shared identity as 
Epicureans. This redefinition of communal identity around Epicurean values could unite 
members as a family despite diverse social, cultural, and economic backgrounds.29 Since 
Philodemus considered the public worship of the gods as formative of one’s conception of the 
gods, as well as a means of living like them, Epicureans likely formed one another by 
worshipping together, especially during civic religious festivals in which they had to guard 
their minds from false views of the gods.
 Concerning συζη' τησις as philosophical study strictly considered, Philodemus’ 
community likely engaged in study by listening to lectures (given by, e.g., Philodemus or 
Siro),30 reading and interpreting philosophical texts with the help of a sage, and having 
philosophical conversations in the course of their common life.31 Συζη' τησις in this community 
was especially text-centred, given (a) the trends toward text-centred philosophical activity in 
this post-Hellenistic philosophical period,32 (b) Philodemus’ concerns that Epicureans of his 
day were not well-versed in Epicurean literature, (c) his conception of the Epicurean teacher 
as a literary guide to his students, and (d) his own output of treatises for his students involving 




27. See discussion in Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” 134–41.
28. See discussion in Clay, “The Cults of Epicurus,” 100–102; Clay, “Individual and Community,” 67–
74. On the notion of the Epicurean community as family, with Epicurus as father, see Bernard Frischer, The 
Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982), 206–7; see also Clay’s discussion of cult observances as a family practice of 
remembrance (PHerc. 1232 fr. 8, col. 1) in Clay, “Individual and Community,” 67–74.
29. This could hold true even if Philodemus’ community was relatively elite in its composition. While 
slaves could have been part of Philodemus’ community (and Epicurus sets a precedent in this respect), the socio-
economic and educational limitations upon community participation (given in On Property Management, col. 23) 
would still apply, as argued in chapter two.
30. In On Rhetoric 2 col. 52 (PHerc 1674) [col. 151 Longo Auricchio], Philodemus mentions 
contemporary Epicureans in Cos and Rhodes who lectured ([τωñν] ... σχολα|[ζο' ν]των) to others on the topic that 
rhetoric is not an art, while Philodemus argued that sophistic rhetoric is an art, though other forms of rhetoric are 
not.
31. Philodemus’ Περι` ο  µιλι'ας, or On Conversation indicates that the study of nature and perception 
were important matters of daily dialogue (see col. 7.4; 4.8n9), though much of what remains of this treatise seems 
to concern the issue of speaking or remaining silent in varying circumstances (critical edition: Filippo Amoroso, 
“Filodemo Sulla Conversazione,” Cronache Ercolanesi 5 (1975): 63n76; see discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, 122–23)
32. See, e.g., Sedley, “Decentralisation”; Dirk Baltzly, “Plato’s Authority and the Formation of Textual 
Communities,” ClQ 64 (2014): 793–807; see also the introductory essay in Troels Engberg-Pedersen, From 
Stoicism to Platonism: The Development of Philosophy, 100 BCE-100CE (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), 1–26.
33. Epicurus himself wrote prolifically, but also wrote easily remembered epitomes for his students (see 
comments in Ep. Hdt. 35).
discourse are certainly the environment in which corrective frank criticism occurred, yet it 
seems plausible that this was not the only mode of formation, for shared study was not limited 
to correction of past mistakes. Study did feature input from skilled teachers to less mature 
students, but also perhaps more collaborative discussions (insofar as a member could 
contribute to collaboration, rather than simply receive instruction).34 For example, Philodemus 
encouraged conversation concerning the study of nature (φυσιολογι'α, On Conversation col. 
7.2n4), which was a key component of making choices to bring oneself pleasure and avoid 
pain (see the treatise On Choices and Avoidances col. 13, likely composed by Philodemus).35 
Such collaboration involved, e.g., discussing Epicurean philosophy proper, discussing what 
was most advantageous in a given circumstance according to hedonistic calculus, and/or 
processing together perceptions, thoughts, and emotions in relation to Epicurean empiricism 
and ethical ideals.36 This collaboration of course shades into the use of reciprocal frank 
speech, but the latter is generally distinct in that it concerns instances of direct correction and 
therapy of faults.
 There were many ways in which Epicureans engaged in ‘shared inquiry’ together. 
Such shared study involved the less direct modes of formation just examined, as well as more 
direct instances of frank criticism. Having established the wider context in which frank 
criticism sits, we proceed to a detailed discussion of its conception and practice.
4.3. Core Evidence for the Communal Practice of Reciprocal Frank Criticism
Typically in Philodemus’ discussion it is the more mature, especially the teachers, who 
exercise frank criticism, but he occasionally indicates that everyone can take part, not simply 
those who are more mature. We have already seen this indication in On Anger col. 19, in 
which Philodemus notes that the irascible person listens neither to their teachers nor their 
fellow students should they try to correct or rebuke him (και` | τωñ ι µη' τε καθηγητα`ς | α νε'χεσθαι 
µη' τε συσχο|λα' ζοντας, αν επιτιµωñσι | και` διορθωñσιν). Along with this witness, the following 
two passages from Lib. comprise the clearest attestations in Philodemus’ writings to fully 




34. Though I know of no direct evidence for this, one may imagine that such collaborative discussions 
of philosophical issues among the more mature assisted Philodemus in his ethical treatise-writing, given as they 
are to the application of Epicurean philosophy to various features of human life.
35. See discussion in Giovanni Indelli and Voula Tsouna-McKirahan, eds., Philodemus, On Choices 
and Avoidances, La Scuola Di Epicuro 15 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1995), 173–74; Amoroso, “Filodemo Sulla 
Conversazione”.
36. Philodemus asserts of friendship in Lib. fr. 28.6n12: ου δε'ν | εστι τηλικουñτον ω  ς το` ε»|χει[ν], ωð ι 
τα [γ]κα'ρδ[ι]α'  τις ε |ρειñ και` λ[ε'γ]οντος α κου' σε|ται. σφο' δ[ρ]α γα`ρ η   φυ' σις ο ρε' |γεται πρ[ο' ]ς τινας εκκαλυ' |πτειν α 
[ν]οειñ..., ‘... there is nothing so grand as having one to whom one will say what is in one’s heart and who will 
listen when one speaks. For our nature strongly desires to reveal to some people what it thinks.’
 ... δυ' νηται [δ’] αυ το`ς37 η  | δι’ η  µωñν η  δι’ α»λλου τωñν | 
 σ[υ]σχολαζο' ντω[ν θ]ε[ρ]απευ|θηñναι, µηδε` συνεχωñς αυ |το` ποιειñν, µηδε` κατα` πα' ν|των, 
 µηδε` παñν α  µα' ρτη|µα και` το` τυχο' ν... 
 ... he can be treated either by us or by another of his fellow-students, and not to do it  
 continually, nor against everyone, nor every chance error... (Lib. fr. 79.1n7)
 ... και` το` δ[ι’ α λ]λη' λων σω' [ι]|ζεσθαι προ`ς ευ φορ[ι']αν και` | µεγα' λην 
 ευ»νοιαν εφο' δι|ον η  γουµε'νους, επει' και` | το` νεωτε'ροις κατα` τη`ν | δ[ι]α' θεσιν 
 πειθαρχηñσαι | π[οτε, ε»τι δε`] τη`ν νουθε'τη|σιν ενε[γ]κε[ιñ]ν δεξιωñς α γα|θο`]ν και` 
 προ'σφ[ορον]... 
 ... and considering being saved by one another as provisions for patience38 and great  
 goodwill, since even to obey [at times] those who are younger in condition, and further 
 to endure (their) admonishment graciously, are good and fitting... (Lib. fr. 36.1n9)39
Lib. fr. 79 is one of several fragments which clarify the proper use of frank criticism by 
describing its improper use, often exemplified by the immature.40 On the basis of White’s and 
Delattre’s reconstructions, the immediately preceding column concerned, among other things, 
an immature student’s reporting of others’ errors in order to ingratiate a teacher (fr. 52).41 In 
this fragment, Philodemus speaks from the perspective of the teachers about a student needing 
treatment, and mentions that this treatment can be done either by ‘us’ or one of his fellow-




37. Delattre reads, αυ τωñν, ‘by them’, with a possible reference to teachers, but notes uncertainty over all 
but the υ in this word (Delattre, “La Pratique Maîtrisée,” 450).
38. The editors of On Frank Criticism have chosen ‘contentment’ to translate ευ φορ[ι']αν (David 
Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 50), with LSJ, s.v., ευ φορι'α. However, such a translation seems less related 
to the context than a rendering like ‘patience’, which has a stronger social dimension, given that ‘goodwill’ 
among members is paired with ευ φορ[ι']αν as a result of successful formative interactions, and that the subsequent 
clause describes the endurance of criticism from others as good. Gigante also disputes ‘contentment’ as a 
rendering, and opts for another rendering offered in LSJ, the ‘power of enduring easily’ (Gigante, Ricerche 
Filodemee, 72, n. 94). ‘Patience’ seems appropriate because it involves a social dimension, i.e., the capacity of 
bearing with others in friendship, enhanced by recalling times when others ‘saved’ oneself from pain.
39. Translation adapted from David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 51.
40. E.g., in col. 1a.1n4, Philodemus introduces a topic of discussion concerning how to distinguish those 
who speak frankly ‘from a polite disposition’ (το`ν | α πο` διαθε'σεως αστει'ας [παρ]|ρησιαζο'µενον) or ‘from a base 
one’ (το`ν α |[π]ο` φαυ' λης). In col. 16a.5n12, Philodemus remarks that the teachers receive harsher rebuke from the 
young (i.e., immature): α»λ|λοι δε` και` συνετωτα' τους | ε αυτου`ς διαλαµβα' νον|τες και` πραε'ως µε`ν α[υ ]τοιñς | 
επιτιµωñσι και` προ`ς η  δο|[ν]η' ν· υ  πο` δε` τωñν ν[ε' ]ων | τα` πολλα` πικρο' [τ]ερ[ον] ε [πι|πλ]η' ττοντα[ι]. ‘Others, who 
distinguish themselves as most intelligent, reproach them gently and to their liking. But for the most part they are 
rebuked more sharply by the young.’ Translation by David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 115. See also fr. 
80; col. 1an2a; 14a; 15b; 16anb.
41. Delattre, “La Pratique Maîtrisée”; White, “Ordering the Fragments,” 42–43.
healthy relationships among Epicurean friends (especially ‘goodwill,’ ευ νοι'α) even during the 
exchange of direct criticism.42 ‘Saving one another’ from moral illness by frank speech 
strengthens friendships by promoting goodwill and patience toward others.
 Some preliminary observations about these texts orient the subsequent discussion. 
First, each witness (including On Anger col. 19) distinguishes between two classes of 
Epicureans eligible to form others within one community: teachers and students. Second, in 
Lib. fr. 79 and On Anger col. 19, Philodemus assumes that the more mature person acts upon 
the less mature, who has an unresolved issue needing the intervention of another. Third, 
Philodemus champions a reciprocity of formation among all members regardless of maturity 
in Lib. fr. 36, but considers it important to clarify that this applies even to the situation in 
which a younger member offers the critique to someone more mature, thus indicating the 
abnormality of such a situation. Fourth, Philodemus describes this formative intervention as 
rebuking (εpiιτιµα'ω, επιπλη' ττω; On Anger col. 19), correcting (διορθο'ω On Anger col. 19), 
admonishing (νουθε'τησις, Lib. fr. 36), treating (θεραπευ'ω, Lib. fr. 79), and saving (σω,ñζω, Lib. 
fr. 36), all of which must be done properly (Lib. fr. 79), though this proper procedure is 
spelled out in much more detail elsewhere. Fifth, Philodemus indicates that formation must 
also be properly received to be effective, i.e., received with obedience, trust, and gracious 
endurance of criticism (Lib. fr. 36; On Anger col. 19).
 The formative activities just described in these passages are identical to the 
therapeutic, saving criticism of wise Epicurean teachers discussed at length in Lib. The wise 
teachers use piαρρησι'α (described in the same language, e.g., ‘rebuke’, ‘correct’, ‘admonish’) 
to ‘save’ and ‘treat’ others throughout.43 The less mature ‘obey’ and ‘endure admonishment’ 
from the more mature as part of the salvific, therapeutic process.44 For example, in fr. 40, the 
‘only saviour’, the ‘one guide of right speech and [action] ’is the Epicurean teacher who 
speaks publicly and honestly about the failings of those he saves.45 The recipient, in contrast, 





42. Fr. 25 speaks of teachers increasing goodwill toward themselves through frank criticism to those 
who receive instruction: ‘... and of how, through frankness, we shall heighten the goodwill towards ourselves of 
those who are being instructed by the very fact of speaking frankly’ (και` τουñ | πωñ ς δια` παρρησι'ας επιτε|νουñµεν 
τη`ν προ`ς αυ του`ς | ευ»νοιαν τωñν κατ[ασκε]υα|ζοµ[ε' ]νων παρ’ αυ το` το` πε|παρρησια'σθαι). Translation by David 
Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 43. See also col. 1b; 10b; 11b; 17b.
43. See, e.g., διορθο'ω in fr. 44.4; διο' ρθωσις in fr.55; επιτιµα'ω in fr. 6.8; col. 16a.9; επιπλη' ττω in col. 
16a.11n12; εpiι'πληξις in col. 16b.7; νουθετε'ω in fr. 23.4n5; 61.2; νουθε'τησις in fr. 77.6n7; θεραπευ'ω in fr. 
44.8n9; 69.8; σω,ñ ζω in fr. 34.5; 77.3n4.
44. See fr. 66.5n6, which describes a student’s process of conversion to obedience of wise admonition 
(‘he will obey the admonition,’ piειθαρχη' σει τηñ[ι νο]υθε|τει'αι).
45. Clarence Glad interprets that this teacher is Epicurus, given the appellation ‘only saviour’, but this 
seems unlikely given the fragment’s concern about present teacher/student relationships, not relations to the 
ultimate teacher, Epicurus (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 158, n. 209). 
 ... [for it is necessary to show him his] errors forthrightly and speak of his 
 failings publicly. For if he has considered this man to be the one guide of right speech 
 and [action], whom he calls the only savior, and citing the phrase, ‘with him 
 accompanying,’ he has given himself over to be treated, then how is he not going to 
 show to him those things in which he needs treatment, and [accept admonishment]?
 (Lib. fr. 40)46 
 Similarly, Philodemus describes piαρρησι'α as a means for salvation and perfection in 
col. 6b. The Epicurean sages who have become ‘perfect’ (τε'λειος) needed saving frank 
criticism in varying degrees on their way to perfection, and this in turn affects how much 
frank criticism they offer to others: ‘And if one has needed frankness minimally, while 
another has been saved by means of this, then the one applies less, the other more of that 
through which he became perfect’ (col. 6b.8n13).’ This helps to explain why some teachers 
differ in their exercise of frank criticism, a question raised earlier in col. 3a. 
 In these three texts (Lib. fr. 36, 79, and On Anger col. 19) Philodemus assumes that all 
members can directly form one another, using the same frank criticism that the wise normally 
do for the less mature. Thus, in order to understand how these mutually formative practices 
work in greater detail, one must draw on the discussion throughout Lib. concerning how the 
wise are to use frank criticism to treat and save others, and how such treatment is to be 
received. This is the subject of the next section.
4.4. The Conception and Practice of Reciprocal Frank Criticism
After first briefly describing the Epicurean framework by which frank criticism operates 
(4.4.1), I describe how Epicureans give and receive frank criticism (4.4.2), and the kind of 
reciprocity involved (4.4.3), in order to then clarify how and why Epicureans depend on each 




46. Translation Konstan et al. Fr. 40: ... [χρη` | γα`ρ αυ τωñ ι δεικνυ' ειν α ν|υ]ποστο' λως τα`ς διαµαρ|[τι']ας και` 
κοινωñς ειπ[ειñ]ν | [ε»]λαττω' σεις. ει γα`ρ [η  ]γη|[σ]α'µενος ε»να τουñτ[ο]ν [ο  ]|δηγο`ν ο ρθουñ και` λ[ο' ]γου | κα[ι` ε»ργου], 
[ο«]ν φ[ησ]ι σωτηñρ[α] µο' |νο[ν, κ]αι` επιφωνη' [σ]ας το` ‘του' |του [γ’ ε  ]σποµε'νοιο,’ παρε'δω|κεν [ε αυ]το`ν 
θεραπε[υ' ]ειν, πωñ ς ου χι` µε'λλει ταυñτ’, εν | [οιð]ς δειñται θεραπευ'σε|[ως, δει]κνυ' ειν αυ τωñ ι κα[ι` νουθε'τησιν | 
προσδε'χεσθαι;]... 
4.4.1. The Epicurean Framework of Moral Formation
The activities of ‘treating’ and ‘saving’ others via frank criticism fit within the Epicurean 
analysis of the human problem and its solution through conversion to Epicurean philosophy.47 
The problem is the failure to achieve the ideal, most pleasurable human life provided by the 
absence of pain (α ταραξι'α). Without Epicurean philosophy, people suffer from various 
physical and psychological pains caused by false reasoning (ψευδοδοξι'α, On Anger col. 
6.14n15), exemplified by, e.g., erroneous beliefs, ignorance, unlimited desires, out of control 
emotions, or harmful behaviour arising from vicious dispositions of character (δια' θεσις).
 Epicureans claimed that they possessed the true, self-evident conceptions of the 
cosmos, conceptions which had been obscured over time as people falsely interpreted their 
perceptions of the world. Epicureans sought to base knowledge on induction from sense 
perception and empirical first principals (e.g., see Philodemus, On Signs, col. 16, 20, 32).48 
The Epicurean criteria for establishing truth are sense-impressions (the impressions 
themselves, not judgements based upon them), feelings (e.g., of pleasure and pain), and 
preconceptions (i.e., self-evident concepts formed from repeated perceptions of things).
 Achieving the most pleasurable life necessarily involves internalizing these truths 
about the world and oneself, and thus gradually transforming one’s dispositions into virtues, 
i.e., healthy dispositions to reason correctly, feel emotions properly, pursue desires wisely, etc. 
(On Choices and Avoidances, 14.1n14). Conversion towards this ideal life involves 
memorizing Epicurean principles, applying these principles to one’s life with like-minded 
friends (especially with the help of a sage’s instruction and correction), and eventually 





47. This section is inevitably cursory. I am especially indebted to Voula Tsouna’s discussion of these 
topics, particularly with reference to Philodemus’ ethical treatise On Choices and Avoidances in Tsouna, The 
Ethics of Philodemus, 15–44. See also Susanne Bobzien, “Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in 
Epicurus’ Philosophy,” in The Virtuous Life in Greek Thought, ed. Burkhard Reis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 206–29; David Konstan, Life; Christopher Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and 
Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3–203.
48. For discussion of Epicurean epistemology and its controverted reconstruction, including whether 
piρολη'ψεις are empirically learned or innate, see Phillip Howard De Lacy and Estelle Allen De Lacy, eds., 
Philodemus. On Methods of Inference (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1978), 195–205; Elizabeth Asmis, “Epicurean 
Epistemology,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, eds. Keimpe Algra, et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 260–94; Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1:78–97; Elizabeth 
Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1984), 19–224; Sedley, 
“Epicurus’ Theological Innatism”; David Konstan, “Epicurus on the Gods”. Particularly with respect to the 
epistemology of therapeutic analysis, see discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 52–73.
49. Philodemus argued, against other Epicureans, that memorization of tenets was not sufficient for 
achieving the best life. One must be able to use the tenets to make correct calculations concerning what to choose 
and what to avoid in order to achieve α ταραξι'α (On Choices and Avoidances, col. 11.7n20; see Indelli and 
Tsouna-McKirahan, Philodemus, On Choices and Avoidances, 160–66).
 Central to Epicurean philosophical therapy is the ‘four-fold cure’ or τετραφα' ρµακος 
(Epicurus, KD 1n4. Philodemus recites the cure in PHerc. 1005 col. 5.8n13: ‘Nothing to fear 
in god, nothing expected in death, easily got is the good, easily born the bad’ (α»φοβον ο   θεο' ς, 
α ν[υ' ]ποπτον ο   θα' νατος και` τ’α γαθο`ν µε`ν ευ»κτητον, το` δε` δεινο`ν ευ εκκα[ρ]τε'ρητον).50 The 
wider structures of the Epicurean system specify how this cure operates. As reviewed in ch. 
three above, the gods are blessed and incorruptible, and thus do not involve themselves in 
human life, and so need not be feared. There is nothing to fear in death because there is no 
pain in it, one ceases to exist as one’s soul atoms dissipate from the body.51 One can gain and 
maintain a secure hold on the character and minimal external goods needed for maximal 
pleasure in this life, even during extreme physical pain leading to death.
4.4.2. Giving and Receiving Frank Criticism
With this framework in mind, we proceed to what the delivery of frank criticism practically 
entailed. The goal of frank criticism is to help another person identify their own painful, 
erroneous ways of thinking, feeling, desiring, and/or behaving, and to help the other person to 
grow out of their faults in accordance with Epicurean philosophy, with its proper, pleasurable 
rationality, emotions, desires, and behaviours.52 This persuasive method operates by 
philosophical argumentation delivered in doses of praise and blame, and may lead to the 
prescription of reformatory exercises.53 
 Philodemus seems to summarize the persuasive process in Lib. col. 9a, in which he 
likely describes a formative encounter between two wise men (as also described in col. 8anb): 
 ... η  [µεγα' λη]ν α σθε'νειαν | η  πο' ν[ων α ηδι'αν] αυ τωñ [ι] παρα|πεπτω[κυιñα]ν και` τα`ς 
 αιτι'|ας αιð[ς παρε]λογι'σθη συνο' |ψεται κα κει'νωι δει'ξει και` | πει'[σ]ει, και` πολυ` δω' σει 
 τουñ|τ’ αυ το` προ`ς επ[ι']γνωσιν τηñς |α λλη' λων τελ[ει]ο' τητος.
 
 ... he will perceive that a [great] weakness or [dislike] for toil has befallen him, and 
 the causes on account of which he has reasoned [falsely], and he will point (these) out 




50. Translation Obbink, On Piety, 536.
51. See, e.g., Kirk R. Sanders, “Philodemus and the Fear of Premature Death,” in Epicurus and the 
Epicurean Tradition, eds. Jeffrey Fish and Kirk R. Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 211–34.
52. See Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 92–93. 
53. For example, Philodemus required ungrateful students to read aloud Epicurean treatises (On 
Gratitude col. 14.14n18; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 77).
 one another’s perfection.54
 The majority of the discussion in Lib. concerns, however, teachers adapting frank 
criticism to various students, not to other teachers. The sage adapts his persuasive technique to 
each recipient, ranging from a mixture of praise and blame to a simple, harsher form of 
criticism alone.55 Whether gentle or harsh, in every instance of frank criticism, the sage 
confronts the recipient with his failures in false thinking or harmful behaviour, sometimes 
publicly.56 On the basis of his knowledge and prior observations of the recipient, the sage 
makes a probabilistic inference concerning the nature of the issues needing treatment, and 
intervenes accordingly.57
 Accompanying this criticism, the sage offers instruction, involving analysis of the 
problem and guidance toward healing.58 Philodemus is by no means unique in his persuasive 
technique or the exercises prescribed for healing; while his arguments often draw particularly 
upon Epicurean principles, other arguments are prevalent also in other schools (e.g., 




54. Translation Konstan et al. See also fr. 78 (80N), in which Philodemus remarks, ‘For when each 
person reasons ([ε κ]α'στο[υ] γα`ρ λογιζοµε'νου), it will happen that he knows things that are [worth] nothing, but 
that the one who saves (others) [heals] everyone of this’ (τον` σω' [ι]ζον|[τ]α δε` τουñτο πα' ντας | [α κ]ειñσθαι).
55. The harsh form of criticism, which Philodemus describes as similar to insult (fr. 60), is used against 
those who are very resistant to change, and/or have progressed toward maturity (fr. 7, 10). The sage softens his 
criticism by, e.g., using kind names for the recipient (‘dearest’, ‘sweetest’, fr. 14), by not mentioning lack of 
progress (fr. 33), by mentioning the recipient’s good qualities and encouraging them to act in accordance with 
them (fr. 68), or by not criticising every fault of the recipient at once (fr. 70; 78/80N, as interpreted by Konstan et 
al. and Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 112). See David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 33, n. 26; 
Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 96–98; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 143–44, n.165.
56. The primary vocabulary used for the critical phase of frank criticism, with representative citations, 
are: ‘reproach’ (εpiιτιµα'ω, fr. 6; επιτι'µησις, col. 21a), ‘rebuke’ (επιπλη' ττω, col. 16a; επι'πληξις, col. 16b), 
‘admonish’ (νουθετε'ω, fr. 61; col. 17a; νουθε'τησις. fr. 77). Other variants include, but are not limited to, ‘blame’ 
or ‘censure’ (µε'µφοµαι, fr. 13; κακι'ζω, fr. 77N; ψε'γω, fr. 33); ‘point out’ errors (δει'κνυµι, col. 9a), ‘sting’ 
(δα'κνω, col. 8b), ‘deflate’ (κολου'ω, col. 21b), etc. See Indices, p. 139f. in David Konstan, et al., On Frank 
Criticism.
57. See, e.g., fr. 1.8n9: a wise man speaks frankly by ‘conjecturing by reasonable arguments’, 
(στοχαζο'µενος | ευ [λ]ογι'αις). See also the limitations of such conjectures in, e.g., fr. 57; 63.
58. Philodemus assumes that frank criticism is instructional throughout Lib., but the remains of the text 
do not preserve a substantial discussion of constructive teaching. One may approximate such teaching by 
observing Philodemus’ other ethical writings. Throughout On Death, for example, Philodemus treats various 
fears related to death, such as the fear of unjust execution (col. 34), of what one might look like when dead (col. 
29), of dying far from home, or of leaving behind vulnerable dependents (col. 25n26). Philodemus instructs his 
reader how to overcome these fears in each case, drawing particularly (but not exclusively) on the Epicurean 
teachings concerning the limits of pleasure and the loss of perception and identity in death (Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, 240). Though instruction through treatises is different than the ad hoc, personal instruction of frank 
criticism, the philosophical arguments and teaching used in both cases were likely very similar.
59. See discussion of philosophical ‘exercises’ in Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From 
Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 211–52; Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, 74–87. Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, 
trans. Michael Chase; ed. Arnold I. Davidson (1987; repr., Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 81–109; Nussbaum, The 
Therapy of Desire. Martha Nussbaum attempts to isolate a genre of therapeutic argumentation used by Hellenistic 
philosophers (Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 16–47), but it is not clear that all of the arguments used by 
Philodemus or other Hellenistic philosophers are therapeutic in this narrow sense, nor operate only on a medical 
portraiture to ‘set before the eyes’ a character type, such as the superstitious person, flatterer, 
greedy money-maker, or sage.60 Perhaps he will make a show of anger for persuasive effect, 
though this may not reflect his actual feelings.61 Softer correction might be the sage’s goal, 
achieved by recounting or confessing an illustrative mistake of his own (fr. 9; 55).62 Perhaps 
the sage will exercise his authority to pardon minor faults (fr. 20; cf. also fr. 4).63 If needed, 
the sage might endeavour to inculcate self-love in the person requiring treatment as an 
expression of the sage’s own love for him (fr. 44, col. 3b).64 Over time, the sage questions 
recipients of treatment regularly,65 and adapts to their developing character and needs.66 
 What qualifications must a mature administrator of such criticism have? First of all, 
the one who offers critique must have the ability to judge the recipient correctly and accurately 
according to Epicurean principles.67 The sage has the ‘perfection of reason and prudence’ and 
an infallible knowledge of Epicurean preconceptions (piρολη'ψεις), which together ground the 
student’s complete trust in him.68 Those whom the teacher treats may differ widely in 
personality, emotional state, age, gender, upbringing, social, cultural, and economic statuses, 
and level of maturity.69 The sage commands a mastery of the mature characteristics which 
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model of ethical argument (as noted by Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 60; and by David Sedley, “The Cure 
of Souls: A Course of Therapeutic Argument,” TLS 24 [June 1994]: 9–10).
60. See discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 86–87, 93, 204–9. See On Anger, col. 1n7, 
esp. 4.15n19: ... τε|θε'ντα δε` προ` ο µµα' των | [ε ]πιστρ[εφ]ειñς προ`ς τη`ν | [θ]εραπει'αν παρασκευ|α' ζει, ‘... these 
having been placed before the eyes, correcting [them], it prepares [them] for therapy.’ The technique seems 
assumed in Lib., but in some instances is present only as a reconstruction; see fr. 77 (78N); 11; 26; 29; 72.
61. See fr. 87 (92N); On Anger col. 34n37 and discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 97–98, 
219–21.
62. Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 98.
63. Fr. 20.5n7 makes reference to pardon given by a teacher (τη`[ν] µεριζο|µε'νην συνγ[ν]ω' [µ]ην εν οιòς | 
διε'πεσον...). See also the leniency concerning first-time errors in fr. 35 (Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 95–
96).
64. The sage persistently ‘tames people into love for themselves’ (τιθασε[υ' ειν] | προσκαρτερητικωñ ς 
α ν|θρω' πους ειñς φιλ[ο' τ]ητας | ε  [αυ]τωñν, fr. 86.2n5) in the face of their indifference to treatment. Fr. 44 and col. 3b 
refer to the teacher as one who ‘loves’ those treated (στε'ργοντι, fr. 44.7; φιλουñσι, col. 3b.11).
65. The evidence for this practice is slightly oblique: fr. 42.9n10 makes reference to students disclosing 
errors ‘without the teacher interrogating’ (ου δ’ α νακρι'νοντος τουñ | καθηγουµε'νο[υ]); see also fr. 84.10.
66. E.g., the wise may increase the amount of frank criticism after having gained more information over 
time (col. 5b), or refuse to teach if he ‘suspects contempt’ (κατα[φ]ρο' νησιν | υ  ]ποπτευ'ων, col. 13a.1n2).
67. As we saw above in ch. 2, Philodemus’ qualifications for the Epicurean teacher include, e.g., 
distinguished literary skill, a lifetime of study, authorship of philosophical treatises.
68. In fr. 56.4n14, Philodemus asserts this knowledge while addressing a concern that a teacher might 
make mistakes in offering therapy: ν[υñ]ν ου χ η  µ[ιñν] δοκειñ δια|πεσειñσθαι προειληµµε' |νο[ι]ς τε κατα` λογισµουñ 
τε|λειο' τητα και` φρονη' σε|ως· καθο` δε` και` το` µη` | τυχειñν τουñ τε'λους και` το` | παρελθειñν [εκ] τωñν ου  δυ|ναµε'νων δια` 
παντο`ς | α νθρω' πωι φ[υ]λαχθηñναι, | διαπεσειñσθαι και` εν παρ|[ρησι'αι ου κ α δυ' νατον.], ‘Now it does not seem to us 
that we will slip up, having been outstripped in accord with the perfection of reason and prudence. But in respect 
both to not attaining perfection and to passing [from] things that cannot be permanently defended by a human 
being, one will slip and [it its not impossible] both in [frank criticism]...’.
69. For discussion of different recipients, including those who are ‘tender’ (α παλο' ς), ‘strong’ (ισχυρο' ς), 
women, rich, or older, see, e.g., fr. 7; 10; col. 4a; 21bn24b.
every recipient should show,70 and a mastery of the permutations of erroneous reasoning in 
various types of recipients. The sage is not infallible in every respect, for sometimes he may 
unavoidably misinterpret signs, or act without full knowledge of the recipient’s circumstances 
simply because he is human (see, e.g., fr. 57; 63). His failures, however, should not deter him 
from further attempts at treatment, nor should they question the student’s complete trust in his 
saving therapy (fr. 4; 63n64). 
 Philodemus would classify the morally formative use of frank criticism as an art that 
requires particular expertise taught by Epicurean teachers, not a skill that can be picked up by 
just anyone. Specifically, it is a conjectural art (dealing in probabilities of outcome, not 
certainties), as Philodemus defines it in On Rhetoric 2 (PHerc. 1674) col. 38.2n15:71 
 ‘Now, art is considered and called by the Greeks a skill or disposition from 
 observation of certain general and elementary principles which extend over the 
 majority of cases to particulars, and an art comprehends something and accomplishes 
 the sort of thing, such as few of those not knowing the art accomplish likewise, doing 
 so firmly and surely or conjecturally.’72
Evidence from Lib. in this trajectory includes references to the sage speaking frankly via 
‘conjecturing by reasonable arguments’ (στοχαζο' µενος | ευ [λ]ογι'αις, see fr. 1), and to 
probabilistic inferences made in the course of care, in medicalised idiom (e.g., fr. 57; 63).73
 Throughout intervention, the personal character of the administrator of criticism is 




70. In the context of a discussion concerning how sages differ in their applications of frank criticism to 
different pupils (shy, arrogant, etc., col. 4a), Philodemus reassures his reader that the sage οιòδεν βα|θυτε'ρως 
[οι«α]ς προ`ς εκα' τε|ρον κοινο' τητας προσοι'|[σο]ντα[ι] και` τελειωθε'ν|τες· , ‘...knows more deeply in regard to each 
[what kinds of] common traits they will exhibit even when they are perfected’ (col. 4b.2n6). The sage shows 
continuity with past Epicurean treatment of the same issues (col. 5b.8n9), just as one uses reports from history to 
gather empirical data (On Signs 20.31n21.3; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 59).
71. See Philodemus’ discussion of art and the technicity of rhetoric in On Rhetoric 2.8 (PHerc. 1674; 
Longo Auricchio 123); 2.17n18 (PHerc. 1672; Longo Auricchio 199n203); 2.28 (PHerc. 1672; Longo Auricchio 
235).  See also discussion in Clive Chandler, Philodemus On Rhetoric Books 1 and 2: Translation and 
Exegetical Essays, Studies in Classics (New York; London: Routledge, 2006), 81–103; Robert N. Gaines, 
“Cicero, Philodemus, and the Development of Late Hellenistic Rhetorical Theory,” in Philodemus and the New 
Testament World, eds. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland, NovTSup 111 (Leiden; Boston: 
Brill, 2004), 197–220; and e.g, Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1. For the standard critical edition of the first two books 
of On Rhetoric, see Francesca Longo Auricchio, ed., Φιλοδη'µου Περι` Ρ  ητορικηñς. Libri Primum et Secundum, 
Ricerche sui Papiri Ercolanesi 3 (Naples: Giannini Editore, 1977).
72. Translation by Gaines, “Rhetorical Theory,” 210. 
73. For further discussion, see Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 63–69; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 133–
37. Julie Giovacchini disputes that piαρρησι'α per se is a conjectural art, as Gigante claims, and prefers to speak 
more generally of the sage’s healing activity as an art, as was medicine (Giovacchini, “La Nouvelle 
Reconstruction,” 298–99). The point remains that Epicurean moral formation via frank criticism is an art, not a 
knack picked up by just anyone. Asmis, Glad, and Tsouna also prefer not to call frank criticism an art, but a tool 
within the art of moral formation (Asmis, “Philodemus’ Epicureanism,” 2393, n. 56; Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, 92–93; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 135).
might obstruct the process.74 These threats involve, for example, the danger that the giver 
would lash out in anger at the recipient (particularly if the recipient resisted intervention), or 
would use criticism to manipulate the recipient for his own interests. Two columns (col. 
1bn2a) seem to summarize the qualities of the person who exercises direct formation from a 
‘good’ or ‘noble disposition’ (το`ν | α πο` διαθε'σεως α στει'ας [παρ]|ρησιαζο'µενον, col. 1a.1n3) 
in contrast to a base disposition (το`ν α |[π]ο` φαυ' λης, col. 1a.3n4):
 ... piαñς [τι'ς] ποτε ευ νοωñν και` | συνετ[ωñς] κα[ι` συν]εχωñς φι|λοσοφωñν και` µε'γας εν ε«|ξει  
 και` α φιλο' δοξος και` [δη]|µαγωγο`ς η«κιστα και` φθο' |νου καθαρο`ς και` τα` προσ|ο' ντα µο' νον 
 λε'γων  και` | µη` συνεκφερο' µενος, | ω«στε λοιδορειñν η  ποµπε[υ' ]|ε[ιν] η  [κ]αταβα' λλε[ιν 
 η] βλα' |πτ[ειν], µηδ’ α σ[ε]λγε[ι']αις | κα[ι` κολ]ακευτ[ι]καιñς χρω' |[µενος τε'χναις] ... 
 [µηδε`] | γ[λ]ω' [σση]ς [α κ]ρ[ατ]η`[ς µηδε`]| µενψ[ι'µοι]ρος (ου δε` [γα`ρ α νο' η]|τος ω«στ[ε 
 κ]αν [µι]κρα'  τ[ις]| βλα'ψηι [θυµ]ωθηñναι) µη[δ’]| ερεθιστο`ς µηδε` τραχυ`ς | µηδε` πικρο' ς.
 ... everyone who bears goodwill and practices philosophy intelligently and  
 [continually], and is great in character, and indifferent to fame, and least of all a 
 politician, and clean of envy, and says only what is relevant, and is not carried away so 
 as to insult or strut or show contempt [or] do harm, nor [uses] insolence or [flattering 
 arts]...[nor without control] over his [tongue, nor] carping (for he is not [foolish] so as 
 to be [enraged] if someone harms him slightly), nor irritable, nor harsh, nor bitter.
 (col. 1b.2n2a.9)75
Other character traits of the ideal administrator of frank criticism include: persistence despite 
lack of progress (fr. 4; 11; 63n64; 69; 85); love for all recipients (fr. 44; 80; col. 3b; Tab. 3 H); 
a bright, friendly, gentle disposition, (... τ[ηñι δια]|θε'σει π[λ]ε[ιñ]στον ε αυτουñ τ[ουñ]|των ο   
[κ]αθηγου' µενος ε[υ η]|µε'ρωι και` φιλοφι'λωι [και` | η ]πι'ωι..., fr. 85.6n10); pleasure in praising 
others, but lack of pleasure in criticising (fr. 78n79; col. 2b); and an awareness of personal 
shortcomings (col. 15b; 18b; fr. 55).
 Yet, the success of direct formation does not depend solely on the expertise of the 
sage. Rather, healing and growth only occur when intervention is properly received. One may 
recall the discussion in ch. two concerning the capability needed to receive philosophical 




74. Tsouna affirms this interpretation of fr. 16 in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 113.
75. Translation Konstan et al. This is not the only location in which Philodemus discusses these traits. 
See also fr. 2; 48 on dispassionate criticism; see fr. 46; 70n71; col. 5a; 10a on sympathy, tolerance, and patience 
for those who err, even those who angrily retaliate to criticism; see fr. 12; 37n38 on the lack of anger and lack of 
concern over personal injury in frank criticism; see fr. 25 on ideal frank criticism which heightens goodwill in 
others; see Tab. 3 H; col. 19a; 20a on the greater intelligence and mature disposition of those who speak frankly; 
see fr. 44 on purity.
extreme instances in which students are unresponsive to the harshest intervention, even such 
that the sage no longer concerns himself for them (fr. 21; 69; 84; 59).76 Similarly, we have 
already seen in this chapter that the irascible person’s anger impedes the reception of 
intervention from others (On Anger col. 19). 
 Throughout On Frank Criticism, Philodemus details the ways in which criticism can 
backfire due to the recipient’s immature disposition (δια' θεσις), e.g., criticism inflames 
passionate resistance, or disheartens and alienates recipients (e.g., fr. 30; 65n66).77 Ideally, the 
sage observes and adapts to these responses, and the obstacles to receiving formation are 
overcome. A formerly resistant recipient might embrace criticism and obey when his passions 
have ‘relaxed’ (α νε'ντος, 65.10) or ‘have been relieved’ (κουφισθει'ς, 66.9).78 The sage may 
use various means of persuasion to help a recipient become more receptive, but the process of 
formation requires the recipient’s active participation as well.
 The basic actions required from the recipient are to endure criticism, obey instruction, 
and remain open to further correction.79 Despite the fact that direct formation is thus uni-




76. See Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 101–2.
77. See discussion in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 104–10; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 137–52. 
In fr. 30.5n9, Philodemus describes an immature person whose disposition is so attuned to pleasures from 
external things, or so opposed to pain, that it leads him to ‘set himself against’ and ‘obstruct’ ‘because pain is 
present’ (τις α piο` τηñς δια|θε' [σ]εως α [κε]ι'οις τωñ ι µε`ν | α ν[τ]ιταττο'µενος το` δε` καταποδ[ι']ζων, α«τε προσ|ο`ν 
ο δυ[ν]ηρο' ν, see Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 107).
Also important is Philodemus’ description of the transition from resistance to acceptance of frank 
criticism in fr. 65n66. After first receiving intervention, such a recipient ‘disobeys’ (α'piειθη' σας, 65.9, 11; 66.2), 
he ‘attacks’ (piροσβα'λλει, 65.12), he ‘pretends that he will escape notice’ (δι[αλ]η' |[σ]εσθαι τα να[ντ]ι'α 
ψ[ε]υσθει'ς, 65.12n13), his passions ‘puff him up,’ ‘hinder’, and ‘distort’ him (τοιñς εκχαυνο[υñ]σι πα' |θεσιν, 
66.7n8; α ντικρου' |ουσιν, 66.8n9; τωñν διαστρεφο' ντων, 66.11), he ‘opposes opinions to one another’ 
(α ν[τ]ιδοκε[υ' ]ων, 66.13), and he ‘wanders’ from obeying the criticism (το[υñ]|το πλανω[δ]ωñ ς ου  πεπο'η|κεν, 
66.13n15). That the passions are the referent of ‘things distorting’ (τωñν διαστρεφο' ντων) is based on the 
preceding comment in fr. 66, that the passions ‘puff up’ and ‘hinder’ (see David Konstan, et al., On Frank 
Criticism, 72–73). With regard to α ν[τ]ιδοκε[υ' ]ων in 66.13, Konstan et al. suggest (without explanation) the 
meaning ‘he is on the lookout’, while Gigante proposes ‘l’opposizione di δο' ξα a δο' ξα’ in light of perceived 
similarities to α ντιδοξειñν, α ντιδοξα' ζειν (Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 79–80).
78. Copious other examples of immature reception of intervention exist in Lib. A representative sample 
of qualities which exemplify failed reception include: indifference or lack of self-love (fr. 86), giving up on 
philosophy or submitting to a teacher without fruitfulness because of ‘being weak’ (fr. 59), distorting passions 
and retaliation (fr. 65; 70; 31; 18, col. 10a), refusal to admit errors, lack of awareness of errors, or arrogant 
assumption that the sage is wrong or inferior (fr. 39; 65n66; 41; col 15b; 17a; 19b; 20a; 21a), mistrust of the sage 
and his motivations in offering criticism (col. 21a; 22an24b).
79. On enduring, see fr. 31; 36; 38; 59; 88; col. 10anb; 14b; 20a; 23b; on obeying, see fr, 36; 45; 64n66; 
on offering oneself for correction, see fr. 28; 39n42; 49; 73; 75n76; 81; 84N.
80. In col. 13b.3n4, it seems there is a contrast of frank criticism with συνβου|[λε]υτικο`ν, or 
‘deliberative’ speech, which Tsouna interprets to entail a contrast between open-ended dialogue or advice about 
what to in general, versus directive instruction and correction of a particular fault (Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, 103). Glad interprets this column to be evidence of the mixing of praise and blame in criticism 
(Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 123, n. 90).
unthinking obedience.81 Rather, it requires active involvement, and assumes the recipient has 
some basic capacity to reason and apply Epicurean philosophy. The good recipient, e.g., has a 
desire to be healed (fr. 86), takes the initiative to offer his own errors for correction (fr. 42; 49; 
51), judges rightly what is advantageous for himself (e.g., to offer himself for treatment, fr. 1; 
49; col. 20b), appreciates the benefit of frank criticism (col. 17b), has an awareness of one’s 
errors and immaturity (fr. 42; 73; 75; col. 15b), accepts the validity and potential benefit of a 
given criticism with gratitude (fr. 39; col 8b; 10b; 14b), trusts others’ criticism as an 
expression of goodwill, friendship, and love (fr. 25; 41; 44; 74; col. 1bn2a; 3b; 13a), accepts 
responsibility for errors revealed by others (fr. 73; col. 21a), and accepts the relative 
superiority of the teacher’s philosophical expertise, character, judgement, and experience in 
relation to himself (fr. 44; col. 20a; 21a).82 
 The wise demonstrate the ideal reception of criticism. In col. 10b.8n14, it seems 
Philodemus discusses the wise man receiving frank criticism from a philosopher outside the 
community:83
 α λλα` και` α νε'ξεται και` | α ποδε'ξεται τη`ν ευ»νοιαν, | αφ’ ηðς ο«  ποτ’ εφαι'νετο συν|φ[ε' ]ρον  
 υ  πε'δειξε, και` χα' ριν |ε«[ξ]ει κατα` τ[ουñ]το και` α πο|λ[ο]γιειñται δε` πειñσαι φιλο' |[σοφον]...
 
 Rather, also he (the sage) will both tolerate it and accept the goodwill from which he 
 (the other philosopher) exhibited whatever seemed advantageous, and he will have 





81. As emphasized by Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 62–63. Martha Nussbaum rightly emphasizes 
that there is a limit to how critical an Epicurean student should be toward the teachings of Epicurus, or toward a 
teacher who faithfully represents Epicurus, for if one were to call the fundamentals of the philosophy into 
question, one does the same for the entire project of formation and achievement of the best life (Nussbaum, The 
Therapy of Desire, 130–32). However, following Tsouna, it seems clear that Philodemus himself exercises 
critical thought toward opposing Epicurean or non-Epicurean viewpoints, trains others to do the same, and 
expects students to evaluate the content, delivery, and intent of frank criticism according to the principles he 
establishes. Surely this is the case with frank criticism by the less mature. It seems that the expected level of 
critical engagement toward other Epicureans increases as one gains mastery and maturity in Epicurean 
philosophy, while the less mature grow into this critical engagement from a position of trust in their mature 
guides.
82. This last point concerning the relative superiority of the teacher applies particularly in the typical 
master to student relationship. Yet, it also applies in the same way to frank criticism among equals (as among the 
wise), or to frank criticism by the immature upon the more mature, though superiority in these latter cases is 
always with respect to a particular issue in need of critique, rather than in general.
83. This interpretation of the context seems supported by the discussion in the preceding columns 
concerning frank criticism among the wise (from col. 8a and following, and especially in col. 10a); see David 
Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 107, n.168; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 117–18.
84. Translation modified slightly from Konstan et al. It seems α piο|λ[ο]γιειñται derives from 
απολογι'ζοµαι, rather than α πολογε'οµαι, as implied by the translation of Konstan et al. (‘he will say in his defense 
that...’); see LSJ, s.v., α πολογι'ζοµαι.
The wise cherish and derive pleasure from criticisms shared in goodwill and in concern for 
their benefit (see also col. 8b).
 In sum, success in direct formation via frank criticism requires a level of maturity and 
skill in both the giver and the recipient, as well as an amiable relationship between the two. 
The administrator of direct formation catalyses growth by his skilled critique and correction 
according to the norms of Epicurean philosophy, and the recipient responds positively to the 
correction and takes a step forward in his progress toward maturity. The less mature require 
someone more mature to help them apply the principles of Epicureanism and grow, without 
whom they would languish in error and pain, for they do not yet have the ability to correct 
themselves as do the more mature.
4.4.3. The Reciprocity of Frank Criticism
In the preceding subsection, the texts discussed have mostly concerned teachers offering frank 
criticism to the less mature. Yet as claimed above in 4.3, Philodemus believed that all 
members ‘save one another’ by participating in frank speech, even if they are less mature (as 
seen in Lib. fr. 36; 79; On Anger col. 19). The focus of this section is to describe this open 
reciprocity of frank criticism among all members, especially those who are less mature. 
 It is important to recognize at the outset that there are limits to the reciprocity of frank 
speech, given the qualifications required for administering critique. Frank criticism is a 
philosophical art requiring for its performance some level of mature knowledge and character. 
 Because the corrector’s own maturity enables his critique over against another, frank 
speech assumes an unequal relationship between giver and recipient in relation to their 
maturity.85 Throughout Lib., the giver of direct formation is assumed to be better, more 
mature, than the recipient.86 In each instance, the giver must possess a legitimate criticism of 
another, and be able to direct the other to maturity, even if, apart from the particular instance 
of formation, the two are equal friends, or the giver is less mature on the whole than the 
recipient. The recipient stands in need of the giver because he possesses insight that the 
recipient does not have with respect to that particular issue (otherwise, the recipient would not 




85. As noted in Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 160.
86. For example: in contrast to a bad teacher, the good teacher is ‘better’ than his students (κρει'τ|τονι, fr. 
44.7n8); the reason why some think they are fit for offering frank criticism is that they are more intelligent than 
others (συν|ετω' τεροι, col. 19a.8n9); a question which marks a sub-section asks why some do not endure criticism 
when it is clear that their teachers are more intelligent (συν[ε]τωτε'ρους, col. 20a.2); Philodemus responds in the 
same column that those who resist frank criticism think themselves to be far better (piολυ` βελτει'ους) in character 
(διαθε'σει) and perception of what is preferable (τωñ ι συνοραñν τα` κρει'ττω), even if they are surpassed by their 
teachers’ theoretical knowledge; see the same sentiment of students in col. 21a.12, who think themselves wiser 
φρονιµω' τε[ρ]οι); the λαµπροι' and older men also do not abide criticism because they think themselves wiser 
(φρονιµωτε'ρ[ους], col. 22b.15.
 Thus it seems that the sage receives critique almost exclusively from other sages,87 due 
to the subtlety of their mistakes, which require a similarly wise person to detect and treat (see 
further discussion in section 4.4.3 below). Moreover, it is only ‘sometimes’ that a sage will 
speak frankly to a sage (piοτε, col. 8a.1).88 Additionally, Philodemus does not allow students to 
attempt frank criticism upon the teacher whose responsibility it is to instruct them.89 Glad’s 
concern to emphasize the unrestricted reciprocity of frank criticism in this community does 
not adequately acknowledge these limitations.90 On occasion a friend might critique another 
who is more mature, but this would be the exception to the norm, and would require a 
sufficient level of maturity in the less mature critic. 
 Nevertheless, all members are, in principle, eligible to offer this formation for others, 
and are encouraged to do so as a sign of friendship and love. As Clarence Glad notes, 
Philodemus’ community exercises an openness in accepting friends of varying levels of 
maturity; one does not have to be perfect, or even mature, to join this community and be 
considered a friend.91 As one matures, so does one’s ability to judge what is advantageous for 
others, diagnose illness in others, and intervene with skill, restraint, and right intentions. The 
less mature may fall short of the ideal application of frank criticism in any number of ways, 




87. Affirmed in Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 115–17.
88. Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 118. That Philodemus separately discusses this scenario perhaps 
indicates its relative infrequency, for otherwise it would be obvious.
89. col. 12b.6n9: τωñν δ’ υ  π’ αυ τουñ | κατασκευασοµε'νων ου  | πα' νυ µε`ν α νε'ξεται παρ|ρησι'ας..., ‘But he 
will not much tolerate the frankness of those who are to be instructed by him...’, translation of Konstan et al. Glad 
thinks that this column does not specify whom the students critique, and thus misses the importance of this 
column (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 157, n. 205). However, that this column refers to students critiquing their 
teacher seems evident, for the students who offer frank speech are ‘those who are being instructed by him’, i.e., 
their teacher, who is the subject of the verb ‘tolerate’. Though heavily reconstructed, Konstan et al. (following 
Philippson) understand the subsequent column, 13a, to refer again to the teacher’s response to students.
See also col. 13bn14a, in which a sage tolerates and praises the concern of another member who seems 
to remind him (or others) about proper behaviour (13b), but then teaches (13b.13) and advises (14a.6) this less 
mature member that he is ‘of those who are so much more inferior’ (τωñν τοσου' |τ[ωι κ]αταδεεστε'ρων) and should 
‘remember who he is and to whom he is speaking’ (translation Konstan et al.).
90. E.g., ‘the doctor might be a doctor in the morning and a patient in the afternoon’ (Glad, Paul and 
Philodemus, 160, see further 152–60). Glad’s statement is valid to some extent, so long as one understands that 
another doctor (i.e., a sage) treats the sage, rather than one of the sage’s ‘patients’. The sage also would likely not 
be suffering from as serious and debilitating a disease as is present in the immature. Martha Nussbaum’s 
description of this asymmetry of roles in medicalised, corrective formation remains accurate, despite her 
occasional failure to emphasize the engagement needed as a recipient of this formation (Nussbaum, The Therapy 
of Desire, 128–29).
91. Clarence Glad offers a detailed description of ancient discussions in Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, 
Maximus of Tyre, and Seneca concerning how many and of what character the wise person’s friends should be, 
and makes an important point of contrast in Philodemus’ willingness to act as friend to even the terminally ill and 
those not expected to recover from their sickness of mind and emotion (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 166–74). It 
is naive, however, to interpret that Philodemus had no screening process for prospective members of his 
community, and that Philodemus has ‘faith in ordinary and common people’, (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 172, 
see 172–75) as discussed in ch. 2, and as On Property Management, col. 23 makes clear. For further discussion, 
see Justin R. Allison, “Philodemus: Friend of the Many, or Friend of the ∆εκτικοι'?” Society for Ancient Greek 
Philosophy Newsletter 18.2 (2017): 17–26.
the few occasions in which they function as the giver of critique. Three other modes of 
involvement, particularly by the less mature, provide further insight into how Epicurean 
friends shared reciprocally in frank criticism.
 First of all, the most accessible way for the less mature to engage in frank criticism is 
to report the errors of others to a leader, who then intervenes directly. These could be 
conscious errors which the accused person seeks to hide, or unconscious errors only identified 
by another. Especially given the limitations of therapeutic conjectures based on empirical 
observations (fr. 57; 63; 66), the whole community functions together to observe and perceive 
errors in one another.92 Even the wise cannot see the ‘individual character’ (τη`ν ιδιο' τη[τ]α) of 
those who conceal themselves (fr. 14),93 and may fail to perceive that an individual has 
recovered (α να|πλασθε`ν ευ τυ' χηµα, fr. 61.6n7), though it is clear to others. The clearest 
evidence for this practice occurs in discussions regarding the right motives and attitudes of 
one who reports others, so as to distinguish a true friend, who ‘desires that his friend obtain 
correction’ (το`ν επι|θυµουñντα το`ν φι'λον τυ|χειñν διορθω' σεως, fr. 50.4n6), from a slanderer 
(δια' βολον, fr. 50.3), or one who wants to ingratiate a teacher by reporting (α πα[γ]|ε'λλοντες, fr. 
52.10n11) what fellow students have said or done against the teacher (fr. 52).94 This practice 
seems especially relevant for less mature students who do not have the capacities for offering 
more direct formation, but are mature enough to identify errors and seek the good of other 
members in friendship.
  Second, one may help others by confessing one’s errors publicly. Despite the 
immaturity revealed by a given mistake, public confession models several aspects of maturity 
(e.g., self-awareness, humility, honesty, willingness to receive treatment), and allows others to 
learn and grow from observing the treatment process in action. In fr. 43, Philodemus argues 
that even bad character can be helpful in forming others, for when one is honest about such 
qualities, ‘we are helped’ (βο|ηθου' µεθα) through ‘sympathy’ (συνπαθι'ας) for those bad 
qualities, just as consistently good character makes frank criticism more effective.95  In fr. 53, 




92. See Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 82. One may interpret the meaning of το'  τινας µη' τε 
συν|αισθα' νεσθαι τα`ς α µαρτι'ας in fr. 1.2n3 as referring to some who fail to ‘perceive errors in common’ (as do 
Gigante and Glad), rather than to some who fail to ‘perceive their own errors’ (as do LSJ, Konstan et al.), but this 
decision is not central to understanding communal perception in Philodemus’ community, given the other 
evidence.
93. As interpreted by Konstan et al.
94. In col. 17a, Philodemus seems to describe the arrogant person who calls upon a teacher to admonish 
another while thinking that he is himself free from error, or thinking that he may hide his own errors by pointing 
out the errors of others for correction. Fr. 76 may also contain a reference to this practice, but the text is heavily 
reconstructed.
95. Philodemus remarks concerning the persuasive power of consistent character: ‘For in fact if it is 
possible for you, having spoken frankly, to stay in the same [condition] n if you withhold nothing n [you will 
save] a man...’ (και` γα`ρ ει µε`ν | ε»σ[τι παρ]ρησ[ι]α'σαντα µειñ|ναι επι` τωñν αυ τωñν, ει µη|θε`ν ε«ξε[ις], σ'ω' σ[εις] 
α»νδ[ρα]|..., fr. 43.10n13). Fr. 47 may be relevant here, for Philodemus seems to say, ‘Therefore, it is 
advantageous to share things that are doubted,’ (fr. 47.7n8). However, the context is too fragmentary to be sure.
fellow-students’ (i.e., confess personal errors and matters of ‘ignorance’, α γνοι'ας).96 He seems 
to affirm that they should, but with caution, lest those who are too immature fail to benefit or 
in fact suffer harm by this honesty.97 The concern that some would fail to benefit (ου»τ’ 
ω |φελη' σουσι, fr. 53.10n11) indicates that confession and honest discussion among students 
should benefit others.98 Teachers seem to engage in this personal confession to some degree as 
well. In fr. 81, Philodemus takes up the question, ‘whether a wise man will communicate his 
own (errors) to his friends with frankness’ (fr. 81.1n4).99 In fr. 55 the same discussion 
continues, as fr. 81 forms the top, and fr. 55 the bottom, of the same column:100 the teachers 
‘[present] for frank criticism what concerns themselves in the presence of the students, to be 
put before Epicurus and for the sake of correction.’101 Philodemus seems to restrict this 
practice due to concerns about right motives, audience, and manner.102 Confessing to others, 
then, is a legitimate way to participate obliquely in frank criticism, but must be done with 
discretion.
 Third, Philodemus’ On Death provides an example of the formative benefit provided 
by a progressing, but not yet mature, Epicurean. All members strive to obey Epicurus, and 




96. Fr. 53.3n6: ει και` προ`ς του`ς | συνκατασκευαζοµε'νους | τα` ε αυτωñν και` τα` α λλη' |λων προοι'σονται. The 
question posed here is likely a section heading in Philodemus’ treatise, as thought by Konstan et al., following 
Olivieri.
97. See fr. 53.7n12: piρο`ς | τοι'νυν του`ς συνκατασκευ|αζοµε'νους λε'γειν τα`ς | ιδι'ας α γνοι'ας ευ λαβωñ ς | 
εκτε'ον. ε»νιοι γα`ρ ου»τ’ ω |φελη' σουσι βα'θους εστε|ρηµε'νοι συ[ν]ε'σεως τα' χα ... ‘One must, then, be cautious in 
speaking of one’s own ignorance to fellow-students. For some, who are bereft of depth of understanding, will 
neither benefit perhaps...’ (Translation Konstan et al.). For this interpretation see Tsouna, The Ethics of 
Philodemus, 114–15.
98. That this was a question worthy of separate consideration indicates that other statements about the 
students’ honesty and willingness to confess errors apply particularly to the student-teacher relationship, and that 
one’s honesty with other learning Epicureans was another issue. 
99. The question of fr. 81.1n4 also likely functions as a sub-heading of the treatise according to 
Konstan et al., following Olivieri: ει σοφο`ς | τα` περ[ι`] αυ το`ν α ναθη' σε|ται τοιñς φι'λοις µετα` π[αρ]|ρησι'ας (fr. 
81.1n4).
100. Confirming White’s and Delattre’s reconstructions (White, “Ordering the Fragments,” 42–43, 68–
69; Delattre, “Le Franc-Parler,” 278). White does not discuss these two fragments in detail, but he links the 
preceding fragments in the same way (i.e., he identifies three columns composed of top and bottom fragments, 
78/52, 79/53, 80/54, to which I now add 81/55, which Delattre claims exhibit a physical join). Recall that here I 
am using Olivieri’s fragment numeration (as used by Konstan et al.) not White’s or Delattre’s revised numeration, 
for consistency’s sake (e.g., White’s numeration is 80/52, 81/53, 82/54, 83/55).
101. Fr. 55.1n6: κα[ι` δι|δ]ο' ναι παρρησι'αι τα` πε|ρι` αυ του`ς επι` τωñν κατα|σκευαζοµε'νων, τι'θε|σθ[α]ι παρ’ 
Ε πικου' ρωι και` χα' |ριν διορθω' σεως. That this is a referent to the activity of the teachers, rather than students, 
seems indicated because of the reference to the ‘students’ (τωñν κατα|σκευαζοµε'νων), rather than to the ‘fellow 
students’ as in other fragments which discuss student behavior (fr. 53; 75; 79), and to the reference at the end of 
the fragment to the “purifier of everyone” (either Epicurus, or the sage) who presents an error ‘for the sake of 
correction of the errors arising from foolishness.’
102. The text is very fragmentary, but it seems Philodemus does not allow ‘showing off’ (το` 
περια[υτι'|ζεσθαι], fr. 81.10n11), nor a general audience (‘not to all, but to some’ or ‘to one’, ου  piαñσιν, α λλ’ 
εν[ι'οις], or εν[ι'] as supplied by Gigante, fr. 84N.4), nor ‘vulgarity’ (α π[ει]ρ[ο]κα|[λι']ας, fr. 84N.5). Tsouna 
interprets that fr. 82, which follows fr. 81 and 84N, discusses the same issue, and refers to the wise man’s 
confidence that he will benefit himself and others in speaking honestly about his mistakes (ευ [ερ|γ]ετη' σειν 
πε'ποιθεν, fr. 82.3n4; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 118).
imitation’ of the more mature teachers (Lib. col. 5a.7n10, τη`ν | α ποµι'µ[ν]ησιν δε` τη`ν 
πο|λυχρο' νιον τωñν καθηγησα|µε'νων).103 The ideal sage is such an example in every aspect of 
life, and less mature members can function as examples for others insofar as they live 
maturely, even if they fall short of being a sage. Even if the progressing person dies before 
reaching maturity, he is beneficial to the formation of others. In On Death, this topic arises in 
a larger discussion concerning how to think properly (i.e., without fear) concerning death, 
particularly the death of the young and those who have not fully achieved the best life (col. 
12n20).104 Philodemus remarks,  
 λε'γω[µεν το]ιγαρουñν η  µειñς | [ι]δι'ως περι` το[υñ δυν]α'µενον π[ροκο' ]ψ[αι] | κατα`   
 φιλοσοφι'α[ν ε ]ξαρπα' ζεσθαι δ[ι]|ο' τι φυσικ[ο`ν] µε`ν τ[ο`] νυ' ττε[σθ]α[ι τ]ο`ν τοι|ο[υñ]τον·   
 ε [πει` δ’] α»λλο[ι]ς ευ λογι'αν παρα|δ[ι]δου`ς τουñ [five letters missing]ς κατα` φιλοσοφι'αν | 
 προκο'ψειν... 
 Let us then for our part say, specifically concerning the case of one who is snatched 
 away [when capable of progressing] in philosophy, that it is natural to be stung with  
 respect to such a person, [but since] he transmits to others the plausibility of ... (the 
 notion that?) ... they will progress in philosophy... (On Death col. 17.32n38)105 
The young person who died must be one who has already achieved substantial progress but 
has not yet become wise and attained α ταραξι'α  (as, e.g., Pythocles did by age 18, discussed in 
col. 12n13).106 Here the benefit given is a form of evidence which supports other Epicureans 
in similar circumstances, i.e., it gives the ‘plausibility’ or ‘reasonability’ (ευ λογι'α) that 
progression will occur in their lives.
 In sum, the nature of reciprocity in frank criticism is a function of individual maturity. 
The immature are inferior in character to other, more mature members, and receive criticism 
from them in order to grow. Occasionally they might administer critique, but otherwise they 
participate by confessing their errors and receiving criticism, and by helping others identify 
their errors and referring them to the more mature. As one matures, one continues receiving 
corrective formation from the more mature, but one comes to engage in criticism more 
frequently and successfully toward others. Drawing nearer to full maturity, one is in a state of 




103. See discussion of modelling and imitation in Frischer, Sculpted Word, 67–86; Erler, “Epicurus as 
Deus Mortalis: Homoiosis Theoi and Epicurean Self-Cultivation,” 177.
104. Henry, Philodemus, On Death, xix. See also discussion of Philodemus’ arguments concerning 
premature death in James Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 143–53; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 269–77; Sanders, “Philodemus and the Fear of Premature 
Death”.
105. Translation adapted slightly from Henry, Philodemus, On Death, 41.
106. This interpretation is supported also by Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 274–75.
frequently and concerning less fundamental issues. Frank criticism is never abolished in a 
community due to human weakness and fallibility; even the sages receive critique graciously 
and confess their errors. Beyond frank criticism, all members form one another less directly 
through shared participation in communal life (i.e., study, shared meals, worship; see above 
section 4.2). As individuals in the community grow out of immaturity, the reciprocity of 
criticism increases. However, as we will see in the next section, individual independence and 
self-sufficiency also increases as friends mature, such that the degree and frequency of frank 
criticism seems to decrease among mature friends.
4.4.4. Interdependence in Moral Formation
If Philodemus claims that Epicureans are ‘saved by one another’ through frank criticism, even 
by the less mature, what kind of morally formative interdependence does he envision among 
friends?107 How and why do Epicureans need to receive moral formation from others, 
especially via frank criticism?
 As already hinted at in the preceding section, I argue here that the reason why 
Epicureans need to receive formative criticism is that they lack sufficient personal moral 
resources. The kind and degree of one’s need for others, and the need for which particular 
others (questions pertaining to ‘how’ others are needed) all depend on the state of one’s moral 
character (whether mature or immature, or in between). Philodemus promotes humility and 
openness to receiving critique from others because it is possible for all members to offer 
formative benefit via frank speech. Nevertheless, he envisions that Epicureans eventually 
grow out of the need to receive critique from others, for they grow into moral self-sufficiency.
 Several texts in Lib. indicate that Philodemus envisioned a trajectory from a profound 
need to receive frank criticism from others due to personal immaturity, to a diminished or 
eliminated need to receive from others due to personal maturity, with its self-sufficiency and 
capacity for self-correction. Describing an immature Epicurean, Philodemus remarks in fr. 30, 
‘... but he pays less attention to his own injury who still is very much in need of external 
things (ο«  τε προσδεο' µε|νος ε»τι πα' νυ τωñν ε»ξω|θεν) and someone who, because of his condition 
(α πο` τηñς δια|θε' [σ]εως), opposes one thing and obstructs another with [medicines], since pain 




107. I focus narrowly on this particular kind of interdependence, and do not attempt to explain why 
friends are needed for Epicurean life in general (e.g., how the pleasures of friendship constitutes an individual 
Epicurean’s happiness, or how friends supply needed external goods for the maintenance of the best life). I side 
with those scholars who consider friendship to be choice-worthy in itself (see Epicurus, VS 23), a necessary 
constituent of personal happiness. See A. A. Long, “Pleasure and Social Utility: The Virtues of Being 
Epicurean,” in From Epicurus to Epictetus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 178–201; David Armstrong, 
“Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship”; Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, 27–31; Essler, “Freundschaft der 
Götter”.
this student fails to meet, at least at present.108 It is less clear what Philodemus meant by those 
external goods upon which this student depends, goods which the student could come to need 
less or not at all. 
 A number of possibilities suggest themselves, but based on Philodemus’ description of 
sages in col. 6b (examined above in section 4.3), it seems one could list frank criticism from 
others among these external goods. Discussing why Epicurean teachers differ from one 
another in their exercise of frank speech to various students, Philodemus offers the past 
experience of the sage as a reason: ‘And if one has needed frankness minimally, while another 
has been saved by means of this, then the one applies less, the other more of that through 
which he became perfect’ (col. 6b.8n13; translation Konstan et al.).109 Those who have 
become wise ‘needed’ (δεδεηµε' |νος) frank criticism to varying degrees in the past, but are 
now perfect (τε'λειος εγ[ε' ]νετο), indicating that, to some significant degree, they have grown 
out of their need for critique from others. 
 Yet, Philodemus elsewhere claims that the wise still make errors and receive critique 
from others. Therefore, Philodemus must refer in col. 6b to the sage’s former need to receive 
frank criticism from others concerning fundamental aspects of Epicurean maturity, as opposed 
to his present need for critique on smaller matters. The sage has grown out of his need for 
critique from others over issues of fundamental importance, for his character and knowledge 
of the cosmos are self-sufficient and cannot be taken away from him, having attained to divine 
blessedness and incorruptibility (as discussed in ch. 3).
 Criticism over smaller matters seems to be in view in col. 8b, describing critiques 
exchanged between two sages (col. 8a was discussed above in section 4.4.2): ‘If then, the wise 
men recognize each other, they will be reminded pleasurably by one another (η  δε'ως | 
υ  ποµνη[σ]θη' νσονται προ`ς | α λλη' λων) in the ways we have made clear, as also by themselves, 
and they will sting each other with the gentlest of stings and will acknowledge gratitude [for 
the benefit]’ (col. 8b, translation Konstan et al.). The ‘gentlest of stings’ (δηγµο`[ν] | ε αυτου`ς 
το`ν [η πιω' ]τα|τον) would refer to light critique, in contrast to harsh criticism offered to the 
immature. Unfortunately this piece of evidence is less secure, given that the key word 




108. Col. 14a initially seemed to contain a similar ascription of need to an immature student, as 
translated by Konstan et al. The column describes a teacher’s rebuke of student: ‘But he (the wise man) will 
advise (him) never to transfer to his life anything [but what is good], and (as one) of those who are so much more 
in need, both to remember who he is and to whom he is speaking.’ (col. 14a.1n6, translation Konstan et al.). The 
translation here of the student’s condition (‘so much more in need’, [κ]αταδεεστε'ρων) is likely mistaken, and 
should be ‘inferior’, as in LSJ, s.v. καταδεη' ς, I.2 (I owe this observation to W. B. Henry).
109. καν ο   µε`ν η«κι[σ]τα | παρρησι'α[ς] ηðι δεδεηµε' |νος, ο   δε` δια` ταυ' της σεσω[ι]σ|µε'νος, ο   µε`ν ηðττον, ο   
[δ]ε` | µαñλλον προσα' γει τ[ι] δι’ | ο τε'λειος εγ[ε' ]νετο, (col. 6b.8n13). The fragment continues, ‘Thus Polyaenus 
too, who had not needed it much, did not...’. The fragment ends after Philodemus reports the fact about 
Polyaenus, but the completed thought likely was that Polyaenus did not apply much frank criticism to others, as 
Konstan et al. and Tsouna suppose.
conjectured, but the editio princeps and Achille Vogliano’s observations confirm that this is 
Olivieri’s reconstruction.110 
 Nevertheless, the text still witnesses obliquely to the concept that the exchange of 
critique among the genuinely wise would concern smaller matters, given that their exchange is 
pleasurable, not painful. As col. 2b shows, blaming others for their faults does not bring 
pleasure to the sage (unlike praising others); instead, it is like drinking wormwood (a sage 
does it ‘pleasurelessly’, α ηδωñς, col. 2b.7). Yet the interaction of the wise does not require 
unenjoyable criticism; because of their moral maturity, there is little to critique.111
 Interestingly, Philodemus points out that the sages’ ‘reminding one another’ is the 
same reminder which the wise also give to themselves (η  δε'ως |υ  ποµνησθη' σονται προ`ς | 
α λλη' λων, ω  ς και` υ φ’ ε αυτωñν, col. 8b.7n10). It seems Philodemus thus describes two relatively 
self-sufficient Epicureans who are capable of correcting themselves, but who nevertheless 
derive pleasure from one another in being reminded of Epicurean truths. This seems much like 
the sort of self-sufficient friendship which the gods model, seen in chapter 3. As Philodemus 
remarks in col. 13 of On Gods 3, ‘for good men, the sharing of discourse with men like them 
showers down on them unspeakable pleasure’, a pleasure the gods share as well in their 
conversations with one another.112
 Philodemus’ high valuation of self-criticism also supports the notion that Epicureans 
ideally grow out of their need for frank criticism from one another. Philodemus envisions 
students developing the skill of correcting themselves, and growing to need the correction of 
others less. In several instances, immature students exhibit an inability to see their own 
errors,113 in contrast to more mature students who model self-awareness in offering 
themselves for correction, or correcting themselves as an example before others (especially in 
the case of the wise).114 
 One may see this contrast at play in Lib. col. 15b, in which Philodemus seems to 
contrast two sets of students, (a) those who correct themselves and thus need others less, and 





110. Olivieri, Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus, 49; David Konstan, et al., On Frank 
Criticism, 104. See Indelli and Longo Auricchio, “Vogliano,” 119. The spacing of what remains of the text make 
‘gentlest’ as a reconstruction unlikely, though a definitively better alternative has not been made.
111. Recall also the discussion concerning the limits of reciprocity above based on one’s moral 
character.
112. Translation by David Armstrong, “Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship,” 128.
113. This theme is present in col. 17a, 18b, 19b, 21a, 23b. In col. 18b.13n14 particularly, Philodemus 
remarks that it is contrary to reason (piα[ρα`] | λο' γον) for some to believe they have not erred.
114. Fr. 51.2n5 refers to instances when ‘we’ (i.e., students) are ‘becoming accusers even of ourselves 
whenever we err’ (η  µαñς κα[ι`]| ε αυτωñν γινοµε'νους κα|τηγο' ρους, ο«ταν [τ]ι διαµα[ρ]|τα' νωµεν). ‘We’ must refer to 
students in some sense, because Philodemus refers to a singular subject (‘he’) who ‘observes us’ confessing 
faults. Fr. 75 refers to students who present themselves for correction. Fr. 55 refers to a wise teacher who presents 
himself to Epicurus for the sake of correction, implying that the teacher himself will illustrate how Epicurus 
might respond to such an error, thus correcting himself.
 ... [τη`ν α λη' θει|α]ν ω  [ς α ]κου' ειν, ω[...]115 | εδεη' [θ]ησαν α»λλων, [α ]λ|λα` δε'ο[ν] µηδε`ν 
 εξαµαρ|τα' νε[ιν], το`ν δευ' τερον | πλουñ[ν] επορευ' θησαν αυ |του`ς διορθω' σαντες· εκειñ | δε` 
 κα[ι`] το` δυσκι'νητον εν|οχλειñ, και` µηδε` τωñν οι[κ]ε[ι']|ων α  µαρτηµα' των επαι|σθα' νεσθαι, 
 και` προ`ς α»λ|λων µε`ν επιτιµω' µε|νοι, τ[ο`] νοµι'ζειν ω  ς επι` | το`ν π[λ]ειñστον ου χ 
 η  µα[ρτη' |κασι]... 
 ...as to hear [the truth] ... [lacuna] ... they needed others, but since [it is necessary] 
 that one not err, they made the second sailing,116 having corrected themselves. But 
 there (i.e., in the other case), their obduracy too gives them trouble and the fact that 
 they are not aware of their own errors, and, though they reproach others, 
 that they believe that for the most part they have not erred. (col. 15.1n15)117 
The beginning of this text is especially difficult. It is unclear how to relate the claim that ‘they 
needed others’ (presumably Epicurean students)118 to the claim that ‘they’ (presumably the 
same students) corrected themselves. Based on the contrast that appears to be posed between 
the two verbs ([α ]λ|λα`), it seems that the students’ self-correction should stand in contrast to 
their needing others (e.g., they exhibited how they did not need others, or needed others 
less).119 The column fragment goes on to describe, in contrast, those who are unaware of their 
own errors, and who do not correct themselves. Given the other witnesses to ‘need’ in Lib., it 
seems reasonable to understand that these latter Epicureans stand in greater need of others to 
reveal their faults, because they cannot do so themselves.
 In these texts it seems the goal of moral formation is to grow into self-sufficiency and 
self-correction, and to grow out of the need to receive correction from others over 
fundamental issues of Epicurean philosophy. Even the wise make mistakes, but not mistakes 
that call into question their perfect, self-sufficient character. Their need for correction over the 
fundamentals is in the past, given their presently perfected self-sufficiency. The truly wise 
have attained divine pleasure and incorruptibility as mortals by means of their perfected 
character and knowledge, as discussed in ch. 3.
 This trajectory toward friendships among self-sufficiently mature friends recalls the 




115. Olivieri’s text reads ου   instead of ω at this point (followed by Konstan et al.), but the editio 
princeps and Vogliano attest the latter, whom I follow here (Indelli and Longo Auricchio, “Vogliano,” 130).
116. I.e., they did the ‘next best thing’ to not erring, see Philippson, “Review of Olivieri, Philodemi 
ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus,” 688; LSJ, s.v. piλο' ος, ο  , 3; David Konstan, et al., On Frank Criticism, 115, n. 181.
117. Translation adapted slightly from Konstan et al.
118. Olivieri understands the subject to be the sages (‘sapientes’, Olivieri, Philodemi ΠΕΡΙ 
ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ Libellus, 54), but this seems overly specific. Moreover, in the top of the same column, immature 
Epicureans are the subject (col. 15a).
119. This contrast is presumably what led Olivieri to insert the negation ου  in line 2, but this does not 
seem to be a correct reading of the papyrus.
and therefore engage in friendships of the utmost pleasure among themselves. It seems that 
analogous friendships are the goal for Philodemus. The exchange of critique among the wise 
in col. 8b seems to exemplify the pleasure of this relationship. Their encounter brings them 
both pleasure because of their perfected moral character.
 Morally formative interdependence between mature Epicurean friends seems 
analogous to their economic interdependence as outlined in ch. 2 above. The practices of 
economic interdependence among affluent friends with relative economic self-sufficiency 
seems to provide conceptual support for a similar vision of ideal interdependence vis-à-vis 
moral formation. Both kinds of interdependent exchange support one another’s plausibility. 
The reasons that friends share in the reciprocity of gifts/frank criticism have more to do with 
the pleasure such reciprocity brings and the friendships it constitutes, rather than with meeting 
needs that arise from personal deficiency (even though the latter is acknowledged). Mature 
Epicureans are ‘rich’ and self-sufficient in moral character; they always have the necessary 
character to maintain the best life, just like they have sufficient ‘natural’ wealth. 
 Of course, the analogy does not hold in other ways. First of all, moral self-sufficiency 
is more secure than financial self-sufficiency, for even when disaster strikes, the ideal 
Epicurean can maintain his hold on α ταραξι'α. It seems one can finally eliminate one’s need to 
receive criticism from others with respect to those issues required for attaining and 
maintaining α ταραξι'α (even if one continues to receive critique on less important issues). 
Secondly, Philodemus does not speak of engaging in friendships with those who are destitute 
in On Property Management, while Lib. witnesses to Epicurean teachers who heavily invest 
their time and concern in students who are catastrophically ‘poor’ in moral character. Though 
all students can reach α ταραξι'α, not all will. Insofar as one is not mature, one remains 
dependent upon others to receive needed moral correction, and this is for one’s own good. 
Philodemus aims to foster the trust and honesty which underwrite this interdependence, 
because it is the means of salvation from moral sickness.
 In sum, Philodemus affirms morally formative interdependence between Epicurean 
friends. Students should entrust themselves wholly to their teachers. Dependence upon others 
to receive criticism is a normal and valued characteristic for an Epicurean student. ‘Saving 
one another’ by means of frank criticism strengthens bonds of friendship by promoting 
goodwill among friends. At the same time, Philodemus links dependence on others with moral 
immaturity. Ideally, Epicureans grow out of their need to receive frank criticism from others 
concerning fundamental aspects of α ταραξι'α, because moral maturity entails perfected self-
sufficiency. Epicureans can eventually receive sufficient moral resources from others such that 
they no longer need further help to maintain maturity, even if they still make minor mistakes. 
Perhaps not all Epicureans will attain to moral perfection, and would constantly depend on 
others’ help to live an Epicurean life in pursuit of its goods. The goal of moral self-sufficiency 
sits ever before them, however, exemplified in the ‘divine’ man Epicurus, who attained the 




CHAPTER FIVE: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG BELIEVERS
With this chapter, we begin the study of Paul’s vision for interdependence in reciprocal 
construction. The present chapter prepares the way for the two case studies from 1 Corinthians 
which follow. I argue in the course of the thesis that Paul’s understanding of economic 
interdependence among believers correlates closely with his understanding of constructive 
interdependence. The two forms of interdependence align and mutually support one another’s 
plausibility. This chapter provides an overview of Pauline believers’ socio-economic locations 
and economic interdependence.
 I argue that Paul himself and the majority of believers in his communities were poor, 
living in vulnerable negotiation of the subsistence level.1 In light of this situation, all believers 
were to participate in interdependent economic reciprocity with one another.2 This reciprocity 
included all believers, even those who had little to give, not simply the few who might have 
had economic stability. Economic reciprocity among poor believers was a ‘survival strategy’.3 
Believers would give out of their individual deficiency in material resources in order to 
receive needed returns from others in the future. Paul’s notion of economic self-sufficiency 
follows accordingly: for most believers, economic self-sufficiency is ultimately a gift from 
God that is communally constituted through a network of reciprocal exchange with other 
believers over time.
 I do not argue here that believers in Pauline communities were exclusively poor, but 
that they were mostly poor. Though it is a subject of much debate, especially in Corinth it 
seems possible that some believers were affluent (whether groups of believers, or individuals), 
and that the community as a whole had more resources than other communities (e.g., than 
those in Macedonia, 2 Cor 8:1n6). Rather than attempting to wade into that debate, I argue 
that Paul’s default conception of interdependent economic reciprocity among believers 




1. For a similar discussion of Paul’s relatively poor socio-economic location and its consequences for 
his conception of gifts in comparison with Seneca, see Thomas R. Blanton IV, A Spiritual Economy: Gift 
Exchange in the Letters of Paul of Tarsus (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2017), 27–40.
2. I do not assume that all believers actually did this, but that this was Paul’s vision for them. On the 
practical problems of realising such interdependence among the poor, see Theresa Morgan, Popular Morality in 
the Early Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. 160–69.
3. For this label, see Justin J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty, and Survival, SNTW (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1998), 163–75.
 The chapter unfolds in two sections. First, I briefly discuss the rationale for the 
consensus that most believers, including Paul, lived in poverty, with a brief look at evidence 
for this, especially from 1 Corinthians (section 5.1). Second, I review the evidence for Paul’s 
general policy of interdependent economic reciprocity among poor believers, focusing 
particularly on 2 Corinthians 8n9 and 1 Thessalonians 4:9n12 (section 5.2). The chapter closes 
with a short summary (section 5.3).
5.1. The Impoverished Socio-Economic Location of Paul and his Communities
For all the heated debate over the socio-economic portrait of Pauline communities, scholars 
generally agree that the majority of believers were poor, i.e., living vulnerably just above 
subsistence, at subsistence, or below subsistence (e.g., in accordance with Friesen’s PS 5, 6 
and 7).4 This judgement concerning most believers’ socio-economic location seems secure, 
even if scholarly disputes remain concerning whether and to what degree some believers had 
more wealth.
 In the early Roman empire, one could estimate that 80n90% of the populace lived 
within this negotiation of subsistence.5 Within this group there were widely differing 
circumstances, and it is difficult to define the proportions of people living in various grades or 
kinds of poverty, especially as adapted to particular locations (urban vs. rural, etc.).6 
Longenecker estimates that 25% of people in an urban context lived below subsistence (his 




4. See, e.g., Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity, ed. and trans. John H. Schütz 
(1982; repr., Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2004); Meeks, The First Urban Christians, 51–73; Meggitt, Poverty; Gerd 
Theissen, “The Social Structure of Pauline Communities: Some Critical Remarks on J. J. Meggitt, Paul Poverty, 
and Survival,” JSNT 84 (2001): 66–68; Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New 
Consensus”; Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 220–58; Timothy A. Brookins, “Economic Profiling of Early 
Christian Communities,” in Paul and Economics: A Handbook, eds. Thomas R. Blanton IV and Raymond Pickett 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 57–87; Ryan S. Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping, and Paul’s Rhetoric of 
Generosity,” JBL 137 (2018): 215–34. Note that Meeks judges there to be no evidence of believers who ‘lived at 
the subsistence level’, a conclusion with which I disagree in this chapter (Meeks, The First Urban 
Christians, 73).
5. Longenecker estimates that 82% of urban dwellers lived in his ES 5n7, corresponding to Friesen’s 
PS 5n7 (Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 53), while Friesen estimates 90% (Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline 
Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 347). Drawing on Scheidel and Friesen’s 2009 essay, 90% of 
people had income ranging from a minimum of 25% of what is needed for subsistence (i.e., starvation) to a 
maximum of 25n66% above the subsistence level (i.e., minimal surplus beyond basic food, clothes, fuel, shelter; 
Scheidel and Friesen, “Size of the Economy,” 84).
6. The difficulty in measuring poverty is compounded by a limitation of poverty in terms of one 
factor, such as caloric intake or wheat consumption (and thus subsistence). See the trenchant comments on the 
difficulty of establishing what poverty means and how it should be measured in Walter Scheidel, “Stratification, 
Deprivation and Quality of Life,” in Poverty in the Roman World, eds. Margaret Atkins and Robin Osborne 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. 54–59; Peter Oakes, “Constructing Poverty Scales for 
Graeco-Roman Society: A Response to Steven Friesen’s ‘Poverty in Pauline Studies’,” JSNT 26 (2004): 367–71.
subsistence (his ES5). Scheidel and Friesen offer two estimations, optimistic and pessimistic, 
for the whole of the Roman empire (i.e., not just urban populations).7 For the optimistic, 10% 
lived below subsistence, 55% lived at subsistence, and 19% lived just above subsistence. 
Pessimistically, the numbers run 22%, 60%, and 8%, respectively.8 These numbers and the 
categories to which they correspond can be misleading if one does not remember that being 
poor entailed being vulnerable to sudden shifts in position (e.g., rapid increase or decrease in 
work opportunities for a day labourer). For the purposes of this chapter, I do not attempt to 
define the degree of poverty for believers in Pauline communities beyond the following: (1) 
being ‘poor’ entailed living just above subsistence, at subsistence, or below subsistence; (2) 
being ‘poor’ entailed constant vulnerability to destitution, and thus the necessity of some form 
of material help from others to subsist (varying from constant to occasional dependence on 
others).
 Paul himself can be located alongside poor believers in his communities. Of course, 
the question of Paul’s socio-economic location has a number of controverted dimensions, 
especially related to Paul’s education and its implications.9 At least it seems clear that in the 
course of Paul’s missionary work, he experienced instances of hunger, thirst, lack of shelter, 
and inadequate clothing (1 Cor 4:11; 2 Cor 11:27). At times he received material support from 
his communities (Phil 4:10n20; 2 Cor 11:8n9),10 and at other times he worked with his own 
hands without receiving such support (1 Thess 2:9; cf. 1 Cor 4:12). Paul was not secure from 
the constant danger of destitution, and his position likely fluctuated, as the positions of other 
poor believers may have.
 Three points of evidence from 1 Corinthians suggest that most believers were poor. 
First, in 1 Cor 1:26, Paul identifies most Corinthian believers as not among ‘the powerful’ 
(δυνατοι'), the ‘well-born’ (ευ γενειñς), and instead aligns them with ‘the foolish things of the 
world’ (τα` µωρα` τουñ κο' σµου), ‘the weak’ (τα` α σθενηñ), the ‘insignificant things of the world’ 
(τα` α γενηñ τουñ κο'σµου), ‘the despised’ (τα` εξουθενηµε'να). Such a description likely involves a 
claim about most believers’ relatively low economic status, among other forms of status.11 
Second, Paul’s rebuke in 1 Cor 11:21n22 presupposes that some believers were hungry when 
others ate their share of the Lord’s supper, implying that they depended on it for their 




7. Scheidel and Friesen, “Size of the Economy,” 84.
8. See the discussion of these numbers and others in Brookins, “Economic Profiling,” 75–77.
9. See, e.g., Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 301–10; Meggitt, Poverty, 75–97; Friesen, “Poverty 
in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 350.
10. Ryan Schellenberg argues, against the consensus, that Paul did not refuse support from the 
Corinthian believers, but chose not to exercise his right to demand it from them when they offered none (Ryan S. 
Schellenberg, “Did Paul Refuse an Offer of Support from the Corinthians?” JSNT 40 [2018]: 312–36).
11. See, e.g., Theissen, Social Setting, 70–73; Meggitt, Poverty, 102–6.
12. See Theissen, Social Setting, 148; Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New 
Consensus,” 348–50; Larry L. Welborn, “Inequality in Roman Corinth,” in The First Urban Churches 2: Roman 
Corinth, eds. James R. Harrison and Larry L. Welborn (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2016), 66–67.
uncertain whether this description is meant absolutely, or that some simply ‘had nothing’ on 
that particular occasion, but this passage at least suggests that some believers struggled to feed 
themselves regularly. Third, Paul directs believers to save for the Jerusalem collection week 
by week (1 Cor 16:2), implying that most believers’ income was immediately spent toward 
pressing needs.13 Paul does not assume believers had disposable surplus ready at any time, and 
thus resists the idea of collecting the contributions without advanced preparation.
5.2. Interdependent Economic Reciprocity among Poor Believers
 
As one who was poor speaking to believers who were poor, Paul envisioned all to engage in 
relationships of interdependent economic reciprocity with one another in their poverty. This 
kind of economic activity would be, Paul hoped, the default relationship among poor 
believers. Such activity is best called ‘swapping’ (so Schellenberg).14 All believers who were 
poor would ‘swap’ with one another, not just those who presently had stability above 
subsistence (i.e., PS/ES5). Making this claim involves correcting a scholarly 
misunderstanding, exemplified in the work of Bruce Longenecker, that poor believers would 
generally have had nothing to give unless they lived stably above subsistence. In this view, 
poor believers would primarily have been recipients of aid from the more affluent few. In 
making this correction I am particularly dependent on a recent essay by Ryan Schellenberg.15 
There may have been wealthier believers who were able to give out of their surplus above 
subsistence to those negotiating subsistence (so Longenecker). However, the default practice 
among most believers who had no such surplus was to depend on one another by ‘swapping’ 
what little they had in the midst of fluctuating conditions at or near the subsistence level. The 
possible presence of wealthier believers would not necessarily change this default practice.
 In his stimulating book Remember the Poor, Longenecker assumes that when Paul 




13. See, e.g., Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 351; 
Thomas R. Blanton IV, “The Economic Functions of Gift Exchange in Pauline Assemblies,” in Paul and 
Economics: A Handbook, eds. Thomas R. Blanton IV and Raymond Pickett (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 289. 
Wayne Meeks also remarks on this weekly savings plan, and assumes that this could not be carried out by the 
‘destitute’, but rather fits ‘fairly well-off artisans and tradespeople’ who did not have disposable capital (Meeks, 
The First Urban Christians, 65). This reading arises from the same erroneous assumption as Longenecker’s, 
discussed below. Cf. Richard Last’s position that a regular contribution in itself does not necessarily entail the 
poverty of all contributors (Richard Last, The Pauline Church and the Corinthian Ekklesia: Greco-Roman 
Associations in Comparative Context, SNTSMS 164 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016], 146).
14. Justin Meggitt proposed the label ‘mutualism’, but some have taken issue with this because of its 
idealistic connotations (see, e.g., Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping,” 218). David Downs also identifies this 
practice of swapping as important to recognize in giving an account of early Christian economic behaviour 
(David J. Downs, Alms: Charity, Reward, and Atonement in Early Christianity [Waco: Baylor University Press, 
2016], 17, 143–73).
15. Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping.”
have a stable, if fragile, economic base above subsistence (his ES5), and definitely does not 
address those who live below the subsistence level (his ES 7).16 Concerning those in the 
middle (his ES6), Longenecker is vague. This vagueness seems to come from the description 
of ES6 itself, inherited from Friesen, which describes those who live ‘at subsistence level (and 
often below minimum level to sustain life)’.17 It seems Longenecker wants to maintain the 
conceptual ambivalence in ES6 because some at this level would have been relatively more 
protected (e.g., if they were part of a household) while others at the same level would not have 
been.18 Nevertheless, the category is problematic. Sometimes Longenecker suggests that Paul 
addressed those at ES6 as economic agents along with those at ES5 (e.g., 1 Thess 4:11n12; 2 
Thess 3:12; 1 Cor 16:1n2); at other times he groups those at ES6 with those at ES7 who were 
unable to give (Acts 20:35; 1 Cor 11:22).19  Ultimately, however, Longenecker judges that 
Paul’s exhortations addressed believers who lived just above subsistence (ES5), not at or 
below subsistence (ES6 and 7): ‘In general, ES5 seems to be where his [i.e., Paul’s] own 
mental averaging of urban Jesus-groups gravitates most naturally.’20
 Longenecker’s erroneous assumption is that believers who are too near the subsistence 
level could only receive, not give. This assumption is problematic because it unrealistically 
excludes the economic agency of most believers to whom Paul, arguably, ascribes such 
agency despite their poverty.21  It may indeed be the case that at times believers had nothing to 
give, but their positions were subject to much fluctuation in and around subsistence, such that 
it is difficult to definitively locate believers in levels 5n7 and thus describe their ability to 
give. Problematic as well is the fact that other early Christian sources indicate that even the 
destitute shared with others (e.g., by fasting in order to give food to others; see, e.g., Herm. 
Sim. 5.3; cf. Did. 1.5n6; 4.5n8; 1 Clem. 55.2; 2 Clem. 4:1n3; 16).22 Moreover, modern 
anthropological research commonly observes similar phenomena of ‘swapping’ among the 
extremely poor.23
 With this misunderstanding identified, the present discussion focuses on the evidence 
from Paul’s epistles for interdependent economic reciprocity among even the poorest believers 




16. Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 253–58.
17. Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 45; Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called 
New Consensus,” 341.
18. Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 54–55.
19. See Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 255–57.
20. Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 258.
21. See illuminating discussion in Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping,” 220–25.
22. See discussion of these passages in Denise Kimber Buell, “‘Be not One Who Stretches Out Hands 
to Receive but Shuts Them When It Comes to Giving’: Envisioning Christian Charity When Both Donors and 
Recipients Are Poor,” in Wealth and Poverty in Early Church and Society, ed. Susan Holman (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2008), 37–47; Downs, Alms, esp. 188–91, 221–25.
23. Pointing out this wider frame of reference, and the distortions caused by failing to attend to it, is the 
particular contribution of Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping.”
surrounding the Jerusalem collection in 2 Cor 8n9. First, Paul assumes that Corinthian 
believers gave what they could to the collection from a position of economic vulnerability, not 
stability.24 He assures them that God is able to provide materially so that they can give in a 
position of economic ‘self-sufficiency’ (αυ τα' ρκεια, 2 Cor 9:8n11). To give was to create 
further risk, but also to trust that God would provide for their own needs despite that risk. 
Importantly, economic ‘self-sufficiency’ seems to be an ongoing gift from God, not simply a 
secure state in place prior to giving (note the future tense verbs of 2 Cor 9:10). Paul’s promise 
of God’s providence applies both to believers’ presently having something to give, and in the 
future, having enough to survive despite the personal loss incurred by the gift. The believers in 
Macedonia provide the model for the Corinthians in precisely this respect, for they gave 
generously out of their great poverty (η   κατα` βα' θους πτωχει'α, 2 Cor 8:2).25 Paul recognizes 
that not all will give the same amount, and that the amount should accord with what one has 
(2 Cor 8:12), but he assumes all take part (note ε«καστος in 1 Cor 16:2; 2 Cor 9:7). The same 
pattern of giving from a position of economic vulnerability arises also in Phil 4:19, where Paul 
offers an assurance of God’s providence for the material needs of believers in Philippi who 
supported Paul.26 These observations indicate that believers contributed to the Jerusalem 
collection from a position of economic vulnerability. All poor believers, not just those with 
relative economic stability above subsistence (PS/ES 5), are asked to give. 
 Second, Paul assumes that the Corinthian believers could also hope for eventual 
material reciprocity in their own time of need from the Jerusalem believers to whom they 
gave.27 In this reciprocity there would thus be ‘equality’ (ισο' της, 2 Cor 8:14n15). To give to 




24. On this point see Meggitt, Poverty, 158–61; Downs, Alms, 168–73; Schellenberg, “Subsistence, 
Swapping,” 227–29.
25. Longenecker initially locates the Macedonian believers in ES7, among those who live below 
subsistence level, based on Paul’s description (Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 257). Yet his assumption that 
such believers could actually have had nothing to give leads him to suppose that their actual location was ES5 
(those who live stably above subsistence level), and that Paul had rhetorically adjusted them downwards to serve 
his purposes in 2 Corinthians 8n9. It is far more plausible to interpret that the Macedonian believers actually gave 
what they could even while they struggled to subsist (i.e., even if they were not living stably above subsistence, 
ES5). Paul pointed to their example because there were many Corinthian believers who faced a similar scenario. 
Theissen argues that Paul could not exaggerate wildly about the Macedonian believers’ poverty because the 
Corinthian believers would soon meet their representatives (Gerd Theissen, “Social Conflicts in the Corinthian 
Community: Further Remarks on J. J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty, and Survival,” JSNT 25 [2003]: 376; Friesen, 
“Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus,” 351–52).
26. Downs seems to interpret, on analogy with Rom 15:26n27, that only spiritual blessings would 
accrue to the Philippians for their material gifts (Downs, Alms, 162–65). Yet it seems Paul assured them that God 
would also provide them a material return by supplying for their ‘every need’ (piαñσαν χρει'αν, 4:19). It remains 
true, of course, that Paul made no indication that he himself would provide this return. On this reading I am 
generally aligned with David E. Briones, Paul’s Financial Policy: A Socio-Theological Approach, LNTS 494 
(London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 113–14, against Ogereau’s critique of this point in Julien 
M. Ogereau, Paul’s Koinonia with the Philippians, WUNT 2,377 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 42.
27. I follow this conclusion as made in, e.g., Meggitt, Poverty, 160–61; Steven J. Friesen, “Paul and 
Economics: The Jerusalem Collection as an Alternative to Patronage,” in Paul Unbound, ed. Mark D. Given 
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 2010), 49–51; Downs, Alms, 168–70; Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping,” 227–28.
interdependence with them, despite its relatively long-distance nature, and the relative poverty 
of most individuals involved.28
 While these texts demonstrate Paul’s approach to the Jerusalem collection, they do not 
directly speak to Paul’s vision for local economic relationships among believers. Most likely, 
however, Paul would have envisioned local relationships in an analogous way. Paul elsewhere 
exhorted believers generally to care for the material needs of other believers (e.g., Rom 12:13; 
Gal 6:6; 10; 2 Cor 9:13).29 One should understand these exhortations in line with his 
conception of interdependent economic reciprocity visible in 2 Cor 8n9. Indeed, precisely the 
sort of reciprocity seen in 2 Cor 8n9 obtained for the Thessalonian believers, as seen in 1 
Thess 4:9n12.
 In 1 Thess 4:9n12, Paul urged the Thessalonian believers to work ‘with their hands’ so 
that they would all ‘have need of no one’ (µηδενο`ς χρει'αν ε»χητε, 4:12). This goal of economic 
self-sufficiency is constituted communally, not individually.30 Paul’s goal was that the 
community would not stand in need of help from outsiders because believers would all share 
among one another (cf. 2 Thess 3:6n13; Eph 4:28).31 As in 2 Cor 8n9, it seems this sharing 
would have taken place among mostly poor believers.32 The amount which individuals could 
contribute varied, of course. Yet Longenecker assumes too much when he claims that here 
Paul primarily addressed those with a stability above subsistence (his ES 5), and could not 
have addressed the destitute (his ES 7).33 Rather, Paul’s directive applied to all believers, not 
only to those who already had a stable economic base, as was the case in 2 Cor 8n9. This 
pattern of communal economic self-sufficiency by the sharing of resources was likely Paul’s 





28. Larry L. Welborn argues for a greater socio-economic distinction between the Corinthian and 
Jerusalem communities, and thus sees Paul hinting at the goal of a redistribution of wealth (Larry L. Welborn, 
“‘That There May Be Equality’: The Contexts and Consequences of a Pauline Ideal,” NTS 59 [2013]: 73–90).
29. See the discussion of these and other passages in Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 140–56.
30. I interpret that Paul expected his exhortations to love one another to be instantiated by economic 
sharing among one another (4:9n12).  For this point I depend upon the discussion in Meggitt, Poverty, 161–63; 
Schellenberg, “Subsistence, Swapping,” 229–31; Reidar Aasgaard, “My Beloved Brothers and Sisters”: 
Christian Siblingship in Paul (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 164–65. This portrait of communally 
constituted self-sufficiency is also identified in Briones, Financial Policy, 113; John M. G. Barclay, “Security 
and Self-Sufficiency: A Comparison of Paul and Epictetus,” ExAud 24 (2008): 70.
31. See Richard A. Horsley, “Paul’s Shift in Economic ‘Location’ in the Locations of the Roman 
Imperial Economy,” in Paul and Economics: A Handbook, eds. Thomas R. Blanton IV and Raymond Pickett 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 118–19.
32. See, e.g., Robert Jewett’s discussion of the Thessalonian believers’ generally poor economic 
situation in Robert Jewett, The Thessalonian Correspondence: Pauline Rhetoric and Millenarian Piety 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 118–23.
33. Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 255.
34. Longenecker, Remember the Poor, 255; Meggitt, Poverty, 161–63; Schellenberg, “Subsistence, 
Swapping,” 229–31.
5.3. Summary
The default way of life for believers was to engage in interdependent economic reciprocity 
with one another in the midst of their poverty, according to Paul. Paul conceived of economic 
self-sufficiency as an ongoing gift from God, constituted not individually but corporately by a 
group of believers who shared their resources. For most believers, participation in economic 
interdependence from a position of individual poverty was no less than a ‘survival strategy’. 
Such participation was also a necessary feature of their faith in God; it constituted their 
confession of the gospel of Jesus Christ (2 Cor  9:13), and it was an instance of their love for 




CHAPTER SIX: RECIPROCAL CONSTRUCTION IN 1 CORINTHIANS 8:1n11:1
This chapter offers the first of two case studies focused upon Paul’s vision for reciprocal 
moral construction among believers in 1 Corinthians. The burden of this case study and the 
next (ch. seven) is to describe how Paul envisioned constructive interdependence: how and 
why did believers need one another for moral construction?
 Chapters six and seven mutually support one another. The Pauline portrait of 
reciprocal construction is not sufficient for present purposes without both of them. This 
chapter discusses several dimensions of Paul’s conception of moral formation that receive 
more detailed treatment in ch. seven, and in some ways the reading presented in this chapter 
depends on that treatment.
 Gaining insight into believers’ constructive interdependence requires some 
examination of the conception and practices of reciprocal construction itself, and the two case 
studies pursue these matters as needed. Inevitably there will be aspects of Paul’s conception 
and practice of reciprocal construction that do not receive treatment. I do not attempt to 
provide a full description of Paul’s understanding of moral formation in these two case 
studies.
 As I will argue, chapters 8n10 of 1 Corinthians provide insight into Paul’s conception 
of reciprocal moral construction among believers. Weak believers and those who adapt to 
them in love depend on one another for needed moral formation. These chapters also offer 
important evidence for Paul’s view of adaptation as a mode of constructing others, which was 
also a dimension of Philodemus’ therapeutic program (as reviewed in ch. four).1 
 This chapter has five sections. I begin with an overview of the subject matter and 
historical situations described in 1 Corinthians 8:1n11:1, with special focus on the identity of 
the two groups discussed and the nature of the problem (6.1). With this foundation laid, I 
examine what adaptation practically entailed, and what qualifications were needed to adapt 
(6.2). This leads into the heart of the chapter, a discussion of how adaptation constructed the 
weak (6.3), and how the weak indirectly constructed those who adapted to them (6.4). The 
final section offers a summative description of constructive reciprocity and interdependence 
among believers in 1 Cor 8:1n11:1 (6.5), drawing upon the discussion in 6.3n6.4.
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1. The focus here is strictly on the morally formative effects of giving and receiving adaptation, as my 
intention is to isolate the effects deriving from the Corinthians’ interpersonal behaviour. Thus I do not take up 
other intended effects of Paul’s paraenesis in 1 Cor 8:1n11:1, e.g., the intended persuasion of the ‘knowers’ to 
reject participation in meals in temple precincts as idolatrous for themselves (10:1n22).
6.1. The Subject and Situations of 1 Cor 8:1n11:1
In these chapters, Paul discusses the nature and consumption of ‘idol food’ (ειδωλο' θυτα) a 
term referring generally to any food sacrificed in a non-Christian cultic act, without defining 
the temporal or spatial relationship to that cultic act.2 These chapters are a literary and 
rhetorical unit, not consisting of separate letters, nor containing an unrelated digression in ch. 
9.3 
 Paul discussed idol food encountered in three settings: a meal in a temple complex 
(8:10; 10:14n22), a meal involving meat purchased in the macellum (10:25n26), and a meal 
hosted by a non-Christian (10:27).4  Paul addressed two actual, identifiable sets of individuals 
defined by their ‘self-consciousness’ (συνει'δησις), knowledge (γνωñσις), and behaviour in 
relation to idol food.5 The solution addressed past damaging behaviour between these groups, 
and involved a change in relationship and behaviour between them (described below).
6.1.1. The Knowers and the Weak
Some Christians consumed idol food freely, including in temple complexes as part of cultic 
acts (10:21n22), likely appealing to their knowledge of the non-existence of idols and their 
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2. As argued by, e.g., E. C. Still and Bruce Fisk (Bruce N. Fisk, “Eating Food Offered to Idols: 
Corinthian Behavior and Pauline Response in 1 Corinthians 8–10 [a Response to Gordon Fee],” TJ 10 
[1989]: 49–70; E. C. Still, “The Meaning and Uses of ΕΙ∆ΩΛΟΘΥΤON in First-Century Non-Pauline Literature 
and 1 Cor 8:1–11:1: Toward Resolution of the Debate,” TJ 23 [2002]: 225–34) over against the arguments to 
limit the meaning to food sacrificed and immediately eaten in temple precincts by Gordon Fee and Ben 
Witherington (Gordon Fee, “Ειδολο' θυτα Once Again: An Interpretation of 1 Cor 8–10,” Bib 61 [1980]: 181–87; 
Ben Witherington, “Not So Idle Thoughts About Eidolothuton,” TynBul 44 [1993]: 237–54).
3. With, e.g., Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation, HUT 28 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 237f; David G. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul’s 
Ethics (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 169–70; Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther: 
1Kor 6,12–11,16, EKKNT 7 (Neukirchener-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1995), 212–15; John Hurd, The Origin of 1 
Corinthians (London: SPCK, 1965), 131–42; Dieter Zeller, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, KEK 5 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 55; against, e.g., Johannes Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief, KEK 5 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910), xl-xliii; Walter Schmithals, “Die Korintherbrief als Briefsammlung,” ZNW 64 
(1973): 263–88; Khiok-khng Yeo, Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 & 10: A Formal Analysis with 
Preliminary Suggestions for a Chinese, Cross-Cultural Hermeneutic, BibInt 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 75–83.
4. In 8:10, Paul refers to dining in a temple complex (e.g., the Corinthian Asklepieion); in 10:14n22, 
Paul refers to participating in cultic acts, again in a temple complex, referring to sharing in libations made 
(piοτη' ριον δαιµονι'ων, 10:21), and in the sacrificial altar of non-Christian cult (τραπε'ζης δαιµονι'ων, 10:21); see 
John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth, WUNT 2,151 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 69–
70, 246–47; Schrage, 1 Korinther II, 446). The same cultic act could also occur at other public spaces or in 
private homes (see Fotopoulos, Food, 242). In 10:26n29, Paul envisions a meal hosted by non-Christians, likely 
not εν ειδωλει'ω,  (as this would contradict 8:10), but in a private home, though there were other possible locations.
5. With, e.g., Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 170–71, against, e.g., Hurd, Origin, 117–25; Peter D. 
Gooch, Dangerous Food: 1 Corinthians 8–10 in Its Context, Studies in Christianity and Judaism 5 (Waterloo: 
Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1993), 62–68.
monotheism as justification for this ‘right’ (εξουσι'α; 8:1b, 4, 5a).6 Despite its awkwardness, I 
label this group the ‘knowers’ or ‘those with knowledge’, rather than the ‘strong’, given that 
Paul did not use strength language to describe them in these chapters. The knowers were 
likely motivated to participate without reservation in meals involving idol food (whether 
explicitly cultic meals or not) in order to maintain and establish important social, economic, 
and cultural bonds with wider Corinthian society, as was normal practice.7 They may have 
ascribed theological value to this unhindered participation, and used their knowledge to 
distinguish themselves from others (if 8:8 contains Paul’s reversal of the values of the 
knowers).8
 The other group of believers did not have the same knowledge as the knowers (8:7a) in 
that their psychology did not allow this knowledge to enable unhindered consumption of idol 
food, not in the sense that they did not acknowledge God as the only God. They had a ‘weak’ 
or ‘vulnerable’ συνει'δησις, described in 8:7.9 The συνει'δησις is one’s ‘self-consciousness’, 
particularly that which retrospectively evaluates behaviour, and thus, for a Christian, monitors 
one’s self-understanding of moral responsibility to God (cf., e.g., Rom 2:15; 9:1; 2 Cor 1:12; 
1 Cor 4:4). By having a weak συνει'δησις, the weak were weak in two senses. First, their 
psychology was conditioned to judge consumption of food explicitly linked to non-Christian 
cultic acts as an act of worship to the gods of that cult. The knowers were not so conditioned. 
Second, they could be persuaded to eat idol food even though it meant idolatry for them. In 
8:7, the phrase describing the συνει'δησις as ‘being weak’ (α σθενη`ς ουòσα), refers back to the 
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6. See discussion of Paul’s quotations of Corinthian positions and his responses in 8:1n9 in John 
Fotopoulos, “Arguments Concerning Food Offered to Idols: Corinthian Quotations and Pauline Refutations in a 
Rhetorical ‘Partitio’ (1 Corinthians 8:1–9),” CBQ 67 (2005): 611–31.
7. See discussion in Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food, 27–46; Wendell L. Willis, Idol Meat in 
Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10, SBLDS 68 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1985), 7–64; 
Fotopoulos, Food, 158–78, esp. 176–78.
8. Whether 8:8a represents Paul’s voice or that of the Corinthians depends in part on one’s 
interpretation of whether piαραστη' σει refers to a ‘bringing before God’ for judgement or for commendation. I 
interpret that Paul reverses the position of the knowers in 8:8bc (with C. K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians, BNTC [London: A. & C. Black, 1968], 195–96). Thus, because there is no conjunction signaling a 
shift between 8:8a and 8:8bc, I interpret piαραστη' σει to refer to benefit gained in God’s sight by eating food, 
which Paul dismisses (pace Fotopoulos, “Arguments Concerning Food,” 627–28).
9. The following summary of the weakness of the weak and the concept of συνει'δησις is indebted to 
discussions in Hans-Joachim Eckstein, Der Begriff des Syneidesis bei Paulus, WUNT 2,10 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1983), 236–43; Volker Gäckle, Die Starken und die Schwachen in Korinth und in Rom: Zu Herkunft 
und Funktion der Antithese in 1Kor 8,1–11,1 und in Röm 14,1–15,13, WUNT 2,200 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2004), 205–15; Gregory Dawes, “The Danger of Idolatry: First Corinthians 8:7–13,” CBQ 58 (1996): 82–98; 
Alex T. Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth, JSNTSup 176 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 130–33; 
David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 382–84; Peder Borgen, 
“‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ ‘How Far?’: The Participation of Jews and Christians in Pagan Cults,” in Paul in His Hellenistic 
Context, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 49–53; Eckhard J. Schnabel, Der erste 
Brief des Paulus an die Korinther (Wuppertal: Brockhaus, 2006), 256–59.
act of idolatrous eating, ω  ς ειδωλο' θυτον εσθι'ουσιν).10 The weak may also have been weak in 
that they were socially and economically disadvantaged (e.g., slaves), and thus were not only 
enticed but pressured to eat by other believers or by non-Christians who had authority over 
them.11 However, whether this was the case is uncertain, given that Paul described their 
situation without direct reference to this status.
6.1.2.The Damage Caused to the Weak
The discussion of idol food was critical for Paul because the weak’s faith was in danger of 
destruction. By observing the knowers consuming idol food directly linked to cultic acts, 
whether at meals in a temple or in private spaces (8:10; 10:28n29a), the weak would have 
been at least encouraged, and at most pressured, to do the same.12 Via their συνει'δησις, the 
weak had a subjective awareness of their eating as sin, producing psychological pain and 
dissonance in their identity as believers in the one God (8:6). However, it is the weak’s 
relationship of responsibility to God (i.e., their faith) to resist idolatry that was the central 
issue of Paul’s concern, a relationship operative through their συνει'δησις, but jeopardized by 
their idolatrous acts which weakened the function of their συνει'δησις further. The language 
used to describe this harm to the weak is language of apostasy and eschatological destruction 
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10. Eckstein argues that the weakness of συνει'δησις cannot refer to the latter, a weakness of conviction 
about future action (akrasia), for this imports a concept of conscientia antecedens, which does not apply for 
Paul’s concept of συνει'δησις (Hans-Joachim Eckstein, Syneidesis, 243, 254–55; see also C. A. Pierce, 
Conscience in the New Testament, SBT 15 [London: SCM, 1955], 75–83). Whether one ascribes the instability 
of the weak to their weakness of συνει'δησις, or to some other aspect of their character, the weak are vulnerable to 
being led into idolatry, and do not have sufficient personal resources needed to resist such influence. Several 
scholars root this instability of conviction in the weak’s συνει'δησις, including Philip Bosman, Conscience in 
Philo and Paul, WUNT 2,166 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 211; Paul W. Gooch, “‘Conscience’ in 1 
Corinthians 8 and 10,” NTS 33 (1987): 248–51; Borgen, “‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ ‘How Far?’,” 50–51; Anthony C. 
Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2000), 643–44; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 383–84. Gardner understands the weak συνει'δησις as a 
feeling of insecurity in relation to others, but this seems too general, and strays from the individual, morally 
evaluative function of συνει'δησις (Paul D. Gardner, The Gifts of God and the Authentication of a Christian: An 
Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 8–11:1 [Lanham: University Press of America, 1994], 42–48).
11. Gerd Theissen, “The Strong and the Weak in Corinth: A Sociological Analysis of a Theological 
Quarrel,” in The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity; trans. John H. Schütz (1975; repr., Eugene: Wipf and 
Stock, 2004), 121–43. Justin Meggitt’s critique rightly questions a key point of Theissen’s reading, but does not 
refute it entirely (Justin J. Meggitt, “Meat Consumption and Social Conflict in Corinth,” JTS 45 [1997]: 137–41). 
Fotopoulos entertains the possibility that the weak could be present at a meal hosted by a non-Christian as a slave 
(Fotopoulos, Food, 245).
12. I include the situation of 10:28n29a because I interpret that Paul remains concerned about the same 
weak Christians in this passage, who were also present at the meal hosted by a non-Christian (with e.g., Schrage, 
1 Korinther II, 469f; Anthony C. Thiselton, “Realized Eschatology at Corinth,” NTS 24 [1978]: 786–88; Barrett, 
1 Corinthians, 242; Hans-Joachim Eckstein, Syneidesis, 265; Fotopoulos, Food, 244–46). Zeller describes this 
view as the majority view, even as he sensibly allows for both a Christian and non-Christian informant, given 
Paul’s indeterminate language (Zeller, 1 Korinther, 346).
(8:9, 11, 13).13 The weakness of the weak’s συνει'δησις was not simply a subjective problem 
of over-scrupulosity, and thus forced self-contradiction by those with knowledge.14 The 
knowers caused the weak to commit what was a genuine act of idolatry for them, and thus 
‘polluted’ or ‘wounded’ the weak who were already particularly vulnerable to idolatry (the 
weak’s συνει'δησις is the object of harm in 8:7, 10, 12).15 The harm caused to the weak 
involved both (a) causing them to sin before God (and thus to have a negative self-perception 
via their συνει'δησις), and (b) weakening the function of their συνει'δησις to accommodate 
further idolatry (they were actually ‘constructed’ to eat idol food, 8:10).
 
6.2. Adaptation to the Weak
As we shall see, Paul’s solution to the problem of idol food involved the knowers’ adaptation 
to the weak believers’ vulnerable condition. What practically did this adaptation mean, and 
what qualifications enabled it?
 Paul urged those with knowledge to abstain from idol food in order to avoid harm to 
the weak. This is the core of their ‘adaptation’. A key question is how far this abstention goes. 
It seems clear that Paul ruled out the consumption of idol food in a temple complex, both for 
its pressure upon the weak (8:10), and because of the danger of idolatry for the knowers 
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13. The behaviour of the knowers was a ‘cause for stumbling’ in the weak’s relationship with God 
(piρο'σκοµµα, 8:9; cf. Rom 9:32n33; 14:21; Exod 23:33 LXX; 34:12; Sir 17:25), by it they were thus ‘being 
destroyed’ in their faith (α piο'λλυνται, 8:11; cf. 1 Cor 1:18; 10:9n10; 15:18; 2 Cor 2:15; 4:3, 9; Rom 2:12; 14:15), 
it ‘causes the weak to sin’ (σκανδαλι'ζει; σκανδαλι'σω, 8.13; cf. Sir 9:5 LXX; Pss. Sol. 16:7; cf. σκα' νδαλον, Lev 
19:14 LXX; Judg 8:27; Ps 105:36; Wis 14:11; Pss. Sol 4:23; Matt 13:41; Rom 9:33; 11:9; 14:13).
14. As proposed in, e.g., Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 194–95; Schrage, 1 Korinther II, 256–59. 
15. The danger of idolatry was real for both knowers and weak, but Paul defined idolatry in the nature of 
the meal and/or the συνει'δησις of the participant, not in the food itself or in a particular location (see the 
distinction between food and idolatry in 10:19n20). See Dietrich-Alex Koch, “‘Alles, was εν µακε'λλω,  verkauft 
wird, eßt..’: Die macella von Pompeji, Gerasa und Korinth und ihre Bedeutung für die Auslegung von 1Kor 
10,25,” ZNW 90 (1999): 217; David G. Horrell, “Theological Principle or Christological Praxis? Pauline Ethics 
in 1 Corinthians 8.1–11.1,” JSNT 67 (1997): 100–101. I am in general agreement with recent interpreters who 
argue that Paul forbade the knowers’ conscious consumption of idol food due to the dangers of their own idolatry 
as well as harm to the weak (not just the latter), e.g., Cheung, Idol Food; Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food; 
Fotopoulos, Food, 236–37; against, e.g., Hurd, Origin; Borgen, “‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ ‘How Far?’,” 54–55; Jerome 
Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom or the Ghetto? (1 Cor., VIII,1–13; X,23nXI,1),” RB 85 (1978): 543–74. However, 
Alex Cheung and John Fotopoulos assume the same danger of idolatry for the knowers as for the weak, and thus 
mishandle Paul’s references to a legitimate capacity to eat for the knowers, different from that of the weak (esp. 
10:29a; see Cheung, Idol Food, 158–59; Fotopoulos, Food, 245–46). David Horrell and E. C. Still offer 
compelling readings which respect Paul’s concerns regarding idolatry for both the weak and the knowers, but also 
affirm some theological legitimacy to the position of the knowers, even if that right is ultimately given up for the 
weak, and even if it is impossible to define precisely what the line was between idolatrous and non-idolatrous 
participation (E. C. Still, “Paul’s Aim Regarding Eidolothyta: A New Proposal for Interpreting 1 Corinthians 
8:1–11:1,” NovT 44 [2002]: 333–43; Horrell, “Christological Praxis?” 83–104).
(10:14n22).16 In 8:13, using himself as an example, Paul appears to champion unqualified 
abstinence, declaring that he would permanently abstain from meat in general (κρε'α) in order 
to avoid harming his fellow Christian. Paul spoke hyperbolically in 8:13, however, because he 
later directed all members to eat meat purchased in the macellum17 and served at meals hosted 
by non-Christians based on the theological reality that all food comes from and belongs to 
God (10:25n27; see Ps 23:1 LXX). This consumption was not to be a matter of moral 
responsibility involving the συνει'δησις, because Paul assumed both marketplace meat and 
meat served by non-Christians were in themselves sufficiently distant from cultic acts, such 
that consumption did not constitute idolatry for the knowers, nor could it have led the weak to 
eat idolatrously (unlike the consumption of 10:14n22 and 8:10).18 However, these allowances 
were qualified, for if ever the cultic connection of the food was explicitly recognized, whether 
at a meal hosted by a non-Christian, or in the macellum, the knowers were to abstain in order 
to support the weak in their own abstinence from what would then be an idolatrous act for 
them (10:28n29a).19 I thus interpret the qualification of v. 28n29a to apply not only to v. 27, 
but to the whole of vv. 25n27.20
 It is important to recognise that the knowers’ adaptation to the weak could likely have 
carried considerable social costs. Cultic acts involving idol food were pervasive in ancient 
Roman Corinth. They occurred in various locations (e.g., private homes, public spaces, or 
temple precincts) and for various occasions (e.g., as part of weddings, birthdays, funerals, 
political celebrations, civic festivals, club or association gatherings, or simply the gathering of 
family or friends). This pervasiveness created pressure to participate in order to maintain 
normal social and economic bonds or to establish new relationships (e.g., in an effort to seek 
patronage). Therefore, abstinence entailed potentially severe limitations and losses in 
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16. It may be that some meals in temple precincts or elsewhere were only marginally cultic in nature, as 
opposed to partaking directly from the sacrificial altar, such that there was a theoretical legitimacy of the knowers 
to eat without committing idolatry (in my view, reflected in 10:29a), though one must beware of separating social 
gatherings too neatly from cultic gatherings; see discussion in Willis, Idol Meat, 63; Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous 
Food, 15–26; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, Keys to First Corinthians: Revisiting the Major Issues [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009], 119–20; cf. critique of Gooch and Willis in Fotopoulos, Food, 67–70, 104–14, 176–78).
17. It is likely that not all meat sold in the market was meat previously sacrificed (against Lietzmann; 
see discussion in Gäckle, Die Starken und die Schwachen, 176–80; Koch, “Macella”). One could easily find out 
whether meat was previously sacrificed or not, though it is not clear whether one would know immediately or 
have to inquire (see e.g., Pliny, Ep., 10.96 with discussion in M. Isenberg, “The Sale of Sacrificial Meat,” CP 70 
[1975]: 271–73).
18. I interpret the phrase µηδε`ν α νακρι'νοντες δια` τη`ν συνει'δησιν in 10:25, 27 to refer to ‘not 
questioning’ the meat’s cultic history as a matter of one’s own responsibility to God, rather than a policy of 
attempting to maintain ignorance to protect oneself from one’s own συνει'δησις (with, e.g., Gordon Fee, The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987], 481–82; against, e.g., Christian Maurer, 
“Συ' νοιδα, Συνει'δησις,” in TDNT, eds. Gerhard Kittel et al. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971 [1964]], 915).
19. Apparently, this would not be an idolatrous act for the knowers, given that their συνει'δησις is not 
involved in 10:29a, but that of the weak. Just as in 8:7n13, in 10:28n29a Paul commands the knowers to abstain 
on behalf of the weak, indicating that the temple meal of 8:10 is not the only situation in which the weak could be 
harmed by the knowers’ free consumption.
20. With Willis, Idol Meat, 231–45; Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 568; Koch, “Macella,” 218.
relationships with outsiders.21 To avoid meals in temple precincts and to abstain for the weak 
in other circumstances likely made it impossible to participate as a fully ‘mainstream’ member 
of Corinthian society. Paul encouraged maintaining regular social involvement with outsiders, 
for he directed the Corinthians to accept invitations from outsiders, and, presumably, to 
remain with their hosts if possible even after refusing to eat idol food (see also 5:9n10).22 Yet, 
the restrictions over idol food at least would have strained, and at most could have jeopardized 
such involvement.23 
 Paul assumed throughout that the knowers were able to adapt to the weak, but which 
particular resources were required? There is no discussion here of a unique skill or technique 
needed for adaptation to the weak, for adaptation consisted simply in abstaining from idol 
food. The knowers needed the ability to discern when a meal would be idolatrous for 
themselves and the weak, but Paul seems unconcerned to spell this out for his readers, and 
assumed that his directives were sufficient. There were no particular social or financial 
resources (or lack thereof) required to adapt, for Paul did not qualify the call to abstinence 
accordingly. 
 The closest one comes to a qualification for adaptation to the weak is simply the fact 
that the knowers were not weak in the same way; they ‘had knowledge’.That the knowers 
were not weak gave them the responsibility to care for those who were, along with the fact 
that their own harmful behaviour was a large part of the problem. It does not seem that having 
knowledge was an unambiguous marker of moral maturity which qualified the knowers to 
adapt to the weak as part of a therapeutic relationship. Again, adaptation was not an act of 
therapeutic skill. The act of abstaining ultimately required trust in God, expressed in the 
willingness to obey God in bearing the limitations and potential consequences for the sake of 
the weak. The faith of the knowers played a constitutive role in bringing benefit to the weak, 
just as their lack of faith resulted in the weak’s destruction.
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21. See Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food, 27–46; Willis, Idol Meat, 7–64; Fotopoulos, Food, 176–78. 
Murphy-O’Connor raises the case of Erastus, named ο   οικονο'µος τηñς πο' λεως in Rom 16:23, perhaps indicating a 
civic leadership position in Corinth (according to Murphy-O’Connor, an aedile; Murphy-O’Connor, Keys, 118–
19). If Murphy-O’Connor’s reconstruction is correct (controversy over Erastus continues to rage), it is difficult to 
understand precisely how Erastus would have adopted Paul’s directives, given he must have participated 
regularly in civic festivals. This is part of the difficulty of the passage, given that Paul does not clearly define for 
modern readers the boundary between idolatrous and non-idolatrous participation, and the legitimate right of the 
knowers to eat.
22. Some occasions may have been distanced enough from cultic activity to allow Christian involvement 
without eating or other participation in idolatry, but Paul does not provide specifics concerning what events a 
Christian may attend (see discussion in Horrell, “Christological Praxis?” 100–101; Borgen, “‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ ‘How 
Far?’,” 42–49).
23. While Fotopoulos rightly stresses the social limitations of Paul’s directives, it seems incorrect to 
suppose that the Corinthians would need to refuse virtually all invitations from non-Christians in order to uphold 
them (Fotopoulos, Food, 235); Paul seems to think dining with non-Christians remains possible and desirable 
(10:27; 9:21).
6.3. Constructing the Weak
How did adaptation in love construct the weak, according to Paul? My answer to this question 
develops out of critical interaction with two other solutions. Some scholars argue that 
adaptation to the weak would eventually lead them out of their weakness in knowledge and/or 
συνει'δησις. Other scholars deny that constructing the weak involves their moral formation, 
preferring instead to speak of construction as an enhancement of communal solidarity; a 
change in relationship, not a change in the weak’s character. I argue for a third position. 
Construction of the weak involves developing their moral character through a change in 
relationship with other believers. This moral development does not, however, involve growth 
out of their weakness. In the following, I rehearse and critique the first and second positions 
just mentioned (6.3.1, 6.3.2), and then present my own reading (6.3.3).
6.3.1. Constructing the Weak by Curing their Weakness?
Several scholars have interpreted that Paul intends the weak to develop internal resources 
sufficient to grow out of their vulnerability in some way by means of the knowers’ adaptation. 
There seems to be an inherent critique in the label ‘weak’, and in the language of ‘saving’ and 
‘gaining’ others as the goal of adaptation in 9:19n23 and 10:33 applied to the relationship 
between the knowers and the weak.24 Perhaps the strongest basis for this interpretation is 
Paul’s command to eat whatever is sold in the marketplace and served at meals (10:25n27). In 
this reading, the command would have been spoken particularly to the weak in order to wean 
them from their weakness, their over-scrupulosity based on a lack of knowledge.25 Paul 
intended at least to relativise the weak’s tendency to make their position absolute, and at most 
to call the weak to abandon their scruples.26 The knowers’ unhindered consumption in these 
sanctioned circumstances would have thus reinforced Paul’s formative effort.27 Less plausibly 
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24. E.g., Weiss, 1 Korinther, 264; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 783–86; Robert Jewett, Paul’s 
Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings, Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken 
Judentums und des Urchristentums 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 428; Zeller, 1 Korinther, 344–45; Murphy-
O’Connor, “Freedom or the Ghetto”, 568n571; Andreas Lindemann, Der erste Korintherbrief, HNT 9/1 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 198.
25. E.g., Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 783–86; Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms, 428; Zeller, 1 
Korinther, 344–45; Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom or the Ghetto”, 568n571.
26. Jewett argues that 10:25 was a ‘radical obligation’ on the weak to abandon their scrupulosity (a 
policy of ‘what you don’t know won’t hurt you’), but also that Paul allowed the weak to stop eating once they 
discovered the food’s origins (Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms, 428).
27. I disagree that the weak were overly scrupulous, and thus I do not find evidence here of Paul’s 
rebuke to the weak. It is at least clear that Paul’s directive in 10:25n27 cannot mean that the weak should have 
knowingly eaten food identified with cultic acts, otherwise he would have contradicted his advice given in 8:7n13 
and 10:28n29a. The weak were not weak because they anxiously searched out the cultic origins of their food. 
Paul affirmed in 10:25n27 that all food purchased in the macellum was to be unrelated to the moral 
consciousness of both knowers and weak (unlike food consumed in a cultic act, as just discussed, 10:14n22), but 
but in the same vein, Jerome Murphy-O’Connor suggests that the weak were ‘spiteful’ and 
‘aggressive’, judging and reviling those with knowledge for their consumption, having 
absolutised their weakness (seen under the surface in 8:8; 10:29bn30, in analogy to Rom 
14:3).28 By adapting to the weak, the knowers indirectly called their weakness into question, 
leading them to question themselves and mature further.29 
 Clarence Glad has offered a sophisticated version of this reading, explaining Paul’s 
approach in terms of psychagogy, especially as modelled by Philodemus. Glad interprets that 
Paul encouraged mature believers to develop weaker, less mature believers by means of 
adaptive, rational therapy. In Glad’s reading of the historical circumstances, the knowers were 
already at work in this task. They were attempting to correct the weak’s immature συνει'δησις 
by rational persuasion and by presenting themselves to the weak as models of the free 
consumption of idol food thus pressuring the weak to do likewise.30 As in philosophical texts 
which discuss immature students, Glad diagnoses the weak as ‘akratic’: they made decisions 
which created strife and uncertainty within themselves; they assented to the non-existence of 
idols, but could not eat food with cultic ties without a guilty self-perception, as if they had 
committed idolatry.31 Paul endorsed the knowers’ position towards idol food in theory, along 
with their pedagogical role and intent, but did not endorse their destructive behaviour.32 Glad 
summarises, ‘Paul does not question the right of the wise to guide the weak but rejects their 
pedagogy and mode of spiritual guidance.’33 Instead, Paul called the knowers not to criticize 
the weak harshly and to abstain from the pressuring consumption of idol food as part of a 
gentler, long-term therapeutic project to develop the weak’s immature character. Like 
Philodemus, Glad argues, Paul required adaptation to the weak in light of their instability as 
newly converted Christians lacking a strong sense of Christian identity and the ability to 
endure harsh criticism. The knowers should continue to instruct the weak on this issue, but 
should be gentle, patient and willing to sacrifice their freedom, bearing with the weak’s 
vulnerabilities as they grow out of them more gradually.
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this did not resolve the issue, for this freedom remained conditioned by the imperative to protect the weak when 
the cultic origin of the food was explicitly identified (10:28n29a). Other believers were to offer this support for 
the weak indefinitely.
28. Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom or the Ghetto,” 568n571.
29. Yet, unlike Romans 14:3, Paul never explicitly rebuked the weak for judging others, and Paul would 
have addressed this more explicitly if needed. While Paul’s rhetorical questions in 10:29bn30 may be read as a 
challenge to the weak’s burdening of the knowers in general, they can be read otherwise, and cannot 
independently support the interpretation that Paul intended the weak to grow out of their weakness. Horrell 
critiques Murphy-O’Connor’s view as overly psychologised and textually unfounded (Horrell, “Christological 
Praxis?” 105).
30. Glads (implausibly) reads τυ' piτοντες (8:10) and οικοδοµηθη' σεται (8:12) as indicating such 
behaviour (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 277–95).
31. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 284–89.
32. Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 278.
33. Ibid.
 In response to this line of interpretation in all of the forms just reviewed, I argue that 
core aspects of Paul’s argument undercut the idea that his goal was to lead the weak out of 
their weakness. I focus on two such aspects here.
 First, this reading runs against the grain of Paul’s contrast between knowledge and 
love (8:1n3). In the programmatic first three verses of chapter 8, Paul relativises any claims to 
knowledge made apart from or in conflict with the ultimate subject of knowing, God. True 
knowledge of anything, including idol food, cannot be independent of love for God, which is 
to be expressed in love for one’s siblings in Christ (8:2n3, 11n12; cf. 13:1n3). Insofar as the 
knowers have ‘destroyed’ their siblings in Christ by their knowledge-enabled ‘right’ (8:9), 
they have not loved their siblings nor expressed love for God. They have not come to ‘know 
as one ought to know’ (8:3); their knowledge is ‘nothing’ (see 13:2). In ch. 13, Paul further 
relativises all human knowledge as incomplete and indirect in contrast with complete human 
knowing only realized by God in the eschaton (13:9n12; see further discussion in ch. 7). Paul 
subordinates individual human knowing, including particular conceptions of idol food, to the 
greater value of love for God and for other believers who differ in these conceptions (8:7). 
 While partly affirming the theological position of the knowers that idols and idol food 
are nothing (8:4; 10:19, 25n26), in 8:8 Paul deems the consumption of idol food as inherently 
irrelevant for one’s relationship to God. Paul writes in 8:8, (NRSV) ‘Food will not bring us 
close to God. We are no worse off if we do not eat, and no better off if we do.’ Intrinsically, 
there is no theological difference between consumption and abstinence, and thus no 
theologically important difference between possessing or lacking the knowledge which 
enables consumption. This holds true even though Paul is interested to protect the weak and 
the knowers from situations in which intrinsically harmless differences in knowledge and 
intrinsically harmless food become harmful. What ultimately matters is maintaining 
faithfulness to God within one’s particular state of knowledge or συνει'δησις. Paul argues 
throughout chapters 8n10 that the knowers should not insist on the primacy and infallibility of 
their own knowledge and behaviour with respect to idol food, but should give up their right 
for the sake of the weak, as Paul, and in fact Christ, have done (9:19n23; 10:31n11:1). 
 In sum, Paul does not valourize the knowers’ moral character (their knowledge and 
συνει'δησις) over against that of the weak, but relativises their differences (8:8). If Paul 
intended the weak to become like the knowers in their relationship with idol food, his own 
argument provides no positive justification for it, and indeed militates against that goal.
 Second, nowhere does Paul directly critique the weak or discuss the process by which 
the weak will gradually change internally in relation to idol food, either in their knowledge or 
συνει'δησις, as a result of the knowers’ adaptation. Paul places responsibility for addressing 
the vulnerabilities of the weak upon the knowers, not upon the weak themselves. Moreover, 
he envisions a permanent change in the knowers’ behaviour for the sake of the weak. Paul 
alludes to this permanency in his hyperbolic statement that he would never eat any meat again 
to avoid causing a fellow believer to stumble (8:13), and he confirms it in 10:25n29a, in 
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which he assumes ongoing abstention for the weak despite allowing freedom for purchasing 
meat in the macellum.34
 This general argument has led several scholars to conclude that construction in these 
chapters does not involve the weak becoming like the knowers, nor does construction operate 
according to a therapeutic model of care for the weak.35 If Paul did envision the weak to 
become like the knowers via adaptation, his argument seems incoherent.36
6.3.2. Constructing the Weak as Constructing Solidarity, not Moral Formation?
Other scholars have interpreted that constructing the weak meant changing the weak’s 
external circumstances (i.e., removing harmful situations), particularly by developing loving 
relationships in the community, rather than some moral development of the weak.37 The 
knowers ‘saved’ the weak from potential harm by making it easier, not harder, for the weak to 
abstain and thus avoid idolatry. The knowers eliminated dangerous opportunities caused by 
their own behaviour, and provided support and solidarity for the weak when others 
encouraged or pressured them to eat idolatrously (10:27n29a).38 Margaret Mitchell reads the 
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34. This passage is fraught with interpretive difficulty and controversy. I interpret that the weak are in 
view as the informant of 10:28n29, and thus adaptation for them remains required even in light of 10:25n27. 
Regardless of one’s understanding of these verses, if one interprets that adaptation to the weak was no longer 
needed in any circumstance by the end of ch. 10, this would create tension with ch. 8 and ch. 9. I deem that 
reading less convincing than one which interprets Paul’s commands to entail ongoing abstention for the weak.
35. E.g., Mitchell, Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 99–105, 237f; Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 179–82, 
197–98; Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge: Philosophical Studies in Paul (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1987), 113–23; Stowers, “Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,” 283–84; Hans-Joachim Eckstein, 
Syneidesis, 255–56; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 380; Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 455–56; Gäckle, Die Starken und die 
Schwachen, 207–8; Ben Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1995), 199; Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians, IBC (Louisville: John Knox, 1997), 142–43; Hans Conzelmann, 
1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, trans. James W. Leitch (1969; repr., 
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 147; Martin, The Corinthian Body, 183–87; Joseph A. Fitzmyer S.J., Romans: A 
New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 33 (New York; London: Doubleday, 1992), 345.
36. Perhaps the most plausible version of this general trajectory is to interpret that Paul did not envision 
adaptation to lead to moral construction of the weak out of their weakness, but that an inevitable effect of this 
adaptation was that some weak believers would probably have gained greater resolve to resist idolatry and/or 
would have developed in their συνει'δησις within the protected environment created by the knowers’ loving 
adaptation. See Gäckle, Die Starken und die Schwachen, 207–8; Hans-Joachim Eckstein, Syneidesis, 275. While 
this seems plausible and cannot be excluded as a possibility, Paul did not explicitly describe this subsequent 
maturation of the weak, nor specify these results as the goal for the knowers’ adaptive abstention. Rather, Paul 
commanded indefinite abstention for weak believers, and seemed unconcerned whether believers had the 
knowledge that led to eating idol food in a legitimate way or not. Paul was most concerned for the weak to avoid 
idolatry, and thus to love God in their weakness (8:3) even if it meant that the weak depended upon others. 
Moreover, as Gäckle notes (especially concerning 1 Cor 12:22) and as I argue further below, the weak in their 
weakness actually play an important constructive role for others, not just in the exercise of spiritual gifts (1 Cor 
12n14), but in the idol food issue as well (Gäckle, Die Starken und die Schwachen, 208, 469–70).
37. See detailed discussion in, e.g., Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 113–23; Stowers, “Paul on the 
Use and Abuse of Reason,” 284–86; Mitchell, Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 99–105, 237ff.
38. Virtually all commentators explain the construction of the weak with reference to this avoidance of 
harm, other differences aside.
construction language as referring to the construction of unity over against factionalism, 
adducing ancient discussions of the topos in this idiom.39 Stanley Stowers argues that Paul 
does not operate with a therapeutic model of reason, because his goal for adaptation is to 
create unity in Christ, not to cure passions or cultivate individual virtue or knowledge.40 As he 
notes, ‘For Stoics and even Epicureans, the basic goal is the inner health of individuals. 
Community often seems to serve only an instrumental function toward that telos. For Paul, the 
goal is the community itself, a community of a certain quality to which the mutual 
enhancement of individuals is intrinsic.’41 These interpretations are helpful, but incomplete, 
for it is difficult to understand how this change in relationship from disregard to loving 
concern does not also in some sense change the moral life of both the knowers and the weak, a 
life which these relationships partly constitute. It is true that Paul’s construction language at 
times has the community as its object, constructing ‘the body of Christ’ (e.g., 1 Cor 14:4, 5, 
12), but in these chapters the implied object is the weak believers (8:1, 10; 10:23; cp. 14:17). 
The dichotomy between the development of relationships and the development of internal 
character is too hasty, and it does not reckon with the importance that relationships among 
believers have for their moral lives, in Paul’s perspective. 
6.3.3. Constructing the Weak in their Weakness
I argue that constructing the weak involved a development in the weak’s moral character that 
arose by means of and in response to a new relationship with the knowers. Assuming Paul’s 
intentions were fulfilled, the most prominent change for the weak was their new relationship 
of dependence upon those with knowledge for assistance in maintaining their faith against 
idolatry. I argue that this change in relationship is most fruitful for understanding the 
construction of the weak. Constructing the weak did not involve developing their knowledge 
or συνει'δησις vis-à-vis idol food, but it did involve growth in their moral character. The moral 
character of the weak developed in that dependence on the adaptation of the knowers became 
an indispensable, constitutive part of their moral lives as believers in God in their weakness. 
Through this dependence, the weak’s faith received protection by the elimination of dangerous 
circumstances, and received encouragement against idolatry in the future.42
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39. Mitchell, Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 99–102.
40. Stowers, “Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,” 284–85.
41. Stowers, “Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,” 286. Stowers does not develop what ‘mutual 
enhancement’ means nor how it is ‘intrinsic’ to Pauline community.
42. It would be incorrect to think that this external support solves the problem in itself without any 
involvement of the weak, for though the weak may be harmed less frequently by the knowers, they must still 
choose to abstain from idolatrous consumption at meals with the solidarity of other Christians, and there likely 
remain other circumstances in which they are pressured to eat idol food by non-Christians without the supporting 
presence of other Christians.
 The weak exercised further trust in God by receiving help from the knowers, for the 
weak received their adaptation as God’s saving intervention. God called the knowers to faith 
and ‘fellowship’ (κοινωνι'α) in Christ with the weak (1:9; 2:5; 10:17). God provided the 
warrant and model for the knowers’ behaviour (the gospel of Christ’s death for the weak, 
8:11; the model was Christ, modelled by Paul, 9:22n23; 10:33n11:1). Like Paul, the knowers 
‘became weak’ (9:22), they ‘enslaved’ themselves to the weak (9:19) in order to save them,43 
and thus became ‘partners’ of the gospel (συγκοινωνοι', 9:23).44 In so doing, the knowers’ 
demonstrated to the weak the meaning of the gospel of Christ’s death for them, their weak 
siblings in Christ. By helping the weak to have faith and resist idolatry in their weakness, the 
knowers, like Paul and Apollos, thus became ‘servants’ through whom the weak exercised 
faith (δια' κονοι δι’ ωð ν επιστευ' σατε, 3:5), through whom God ‘causes growth’ in faith (3:5n9), 
through whom the weak are ‘being saved’ from the power of sin (σω, ζοµε'νοις, 1:18), 
preserved blameless until the day of the Lord’s return (1:8). As Paul discusses later in 1 Cor 
12 (discussed in ch. 7), the knowers’ gave the weak constructive benefit which they received 
in faith as God’s action on their behalf through their indispensable fellow-members of the 
body of Christ (12:7, 11, 12n27).
 The weak’s experience of this divine intervention through the knowers was not a 
dispensable, external boost for their moral lives as believers. The weak could not and should 
not live out their faith independently from the knowers’ help. Rather, receiving in faith God’s 
salvation through the knowers was constitutive of what being a weak believer in God meant. 
Just as Paul saw his own adaptation to others as a constitutive element of his preaching, 
without which he would have obstructed the gospel (cf. εγκοπη' , 9:12), so too the adaptation of 
the knowers was indispensable for this saving benefit of the weak. Without this new 
relationship with the knowers, their relationship with them lay broken, their κοινωνι'α in 
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43. The knowers did not ‘save’ the weak precisely in the same way that Paul described in 9:19n23, for 
the knowers helped weak Christians to maintain their faith, rather than come to faith for the first time. One need 
not interpret that Paul precisely modelled the knowers’ particular behaviours toward the weak in order to 
understand 9:19n23 as a model for them (i.e., interpreting that Paul referred particularly to ‘weak’ Christians in 
9:22, as in ch. 8; that his ‘becoming weak’ referred particularly to adapting to them in the issue of idol food; or 
that ‘winning’ the weak [κερδαι'νω] referred to reforming them [as in Matt 18:15; 1 Pt 3:1] rather than helping 
them come to faith for the first time). Paul may have referred to his becoming ‘weak’ in 9:22 in the sense of 
supporting himself by manual labour, for example, but his model still remained relevant for the knowers 
regardless of the precise meaning of ‘becoming all to all’ in 9:19n23.
44. The meaning of συγκοινωνο' ς has been heavily debated. I interpret it to refer primarily to the role of 
sharing in the gospel’s power to save others as an instrument of its communication. This reading is in keeping 
with the parallelism of the ι«να clauses throughout 9:19n23, in which Paul’s concern is to ‘win’ and ‘save’ others. 
The role of sharing in the gospel’s communication does not entail that Paul or the knowers somehow detracted 
from the priority and efficiency of God’s saving work in the gospel, for God’s ‘partners’ and ‘co-workers’ 
(συνεργοι', 3:9) remain ‘nothing’ by comparison with God who ‘causes growth’ (3:6n7), from whom they have 
received everything (4:6n7). However, being a συγκοινωνο' ς could also imply the role of sharing in the gospel’s 
benefits, as Paul’s concerns about being found α δο' κιµος indicate (9:27). See Morna Hooker, “A Partner in the 
Gospel: Paul’s Understanding of His Ministry,” in Theology and Ethics in Paul and His Interpreters, eds. 
Eugene H. Lovering and Jerry L. Sumney (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 83–100; Dustin W. Ellington, “Imitating 
Paul’s Relationship to the Gospel: 1 Corinthians 8.1–11.1,” JSNT 33 (2011): 303–15. 
Christ was disrupted, their faith in God was being destroyed by their idolatry, and they were 
separated from God’s saving initiatives for them through others in the body of Christ.
 One might object that I have just described my preferred version of the second position 
reviewed above, in which constructing the weak meant establishing relational solidarity with 
them (thus giving them a needed external good) rather than changing their moral character in 
itself. However, to depend on the knowers’ adaptation was not to stall moral development by 
depending on some external good other than oneself. That construal of the moral life and its 
development assumes that genuine moral character operates only individually, and that the 
goal is moral self-sufficiency. For Paul, however, the goal is not moral self-sufficiency, but 
faithful response to God (this subject receives further discussion in ch. 7). By depending on 
other believers’ help, the weak did not avoid moral development, but embraced it, for they 
responded in faith to God’s saving intervention for them through others. Depending upon 
others did not hinder the weak’s maturity in faith; rather, in this case, dependence upon others 
in the body of Christ was the proper mode of mature faith in God for the weak.
 In summary, the weak’s moral life developed in that it operated in a new mode of 
dependence on the knowers which strengthened their commitment to God against idolatry, and 
properly ordered their faith to God’s saving work for them in dependence upon the knowers 
and thus upon God himself. Dependence on the knowers partily constituted the moral life of 
the weak before God; to depend on God was to depend on the knowers for help. Maturity as 
weak believers involved dependence on others out of faith in God, not self-sufficiency.
6.4. The Weak’s Construction of the Knowers
Throughout these three chapters, Paul never calls the weak to action on behalf of others. It 
may seem odd, then, to find here a discussion of the weak’s moral construction of those with 
knowledge. I argue that adaptation to the weak had morally constructive effects for the 
knowers as well.
 To understand how the knowers were to experience moral construction, one must 
identify the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the experience, assuming they followed Paul’s directives. 
There is a danger of running beyond the evidence in a quest to define the inner states or beliefs 
of the knowers in order then to compare them with Paul’s arguments, and finally to sketch a 
picture of their supposed development. Our historical access to the knowers is only through 
Paul’s polemic against them.45 My reconstruction is based on Paul’s perspective. I offer the 
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45. For example, it may be that the knowers agreed with some of Paul’s arguments and theological 
values, but had a differing interpretation of what they entailed (e.g., what it meant to ‘construct’ others or to be 
αpiρο'σκοπος to all people), or appealed to arguments Paul did not mention (e.g., Paul does not directly address 
the possible social and economic pressures the knowers faced to eat idol food).
following basic summary of the knowers’ circumstances based on the outline given at the 
beginning of this chapter: (a) the knowers considered themselves Christians, (b) they thought, 
however consciously or not, that abstinence from idol food for the weak was of less value for 
themselves than their unrestricted participation (whether of less value socially, economically, 
and/or theologically), and (c) they chose to act accordingly.
 Roughly stated, Paul’s strategy was to persuade the knowers to abstain for the weak by 
arguing that the theological importance of doing so should determine their behaviour as 
Christians. According to Paul’s rhetoric, the knowers existed in a conflicted state of trusting 
God as believers, and yet sinning against God by their actions toward the weak. Paul’s 
argument throughout these chapters created a high-stakes, binary choice for the knowers: 
either sin against Christ in harming the weak, or adapt for the weak in obedience to the gospel.
 By harming the weak, the knowers necessarily destroyed their own faith. For Paul, to 
continue on course was to continue sinning against Christ by destroying the weak (8:12), and 
thus to oppose the very God from whom the knowers have received everything (4:7), 
including their ‘right’ to eat idol food (8:4n6; 10:26). God had acted in the gospel to create 
and save the weak (1:18, 23n24; 3:5). Fellowship in the body and blood of Christ entailed 
fellowship with the weak as siblings (8:11n12; 10:16n17), such that to harm the weak was to 
harm one’s own relationship to Christ (and vice versa, as 1 Cor 5:6n13 makes clear). When 
Paul obliquely warned the knowers against being found ‘unapproved’ (α δο' κιµος) in 9:27, Paul 
very likely had the knowers’ final destruction as Christians in view as the end result of their 
opposition to adapting for the weak (cf. the more explicit warning concerning their idolatry in 
10:12, 20n22).46 Just as the weak’s idolatry fundamentally threatened their faith, so too the 
knowers’ refusal to adapt threatened theirs. Tracing the implications of Paul’s rhetoric, to fail 
to adapt is to fail to become ‘partners’ of the gospel (συγκοινωνοι', 9:23), it is to place an 
εγκοπη'  in the way of the gospel (9:12), it is to fail to do all for the sake of the gospel and glory 
of God (9:23; 10:31), it is to seek one’s own interests above others (10:23; 33), and it is to 
refuse to imitate Christ (and Paul, 11:1). Adaptation to the weak was not an option for the 
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46. With, e.g., Fee, 1 Corinthians, 440; Zeller, 1 Korinther, 324; Schrage, 1 Korinther II, 371–72; 
Garland, 1 Corinthians, 444–45; against, e.g., Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 518, 541–42; Thiselton, 1 
Corinthians, 716–17. In 9:24n27, Paul continues his exemplary, first-person mode of discourse, challenging the 
knowers to endure hardship and discipline in their efforts to do all for the sake of the gospel (9:23), including to 
give up their right to abstain from idol food for the weak. The passage functions as an implied warning that 
failure to imitate Paul will result in failing to gain the ‘incorruptible crown’ at the end of the race (9:25), and in 
being found ‘unapproved’ (α δο' κιµος; 9:27). It could be that Paul simply refers to being unapproved with respect 
to his apostolic role. Yet in 2 Cor 13:5, being α δο'κιµος is opposed to being among those in whom Christ is 
present. In 10:9, Paul warns the knowers not to ‘test’ (µηδε` εκπειρα' ζωµεν) Christ, as did the wilderness 
generation, resulting in God’s destruction of them (α πω' λλυντο; cf. Num 21:5n9). The ‘testing of Christ’ here 
surely refers to the knowers’ participation in cultic meals, as in 10:22 (so, e.g., Fee, 1 Corinthians, 456–57; 
Schrage, 1 Korinther II, 400–401). Yet, the knowers also ‘test Christ’ in that they sin against him by destroying 
their weaker brother (8:12). The warnings of ‘destruction’ and ‘fall’ in 10:9, 12 (cf. Rom 11:11n12) would 
remain relevant for that sin as well.
knowers if they wanted to continue in faith, according to Paul. Rather, adaptation was 
fundamentally constitutive for their faith; there could be no proper faith in God without it.
 Before adaptation, the knowers did not fully understand the gospel’s meaning for their 
lives (they did not ‘know as one ought to know’, 8:2). Their knowledge enabling idol food 
consumption was ‘nothing’ (13:1n3) because they did not act in love toward the weak. They 
had domesticated the gospel to their own knowledge of idol food, and used that knowledge as 
the norm of their behaviour, rather than love. Adapting to the weak was the means by which 
the knowers grew in their understanding and obedience to the gospel. The transition for the 
knowers in adapting was basically one of repentance from sin, and trusting God more 
completely (cf. 1 Cor 3:1–4). This formative transition was abstractly the same as that of the 
weak, a transition from the danger of eschatological destruction to salvation by faith in God, 
realized for the knowers in their adaptation to the weak.
 Therefore, the weak were not incidental to the knowers’ faith, but indispensable. Only 
by being in relationship with the weak could the knowers come to understand that their 
knowledge was relativised by the gospel, that their knowledge of idol food was not the norm 
for their Christian lives, but love.47 Simply by being vulnerable siblings of the knowers, the 
weak constitutively shaped the lived realities of their faith in God. The weak were necessary 
for the salvation of the knowers as the gospel drew them to faith in God over against their own 
sinful myopia.
6.5. Constructive Reciprocity and Interdependence 
It remains to offer a summative overview of Paul’s vision for constructive reciprocity and 
interdependence between believers in these chapters. 
 Concerning constructive practice, there is no reciprocity of formative intervention in 
these chapters. Paul calls believers with knowledge to adapt to the weak, and does not ask the 
weak to reciprocate by taking up formative action toward the knowers. Paul’s vision for 
genuinely reciprocal constructive practice does not come to expression here, but in 1 Cor 
12n14 (examined in ch. 7).
 On the other hand, there is a form of reciprocity in that both the weak and the knowers 
receive construction from one another. The knowers construct the weak directly through their 
adaptation, while the weak construct the knowers indirectly simply by being weak, such that 
the knowers must adapt to their weakness. The evidence for this reciprocity of construction 
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47. One might propose solving the issue of 1 Cor 8:1n11:1 by cordoning off the knowers from the weak, 
but this would have been for Paul to sunder the fellowship established in Christ by the gospel (1:9n13; 
10:16n17), which is at the heart of what the gospel entailed, and the means by which both knowers and weak 
came to understand what it meant to live their faith in God. 
leads us to ask how and why both groups were interdependent upon one another for this 
construction.
 The weak depended on the knowers for construction due to their personal deficiency in 
knowledge and συνει'δησις, which left them particularly vulnerable to idolatry via the 
consumption of idol food. They could not draw on their own moral resources to manage this 
weakness. Paul’s strategy did not aim at achieving their moral self-sufficiency. They needed 
others who did not share their deficiency, who could offer them support against idolatry. The  
knowers offered them protection from further harm, and supported their faith to avoid 
idolatrous consumption when otherwise faced with idol food. In doing so, they constructed the 
weak’s moral life by leading them to further trust in God. All indications in these chapters 
suggest that the weak’s dependence on others was the long-term solution; this dependence was 
a form of maturity in faith for weak believers. The weak’s moral life of faith in God was 
constituted by their continual dependence on their siblings in Christ for help, through whom 
God operated to save the weak from destruction.
 The knowers likewise depended on the weak for construction due to their personal 
deficiency. The knowers were not deficient like the weak, but their lack of love demonstrated 
that they had failed to understand the meaning of the gospel of Christ’s death for the weak. 
Therefore, they too were not morally self-sufficient. Just as the weak sinned against God by 
their idolatry, the knowers sinned against God by their destruction of others. Without the 
presence of the weak, the knowers did not have personal moral resources to recognize that 
they had resisted the gospel by domesticating it to their knowledge. The knowers’ moral life 
of faith in God required ongoing adaptation to the weak as a constitutive element. They 
depended upon the weak to live their moral lives, for by ongoing adaptation to the weak they 
were saved from their sin, and came to understand how love relativises their knowledge.
 The nature of this interdependence in moral construction is analogous to believers’  
economic interdependence, as discussed in ch. 5. Believers depended on one another for moral 
construction because they did not have the resources to live self-sufficiently on their own, just 
as they participated in economic interdependence in the midst of poverty. Like participation in 
economic interdependence, participation in constructive interdependence indicated maturity in 
faith. Doing so was an acknowledgement of the claims of the gospel and an acknowledgement 
of one’s dependence upon God. Just as the material goods needed for life were an ongoing gift 
from God through economic interdependence, so too God provided the necessities of 
believers’ moral lives as an ongoing gift through relationships of constructive 
interdependence. These structures of economic and constructive interdependence seem to 
reinforce each other (see further discussion in chs. seven and eight).
 At several points in this chapter we have seen Paul’s theology of moral formation in  
operation. God defines the believer’s moral life from first to last. This is the case not just in 
providing norms for the moral life (e.g., love, prohibition of idolatry), but in ordering the 
moral life to be one of ongoing response in faith to God’s saving activity. The moral life is not 
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just about attaining individual moral character, but about interaction in relationship with a 
God who is distinct from the individual and his moral character. This God has created a 
community of believers through which he acts for salvation. These topics receive further 
discussion in ch. seven.
 Finally, it seems that there was no growth out of constructive interdependence. Just as 
the weak did not grow out of their weakness and dependence on others, so too the knowers did 
not arrive at a point when receiving construction from the weak was unnecessary. In neither 
case was there a transfer of moral resources between believers that led to moral self-
sufficiency. No believer could come to the point at which he no longer needed others through 
whom God acted to bring saving benefit. This dynamic of constructive interdependence is 
much more apparent in 1 Cor 12n14, examined in ch. seven, but it is no less operative in the 
present chapters.
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 CHAPTER SEVEN: 
RECIPROCAL CONSTRUCTION IN 1 CORINTHIANS 12:1n14:40
This chapter offers the second case study focused upon Paul’s vision for reciprocal moral 
construction among believers in 1 Corinthians. Like ch. six, the aim here is to understand how 
and why believers need one another in moral construction. Unlike ch. six, this passage of 1 
Corinthians provides Paul’s explicit reflections on the nature and practice of reciprocal moral 
construction, and on the nature of constructive interdependence among believers. Also unlike 
ch. six, here Paul offers his most sustained discussions of the roles of speech and love in 
constructing others. 
 As I will argue, these chapters demonstrate that constructing others is a morally 
formative process in which believers’ speech, offered in love, functions as a medium for the 
self-revelation of God by the Spirit (12:7). By constructing one another, believers facilitate 
one another’s relationships with God. This ongoing relationship with God by means of his 
revelation through others orients a believer’s moral life. Receiving construction involves 
critical reception of gifted speech in faith, responding both to the human speaker and to God. 
This process involves moral progress (construction is morally formative), but a believer’s 
relationship with God can never be encompassed in his moral character or in moral resources 
received from others. God is immanently involved in every instance of construction, but he 
also remains transcendent. God cannot be identified with human speech or moral character, 
because in the present, all believers know ‘in part’, i.e., their knowledge is qualitatively 
different than God’s own (13:8n13). Thus, believers always need to receive formation from 
others, because to do so continually constitutes their moral lives in relation to God. The 
specific practices and protocol for reciprocal construction described in ch. 14, driven by love, 
aim to protect permanent relationships of constructive interdependence among believers.
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I give a brief overview of the literary, 
historical and rhetorical shape of 1 Cor 12n14 (section 7.1). Next, I draw upon 1 Cor 12 to 
outline the contours of divine and human involvement in moral construction, thereby 
introducing a number of themes to be discussed throughout the chapter, particularly the 
transcendence and immanence of God vis-à-vis construction (section 7.2). In the next two 
sections I describe the process of giving and receiving constructive speech (sections 7.3 and 
7.4). With respect to giving speech, I first define the content (‘what is said’, e.g., prophecy, 
teaching, etc.) and character (‘how it is said’, i.e., love) of constructive speech as presented 
especially in chs. 13n14 (section 7.3). Then with respect to receiving speech, I delineate the 
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effects and reception process for constructive speech in section 7.4. After having discussed the 
basic shape of giving and receiving constructive speech, the section also includes a discussion 
of the protocol for giving and receiving speech as discussed in 14:26n40. Finally, in the last 
section, I bring the whole of the chapter to bear on the question of the nature of construction 
and the need for others in it (section 7.5). The chapter concludes with a short summary 
(section 7.6).
7.1. Overview of 1 Corinthians 12n14
These three chapters of 1 Corinthians are a coherent whole meant to address practical issues in 
worship gatherings of Corinthian believers, issues particularly concerning the right expression 
of ‘spiritual gifts’. This applies no less to ch. 13, which is an integral part of Paul’s argument 
in these chapters, not an unrelated detour.1 
 Paul seems to address a situation in which some believers used spiritual gifts to foster 
divisions among believers.2 Some highly valued speaking in tongues, probably to the 
devaluation of other gifts and gifted persons (esp. the inability to speak or understand 
tongues).3 These believers were prone to speaking in tongues at gatherings without 
interpretation for others (14:1n19), and/or speaking generally without interruption, such that 
others could not contribute (14:27n33).
 Practically, Paul wants to ensure that believers offer their spiritual gifts in love (ch. 
14), i.e., to benefit or construct others, and do so in such a way that all may contribute (thus, 
e.g., tongues must be interpreted, and opportunities to speak must be shared in turn). His 
appeal for this behavioural change draws upon his arguments in chs. 12 and 13. The 
description of gifts and the gifted body of Christ in ch. 12 rules out any attempt toward self-




1. On the literary and rhetorical analysis of these chapters see, e.g., José Enrique Aguilar Chiu, 1 
Corinthians 12–14: Literary Structure and Theology, AnBib 166 (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 2007), esp. 
315–26; Camille Focant, “1 Corinthiens 13: Analyse Rhétorique et Analyse de Structures,” in The Corinthian 
Correspondence, ed. Reimund Bieringer, BETL 125 (Leuven: Peeters, 1996), 199–245; Oda Wischmeyer, Der 
höchste Weg: Das 13. Kapitel des 1. Korintherbriefes, SNT 13 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 
1981), 27–38; Mitchell, Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 266–83. On the Pauline authenticity of ch. 13, see Jeremy 
Corley, “The Pauline Authorship of 1 Corinthians 13,” CBQ 66 (2004): 256–74.
2. Concerning historical reconstructions of the identity and interests of the Corinthian believers 
generally, see Edward Adams and David G. Horrell, eds., Christianity at Corinth: The Quest for the Pauline 
Church (Louisville; London: Westminster John Knox, 2004); Ron Cameron and Merrill P. Miller, eds., 
Redescribing Paul and the Corinthians (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 1–16. With respect to the 
historical situation as illuminated by 1 Corinthians 12n14, see further discussion in, e.g., Christopher Forbes, 
Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment, WUNT 2,75 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 170–75, 260–65; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 569–74. Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die 
Korinther: 1 Kor 11,17–14,40, EKKNT 7 (Neukirchener-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1999), 111–13. 
3. On the link of tongues with high status see, e.g., Martin, The Corinthian Body, 88–92.
the gifts in their diversity, not simply tongues; God has composed the community and works 
through its members so that everyone is indispensable to others in their diversity;4 God has 
ordered the community around reciprocal concern for one another, in which harm or benefit to 
one member is harm or benefit to all. Moreover, the gifts themselves are worth nothing apart 
from their use to benefit others in love, as Paul argues in ch. 13. In chs. 12n14, Paul aims to 
promote unity that serves the reciprocal benefit of all through the use of gifts in love.5 
Conversely, he seeks to show that any other use of the gifts, especially to shore up status 
distinctions in the community, is a misuse that misunderstands the gifts and their Lord.
7.2. 1 Corinthians 12: Divine and Human Involvement in Construction
Before discussing the mechanics of giving and receiving construction, it is important to attend 
to Paul’s programmatic remarks in ch. 12 upon what construction via gifted speech is and 
what relationships it presupposes. As we shall see, construction has most of all to do with 
God, so describing the nature of constructive speech entails describing divine and human 
involvement in it.
 Despite the diverse forms of constructive speech referred to in 1 Cor 12n14, all have 
the same basic character as human speech through which God acts to reveal himself. God 
gives each instance of constructive speech, and such speech is a divine self-manifestation by 
the Spirit for the common good (ε κα'στω,  δε` δι'δοται η   φανε'ρωσις τουñ πνευ' µατος προ`ς το` 
συµφε'ρον, 12:7).6 God operates ‘everything in everyone’ (τα` πα΄ντα εν παñσιν, 12:6), in each 
person without exception (ε κα'στω, , 12:7, 11; εν ε«καστον, 12:18) for the ‘good’ of all (12:7). 
Apart from God’s agency, obviously, there would be no divine self-revelation through this 
speech, and thus no constructive benefit (το` συµφε'ρον)7 accessible in the speech, for the self-




4. While there are leading figures in the community and thus elements of hierarchy (12:28), such 
leadership is defined by loving pursuit of the good of others (13:4n7; see also, e.g., 9:23; 10:31n11:1). See 
Martin, The Corinthian Body, 102–3.
5. On the purpose of unity for reciprocal benefit I am in general agreement with Kei Eun Chang, The 
Community, the Individual, and the Common Good: To Idion and to Sympheron in the Greco-Roman World and 
in Paul, LNTS 480 (London; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 207–8.
6. I interpret η   φανε'ρωσις τουñ πνευ' µατος as a subjective genitive construction because God and the 
Spirit are subjects in 12:6 and 12:11 (with, e.g., Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 146, n. 186). However, an objective 
genitive reading could have much the same sense, insofar as God is the giver of the manifestation of the Spirit 
(cf. Fee, 1 Corinthians, 589, n. 30).
7. I do not interpret το` συµφε'ρον exclusively to be a morally formative benefit (see, e.g., gifts of healing 
in 12:9), only that the morally formative benefit of Spirit-inspired speech must derive from this benefit given by 
God.
8. A similar relationship obtains in Paul’s description of his preaching to the Corinthians. The 
Corinthians’ faith is in the ‘power of God’, not ‘in human wisdom’ (2:5), because Paul’s speech was not just 
human speech but a ‘demonstration of the spirit and power’ (α ποδει'ξει πνευ' µατος και` δυνα'µεως, 2:4). This ‘word 
of the cross’, which is a fully human message preached and exemplified by Paul, is the ‘power of God’ for those 
results from encounter with God in and through believers’ speech, though Paul does not 
elaborate further upon how this works in 12:7 (though see discussion of 14:24n25 below). 
God does not just provide a moral model toward which believers strive apart from divine 
agency, but participates directly in every instance of construction in each believer (which is a 
kind of moral formation, as I argue below).
 Grounding constructive benefit in encounter with God through believers’ speech does 
not render the human speaker, his speech, and the human relationships in which constructive 
interaction occurs irrelevant (as though God’s agency excluded or curtailed human agency).9 
Rather, the self-manifestation of God is immanent within these particular human persons and 
the content and character of their interaction with one another. Paul envisioned a process of 
receiving human speech as God’s speech through critical evaluation (see discussion of 14:29 
below).10 This discernment process assumes that the content and character of the human 
speech are not irrelevant but necessary for mediating God’s self-revelation. Thus, constructive 
speech is fully human speech that is also intelligible and credible as a self-manifestation of 
God based on its content and character. 
 In moral construction, God’s relationship with believers cannot be severed from their 
relationships with other believers, for to be in relation to God as a believer necessarily entails 
being a ‘member’ in a ‘body’ that belongs to God (the ‘body of Christ’, 12:27), a network of 
reciprocal concern for others (12:12n14, 25). God’s involvement does not displace or curtail 
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being saved by it (1:18). So too in 1 Thessalonians 2:13, Paul locates the effectiveness of his preaching in God’s 
word (λο' γον θεουñ) mediated through his speech. It is God’s word that is ‘at work in you who believe’ (ε νεργειñται 
εν υ  µιñν τοιñς πιστευ' ουσιν), not simply Paul’s words.
9. The general conceptual framework of this chapter’s discussion is that of a non-competitive construal 
of God’s agency and human agency. I follow the work of scholars who align Paul with this construal of the 
relation between divine and human agency, as in John M. G. Barclay, “‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’: 
Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul,” in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment, 
vol. 335, eds. John M. G. Barclay and Simon Gathercole, LNTS 335 (London; New York: T&T Clark, 
2006), 157; Volker Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul: Transformation and Empowering for Religious-
Ethical Life, WUNT 2,283 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 250–52; Eastman, Paul and the Person, 160–62; 
Kyle B. Wells, Grace and Agency in Paul and Second Temple Judaism, NovTSup 157 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 
2015), 293–311. See also the similar construal for biblical prophecy in R. W. L. Moberly, Prophecy and 
Discernment, Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–
38, and passim. This position on divine and human agency, generally speaking, comports with the doctrine of 
concurrence, which has been widely held throughout the Christian tradition. For theological expositions of this 
non-competitive relation see Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key, Current Issues in Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 274–301; Susannah Ticciati, A New Apophaticism, Studies in Systematic 
Theology 14 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013), 55–71.
10. See discussion in Moberly, Prophecy and Discernment, 1–38, 169–220. It would be highly 
implausible if Paul conceived of this discernment as unrelated to the content and character of the speech (e.g., if 
this is true, how is there any humanly intelligible consistency in such speech so that it can be distinguished from 
what is not of God? Why then is Paul so concerned to shape believers’ expressions of love?). Rather, this process 
of discernment is a fully human process, involving human rationality and relationships, even as it is empowered 
by God. Paul offers concrete guidance for discerning this speech’s content and character, but these chapters do 
not set out precise criteria by which any speech might be definitively named as God’s (even the criteria of love 
and offering benefit to others require discernment). A main reason for this lies in the fact that this letter assumes a 
common frame of reference between Paul and the Corinthians that is no longer accessible. 
believers’ relationships with one another in constructive interactions. Rather, God’s 
transcendent and immanent involvement through human relationships constitutes the human 
character of constructive interactions. God created the human relationships of the body (12:24, 
28), and stands over them as lord (12:3n6).11 When a believer speaks by God’s spirit, she does 
not cease to speak as a human person to other persons in human relationship. When a believer 
receives constructive benefit from another, she interacts with the giver within their personal 
relationship. No one member can disqualify himself from the body because of difference from 
others (difference being constitutive of the body, 12:15n16). Nor can one member legitimately 
claim not to need another (12:21), or not to share in the good or harm other members receive 
(12:26). To disregard this bond with others is to harm oneself and to create a rift in one’s 
relationship with God, to ‘sin against Christ’, 8:12 (discussed in ch. six above).12 
 And yet, response to the constructive speech of another is not simply response to that 
human person, but first of all response to God who has spoken through that person (see 
discussion of 14:24n25 below). The ‘benefit’ comes from God’s self-revelation, which is 
immanent within yet remains distinct from human speech.13 All members relate to one another 
properly by faith in God who has established the body and is at work within it.
 This orienting outline introduces God’s transcendent and immanent involvement in 
moral construction. In the rest of this chapter, I track this set of relationships and their 
practical entailments for reciprocal construction.
7.3. The Content and Character of Constructive Speech
Constructing others as a believer necessarily involves specific content (i.e., what is said, 
whether prophecy, teaching, etc.) and character (‘how’ it is said, i.e., in love, including loving 
emotional and volitional dispositions, loving awareness and concern for others involved, etc.). 
The burden of this section is to give an overview of these two aspects of constructive speech, 




11. Even 12:12, which makes an analogy between Christ himself and the ‘body’ of human relationships 
does not support a simple identity between them. Nor does the identification of believers as the σωñµα Χριστουñ 
(12:27) entail that Christ can be wholly identified with the human believers; rather, the believers together belong 
to Christ. See discussion in Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 210–16; Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 287–88; Thiselton, 1 
Corinthians, 995--996.
12. Paul’s response to a report of divisions among believers strikingly exhibits the same relational 
framework as in ch 12: ‘Is Christ divided?’ (µεµε'ρισται ο   Χριστο' ς; 1:13).
13. In fact, all present human knowing (and thus gifted speech) is incomplete and unresolved (13:8n13), 
and will be abolished in comparison to God’s own knowing revealed in the eschaton (see discussion of ch. 13 
below).
7.3.1. Content of Constructive Speech
There are several kinds of constructive speech discussed in ch. 12n14. In chapter 14, Paul 
champions prophecy above all (piροφητει'α, προφητευ'ω, 14:6, 24n25, 28n31), but he also 
expects other kinds of speech to be used, including song (ψαλµο' ς, 14:26; cf. 14:16n17), 
teaching (διδαχη' , 14:6, 26), revelation (α ποκα' λυψις, 14:6, 26), knowledge (γνωñσις, 14:6), and 
tongues with interpretation (λαλειñν γλω' σση, /γλω' σσαις, διερµηνευ'ω, e.g., 12:10; 14:13, 26, 
27n28, 39). Earlier in chapter 12, Paul names two other speech-based χαρι'σµατα, the ‘word of 
wisdom’ (λο' γος σοφι'ας, 12:8), and ‘word of knowledge’ (λο' γος γνω' σεως, 12:8).
  It seems that Paul was not concerned to provide an exhaustive and systematic 
discussion of the kinds of constructive speech in 1 Cor 12n14.14 It must be remembered that 
Paul began the discussion by claiming each of these different kinds of speech as a 
‘manifestation of the Spirit’ through which God reveals himself for the good of all (12:7). 
This is true of all speech offered in love regardless of whether the form or content contains an 
explicit claim to speak for God or to reveal God (as is the case for prophecy particularly). 
Though some general comments can be made, it is impossible precisely to identify the form 
and content of each kind of speech in distinction from the others due to a lack of evidence. 
 One may attempt to infer the content of speech by the description of its effects. Yet 
this too leads only to a generalized picture in which each kind of speech shares similar effects 
despite presumed differences in form and content. These effects include: ‘exhortation and 
comfort’ from prophecy (piαρα' κλησις, παραµυθι'α, 14:2, cf. piα' ντες παρακαλωñνται, 14:31), 
praise or thanksgiving to God so that another might say, ‘Amen’ (ευ λογε'ω, ευ χαριστε'ω, 
14:16n17), ‘instruction’ of others by any intelligible speech (κατηχε'ω, 14:19; cf. all ‘learn’ 
through prophetic speech, µανθα' νω, 14:31), and the ‘conviction’ and ‘judgement’ of others 
(ελε'γχω, α νακρι'νω, 14:24). Yet these effects are difficult to neatly separate from one another. 
Moreover, Paul has little concern to link systematically the kinds of speech with particular 
kinds of effects. For example, one naturally links songs to the effect achieved by allowing 
another to affirm one’s own praise and thanksgiving to God (14:16n17), but further 
correlations are not straightforward.
 It seems most appropriate to understand all these effects as modes of ‘construction’. 
Any kind of speech can result in construction, even if the form, content, or precise mode of 




14. On this I align with, e.g., Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 
Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 573. Kinds of speech not explicitly 
mentioned in ch. 14 are the word of wisdom (1 Cor 12:8), ‘admonishment’ (νουθετε'ω, as expected in 1 Thess 
5:14; Rom 15:14), παρα'κλησις and piαραµυθι'α that do not result from prophecy specifically (as in 1 Thess 5:11, 
14; Rom 12:8), or corporate prayer beyond public thanksgiving or praise of God (1 Cor 11:4n5). Paul does not 
discuss prayer or songs as special gifts in ch. 12. Teaching does not appear until the list of 12:28, and then only 
as ‘teachers’. 
stress a common function and orientation for all despite the diversity of speakers and their 
speech forms. Whether the speech is a song or a revelation, whatever it might be, ‘Let all be 
done for construction’, Paul says (14:26). This means that the described effects of prophecy 
should not be understood as the exclusive domain of prophetic speech forms and content.15 
The injunctions to prophesy (12:31; 14:1, 39), then, command the use of prophecy specifically 
among other gifts, but also encourage the use of any speech that has the same function as 
prophecy, i.e., speech which reveals God to others and thus leads to their benefit (as all 
inspired speech does, 12:7). It seems ‘prophecy’ and ‘to prophesy’ in ch. 14 function as a 
synecdoche for all gifts which reveal God to others for their benefit.16 
 Why then did Paul choose to promote prophecy among the Corinthians (14:1, 5, 39), 
rather than some other gift, or no particular gift at all? It seems the primary reason is that 
prophecy’s form and content exemplify the basic character of all constructive speech as a self-
revelation of God through human speech for the shared benefit of others (12:7). It is 
particularly with the form and content of prophetic speech that (1) one makes an explicit claim 
to speak for God, not oneself (i.e., to speak so as to reveal his will, purposes, demands, etc.) 
(2) to particular people in specific circumstances for their benefit. It is not that other forms of 
speech do not reveal God and thus provide benefit to others, but their form and content align 
less explicitly with these two characteristics. Prophecy also thereby serves as a useful tool to 
demote uninterpreted tongues, a key concern in this chapter (unlike prophecy, speaking in 
tongues seems directed to God, and without interpretation it is not of benefit to others). Other 
forms of speech are not dispensable, less beneficial, or less revelatory (even tongues), but they 
are less effective for Paul’s rhetorical purposes to orient the value system of gifts to their 
character as media of the activity of God for the benefit of others. With these introductory 
remarks in mind, a brief sketch of the form and content of each kind of speech mentioned in 
ch. 14 follows. 




15. If one read ch. 14 in that way (e.g., that only prophecy can produce piαραµυθι'α or piαρα'κλησις) this 
would leave only ‘construction’ or ‘instruction’ as effects of other kinds of speech (in keeping with the general 
comments in 14:19, 26). This approach is surely too formal, for the particular effects ascribed to prophecy (in 
14:2, 24, 31) appear elsewhere in Paul without specific reference to prophecy. ‘Exhortation and comfort’ (14:2) 
are expected of all believers generally in 1 Thess 5:11, 14, whereas ‘exhortation’ is a gift separate from prophecy 
in Rom 12:8. Roughly the same function of ‘convicting’ and ‘judging’ others (14:24) is expected of all in 1 Thess 
5:14 (though using νουθετε'ω), and in 1 Cor 5:12 (though using κρι'νω). Causing others to ‘learn’ (14:31) is 
synonymous with ‘instructing’ others, which is ascribed to all other intelligible speech in 14:19, not just 
prophecy.
16. With Hays, First Corinthians, 237. 
17. See the definition of the 1973 SBL Seminar on Early Christian Prophecy: ‘The early Christian 
prophet was an immediately-inspired spokesperson for God, the risen Jesus, or the Spirit who received 
intelligible oracles that he or she felt impelled to deliver to the Christian community or, representing the 
community, to the general public.’ (cited in M. Eugene Boring, “Prophecy [Early Christian],” in Anchor Bible 
Dictionary, ed. David Noel Freedman [New York: Doubleday, 1992], 496). The literature on the nature of early 
Christian prophecy is substantial. See, e.g., the surveys in David E. Aune, Prophecy in Early Christianity and the 
Ancient Mediterranean World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983) 1–14; Antoinette Clark Wire, The Corinthian 
conclusion of his extensive study, David Aune claims that the distinguishing characteristic of 
early Christian prophecy is this claim to speak for God, not any particular form or content of 
the speech itself (though there are observable tendencies in form and content which he 
enumerates).18 Prophetic speech occurs by means of revelation from God to the speaker 
(α ποκα' λυψις, 14:6, 26; cf. 2:10). For Paul, prophecy is addressed toward particular believers 
and their circumstances as they are gathered for worship. While there is no single set of 
content for prophecy, all prophecy is grounded in the revelation of God in Christ crucified (1 
Cor 2:7, 10).19 David Aune and Ulrich Müller, among others, have noted 1 Thess 4:13n17, 1 
Cor 15:51n52, and Rom 11:25n26 as passages which likely contain instances of Paul’s 
prophetic speech.20 Paul also speaks in a prophetic mode when he claims at the end of 1 Cor 
14, ‘what I am writing to you is a command of the Lord’ (14:37). Prophecy can make claims 
about the future, but need not always do so.21 For Paul, prophecy is a deliberate act of the 
speaker and does not necessitate an absence or limitation of human agency to make room for 
God’s agency (cf. 14:32).22 Prophecy remains fully human, shaped by the experience, 
perception, and character of the human speaker.23 The speech can be spontaneous, based upon 
a revelation received immediately prior (as occurs in 14:30, which requires another speaker to 
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Women Prophets: A Reconstruction Through Paul’s Rhetoric (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 226–28; 
Ulrich Luz, “Stages of Early Christian Prophetism,” in Prophets and Prophecy in Jewish and Early Christian 
Literature, eds. Joseph Verheyden, Korinna Zamfir, and Tobias Nicklas, WUNT 2,286 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2010), 57–75. 
18. David E. Aune, Prophecy, 338.
19. With, e.g., Tobias Niklas, “Paulus n der Apostel Als Prophet,” in Prophets and Prophecy in Jewish 
and Early Christian Literature, eds. Joseph Verheyden, Korinna Zamfir, and Tobias Nicklas, WUNT 2,286 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 94–95. Dautzenberg resists a complete identity of prophetic speech with 
kerygma, and resists understanding the ‘wisdom’ and ‘mystery’ of 1 Cor 2:6n16 to refer only to the revelation of 
God in Christ, rather than supplementary revelations as well (Gerhard Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie: Ihre 
Erforschung, ihre Voraussetzungen im Judentum und ihre Struktur im ersten Korintherbrief, BWANT 6 
[Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1975], 152, 302). Markus Bockmuehl similarly understands 1 Cor 2:6n10 to refer both 
to ‘the’ mystery of God’s salvation in Christ as a whole, as well as to individual dimensions of God’s present and 
future work that are reserved only for those mature enough to receive them (see Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, 
Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christianity, WUNT 2,36 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1990], 157–66).
20. See discussion in David E. Aune, Prophecy, 248–62; Ulrich B. Müller, Prophetie und Predigt Im 
Neuen Testament, SNT 10 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1975), 214–33. Müller is more inclusive of 
prophetic texts due to his close linkage of prophetic content with paraenetic function (criticized by, e.g., Luz and 
Aune: Luz, “Prophetism,” 65; David E. Aune, Prophecy, 262.
21. See discussion in, e.g., Forbes, Prophecy, 222–25. Aune understands the Apocalypse of John and 
Pauline prophecy as instances of the same diverse phenomenon of Christian prophecy (David E. Aune, 
Prophecy, 205–8). 
22. Compare, e.g., Laura Nasrallah’s discussion of Philo’s understanding of prophetic ecstasy requiring 
the expulsion of the mortal mind, exemplified in Philo, Who is the Heir of Divine Things? 66 (Laura Salah 
Nasrallah, “An Ecstasy of Folly”: Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity, HTS 52 [Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003], 36–44); see also the discussion in Martin, The Corinthian Body, 96–102.
23. See discussion in Moberly, Prophecy and Discernment, 1–38. Ian Scott unnecessarily understands 
charismatic gifts (e.g., prophecy) to require ‘bypassing the rational faculties’ of the recipient, and to consist of 
separate ‘charismatic vehicles of knowledge’ in distinction from ordinary Christian knowing (Ian W. Scott, 
Implicit Epistemology in the Letters of Paul, WUNT 2,205 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006], 45–46, 66–67).
end his speech), but need not exclude a delay or prior preparation by the speaker. It is a form 
of interaction between believers in worship.24 
 Teaching may be distinguished roughly from prophecy in that it does not explicitly 
claim immediate divine revelation for its speech.25 It is probable that teaching involved 
general paraenesis, scriptural interpretation, or instruction in Christian tradition.26 However, 
this description of teaching is exceedingly general and somewhat artificial given the lack of 
evidence.27 Attempts to disentangle the content of prophecy from that of teaching are 
unsuccessful.28 Speech ‘by means of knowledge’ (14:6), the ‘word of knowledge’, and the 
‘word of wisdom’ (12:8) might be coordinated with teaching, but it is equally possible that 
these coordinate with prophecy.29
 The precise form or content of the ‘song’ or ‘psalm’ (ψαλµο' ς) is even more difficult to 
determine. It may have been a prayer of praise to God (as 14:13n17 seems to show), could 
have involved instruments, and may have been from tradition (e.g., the psalms of the OT) or 
fresh composition.30
 Tongues and their interpretation are equally difficult to specify. It seems that tongues 




24. Forbes stresses the difference between unsolicited Christian prophecy and solicited Greco-Roman 
forms of prophecy (contra David E. Aune, Prophecy, 66–77; see Forbes, Prophecy, 304–7). Regardless of the 
validity of the comparative distinction, it is important to recognize that prophetic speech was a form of 
interaction with others in the community (the source of the speech from God need not make it less humanly 
attached to this interaction).
25. Eugene Boring clarifies this point well, even if it does not get us very far: ‘The prophet presents all 
that he utters as a prophet as the immediately inspired present address of the deity to his community. This 
message may well include material taken from tradition and the prophet’s own reflection, consciously or 
unconsciously, with or without reinterpretation, but it is not presented as material which a past authority once 
said, but as what the deity now says. The same material may be presented by the non-inspired teacher or 
preacher, but with the formal and functional difference that this claim to immediate inspiration is not made.’ 
(Boring, cited in Forbes, Prophecy, 226–27).
26. These three functions of early Christian teachers arise from a survey of 20th century research in 
Alfred F. Zimmerman, Die urchristlichen Lehrer: Studien zum Tradentenkreis der διδα'σκαλοι im frühen 
Urchristentum, WUNT 2,12 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988), 52–68.
27. Aune makes the distinction and acknowledges its artificiality (David E. Aune, Prophecy, 202).
28. Forbes, e.g., insists that the difference remains clear in that prophecy delivers present revelation by 
means of supernatural knowledge apart from the prophet’s own ‘thought processes’ (particularly in predicting the 
future), whereas teaching (and evangelistic preaching) proclaims past revelation without the aid of supernatural 
knowing (Forbes, Prophecy, 228–29. Yet, teaching is as much a gift of the Spirit to reveal God as prophecy is, so 
no easy differentiation on these lines seems possible.
29. The wisdom of God is that which is divinely revealed through the Spirit (2:6); the person who is 
wise is able to judge a dispute between believers (6:5); the knowledge of 8:4n7 seems to be applied theological 
knowledge; the knowledge of 13:2; 14:6 seems coordinated with prophecy (see discussion in, e.g., Ciampa and 
Rosner, 1 Corinthians, 574–77; Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 156–59; Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 148–
50).
30. See Eph 5:19; Col 3:16, and the detailed discussion in Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 830–33.
31. See 14:2. One must remember that Paul discusses ‘kinds of tongues’ (12:10), indicating that there 
may have been various instances of tongues that did not all share the same character (stressed by Thiselton, 1 
Corinthians, 970–72). The two most plausible alternative understandings are that tongues may also have involved 
speaking (and interpreting) unlearned human languages, or expressing the unconscious. See discussion in, e.g., 
Sung Bok Choi, Geist und christliche Existenz: Das Glossolalieverständnis des Paulus im Ersten Korintherbrief, 
interpreted, tongues likely took the form of prayer to God (which others might affirm, as 
implied by 14:13n17).32
7.3.2. Character of Constructive Speech
Having discussed the content of constructive speech, it remains to discuss the character of 
such speech. In 12:31, Paul introduces love as a ‘way beyond comparison’ in relation to all 
gifts (καθ’ υ  piερβολη`ν ο  δο' ν, cf. 2 Cor 1:8; 4:7, 17), hinting that love is not simply a gift 
among others, but the mode in which they exist and function.  In 1 Corinthians 13, Paul 
defines love and its relationship to gifts in preparation for his specific guidelines upon the 
pursuit of love and speech-based gifts for others in ch. 14. As will become clear, believers’ 
love differs from their knowledge and gifts because to ‘have love’ is not just to express loving 
action (e.g., giving all of one’s possessions away) as one way of constructing others alongside 
gifted speech. Love is instead the mode in which one offers all constructive speech and other 
gifts.
 Despite the striking lack of reference to God or Christ in ch. 13, this reading proceeds 
from the understanding that a believer’s love derives from and participates in God’s own love 
for the believer in three relevant ways.33 First, God takes the initiative in Christ to express his 
love by ‘calling’ believers into relationship with himself (1 Cor 1:2, 9; 7:17, 27; 1 Thess 1:4). 
Believers are ‘beloved by God’ (1 Thess 1:4); they are those for whom Christ died (1 Cor 
8:11). A believer’s love is a response to the prior initiative of God’s love (in 1 Thess 1:3n5, 
the believers’ love is a result of the gospel’s divine power; see also 1 Cor 8:3). Second, God 
defines what love is by showing that love definitively in Jesus’ self-giving death to save his 
sinful enemies (see 1 Cor 8:11; 10:33n11:1; Rom 5:8; 8:35, 39). Third, believers love only 
because of God’s agency by the Spirit to create and empower believers’ acts of love. In 1 
Thessalonians, Paul prays that God would increase believers’ love for one another (3:12), and 
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WMANT 115 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2007), 25–34, 75–89; Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 712–21; 
Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 970–89; Forbes, Prophecy, 56–72; Martin, The Corinthian Body, 87–92.
32. Driving at the need for interpretation of tongues (14:13), Paul imagines a scenario in which a 
believer praises God in a tongue that is unintelligible to others, and thus fails to enable others to benefit from this 
praise (14:13n17). If this tongue were interpreted, it seems it would take the form of prayer to God, perhaps 
particularly a song (note use of ψα'λλω in 14:15). It is also possible that interpretation yields intelligible speech 
similar to prophecy or teaching (as implied by 14:6). If Paul speaks in tongues to the Corinthian believers, he can 
only benefit them if he additionally speaks ‘by revelation, by knowledge, by prophecy, or by teaching’ (14:6). 
Perhaps these additional kinds of speech listed in 14:6 are examples of the form that ‘interpretation’ might take as 
well. See discussion in Forbes, Prophecy, 91–102; Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 234–38.
33. In this I generally follow the trajectory of, e.g., Karl Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead, trans. H. 
J. Stenning (1924; repr., Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2003), 79–88; Thomas Söding, Das Liebesgebot bei Paulus: 
Die Mahnung zur Agape im Rahmen der paulinischen Ethik, NTAbh 26 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1995), 124–49; 
Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg.
claims they are ‘taught by God’ to love each other (4:9).34 The same divine involvement in 
believers’ love seems at play no less in 1 Corinthians (see Paul’s dialectic between his own 
and God’s agency in 1 Cor 15:10). These comments provide basic plausibility for the 
following reading of ch. 13, which features further discussion of this relationship between 
believers’ love and God’s love.
 When Paul speaks of ‘love’ in 1 Corinthians 13, he refers to a believer’s love of other 
believers, because the ultimate goal is to help believers walk in the ‘way’ of love in their use 
of gifts (12:31; 14:1). Yet Paul’s comments upon the eschatological endurance of love lead 
one to question whether believers’ love participates in a love that transcends their own. 
Moreover, the description of love in vv. 4n7, strictly understood, depicts a perfect love, 
realized fully only by God in Christ. Nevertheless, throughout ch 13, love refers to a believer’s 
love for others, with the understanding that Paul’s conception of this love necessarily means it 
derives from and participates in God’s love in the ways outlined above.
 The relationship between a believer’s love and her constructive speech emerges most 
clearly in vv. 1n3 and 8n13. These passages frame the description of love’s characteristics in 
vv. 4n7. The concrete expressions of love in vv. 4n7 demonstrate the proper relationship 
between love and the gifts as described in vv. 1n3 and 8n13. For this reason, I have postponed 
discussion of vv. 4n7 until after the examination of vv. 1n3 and 8n13.
7.3.2.1. 1 Corinthians 13:1n3
In 13:1n3, Paul claims that the gifts in themselves are useless and valueless unless one 
‘possesses love’ (α γα' πην ε»χω). Without love, the tongues-speaker himself becomes mere 
noise rather than one who delivers personal address to others (‘I have become a sounding 
brass or clashing cymbal’, 13:1).35 Without love, a person ‘is nothing’ (ου θε'ν ειµι),36 even 
though they may possess prophecy, knowledge of apocalyptic mysteries (as in 2:1, 7; 4:1; 
15:51), knowledge of everything (‘all knowledge’),37 and miracle-working faith (13:2). The 




34. See discussion in Stephen Witmer, Divine Instruction in Early Christianity, WUNT 2,246 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 153–64.
35. So Zeller, 1 Korinther, 408; see discussion of the metaphors in Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1036–40.
36. See the phrase ‘is nothing’ also in 1 Cor 7:19, referring to the relativised value of circumcision and 
uncircumcision in comparison to the absolute value of ‘keeping God’s commandments’.
37. In 13:2, the scope of ‘all knowledge’ is contextually bounded by its pairing with ‘all mysteries’ as an 
object of the verb ειδωñ , and also by the prior reference to prophecy, indicating that ‘all knowledge’ refers first to 
prophetic, revelatory knowledge as a special manifestation of the Spirit (as in 12:8). Yet to restrict the referent of 
‘all knowledge’ in 13:2 to this kind of knowledge alone is not justifiable in light of the concern with knowledge 
and knowing in general in 13:8n13, to be argued below (with Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 287–88).
others and oneself to death (13:3): without love, Paul says, ‘I gain nothing useful’ (ου δε`ν 
ω φελουñµαι, 13:3).38
 These verses claim that the exercise of love is the necessary condition for the 
beneficial use of gifts for others. Yet the role of love extends further. While Paul does not 
deny the value of the gifts, he grounds their value and even their existence exclusively in love. 
In Paul’s rhetoric, to take up the Spirit’s gifts without love results in an implosion: it brings 
about the nothingness of such behaviour and of such an acting self (the person becomes 
impersonal, meaningless noise, becomes ‘nothing’, 13:1n2).39 Not only are there no gifts apart 
from love (including ‘all knowledge’; see further below), there is no Christian self 
independent from being a self for others in love. 
 As will be further argued below in the discussion of 13:8n13, the love which grounds 
the existence and value of gifts is not less than a human set of dispositions and behaviours, 
though it is more. It must be more, because ‘love’ as a purely human set of dispositions cannot 
perform the role ascribed to it here in 13:1n3. The gifts are possibilities for believers created 
and sustained by God, not themselves (12:4n7). Thus, the ‘love’ which grounds the value and 
existence of these divinely-gifted capacities cannot be exclusively human, i.e., conceived 
independently from God’s activity in believers’ love, for believers have nothing that they have 
not received from God (1 Cor 4:7; their being ‘in Christ’ is ‘from God’, 1:30).
 The relationship between love and gifts gains further clarity especially in 13:8n13. In 
these verses Paul develops the idea that ‘possessing love’ in 13:1n3 means to recognize the 
ways in which God conditions a believer’s life, particularly with respect to the ‘in part’ nature 
of the gifts, and indeed of all human knowledge.
7.3.2.2. 1 Corinthians 13:8n13
In 13:8, Paul contrasts love, which ‘never falls’ (ου δε'ποτε πι'πτει), and the gifts of prophecy, 




38. I understand the passive verb ω φελουñµαι as referring to personal benefit or use ‘to me’ as part of a 
strategy to benefit others, but it could refer to ultimate soteriological benefit, as in 15:32 (for the latter, see Zeller, 
1 Korinther, 410). It is unclear whether 13:3 originally read ι«να καυχη' σωµαι (‘so that I might boast’) or ι«να 
καυθη' σοµαι (‘so that I might be burned’), though the text-critical evidence favours the former. The internal 
evidence favours the latter for its greater sense (understood, e.g., as a possible reference to Dan 3), though 
difficulties remain (see discussion in Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 289–92; for internal support of the former as a 
plausible reading, see Zeller, 1 Korinther, 409–10).
39. So too Focant, “1 Corinthiens 13,” 221.
with all present knowing as a believer, not just gifts per se.40 Love ‘never falls’, in the sense 
that it will not ‘cease’ (piαυ'ω) and be ‘abolished’ (καταργε'ω) in the eschatological future like 
the gifts and present, partial knowledge of God.41 This end is a future reality because (γα' ρ, v. 
9) present knowing and prophesying is ‘in part’ (εκ µε'ρους, 13:9)42 in comparison to the 
future arrival of ‘that which is complete’ (το` τε'λειον), which abolishes what is partial (13:10). 
By the arrival of ‘the complete’ or ‘the perfect’, Paul speaks of the eschatological parousia, 
the ‘day of the Lord’ (see similar language used in 1 Cor 1:8; 4:5; 15:23n24), which brings the 
abolishment of present knowing by the establishment of a qualitatively different ‘knowing as 
we are known’ by God, as Paul elaborates in 13:12 (see discussion further below). The use of 
καταργε'ω recalls the present and eschatological destruction of the rulers of the present age (1 
Cor 2:6; 15:24, 26). Throughout 13:8n13, God is the source of the gifts and partial knowledge, 
but also the one who renders them ‘partial’ by bringing about their end and establishing a 
different order of knowing altogether.
 Paul develops this contrast between love and knowing with two illustrations. First, 
present gifts and knowing are ‘in part’ in that they are like a child’s ‘speaking’ (λαλε'ω), 
‘understanding’ (φρονε'ω, cf. Rom 12:3; Acts 28:22), and ‘reasoning’ (λογι'ζοµαι; cf. 1 Cor 
4:1; 13:5; Phil 3:13). The present gifts will be abolished in the same way that a person, having 
become mature, ‘abolishes’ or ‘sets aside’ ‘what is childish’ (τα` τουñ νηπι'ου). The burden of 
the illustration is to show the qualitative discontinuity between mature and childish thinking 




40. Ian Scott argues that the referent of knowledge and knowing in vv. 8n13 is ‘almost certainly 
charismatic revelation, not the fruit of ordinary rational thought’ because if human knowing in general passed 
away, faith would too, given its close connection with knowledge (Ian W. Scott, Implicit Epistemology, 67). But 
this is to forget, as Gooch points out, that a different order of knowing ‘as we are known’ will obtain in the 
eschaton (13:12). It is also based on Scott’s vague distinction between believers’ ‘ordinary rational thought’ and 
their knowing by God’s special revelation, which is a feature of his work elsewhere. Scott misreads Gooch in his 
favour on this point (see Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 144–45). 
Fee argues that the knowledge of vv. 8n13 is not ‘ordinary human knowing or learning’, but ‘that special 
manifestation of the Spirit’, which ‘has to do especially with “knowing” the ways of God in the present age’ 
(referring to 12:8; 13:2; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 644). Yet, Fee interprets 13:12 to refer to the incomplete nature of 
our knowledge of God in general (Fee, 1 Corinthians, 648). Again the vague distinction is made between 
‘ordinary human knowing’ and instances of supernatural knowing. It is unclear how instances of knowing God’s 
ways in the present can be separated from knowledge of God, self, and others in general. Gooch’s discussion is 
most helpful on this point: Paul does not simply denigrate the specific content or particular use of some gifts, but 
places all human knowing of God and all gifts (including Paul’s own) in their properly limited frame of reference. 
Paul’s argument about the superiority of love in contrast to all gifts would fall flat if he were only speaking of 
‘knowing’ with reference to the particular content and instances of prophecy, tongues, or a ‘word of knowledge’. 
If that were true, then there could be present human knowing that is not conditioned in the same way by love and 
by the qualitative distinction revealed in the eschaton between God’s knowing and present human knowing. See 
Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 315, n. 214, and further discussion below.
41. For piι'piτω in this sense, cf. Rom 11:11, 22; 14:4; 1 Cor 10:8, 12; Luke 16:17. One might understand 
‘love never falls’ simply as a negative restatement of v. 7, but this does not appreciate δε' , signaling discourse 
development in 13:8, nor the inclusio formed with 13:13 (with Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 304–5).
42. See Philo, Leg. 1.78 for a similar contrast between φρονη' σις which is καθο'λου, ‘universal’, 
identified as God’s, and that which is ‘particular’, merely human, εκ µε'ρους.
this image: it is not as though childish knowing differs from adult knowing only by lacking 
data (as though missing pieces of a jigsaw), but by having a qualitatively different 
epistemological perspective.43 The metaphor concerns cognitive activity in general 
(‘speaking’, ‘understanding’, ‘reasoning’), indicating that Paul discusses gifts and their 
cognitive entailments in general throughout 13:8n12 (not just prophecy, tongues, and 
instances of gifted knowing).
 Second, in v. 12, Paul equates partial knowing and use of the gifts with indirect and 
unresolved sight: ‘now we see by means of a mirror, in a riddle’ (13:12a).44 The force of 
seeing ‘by means of a mirror’ is to describe present sight as mediated, indirect, and thus 
inferior in comparison to future, unmediated sight ‘face to face’ with God in the eschaton 
(13:12b; cf. Gen 32:31 LXX; Exod 33:11; Deut 5:4; 34:10; Ezek 20:35; Matt 18:10; Rev 
22:4).45 The imagery likely draws on Num 12:8, in which God compares his revelation to 
Moses, which is ‘mouth to mouth’ (MT: הֶּפ־לֶא הֶּפ ) and ‘not in riddles’ (ου  δι’αινιγµα' των), 
with his revelation to other prophets through visions and dreams alone. Present knowing 
remains unresolved, like unsatisfactory attempts to solve a riddle.46 God is the intended object 
of the present gaze ‘by means of a mirror, in a riddle’, but what is seen is a puzzling reflection 
of God, not God in himself.47
 In the second half of v. 12, present knowing ‘in part’ contrasts with complete future 
knowing ‘as I have been truly known’ (i.e., known by God, cf. 1 Cor 8:3; Gal 4:9; Rom 
8:28n30).48 As God brings the nullification of partial knowing in the parousia (13:10), so too 
God is the ultimate subject of complete knowing, i.e., the one on the basis of whose knowing 




43. Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 146–47.
44. Gerhard Dautzenberg argues that this sight refers particularly to prophetic vision (Dautzenberg, 
Urchristliche Prophetie, 149–225); followed with some adjustments by Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 309–10. 
Dautzenberg’s position is well argued and plausible, but it does not seem that Paul’s concern is so narrowly 
focused on prophetic vision given the parallel between ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’ in the two halves of v. 12, and the 
general language of v. 11 as discussed above (with, e.g., Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg, 131–35; Zeller, 1 
Korinther, 416–18; Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 778).
45. See discussion in Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 147–51; Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 310–12.
46. Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 151–54.
47. Miguens proposes that in v. 12, present ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing in part’ is not sight of God or 
knowledge of God, but an intellectual understanding of the mysteries of the Christian faith (drawing upon 13:2, 
and seeking to respect the absolute use of the two verbs without an expressed object; Emanuel Miguens, “1 Cor 
13:8–13 Reconsidered,” CBQ 37 [1975]: 81–87). The difficulty with this distinction is that it is unclear how all 
knowledge of the Christian faith can be something other than a form of knowing God. Paul is comfortable to 
some degree to speak of ‘knowing God’ as shorthand for the transition from having no faith to having faith (Gal 
4:8n9).
48. The adverb καθω' ς here signals analogy between future human knowing and the knowing that God 
has, rather than signalling a cause-effect relationship between the two (as, e.g., in 1 Cor 1:6). It seems 
nevertheless logically required that God’s knowing be the basis for future human knowing. In Paul’s 
eschatological schema there is no other knowing available, for all other human knowing has been abolished. Yet 
in itself, καθω' ς need not indicate this relationship.
49. The different order of knowing is also signaled by the change from γινω' σκω to επιγινω' σκω (with, 
e.g., Zeller, 1 Korinther, 418).
thinks of a Christian self as constituted by relationship with God, shown in the reciprocity of 
knowing ‘face to face’ and the sole basis of future knowing as rooted in the knowledge that 
God possesses.50 
 Throughout 13:8n12, Paul has advanced a qualitative difference between present 
knowing ‘in part’ and future knowing ‘as we are known’ by God. The difference between 
these two forms of knowing entails the abolishment, not the development, of present 
knowledge. This difference is not just between qualitative stages of a believer’s present 
human knowing, but the qualitative difference between human knowing and divine knowing. 
This is clear in 13:12, and intimated in 13:10 in that ‘the complete’ is a divine eschatological 
reality.51
 This qualitative difference in knowledge remains even when one recalls that present 
human knowing of God is Spirit-empowered. Believers do actually ‘see’ and ‘know’ God by 
the Spirit in the present, though in part (13:12). Paul is no sceptic. The Spirit, who knows the 
depths of God, has revealed God’s own wisdom to believers (2:10n12; cf. 1:30). The 
Corinthians have been ‘made rich in all knowledge’ in Christ (1:6). There is continuity 
between ‘now’ and ‘then’: the identity of believers and God will endure in some sense; the 
believers will be subjects of ‘knowing’ then, though in a different way; love between God and 
the believers will endure. Yet this continuity is not a possession of the believer alone, but is an 
ongoing work of God by the Spirit. All present knowledge remains ‘in a riddle’, ‘in part’. 
 To attend to this tension is precisely Paul’s goal. By maintaining a qualitative 




50. See discussion in Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg, 140–43.
51. Against Jan Lambrecht, “The Most Eminent Way: A Study of 1 Corinthians 13,” in Texts and 
Contexts: Biblical Texts in Their Textual and Situational Contexts, eds. Tord Fornberg and David Hellholm 
(Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1995), 290; Focant, “1 Corinthiens 13,” 234. See also Spicq’s near 
identification of a believer’s present acts of love with eschatological ‘knowing’ as we are known (13:12; Ceslaus 
Spicq, Agapè dans le Nouveau Testament [Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1959], 118–20).
Emanuel Miguens argues that 13:8n13 concerns development of knowledge within the present, from 
immature to mature faith, following the maturity distinctions present in 1 Cor 2:6; 3:1; 14:20 (Miguens, “1 Cor 
13:8–13,” 87–91). Miguens rightly wants to retain the sense that future knowing will still be human knowing, but 
he wrongly infers that present knowing therefore develops into future knowing, and can never be qualitatively 
different, a kind of knowing as God knows. Commenting on καθω' ς in the clause ‘knowing as I have been truly 
known’ (13:12d), Miguens comments, ‘of course, it cannot mean the same degree of knowledge in God and in 
man’ (Miguens, “1 Cor 13:8–13,” 93). He gives no explanation for this assumption. However, a transition in 
knowing to the ‘same’ degree of knowing that God has himself (in some sense) is what Paul seems to be 
claiming. This remains the case even if humans cannot know as God knows in every way, for then they would 
transcend the creator/creature distinction and cease to be human (see Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg, 141, n. 
457). Miguens’ reading is unable to account for the contrast between love and gifts in 13:8, for if the ‘then’ of 
13:8n13 consists only in a later state of Christian maturity before the eschaton, it makes no sense to say the gifts 
will ‘then’ be ‘rendered inoperative’ (Miguens’ translation), ‘when Christian life attains a fullness where only 
agapē is the driving force in this development towards full manhood in Christ’ (Miguens, “1 Cor 13:8–13,” 96–
97). In the present, Paul champions love and gifts, and does not expect the gifts to pass away before the eschaton 
(14:1, 39). See also the discussion of Miguens’ reading among Standaert, Ellis, and Murphy O’Connor in Benoît 
Standaert, “1 Corinthiens 13,” in Charisma und Agape, ed. Lorenzo De Lorenzi (Rome: Benedictina, 
1983), 139–42.
known’, Paul likely combats what he views as some Corinthian believers’ dysfunctional 
understanding of the gifts and knowing, i.e., an understanding that does not make a qualitative 
distinction between present knowing and God’s own knowing. This dysfunction perhaps took 
the wrong cues from the experience of God’s power to know him and to possess gifts by 
which God manifests himself to others. Insofar as believers failed to recognize their partial 
knowing, they failed to recognize the qualitative difference between themselves and their 
transcendent God.
 In 13:13, Paul asserts that love ‘remains’ (µε'νει) with faith and hope. It seems that this 
statement refers to the present significance of love in light of its eschatological difference 
from gifts and knowing ‘in part’.52 Love ‘remains’ in the present as the fundamental mode 
(with faith and hope, cf. 13:7) in which believers’ partial knowing and gifts operate, because 
love ‘remains’ in the eschaton beyond present knowing (already in 13:8).
 What does the eschatology of 13:8n13 entail for the present use of gifts and knowledge 
by believers? All interpreters must confront this question, even if one has an exclusively 
future understanding of µε'νει, for Paul intends to shape present relationships between 
believers in Corinth with his comments in 13:8n13. One may obviously dismiss the idea that 
Paul’s aim in 13:8n13 is to supplant the use of gifts in the present with the exercise of love. 
The first directive given on the basis of chapter 13 is to seek love and the gifts (14:1). 
 One may also reject the interpretation that love ‘remains’ in the sense that present acts 
of love, and believers’ moral character enabling them, have an absolute validity or authority 
unconditioned by the qualitative distinction between creature and creator, between present and 
eschaton.53 Paul’s aim in vv. 8n13 is not to claim human expressions of love in themselves to 
be sufficient for benefiting others. If love ‘remains’ beyond present knowing of God into the 
eschaton, then the ‘love’ which remains must transcend believers’ present expressions of love 
as well, for those expressions are conditioned by present partial knowing too (see, e.g., the 
link between love, knowledge, and perception in Phil 1:9; 2:2).54 To ‘have love’ is not to 




52. Thus, I reject the choice between an exclusively present sense and an exclusively future sense for 
µε'νει. See the discussion in Lambrecht, “The Most Eminent Way: A Study of 1 Corinthians 13,” 292–300. Others 
who see both an eschatological and present claim here, though varying in the specifics (or lack thereof) 
concerning the relationship between the two, include: Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 230–31; Barrett, 1 
Corinthians, 308; Lambrecht, “The Most Eminent Way: A Study of 1 Corinthians 13,” 297; Fee, 1 
Corinthians, 649–51; Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg, 153–55; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 626; Thiselton, 1 
Corinthians, 1071–74; Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 316–17.
53. As represented by Miguens’ reading (Miguens, “1 Cor 13:8–13”). See discussion in Barth, 
Resurrection, 79–88; Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 310–11.
54. See Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 154–55; Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral 
Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 247–48.
imitation of Christ.55 Paul’s argument does not promote a gifted human capacity in itself that 
can transcend the eschatological boundary he has drawn, even though he remains concerned to 
change concrete human behaviour.56 If this were Paul’s goal, he would be committing the 
same misstep that he seeks to correct, i.e., championing certain Spirit-empowered phenomena 
as having absolute value over others in the present. A believer’s acts of love in the present are 
no more Spirit-empowered; their gifts and present knowing are no less. Whether it is tongues 
or particular instances of kindness (or endurance, etc.), identifying one instance of believers’ 
behaviour as unconditioned by partial knowing in contrast to others is to cause divisions in the 
body, and thus to act without love for God or others.
 As argued above, a believer’s gift or loving act in itself (whether speech, sacrificial 
behaviour, etc.) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for constructing another (13:3). 
Rather, all gifts, knowing, and expressions of love are media through which the Spirit works 
to effect construction. All such media are ‘in part’; they need not be identified with God’s 
perfect moral character or knowledge to be used in this way. These claims do not eliminate the 
significance of the believer’s action, render this action less human, nor entail an ‘anything 
goes’ approach to the character of this action. Rather, they properly situate the action 
theologically as God uses it within the divine economy of moral construction in the 
interdependent community.
 Love ‘remains’, then, not primarily as a present behaviour or disposition belonging to 
the Spirit-empowered believer (it does involve this), but fundamentally as participation in a 
relationship beyond oneself with God and other believers.57 Participation in this relationship 
in the present ‘remains’ into the eschaton because its ‘remaining’ is not dependent upon some 
aspect of the believers’ ‘partial’ moral character or knowledge, but upon believers being 
known by God, i.e., being recipients of God’s love alongside others. In the present, believers 
participate in that love by modelling their lives with one another in accordance with the prior 




55. Many commentators are concerned not to link love in 1 Cor 13 with a human virtue, especially 
Protestants; for general discussion see Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices 
(Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2008). It is a complex task to discern precisely what is at stake 
in the claim that love here is not a virtue. In my understanding, Paul’s statements can be compatible with a virtue 
theory insofar as love is not reduced exclusively to a human disposition apart from God’s agency. Love is not just 
a virtue so construed. Yet, God’s involvement in believer’s acts of love is transcendent and does not render a 
believer’s loving behaviour less human (i.e., as not having the character of human moral agency which could be 
described by a virtue theory). Nevertheless, Paul’s concern to relativise human action in comparison to God’s 
agency points to a lack of concern for developing a moral psychology of love to ground its eschatological 
endurance. Because all knowing and loving is in part, the achievement of a particular state of moral character and 
psychology is not preeminent (but not irrelevant insofar as a believer must still act in love). See further discussion 
below.
56. See Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 292–93; Karl Barth, The Church Dogmatics, IV,2, eds. Geoffrey 
William Bromiley and Thomas Forsyth Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), 828–31. 
57. See, e.g., Spicq, Agapè, Vol. 2, 115; Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 319; Söding, Das Liebesgebot, 144–
45.
7.3.2.3. 1 Corinthians 13:4n7
The characteristics of love parallel Paul’s own description of God and his love, further 
indicating the analogical relationship between believers’ love and God’s love.58 Believers seek 
to imitate God’s love for others whom he has loved, in the way God has loved them. Despite 
the lack of explicit reference to Christ here, believer’s love is christologically-shaped, in 
keeping with God’s definitive expression of his self-giving love in Christ. Already we have 
seen Paul refer to Christ’s dying for the benefit of others as a basis for adapting to those who 
are weak (1 Cor 8:11; 11:1; see ch. six). The Christ-imitating, self-limiting posture of love 
obtains in each predicate listed in 13:4n7. 
 As argued above, this list of love’s characteristics should be understood in relation to 
13:1n3, 8n13. These qualities of love take shape in reference to Paul’s wider discussion in 
chs. 12 and 14, for which the proper relationship between love and knowledge is fundamental. 
First of all, these verses describe the character of those who acknowledge the limitations of 
their knowledge in part, unlike those who misuse the gifts in order to create status distinctions 
and divisions among believers. In this way, e.g., love is not ‘jealous’, it does not ‘boast’, it is 
not ‘arrogant’. Believers who love thus do not forget that they have nothing they have not 
received from God (1 Cor 4:7). Second, these verses describe the character of believers who 
use their gifts in accordance with the fact that God gave them to benefit others in the 
interdependent body of Christ (ch. 12). In this way, e.g., love ‘does not seek its own benefit’, 
it ‘rejoices with the truth’. Third, the qualities of love describe the believer who abides by the 
protocol for the loving use of gifts as described in ch. 14. This protocol includes speaking 
intelligibly for the benefit of others (and thus interpreting tongues, 14:1n19, 27n28), allowing 
others to critically judge one’s own speech (14:29), and restricting one’s own speech to allow 
all others to participate (14:29n33; e.g., love ‘endures all’). This protocol and its relation to 
love receives further discussion below. Just as love ‘does not act unfittingly’ in the exercise of 
gifts (ου κ α σχηµονειñ, 13:5) believers who love do everything ‘fittingly’ (ευ σχηµο' νως, 14:40). 
By acting in accordance with this protocol, which is animated by recognition of one’s place in 
the body of Christ and one’s partial knowledge in relation to God, believers demonstrate love. 
Believers’ love may be called a ‘love beyond knowledge’, in that they love according to the 






58. See discussion in Wischmeyer, Der höchste Weg, 92–116; Söding, Das Liebesgebot, 133–43.
59. See Paul W. Gooch, Partial Knowledge, 156–57.
7.3.2.4. Summary
Section 7.3 has reviewed the content and character of constructive speech. Whatever its 
specific form and content, all speech serves to reveal God to others for their morally 
constructive benefit. Prophecy is Paul’s exemplar of such speech, but not to the exclusion of 
other forms.
 Love, the character of constructive speech, is the necessary mode in which all such 
speech functions. The discussion of ch. 13 has a number of important ramifications for this 
chapter. God’s own love is prior to and determinative of believers’s love. The examination of 
partial knowing (vv. 8n13) further establishes the qualitative distinction made in 12:7 between 
all human knowing (with its derivative speech and action) and God’s self-revelation through 
that speech. Offered in love, believers’ gifts serve as media through which God reveals 
himself, and are not to be identified with God’s revelation itself. Believers exercise ‘love 
beyond knowledge’ as they act in accordance with God’s determination of value beyond their 
own, in recognition of their limited knowledge and utter dependence upon God.
7.4. The Effects and Reception of Constructive Speech
We turn now to discuss the effects of constructive speech in love and the dynamics of its 
reception. As previously said, ‘construction’ occurs when God encounters believers through 
particular instances of inspired speech (12:7). Construction is synonymous with ‘benefiting’ 
others (ω φελε'ω, 14:6), and is thus bound with the ‘shared benefit’, το` συµφε'ρον, worked by 
God, 12:7).60 The object of constructive speech should be others in the εκκλησι'α, as a whole 
and individually, not the self (see εκκλησι'α as object in 14:4n5; ο   ε«τερος, 14:17; α»λλους, 
14:19). In what follows I provide an overview of the constructive effects described in ch. 14, 
followed by discussion of the process by which believers received construction.
7.4.1. The Effects of Constructive Speech
As noted above, the descriptions of constructing effects in ch. 14 conceptually blend together 
and cannot be easily distinguished from one another, just as with the content of constructive 




60. See Ingrid Kitzberger, Bau der Gemeinde: Das paulinische Wortfeld οι
 
κοδοµη' /(εpi)οικοδοµειñν, FB 
53 (Würzburg: Echter, 1986), 107.
exhortation from judgement), but rather to understand all as part of a wider moral construction 
process.61
 In 14:3, the one who prophesies speaks ‘exhortation’, and ‘comfort’ (piαρα' κλησις, 
παραµυθι'α). It seems that piαρα' κλησις refers generally here to the exhortation of others to 
concrete action in faithfulness to God (as in, e.g., 1 Thess 2:3; Rom 12:1; cf. παρακαλε'ω in 1 
Cor 1:10; 4:16; 16:12, 15; 1 Thess 4:1, 10; 5:14).62 It could also have the sense of 
‘encouragement’ or ‘comfort’ (as in, e.g., Phlm 7; 2 Cor 1:3n7; Rom 15:4), and would thus be 
essentially synonymous with piαραµυθι'α, ‘comfort’ (for which see Phil 2:1; piαραµυθε'οµαι in 
John 11:19; 31; 1 Thess 2:12; 5:14). One finds prophetic speech with the intended effects of 
comfort and exhortation in 1 Thess 4:13n18 and 1 Cor 15:51n58, both referring to the 
resurrection of the dead. The verbs piαρακαλε'ω and piαραµυθε'οµαι are coordinated in 1 Thess 
2:12, along with ‘implore’ (µαρτυ' ροµαι), summarily describing Paul’s exhortation toward the 
Thessalonian believers to ‘live worthily of God’ (το` περιπατειñν υ  µαñς α ξι'ως τουñ θεουñ) as he 
introduced them to the gospel and instructed them in faith. In piαρα' κλησις and piαραµυθι'α, it 
seems one should envision speech that urges others to new actions or dispositions in faith, 
encourages or strengthens believers in their current course of faith, and/or offers comfort or 
support in difficulty.63
 In 14:16n17, construction takes the form of prayer to God (in thanks, or in praise)64 so 
that another believer may say ‘amen’ in response (note also ψαλµο' ς in 14:26).65 In keeping 
with Paul’s schema throughout chs. 12n14, the prayer offered to God (even in a tongue) in the 




61. Paul’s discussion does not provide the distinctions needed to make such specifications. For a similar 
approach which lumps these phenomena together, see, e.g., Philip Vielhauer, Oikodome. Das Bild vom Bau in 
der christlichen Literatur vom Neuen Testament bis Clemens Alexandrinus, Reprint [1979], ed. Gunter Klein 
(Karlsruhe-Durlach: Tron, 1940), 87; David Hill, New Testament Prophecy, Marshalls Theological Library 
(London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1979), 118–38; Müller, Prophetie, 19–46; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 234.
62. In 14:8, Paul claims that unintelligible speech is like an indistinct trumpet blast that fails to 
communicate a call to battle. This seems to provide indirect evidence that constructive speech can call people to 
concrete action, in Paul’s imagination (as with piαρα'κλησις in general).
63. Verbs coordinate with piαρακαλε'ω elsewhere in Pauline and deutero-Pauline literature are 
‘construct’ (οικοδοµε'ω; 1 Thess 5:11); strengthen (στηρι'ζω, 1 Thess 3:2; 2 Thess 2:17); ‘implore’ or ‘affirm’ 
(µαρτυ' ροµαι, 1 Thess 2:12); ‘ask’ or ‘beg’ (δε'οµαι, 2 Cor 5:20; 10:2; ερωτα'ω, 1 Thess 4:1); ‘forgive’ (χαρι'ζοµαι, 
2 Cor 2:7);  command (piαραγγε'λλω, 2 Thess 3:12); teach (διδα'σκω, 2 Tim 6:2; cf. 1 Tim 4:13; Titus 1:9); 
‘convict’ and ‘rebuke’ (ελε'γχω, επιτιµα'ω, 2 Tim 4:2). In Phlm 9, piαρακαλε'ω is opposed to ‘command’ 
(επιτα'σσω, v. 8; cf. the contrast between επιπλη' σσω and piαρακαλε'ω in 1 Tim 5:1, but also the coordination of 
piαρακαλε'ω and ελε'γχω ‘with all authority’, µετα` πα'σης επιταγηñς). This distinction should not be applied to 1 
Cor 14, as though inspired speech could never take the form of a command.
64. God is the implied object in 14:16, as inferred from the discussion of prayer to God (θεω,ñ , 14:2), and 
similar usage elsewhere (Josephus, A.J. 7.380; Luke 1:64; 24:53; 1 Chr 29:10 LXX). There is significant overlap 
between thanksgiving and praise semantically, as blessing can be a form of thanks (as in Luke 2:28n32; 24:30; 1 
Cor 10:16). 
65. The ιδιω' της of 14:16 is rightly understood as another believer who is made into an ‘outsider’ by 
being unable to understand uninterpreted tongues (with e.g., Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 402; Elim Hiu, Regulations 
Concerning Tongues and Prophecy in 1 Corinthians 14.26–40, LNTS 406 [New York: T & T Clark, 2010], 62; 
Fee, 1 Corinthians, 673.
and thus indispensable for the good of others. Admittedly, Paul is not concerned here to spell 
out how this works to construct others, nor to define how praise of God fits within the moral 
life of a believer. To say ‘amen’ entails an affirmation and appropriation of what has been said 
by the one who prays (as in OT usage, e.g., 1 Chr 16:36; Neh 8:6; Ps 41:13).66 The prayer is 
not an optional nicety, nor redundant with the praise or thanksgiving that could be offered 
without it, but is an indispensable and constitutive part of other believers’ worship of God. 
This instance of construction is most helpful for present purposes as evidence of the nature of 
construction in general, i.e., leading others to interaction with God.
 In two instances, construction takes the form of instruction. These effects partially 
overlap conceptually with exhortation (14:3), and critique (14:24n25, examined below). In 
14:19, Paul contrasts his wish to speak ‘five words with my mind’ (i.e., words intelligible to 
others) ‘so that I might instruct others’ (ι«να και` α»λλους κατηχη' σω), rather than thousands in 
an unintelligible tongue. Virtually any form or content of speech is in view (which is Paul’s 
rhetorical point!), making it difficult to specify the nature of the instruction.67 In 14:31, all 
prophesy ‘so that all might learn and all might be exhorted’ (ι«να πα' ντες µανθα' νωσιν και` 
πα' ντες παρακαλωñνται). The effect of learning from prophetic speech coordinates with ‘being 
exhorted’, without clear differentiation.68 At least these instances of learning and instruction 
further expand the possible effects of construction to include positive teaching, rather than 
simply affirmation of what is already understood.69
 Lastly, in vv. 20n25, the critical nature of constructive speech comes into view. Here 
Paul makes a pointed contrast between the effects of uninterpreted tongues and the effects of 




66. Most commonly cited among 1 Corinthians commentators for the discussion of ‘amen’ remains 
Heinrich Schlier, “αµη' ν,” in TDNT, eds. Gerhard Kittel, Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and Gerhard Friedrich (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 335–38.
67. To limit it to ‘dogmatic’ instruction seems overly specific (so Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 240). See 
the general use of the verb κατηχε'ω in Rom 2:18; Acts 18:25; 21:21. In Gal 6:6, Paul seems to refer to 
community leaders who ‘teach the word’ to others.
68. See µανθα' νω in, e.g., Rom 16:17; 1 Cor 4:6; Phil 4:9, 11; Col 1:7. Schrage unsatisfactorily 
differentiates this instruction as ‘im Sinne praktischen Lernens’ (as in Phil 4:11; 1 Cor 4:6) without explanation 
or support (Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 455, n. 523).
69. See discussion of the instructive nature of prophecy and construction generally in Hill, New 
Testament Prophecy, 126–28; Müller, Prophetie, 38–39.
tongues (14:20). If an outsider, a non-believer,70 observed a meeting in which all believers 
spoke in tongues without interpretation, they would declare, ‘You are mad!’. The declaration 
(µαι'νεσθε) could refer either to the claim that the believers are ‘out of their minds’ and thus 
not worthy of credibility, or it could refer to the claim that the believers are ‘raving’ with an 
inspired madness akin to other non-Christian Greco-Roman religious experiences.71  In both 
cases, the outsider does not receive benefit from encounter with God, but is rather turned away 
from God by being misdirected by the believers. The tongues would be unintelligible, and 
would make no positive contribution to the non-believer.72 If a non-believer visited when all 
prophesy to one another,73 however, he would be ‘convicted by all’ (ελε'γχω)74; ‘judged by all’ 
(α νακρι'νω)75, and ‘what is hidden in his heart becomes known’, i.e., he would become fully 
aware of the aspects of his life that conflict with the character of God.
  ‘What is hidden’ likely refers to the person’s inner life that is hidden from view, 
requiring God’s agency to clarify and evaluate (with either a positive or negative judgement to 
follow; see 1 Cor 4:5, where God’s judgement of τα` κρυπτα'  leads to praise). This 
interpretation of ‘what is hidden’ assumes that the outsider did not previously think of himself 
as having sinned before God (it was hidden to himself, for he did not think in terms of his 




70. T. J. Lang has argued that the α»πιστοι of the Corinthian correspondence were individuals who shared 
intimate relationships with the believers (via, e.g., marriage, meals, participation in Christian gatherings, and 
legal arbitration) such that they sat on the border between insider and outsider; see T. J. Lang, “Trouble with 
Insiders: The Social Profile of the α»πιστοι in Paul’s Corinthian Correspondence,” JBL (Forthcoming). Lang 
proposes that the α»piιστος of 14:20n25 is one who does not hold exclusive allegiance to God, but may be 
attempting to hold multiple religious allegiances at once as he negotiates relationship on the boundaries of the 
believing Corinthian community. Lang succeeds in pointing out that an α»piιστος may in fact have strong ties to the 
community, but it is not clear that the α»πιστοι form a defined group distinct from all other outsiders in every case. 
With respect to 14:20n25, it seems that the ιδιω' της and α»πιστος are effectively synonymous, referring generally 
to a person who is not loyal to God as revealed in the gospel, and thus an outsider, a non-believer (with, e.g., Paul 
Trebilco, “Creativity at the Boundary: Features of the Linguistic and Conceptual Construction of Outsiders in the 
Pauline Corpus,” NTS 60 [2014]: 187; Zeller, 1 Korinther, 431–32).
71. See discussion in, e.g., Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 410.
72. The tongues would thus serve as a ‘sign’ of their exclusion from the believing community, as Paul 
seems to indicate by his citation of Isa 28:11n12 in 14:21. I interpret Paul’s statement about tongues and 
prophecy functioning ‘as a sign’ for non-believers and believers, respectively (14:22), to refer to the differing 
effects of the two phenomena upon others (a sign of God’s judgement and thus disadvantage to others, or a sign 
of God’s agency for the benefit of others). See particularly the discussion in Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 406–9; Fee, 
1 Corinthians, 680–83; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1122–26.
73. It is most likely that the prophetic speech directly addresses other believers, and only indirectly 
addresses the visitor (other believers are the intended recipient of prophetic speech throughout ch. 14; against, 
e.g., Zeller, 1 Korinther, 432; Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 247). Neither the phrase ‘by all’ 
(Dautzenberg), nor the likelihood that a prophet would address particular sins (Zeller), requires that the speech be 
directly addressed to the visitor (of course it remains possible). It is also not necessary to suppose that those who 
speak prophetically have special knowledge of the visitor’s internal life by which they expose him (with, e.g., 
Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 412).
74. I.e., he is ‘exposed’ to facilitate recognition of his fault, cf. Matt 18:15; Luke 3:19; Ign. Phld. 7:1 
(with, e.g., Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 248). 
75. I.e., an ‘examination’ that results in identification of fault; see,  e.g., 1 Cor 2:14n15; 4:3n4; 9:3; Lev 
19:17 LXX; Jude 15 (with, e.g., Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1128; Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 248). 
hidden, but can hide no longer (like ‘what is hidden out of shame’ in 2 Cor 4:2).76 In either 
case, I understand this effect of prophetic speech to be broadly analogous to the critical 
function of frank speech in Philodemus.77
 One might object to the use of 14:24n25 as evidence of typical constructive speech 
between believers because it seems this is an exceptional case involving an outsider. Is it the 
case that the same critical effect would obtain generally between believers? It seems rather 
that 14:24n25 is the paradigmatic case of construction, for it is the most detailed description 
of construction in chapter 14, and it dovetails precisely with the nature of gifted speech as a 
manifestation of God (12:7; note that the visitor responds first to God in worship, discussed 
further below). Insofar as one who is α»piιστος comes to worship God, he has become an 
insider, a believer. The effects and reception of prophetic speech partly constitute this change. 
Moreover, the effects of 14:24n25 conceptually blur into the other effects of construction 
already discussed. There could also be, e.g., a critical function presupposed within the 
exhortative and instructive effects of construction. Elsewhere Paul assumes that believers in 
general would exercise a similar critical role toward one another (see 1 Cor 5 [κρι'νω]; 2 Cor 
2:6 [επιτιµι'α]; 1 Thess 5:14; Rom 15:14 [νουθετε'ω]). The fact that these other critical 
functions are not linked to spiritually gifted speech is not an indication that they are different 
in kind than the speech of 1 Cor 12n14. 
 Nor should one assume that this critical element of constructive speech applies only to 
new or immature believers. While there is growth in maturity as a believer, no one is protected 
from critique by their maturity, for all know in part, and all are addressed by the transcendent 
God in construction (see further discussion on this point in section 6 below).
 In sum, generally speaking, construction includes all aspects of a morally formative 
process. Construction can range from comforting affirmation to searching criticism. It can 
involve strengthening another’s existing moral life and behaviour, or urging a radically new 
course. The one who constructs could simply offer a needed reminder, or provide fresh 
instruction (regardless of speech form, whether as a revelation from God, or as an instance of 
teaching, or with a song, etc.). These effects presuppose some kind of observable moral 
development (though the precise nature of this is not specified).
 In all instances, construction relates others to God, because God orients the moral life 
of all believers and is personally active in the construction process to bring constructive 
benefit through his encounter with believers. It is especially in the reception of construction, 




76. 1 Cor 4:5; 2 Cor 4:2; Rom 2:16. See especially Stephen J. Chester, Conversion at Corinth: 
Perspectives on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian Church, SNTW (London; New York: T&T 
Clark, 2003), 114–25. 
77. In Lib., fr. 42.6n12, Philodemus uses α νακρι'νω to describe the teacher’s examination of students for 
yet-to-be-acknowledged faults, in contrast to faults voluntarily offered for correction by the students (fr. 42). See 
also ελε'γχω in Lib., col. 16b.7n8, with reference to the exposure of pretence by frank speech, and εξελε'γχω in 
col. 23a in reference to the rich who do not respond positively to those who ‘convict’ them.
7.4.2. Reception of Construction
In examining the reception of constructive speech, let us return to 14:24n25. These verses 
exhibit the same basic relational structure described in 12:7, i.e., God reveals himself through 
inspired speech for the benefit of others. I argue that these verses provide a paradigmatic 
description of receiving constructive speech for these chapters.
 It is critical to observe the response of the visitor in v. 25. By means of the prophetic 
speech (ου«τως, ‘thereby’),78 the person ‘worships’ God (piροσκυνε'ω), entailing a response of 
repentance and submission in faith.79 The former non-believer responds directly to those 
present who exposed his faults, but only as an expression of his worshipping response to 
God,80 and only to proclaim that God is among them.81
 This instance of construction, like Philodemean frank criticism, involves the 
identification of moral failure by others, the recipient’s acknowledgement of his failures, and 
his commitment to change in accordance with the guidance of others (14:24n25).82 However, 
prophetic speech claims to speak for God, and the recipient responds to God in responding to 
this speech. Responding to God necessarily entails ongoing relationships of trusting 
acceptance toward believers who speak for God, and who thus help one develop moral 
dispositions and behaviours in accordance with faithful response to God.83 Yet the visitor does 
not respond in faith to the believers themselves, nor does he simply commit to their God-
oriented moral framework as a model toward which he should strive. Rather, he responds in 
faith to God himself who personally interacts with him in and through the speech of others. 
 Beyond 14:24n25, discerning reception of speech receives discussion also in 14:29. 
Here Paul turns to discuss guidelines for prophetic speech: ‘Let two or three prophets speak, 




78. This understanding of ου«τως is similar to instances in, e.g., 1 Cor 7:17, 36; 11:28; 1 Thess 4:17; 
Rom 5:12; Gal 6:12.
79. As for piροσκυνε'ω in, e.g., Matt 18:26; Num 22:31 LXX.
80. I understand the participial phrase beginning α piαγγε'λλων ο«τι... as expressing the manner in which 
the non-believer ‘worships’ God (piροσκυνη' σει), just as does the phrase ‘falling on his face’ (piεσω`ν επι` 
προ'σωπον).
81. By this response it is likely that something of what was ‘hidden’ becomes known also to the 
community, for the previous content of prophetic speech would be indicative in some way (and it is unreasonable 
to exclude this, assuming there would be further conversation and relationship after the declaration). The 
constructive effect of prophetic speech is public, not private, but there still remains a distinction between the 
visitor’s encounter with God and his encounter with the community. 
82. In Lib. fr. 41, Philodemus condemns those who hide (κρυ' piτω, λαθραιοπραγε'ω) their own faults as 
most unfriendly (α [φ]ιλω' τατον, 41.3). They will gain no benefit from doing so, and they will be found out by the 
sage anyway. In fr. 79N, there is a potential reference to hiding faults in an unknown context, ‘... κρυ' π[τειν τ]α`ς 
α µαρ|τι'ας...’ (79N.8n9), with the reconstruction of Gigante, Ricerche Filodemee, 101–2.
83. As Chester argues, the response entails a shift in social belonging: now the moral life of the visitor is 
defined by reception of these believers’ claims about himself in relation to God as opposed to the moral claims of 
alternative social networks. See Chester, Conversion, 121–25.
84. The verb διακρι'νω here likely refers to evaluative judgement, most similar to judging a dispute 
between two people (as it is used in 1 Cor 6:5).
speech, but a critical evaluation and appropriation of the speech’s content and character as 
God’s own for oneself and others.85 It seems ‘others’ in 14:29 refers to all others present, not 
simply to other prophets.86 In 1 Thess 5:21, the community as a whole is to ‘test everything’ 
(piα' ντα δε` δοκιµα' ζετε). This command follows immediately upon the injunction not to 
‘despise’ prophecy (piροφητει'ας µη` εξουθενειñτε, 5:20), so prophetic speech is assumed as one 
object of communal evaluation.87 It does not seem likely that Paul would restrict evaluation of 
prophecy to other prophets in Corinth, but fail to specify this limitation in Thessalonika, even 
if there were some individuals with a particular gift of discernment. 
 The qualification enabling others to judge speech seems simply to be that they are 
believers who possess the Spirit (they are piνευµατικοι', who ‘judge’ all things as a gift by 
God’s spirit, α νακρι'νω, 2:15). Paul assumes that all are qualified to test everything in 1 Thess 
5:21. While there are some individuals who specialize and perhaps lead in this discernment 
(cf. the gift of discernment in 12:10),88 all participate in critical reception together without 
exception. This discernment is fully human, but involves God’s agency as well. The moral and 
epistemological transformation by the Spirit that has occurred in becoming a believer enables 
each to participate in this discernment with others.89
 Although here Paul only speaks of prophecy and its reception, the same process of 
reception would apply to all instances of constructive speech, for all are media for the 
revelation of God (12:7). All speech faces the possibility that others might reject the speech as 
not revelatory of God. No one person can claim that their speech is above this judgement, 
because all know in part, and cannot avoid the qualitative difference between their speech and 
God’s revelation (a difference presupposed in the fact that it is human speech through which 
God reveals himself). The one who speaks cannot self-sufficiently manage the constructive 




85. See discussion of the critical and hermeneutical dimensions of this discernment in André Munzinger, 
Discerning the Spirits: Theological and Ethical Hermeneutics in Paul, SNTSMS 140 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 52–64.
86. Those who see a communal discernment process here include Munzinger, Discerning the 
Spirits, 70–73; Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 838; Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 451; Forbes, Prophecy, 267. Aune 
recognizes the communal discernment of 1 Thess 5:21, but implausibly limits prophetic evaluation in 1 Cor 14:29 
to prophets alone, whose prophetic gift is bound with discernment of prophetic speech (David E. Aune, 
Prophecy, 219–22).
87. Similarly general injunctions for critical judgement by all believers occur in Rom 12:2 and Phil 
1:9n10.
88. The gift of ‘discerning spirits’ should be understood as the discernment of God’s transcendent 
presence (or absence) in any form of inspired speech, with, e.g., Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 967; Schrage, 1 
Korinther III, 156; Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 711–12. I disagree with Grudem’s understanding of discernment as 
distinguishing divine or demonic spirits generally (Wayne A. Grudem, The Gift of Prophecy in 1 Corinthians 
[Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1982], 62–67). See especially the discussion in Munzinger, 
Discerning the Spirits, 45–98.
89. Aune suggests that discernment in 1 Thess 5:21 is not a ‘spiritual gift’, but a ‘fully rational 
procedure’ (David E. Aune, Prophecy, 219–20). This falls prey to a modernist natural/supernatural distinction, 
and it is not integrated into his discussion of the spiritual gift of discernment in 1 Cor 12:10; 14:29. Instead, see 
discussion in Munzinger, Discerning the Spirits, 141–88.
constructive benefit and its reception. The believer has no personal resources by which she 
can mitigate the vulnerability of her speech to critical reception, for this would be to transcend 
her knowledge ‘in part’ and thus effectively to become God. Even Paul’s claim to offer a 
command of the Lord must be critically received (14:37). Rather, it seems critical reception 
plays a constitutive role for constructive speech:  all speech benefits others only through its 
critical identification as God’s speech by others.90 
7.4.3. Further Protocol for Constructive Speech (1 Corinthians 14:26n40)
The protocol for constructive speech offered in 14:26n40 aims to ensure that all speech serves 
to benefit others, whatever its form (‘let all be done for construction’, 14:26). Construction 
thrives in the proper relational environment set out in these verses, an environment in which 
all is done for the benefit of others, all value each contribution in turn, and no one member 
curtails or excludes the contribution of another. This protocol recalls the characteristics of 
love in 13:4n7.
7.4.3.1. 1 Corinthians 14:27n33
Tongues are the first to receive practical guidelines (14:27n28). As Paul already argued, 
instances of tongues must be interpreted if spoken in the assembly so that they may construct 
others (14:28, see 14:1n25). Additionally, Paul desires no more than three instances of 
tongues (δυ' ο η»  το` πλειñστον τρειñς) to be offered with interpretation, and wants each instance to 
be offered individually, not simultaneously (α να` µε'ρος). It seems that the maximum of three 
instances of tongues is the limit for the entire meeting, judging from the lack of a similar 
limitation upon prophetic speech (14:29). This would allow opportunity for those with other 
gifts to speak, assuming that Paul reacts against overuse of tongues to the exclusion of 
others.91 Individuating tongues allows for each contribution to be heard and valued for the 
indispensable gift that it is.
 Similar protocol applies for prophetic speech (14:29n33). As reviewed above, all 
prophetic speech is subject to discernment by others, whether immediately after each 
prophecy, or after the delivery of two or three (14:29). Like tongues, believers prophesy 




90. See Munzinger, Discerning the Spirits, 63.
91. It could also be the maximum number before their interpretation (so as to ensure each instance of 
tongues is able to construct others). See discussion in, e.g., Fee, 1 Corinthians, 691; Hiu, Regulations, 109–10. It 
does not seem that Paul only disdainfully concedes a few ‘token’ instances of tongues, as argued by Wire, 
Prophets, 146–47. 
makes a prophetic revelation to another (14:30; this is a demonstration of a prophet’s own 
‘spirit’ being obedient to the prophet himself: piνευ' µατα προφητωñν προφη' ταις υ  ποτα' σσεται, 
14:32).92 Paul establishes this protocol so that all may participate, so that no one person might 
exclude others from contributing (γα' ρ in v. 31 indicates the reason for the rule of v. 30).
 Just as Paul indicated at the beginning of this section in 14:26, believers might use any 
number of speech forms to construct others. While the protocol here concerns tongues and 
prophecy particularly, the guidelines would apply, mutatis mutandis, to other forms of 
constructive speech. Of course, one cannot directly apply the limitations upon tongues to the 
other gifts, whether the need for interpretation or the limit to two or three instances in a 
meeting. Yet all gifts must be offered with concern to benefit others (of which the concern for 
translation is one instance), and even Paul’s preferred gift of prophecy can be used as a tool 
for excluding the contributions of others, and must be limited if it does so. Generally stated, 
the protocol of vv. 27n33 entails that (1) believers who speak must do so to construct others, 
(2)  no believer may use their gift to exclude the contributions of others, and (3) all believers 
must give individual, valued attention and critical reception to each contribution.
 The protocol of vv. 27n33 aligns the process of construction with proper order in 
constructive relationships. Paul grounds his guidelines in the character of God, who is not a 
God of ‘disorder’ (α καταστασι'α) but of ‘peace’ (ειρη' νη; 14:33). The last charge given on the 
whole discussion since 12:1 is, ‘Let all be done fittingly and in order’ (piα' ντα δε` ευ σχηµο' νως 
και` κατα` τα' ξιν γινε'σθω, 14:40). This necessary link between construction and relational order 
is simply an expression of the centrality of love for construction. Love ‘does not behave 
unfittingly’ (ου κ α σχηµονειñ, 13:5). Love is concerned to benefit others with one’s speech, not 
oneself (13:5). Love recognizes one’s limited knowledge and the God-given, indispensable 
value of one’s fellow members. ‘Love beyond knowledge’, particularly as described in ch. 13, 
drives the relational protocol of construction.
  
7.4.3.2. 1 Corinthians 14:34n35
 
The notion that Paul championed the full participation of all in constructive speech in chs. 
12n14 might seem to founder upon collision with 14:34n35. At first glance, it seems that here 





92. On 14:32, see discussion in, e.g., Zeller, 1 Korinther, 442–43. Precisely how one speaker comes to 
be silent and the other speaker begins is unclear, but it seems less likely that an immediate interruption is in view, 
though it is possible if there is a critical element within the second prophecy about the first (with, e.g., Hiu, 
Regulations, 131; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1142).
 Some attempt to distance these verses from Paul, either considering them a non-
Pauline interpolation (so, e.g., Dauztenberg, Fee, Hays, Conzelmann, Schrage, Lindemann),93 
or a Corinthian quotation (so, e.g., Collins).94 The external textual evidence appears to attest 
the verses unanimously (though with transposition after v. 40 in Western texts), making the 
case for interpolation more difficult, but not impossible.95 Others attempt to understand the 
generalized prohibitions to refer to particular types of disruptive speech, especially speech 
disrupting particular relationships with men (e.g., speech critical of one’s husband or father, 
so Schnabel and Thiselton, or speech by married women particularly, so Schüssler 
Fiorenza).96 Still others take these verses at face value and interpret them as Paul’s absolute 
prohibition on women’s speech in contradiction to 11:5.97
 Among the options, the last would cause the greatest problems for the present reading 
of these chapters, yet it seems unlikely to be correct. Such a contradiction would render Paul’s 
discussion in ch. 11 rhetorically unworkable and theologically inconsistent with his discussion 
in chs. 12n14 (particularly with respect to the indispensability of all gifts and gifted persons). 
More attractive is the interpretation that vv. 34n35 are a Corinthian quotation refuted by Paul 
in v. 36, but sufficient textual signals in this direction are lacking. Rather, the verses most 
likely either are an interpolation, or only silence speech that is disruptive, not constructive. 
The choice between these two remains open for present purposes. In either interpretation, one 
may avoid the problem that these verses are inconsistent with the full participation of all 




93. Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 257–73; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 699–705; Hays, First 
Corinthians, 245–49; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 246; Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 479–87; Lindemann, 1 
Korinther, 316–21.
94. Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999), 513–17.
95. For discussion confirming this judgement see, e.g., Curt Niccum, “The Voice of the Manuscripts on 
the Silence of Women: The External Evidence for 1 Cor 14:34–35,” NTS 43 (1997): 242–55; Wire, 
Prophets, 149–52. Note also, however, the (remote) possibility that Codex Vaticanus might attest to 1 Cor 
14:34n35 as a textual addition in Philip B. Payne, “Vaticanus Distigme-Obelos Symbols Marking Added Text, 
Including 1 Corinthians 14.34–5,” NTS 63 (2017): 604–25. Payne proposes witnesses to the omission of 1 Cor 
14:34n35 in Codex Fuldensis and ms. 88 as well. See the negative verdict upon Payne’s arguments in Jennifer 
Shack, “A Text Without 1 Corinthians 14.34–35? Not According to the Manuscript Evidence,” JGRChJ 10 
(2014): 90–112. For a review of similar text-critical cases where large portions of text ‘float’ between different 
positions, see J. M. Ross, “Floating Words: Their Significance for Textual Criticism,” NTS 38 (1992): 153–56.
96. See Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of 
Christian Origins (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 230–33; Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 845; Thiselton, 1 
Corinthians, 1158.
97. See, e.g., Wire, Prophets, 156–57; Zeller, 1 Korinther, 447, n. 395; others in Dautzenberg, 
Urchristliche Prophetie, 266, n. 37; Jill E. Marshall, Women Praying and Prophesying in Corinth, WUNT 2,448 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 181–213. Marshall’s contribution to this trajectory is to argue that Paul showed 
similar ambivalence on the place of women as other ancient authors (e.g., Plutarch, Philo, Livy). Those who 
disagree with this view include, e.g., Schrage, 1 Korinther III, 485; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 702; Barrett, 1 
Corinthians, 331; Dautzenberg, Urchristliche Prophetie, 265–70; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 246; Hays, First 
Corinthians, 246; Jean Héring, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, 2nd ed., trans. A. W. 
Heathcote and P. J. Allcock (London: Epworth, 1962), 154; Joseph A. Fitzmyer S.J., First Corinthians, AB 32 
(New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2008), 529–31.
 Of these two options, it seems more likely that Paul silences a particular kind of 
disruptive speech in theses verses, though it is difficult to be certain, and difficult problems 
remain. An interpretation of these verses according to the ‘disruptive speech’ option may run 
in the following way.
 The precise nature of this disruptive speech is unknown, but it seems it cannot be 
constructive speech offered in love, for otherwise Paul would contradict his concern to 
promote the indispensability of all members’ gifts since ch. 12. Previously silenced speech 
includes uninterpreted tongues, and prophecy that effectively prohibits another from speaking 
(14:28, 30). In keeping with these examples, it seems Paul silenced speech that no longer had 
a claim to formative benefit, that no longer operated in love (at least from Paul’s perspective).  
 One might interpret that the demands of love in certain circumstances required women 
not to make their otherwise legitimate, constructive contributions, for love ‘does not act 
unfittingly’ (ου κ α σχηµονειñ, 13:5). Some scholars thus suppose these verses to exclude 
women from, e.g., speaking prophetically in a critical manner toward men (esp. men of a 
woman’s household), or taking part in the public discernment of their husbands’ speech (or 
the discernment of speech by any man to whose household women might belong).98 
 The trouble with such a reading is that up to this point, Paul has not indicated that love 
requires a silencing of critical speech in certain circumstances or relationships. Rather, all 
members are to be involved in offering speech which can have a constructively critical edge, 
and all discern such speech together (14:26, 29). Supposing Paul excluded women’s critical 
discernment of their husband’s speech (or their father’s speech), it is not clear how a woman 
might not speak critically toward her husband or other men by speaking prophetically 
(assumed in 11:5), or indeed by speaking with any gift, for all serve to reveal God and thus 
construct others.99 It seems wrongheaded to conclude of this passage, based on a short, 
selective survey of elite ancient sources on the public speech of women (e.g., Philo, Plutarch), 
that, for Paul, ‘Personal interaction between a married woman and other men was considered 
scandalous or, in Paul’s words, disgraceful’.100 
 The only clue to the kind of speech involved is the directive for women to question 
their husbands at home, not in the gathering (14:35). On this reading, the disruptive speech 
silenced could involve, e.g., asking questions in a disruptive, inappropriate way, or perhaps 




98. E.g., Schnabel, 1 Korinther, 845; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1158; Grudem, Prophecy, 245–55.
99. With, e.g., Forbes, Prophecy, 273.
100. Ciampa and Rosner, 1 Corinthians, 728. See, e.g., the discussion of the roles of women (some 
married) in Christian mission in Schüssler Fiorenza, Memory of Her, 168–84; Ben Witherington III, Women in 
the Earliest Churches, SNTSMS 59 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 104–17. See also the 
discussion in Marshall, Women Praying, 43–155.
101. See discussion in Ben Witherington III, Women, 101–3; Forbes, Prophecy, 276–77; Ciampa and 
Rosner, 1 Corinthians, 724–29.
promote order and peace that protects the contributions of all members and fosters mutual 
benefit in love (as argued above concerning 14:30n33).
 Such a reading is not without serious difficulties (especially the lack of evidence for its 
heavily construed reading of λαλε'ω). Nevertheless, between this reading and that of 
interpolation, there are two plausible understandings of these verses which maintain the thrust 
of chs. 12n14 toward the participation of all members in constructing others.
7.4.3.3. Summary 
In this section, we have traced the effects and reception of constructive speech. Believers who 
construct others are engaged in a reciprocal, morally formative process. The effects of speech 
range from encouraging affirmation to exposing criticism, and involve real learning and 
development in the recipient as they are directed to respond faithfully to God. The effects and 
reception of speech in ch. 14 illustrate once more that construction operates according to 
God's transcendent and immanent involvement to reveal himself in human speech (12:7). In 
reception, all believers critically discern speech together, and no member can offer speech that 
doesn't require such discernment. In keeping with love oriented to relationship with God and 
others among the body of Christ, Paul establishes protocols for construction ensuring that
(1) believers who speak must do so to construct others, (2)  no believer may use their gift to 
exclude the contributions of others, and (3) all believers give individual, valued attention and 
critical reception to each contribution. Verses 34n35 can be understood to support, not 
impede, the concern for the indispensability of all in construction.
7.5. Interdependence in Moral Construction
It remains to specify the nature of believers’ need for one another in construction. This need 
follows from the nature and practice of reciprocal construction in general as indicated by chs. 
12n14. This final section synthesizes the preceding exegetical work to focus upon this issue.
 This chapter began by outlining God’s transcendence and immanence in relation to 
human believers’ constructive activity. Each instance of construction is a self-manifestation of 
God given in and through believers’ speech for the benefit of others (12:7). I have argued that 
chs. 13 and 14 support this reading. For Paul, human constructive activity cannot be identical 
with divine activity, for all now know in part (13:8n13) and all speech must be critically 
received as God’s word within human words (14:25). In manifesting himself, God transcends 
the human media of his self-manifestation. And yet God is also immanent within all believers’ 
constructive activity. There is no portion of human activity that God does not create or operate 
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(12:6, 11). God’s involvement to construct others does not render such activity less human, so 
as to compete in a zero-sum game with human involvement at any point.
 God’s transcendent and immanent involvement in construction means that believers’ 
participation in construction, and indeed their moral lives, can never be self-sufficient. In 
other words, God’s involvement in believers’ moral lives and in moral construction can never 
be reduced to an individual’s relationship to his own moral character, or reduced to an 
interaction between believers apart from the agency of God. I do not mean with this claim that 
believers’ participation in construction is not fully human in its own right. Construction 
cannot be construction apart from relation to God, e.g., without being a response to God’s 
revelation, without dependence upon the agency of God (and thus the agency of other 
believers through whom God acts). God transcendently, non-competitively creates and 
operates human participation in construction. This applies to all aspects of believers’ 
involvement in construction, from constructing others to being constructed by others (e.g., the 
content and character of constructive speech, the discernment and reception of speech, the 
personal moral character that develops as a result of receiving construction, the human 
relationships of construction). Taking these two movements of construction in turn 
(constructing and being constructed), one may further specify the shape of a believer’s moral 
life in dependent relation to God and its concrete entailments for the nature and practices of 
construction.
7.5.1. Constructing Others
Already we have noted, believers’ relation to God determines the way in which they construct 
one another. God’s agency to reveal himself through each believer grounds the possibility of 
offering constructive speech, not the speaker’s personal moral resources or the content of such 
speech alone (12:7). Again, this is not to say that the moral character of the speaker and/or the 
content of the speech play no role in construction. Rather, it is to say that the role they play is 
to point away from themselves, to be media of God’s revelation to others, not to be identified 
wholly with that revelation itself. This role of revealing God requires ongoing dependence on 
the agency of God by the Spirit; it is not an autonomous spiritual capacity in the believer. As 
understood from the analysis of 14:25, and 29, the fact that all speech is subject to critical 
reception by others indicates believers’ lack of self-sufficiency in their attempts to form 
others. There is no speech for God that does not require critical reception by others. The 
speaker’s internal moral resources are unable to transcend present knowing in part (13:8n13), 
and thus render the content or character of constructive speech infallible and without need for 
discernment. In order for constructive speech to be such, the speaker is dependent on others to 
critically receive it as a manifestation of God.
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 As already noted, God’s dispersing his self-revelation to all believers opens the door 
for all to offer constructive speech, not just those with one particular state of moral maturity or 
knowledge. Paul’s protocol for protecting the contributions of all in 14:27n33 aims to respect 
the reality of God’s self-manifestation in all believers without exception. 
7.5.2. Receiving Construction
 
In receiving construction, believers demonstrate a lack of self-sufficiency for the moral life in 
at least two senses. First of all, discernment of constructive speech, i.e., the self-revelation of 
God, is a communal affair empowered by the Spirit (14:29). All members participate in this 
reception together, even if some have a particular gift of discernment and thus lead others. 
Each individual depends upon a common framework for discernment learned from others, and 
interacts with the judgements of others. Just as no one is self-sufficient to reveal God and 
construct others, no one can exercise self-sufficient discernment apart from God’s agency and 
that of others through whom God reveals himself.
 Second, even as believers develop morally, their character (e.g., their dispositions, 
knowledge, emotions, desires) remains dependent upon God and others for further 
construction.102 The sense of dependence I aim to explain here is not simply all believers’ 
permanent dependence on the Spirit for their moral life in general (though this is also the 
case), but believers’ permanent dependence on others and on God for positive moral 
construction, regardless of previous growth.
 Instances of being constructed, e.g., learning or repenting, do indeed signal progression 
and real change in moral character. Yet this positive change in a believer does not reduce the 
remaining moral construction that others can give to him, as though making him incrementally 
more self-sufficient and less dependent on others or on God. The goal of being constructed 
morally as a believer, of imitating Christ (a form of assimilation to God), does not entail 
growing out of one’s need to receive moral construction from others insofar as one can do so 
(such that, e.g., one could track a believer’s progress in terms of greater and lesser need for 
moral construction from others). An inverse relationship between moral growth and 
dependence on others and on God is impossible, not just because of the ‘in part’ nature of 





102. I do not deny by this claim that the development of internal moral character is a real part of 
believers’ construction. That there is continuity in God’s revelation in the construction process allowing for a 
sense of progress in a believer’s moral life seems clear, for the revelation of God in the gospel as a whole does 
not change (and Paul assumes as much in 14:20; see also 3:1n4; 1 Thess 3:10). Moreover, authentic constructive 
interactions presuppose that the community has discerned continuity with the gospel within them (and thus 
continuity with scripture as read in light of the gospel, etc.).
 No positive development in human moral character can render future construction 
from others unnecessary, because the nature of construction involves response to the 
transcendent God who can never be identified with ‘partial’ human character. A believer can 
never be morally self-sufficient in this way, for the moral life does not consist of a believer’s 
self-relation alone (i.e., acting in accordance with one’s own mature or maturing moral 
character, having internalized the model of a moral exemplar).103 Rather, a believer’s moral 
life consists of ongoing response to others beyond oneself, ultimately to the transcendent 
God’s self-revelation through other believers.
 No believer can develop morally, or so internalize God’s ongoing self-revelation 
through others as to render it no longer constitutive, or less than constitutive, of a believer’s 
moral life. Nor can a believer claim not to need certain effects of moral construction (e.g., to 
transcend or lessen the need for critique or teaching from others), or not to need construction 
offered in certain areas of a believer’s moral life (as though one had mastered avoiding 
idolatry, for example). Nor could one render others redundant by comparing their contribution 
with a particular leader’s (e.g., Paul) to show that their contributions added nothing 
essential.104 All such claims attempt to reduce the constructive good of encounter with God 
through others into human moral resources, to turn interaction with the transcendent God 
through others into self-relation. To do so would mean being God, and ceasing to know in 
part, on Paul’s schema. Moral character as a believer is always ‘in part’ in that it is always 
dependent upon God and other believers in this way; by definition, it can never be a secure 
self-possession.
 Receiving construction assumes and sustains relationships of continual dependence 
upon others, and ultimately upon God, for the reception of further construction. The goal of 
believers’ moral lives is ongoing, faithful response to God alongside others, i.e., by God’s 
power remaining firm in faith together until the end (1 Cor 1:8; see also Phil 1:10). The goal is 
not the achievement of a particular moral state by which one may securely and self-
sufficiently live the moral life and enjoy its benefits. That goal is impossible according to the 





103. Here I am drawing conceptually on Susan Eastman’s discussion of first, second, and third person 
perspectives of self in Eastman, Paul and the Person. See also Rowan Williams, “Making Moral Decisions,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. Robin Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 3–15.
104. Paul and the unnamed visitor are in the same, permanent position of dependence upon God and 
others for positive moral construction as believers. No matter their progress, neither can turn interaction with the 
transcendent God through others into self-relation. To think the new believer cannot be of any morally 
constructive benefit to Paul because of his lack of learning and progress is to fail to reckon with the fact that Paul 
encounters the transcendent God in the new believer’s speech.
105. This, I suggest, is the theological basis for the judgement that Paul differs from the philosophers in 
that he is not concerned about the formation of character per se, as recognised by Malherbe and Glad.
 All believers remain, whatever their progress, in a state of dependence upon God and 
all others for positive moral construction in order to live the moral life. One cannot faithfully 
respond to God without responding continually to his manifestation in each believer, 
regardless of one’s progress. This means that the concrete entailments of a believer’s response 
to God, and thus of a believer’s moral life, emerge over time in relationship with other 
believers until death or the eschaton. These entailments are not fully known in advance, but 
are continually discerned alongside others in response to God’s ongoing self-manifestation in 
the community. This interdependence in moral construction, then, extends permanently to all 
other believers, for God has chosen to manifest himself in all over time.
 The nature of this interdependence in moral construction is, again, analogous to 
believers’ economic interdependence, as discussed in ch. five. These structures of economic 
and constructive interdependence seem to reinforce each other. Believers depend on one 
another for moral construction because they do not have the resources to live self-sufficiently 
on their own, as they participated in economic interdependence in the midst of poverty. 
Participation in the use of gifts was an acknowledgement of the claims of the gospel and an 
acknowledgement of one’s dependence upon God, as was the sharing of economic goods. The 
analogy breaks down however, in that one can never gain sufficient moral resources to live 
self-sufficiently, unlike economic resources. Also unlike poverty, lacking moral self-
sufficiency is not a life-threatening problem to be overcome, but a fundamental reality of faith 
to be embraced by all believers (see further discussion in ch. eight).
7.6. Summary
This chapter has argued that God’s transcendent and immanent involvement in moral 
construction entails permanent moral interdependence among believers. God uses believers’ 
varied forms of speech offered in love as media through which he reveals himself to others for 
their constructive benefit. A believer’s moral life, and growth in that life, consists of ongoing 
response to the transcendent God’s self-revelation through others. Believers continually 
depend on one another for needed moral construction as they together depend upon God, 
because their moral character is always ‘in part’, qualitatively different from God’s. The 
specific practices and protocol for reciprocal construction, rooted in love, presuppose and 
protect relationships of moral interdependence between believers.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: PAUL AND PHILODEMUS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In this final chapter, I place Paul and Philodemus in comparative perspective. Drawing upon 
the previous chapters, here I offer a summative analysis of their similarities and differences 
vis-à-vis interdependence in moral formation. Alongside the similarities between Paul and 
Philodemus, there are significant qualitative differences in what moral formation entailed, and 
what kind of moral interdependence obtained between members. These differences emerge by 
comparing socio-economic locations, theological frameworks, and formative practices.
 Therefore, the discussion of this chapter begins with a comparison of socio-economic 
location (section 8.1), of theology (section 8.2), and of formative practice (section 8.3). These 
three sections then inform the comparison of interdependence in moral formation (section 
8.4). Finally, I conclude by stating my argument’s contribution to the PaulnPhilodemus 
comparative project (section 8.5), and by offering brief reflections upon the implications of 
this thesis for other research (section 8.6).
8.1. Socio-Economic Interdependence
The practice of economically interdependent gift reciprocity was an ideal for both Paul and 
Philodemus. Both would assume this interdependence to have been a necessary feature of 
members’ relationships with one another.
 According to Philodemus, an Epicurean is not economically self-sufficient. He gives 
gifts to others, among other reasons, in order to provide himself sure hope of receiving help 
from them in case of financial disaster, a possibility from which no one is absolutely 
protected. Yet Philodemus understood individuals to participate in this economic 
interdependence from a position of relative wealth. The Epicurean life, in his view, just was 
one that had ‘natural wealth’ for leisured retreat from work. The kind of gifts exchanged were 
those given among Roman elites. Relationships of economic interdependence obtained 
between those who were relatively self-sufficient financially in comparison with most of the 
populace who negotiated subsistence-level living. There was an ineliminable, but limited, 
need to engage in gift reciprocity in order to receive financial support in the rare case of 
financial disaster. The greater need to engage in gift reciprocity arose from the fact that it was 
constitutive of pleasurable friendships, and thus the life of α ταραξι'α. The need for exchange 
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emerges far more from the necessarily social nature of the most pleasurable life rather than 
from individual deficiency in economic resources.
 Paul, in contrast, understood individual believers to participate in economic 
interdependence from a position of relative poverty. The majority of believers, with Paul, 
would have engaged in economic interdependence while hovering in and around the 
subsistence level. Economically insecure believers needed to engage in gift reciprocity, among 
other reasons, in order that they would receive needed reciprocation from others on a regular 
basis. The need for interdependent exchange emerged both from the social entailments of faith 
in God and from individual deficiency in resources.
 Philodemus envisioned relatively limited economic dependence on others because he 
assumed all involved possessed relative economic self-sufficiency. Paul envisioned relatively 
greater economic dependence on others because he assumed all involved did not possess 
relative economic self-sufficiency. Their differing socio-economic locations align with their 
differing conceptions of economic interdependence. This difference in the nature of 
interdependence applies, mutatis mutandis, to interdependence in the sharing of morally 
formative goods as well, as will be discussed below. Yet, unlike this difference in economic 
interdependence, which is a matter of degree, I argue that their views of moral 
interdependence differ in kind.
8.2. Theology of the Moral Life
Piety was constitutive for the moral life of both Paul and Philodemus. The moral character of 
God and Christ provided a norming model for believers, just as the gods did for Epicureans. 
However, fundamental differences arise when one compares the two understandings of divine 
involvement in human moral life, and of human assimilation to divine moral character. These 
theological differences are decisively important for understanding each figure’s conception of 
interdependence in moral formation.
 Philodemus’ gods do not involve themselves in human affairs. There is nothing to fear 
from them, for they by definition do not show χα' ρις or ο ργη'  toward humans. From their 
dwelling place far from the world, the gods model perfectly secure freedom from pain enjoyed 
within friendships with one another. The gods are morally perfect and absolutely self-
sufficient. Despite necessarily sharing their pleasure in friendship with others, they 
individually transcend any need to receive from another (i.e., a need due to individual 
deficiency). Pious worship of the gods matters for the moral life because to revere them 
rightly is mentally to align oneself with and strive after moral perfection. Despite the 
importance of the gods’ moral model, in many ways the human sage is more important, 
because he demonstrates the ideal moral life within human weakness. The sage can actually 
share in the same kind of pleasure that the gods have as a result of his self-sufficient, perfected 
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moral maturity, though this pleasure is more vulnerable. The sage has an inalienable hold on 
happiness by virtue of his moral character. Furthermore, a mature Epicurean’s empirical 
knowledge of the cosmos and of the gods is not qualitatively different than the gods’ own 
knowledge. The sage thus assimilates to himself the gods’ own moral perfection, pleasure, and 
knowledge, acting as a ‘divine’ model to others as a human being.
 Paul’s God is active in human life precisely in the ways Philodemus would deny. God 
defines believers’ lives according to his χα' ρις shown to them in Christ, and exercises his ο ργη'  
upon the world as well (e.g., 1 Thess 1:10; 2:16; 5:9). Crucially, God is immanently and 
irreducibly involved in every instance of moral formation between believers. Believers’ moral 
lives consist of ongoing, faithful response to God as he reveals himself through other 
believers. God’s direct involvement in the lives of believers creates and sustains their morally 
formative interaction with one another, without which such interaction would be impossible 
(i.e., without becoming something other than Pauline moral formation). Believers’ love for 
one another in formation derives from God’s own love for them: God takes the initiative to 
love, God provides the norm for love in the self-giving love of Christ, and God’s Spirit 
empowers believers’ love.
 And yet in all this involvement, God remains transcendent and qualitatively other than 
believers. All human knowledge and moral character involved in formative interactions with 
one another remain in part, qualitatively different than God’s own knowing to be revealed in 
the eschaton. All believers’ formative interactions are media through which God acts to reveal 
himself for formative benefit; these revelatory media cannot be qualitatively identified with 
God, no matter their mature moral character (e.g., even if the speaker is Paul). In the eschaton, 
believers’ present knowing will be abolished, not completed, by the revelation of God’s own 
knowledge. 
 This has important implications for Paul’s view of moral assimilation to God.  
Believers experience real moral progress in the imitation of Christ, but this progress never 
involves transcending a believer’s qualitative difference from God in character or knowledge. 
While believers imitate Christ in their acts of love for others (e.g., adapting to the weak in 1 
Cor 8n10; pursuing love in the use of spiritual gifts in 1 Cor 14), their love participates, by the 
Spirit, in God’s love shown in Christ. In such participation, believer’s love is not qualitatively 
the same as God’s love, because of the limits of partial knowledge.
 For the purpose of an Epicurean’s moral life (according to Philodemus), he relates to 
the gods only indirectly, i.e., by gradually internalizing the gods’ empirically-known moral 
model within his own character (most often with the help of others). Incrementally he grows 
toward their moral perfection and self-sufficiency within friendships with others. This divine-
human relation takes place without direct interaction between the Epicurean and his gods, 
even in his worship of them. The relation consists exclusively in the development of the 
Epicurean’s own conception of the gods. This relation, moreover, is sufficient for the 
Epicurean’s moral life; there is no need for further, direct interaction with the gods, because 
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humans already have all that is necessary. The sage so embodies divine knowledge and moral 
character that additional revelation from the gods would be superfluous. Just as the gods have 
no need to be involved in the human realm, humans have no need for the gods’ direct 
intervention.
 Paul’s theology, in contrast, orients a believer’s moral life to ongoing response to God 
who transcends the believer and her conception of him. Formative benefit derives from 
beyond oneself, i.e., from the self-revelation of God, not simply from human moral 
knowledge and character given to or received from another believer. As a believer grows 
morally, she can never so internalize God so as to turn her interaction with God into self-
relation, to render her relation to God into a matter of her own cultivated conception of him. 
This God speaks in and through other believers, whose formative contributions thus cannot be 
rendered redundant or unnecessary by a believer’s moral progress. 
 These theologies are fundamentally opposed to one another. In Philodemus’ 
perspective, Paul’s God is an unnatural fiction, and Paul is a victim of his own ignorant 
superstition. Not only would the apostle be doomed to a life of misery by his theology, but he 
is responsible for dooming others to the same. Paul would be no more amenable to 
Philodemus’ theology. To accept God’s direct intervention in the world is to deny 
foundational tenets of Epicurean philosophy, especially one of the four claims in the 
tetrapharmakos, that there is nothing to fear from the gods. 
 Therefore, it is not simply that Philodemus ascribed relatively less need for divine 
involvement in moral formation, and Paul relatively more, as though the ‘goods’ provided by 
divine involvement and the nature of that involvement were qualitatively the same in the two 
theologies. Rather, both operated with qualitatively different understandings of divine-human 
relationship in the moral life: one in which the Epicurean related indirectly to the gods by 
internalizing their moral model, and another in which the believer interacted directly with a 
transcendent God who cannot be so internalized. The formative benefits derived from the 
divine qualitatively differ, because formative benefit derived from personal interaction with a 
transcendent God (Paul) cannot be rendered into formative benefit derived from human 
reflection upon gods who are not transcendent (Philodemus). Paul and Philodemus did not 
deal in an exchangeable ‘currency’ of moral resources on this point. This remains true even if, 
for Paul, personal interaction with the transcendent God led to a form of individual progress in 
moral character. All such character was ‘in part’, and presupposed the continual agency of 
God to constitute and sustain it in faithful response over time to God’s own ongoing self-
revelation through others.
 These qualitative differences in theology (in the nature of the divine, the nature of the 
divine-human relationship in moral formation, and the nature of formative benefit) play 
crucially important roles in Paul and Philodemus’ conceptions of interdependence in moral 




Both Paul and Philodemus envisioned all members of their respective communities engaging 
in  reciprocal practices of moral formation, especially practices involving speech. These 
practices involved similar morally formative effects, e.g., encouraging others to maintain their 
commitment, exposing others’ faults, or providing concrete moral instruction. Members used 
specialised speech to form others according to the specific worldview of both communities. 
Both thought reciprocal engagement in these formative practices was constitutive of 
‘salvation’, and constitutive of being a member of the community. In what follows, I review 




I discuss the practices of giving moral formation in three sections. I first discuss the 
qualifications which enable one to offer formation, and then discuss two aspects of the way 
one offers formative benefit, i.e. adaptation and love.
8.3.1.1. Qualifications
  
For Philodemus, the qualification that enabled one to offer formative benefit is personal moral 
maturity. Treating others was an ability given by the mature Epicurean’s virtue and 
philosophical knowledge. Frank criticism was an art, in its mature form involving 
considerable expertise as one negotiated a therapeutic relationship. Those who were less 
mature could occasionally have something of benefit to offer, but predominately the mature 
played the formative role.
 For Paul, personal moral maturity was also integral for offering formative benefit. 
Right content and character in formative speech were necessary ingredients. Yet this content 
and character were unavoidably ‘in part’, and could not provide formative benefit in itself 
(i.e., apart from the agency of God to reveal himself through it). The content and character of 
formative speech functioned instead within God’s agency as a medium for God’s self-
revelation by the Spirit. No one person’s speech or character could be wholly identified with 
God’s own; all speech required critical discernment, even Paul’s. All members may offer an 
indispensably formative benefit by their speech, regardless of the maturity or skill level of the 
speaker, because formative benefit resides in gifts of God’s revelation (not simply in the 
content and character of speech) and because God acts to reveal himself in all believers 
without exception. It was not simply that the less mature, or those different in gifting from the 
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leaders, might occasionally offer beneficial formative speech to some individuals, but that all 
believers offered formative speech that was indispensable for all other members of the 
community, for it manifested the transcendent God. 
8.3.1.2. Adaptation
A central dimension of the art of frank criticism, for Philodemus, was adaptation of speech to 
the particular needs of individuals. Adaptability assumed the skilled diagnosis of a wide 
variety of moral illnesses in recipients, and a therapeutic relationship in which the more 
mature gradually led the less mature recipient out of their illness.
 Again there are similarities in Paul’s vision of moral formation. He himself engaged in 
similar kinds of adaptive criticism toward believers. Paul championed love in the form of 
adaptive care as a mode of ‘constructing’ others (1 Cor 8n10). Adaptation of some kind seems 
assumed in 1 Cor 12n14 as well, though it is less explicit. As described in 13:4n7, believers 
who love others demonstrate forms of adaptation in their patience, self-giving endurance, and 
pursuit of others’ good.
 Situating adaptation within the involvement of God and partial human knowing leads 
to the conclusion that Paul construed adaptation differently than does Philodemus. As shown 
in 1 Cor 8n10, adaptation did not mean leading the recipient out of their psychological 
weakness and deficiency in knowledge. The knowers’ more flexible personal psychology and 
theological knowledge did not act as the norm for the weak in this case. The goal for the weak 
was not to achieve a psychological or knowledge-based benchmark, but to maintain their faith 
in God in their weakness. Adaptation was not temporary, but permanent.
 In other circumstances, Paul certainly attempted to persuade believers out of their 
immaturity, often offering himself as the model (e.g., the knowers in 1 Cor 8n10). Similarly, 
Philodemus could label some differences between friends as irrelevant for the best life, just 
like Paul. The difference lies in the fact that Paul practiced adaptation with an awareness of 
‘partial’ knowledge. Philodemus would have attempted to apply therapy to any form of false 
belief, however small. He operated with a singular model of human maturity embodied in 
Epicurus, to which all should conform without remainder. While Philodemus valued tolerance 
and adaptation to others, he could not follow Paul in relativising the weak’s difference in 
knowledge and moral psychology.
 Moreover, unlike adaptation in Philodemus, the knowers came to understand what 
their faith meant by adapting to the weak. In doing so they found their knowledge relativised 
and discovered the entailments of their faith in God as they pursued the benefit of the weak (1 
Cor 8n10). The weak were thus indispensable for their moral growth. Considered from 
Philodemus’ perspective, the formative benefits of administering adaptive therapy were 
marginal by comparison to the benefits of receiving therapy. Philodemus would agree with 
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Paul that a mature Epicurean would adapt in love to others, and choosing not to do so when 
one had the opportunity would indicate immaturity. Similarly, a maturing Epicurean would 
learn as he practised adaptive frank criticism toward others. Yet, for Philodemus, one adapted 
to form others because one already was sufficiently mature to do so, not in order to become 
mature.
 Adaptation also seems less of a specialised psychological and rhetorical skill in Paul, 
because it was not philosophically and psychologically well-defined. This lack of definition 
was likely the result of Paul viewing human speech and knowing (and thus all adaptation) as 
in themselves insufficient to effect formative change. Paul assumed that all believers can love 
and adapt to others by God’s spirit, not simply the more mature. Paul seems unconcerned that 
all formative speech feature highly specific psychological adaptation to individual needs. 
Some instances of formative speech did not involve addressing a particular individual and 
their dysfunction, but addressed the community as a whole. This may be the case even for 
some critical instances of speech. 
 It remains the case that, at times, believers adapted to others individually in order to 
help them recover from moral failure (e.g., Gal 6:1). These circumstances are most similar to 
a relationship of adaptive therapy via frank criticism in Philodemus. While these cases merit 
further discussion beyond this thesis, a properly situated understanding of the formative 
relationships here would attend to God’s involvement, the insufficiency of the adaptive, 
formative speech in itself to effect change, and the need for critical reception of the formative 
speech. In these respects the situation of Galatians 6:1, for example, seems analogous to that 
of 1 Cor 14:24n25.
8.3.1.3. Love
Love necessarily governed the use of formative speech according to both Philodemus and 
Paul. The Epicurean teacher loves his students (Lib. col. 3b.11, φιλε'ω; col. 21a.10; φιλε'ω; fr. 
44.3, φιλε'ω, 44.7, στε'ργω; 80.9n10, α γαπη' σις). The students gather together to learn in love 
(col. 13a, α γα' πη; fr. 54.1n2, στοργη' ). Teachers endeavour to lead others into self-love (fr. 
86.4, φιλο' της).
 At first glance there is considerable overlap conceptually, if less so lexically, between 
1 Cor 13:4n7 and the description of the mature teacher’s character throughout Lib. Love, for 
Philodemus, is one of the outworking of the mature Epicurean’s character by which he 
successfully cares for others. Love follows from Epicurean maturity, while vices impede it. A 
mature Epicurean loves in accordance with his secure moral character and knowledge. His 
students can trust him as their ‘saviour’ because of the security of his knowledge and 
character, and his consequent love for them. For example: the Epicurean teacher is patient and 
kind to immature students in his pursuit of their benefit (fr. 46; 70n71; col. 5a; 10a); he does 
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not boast or inflate his importance, but admits his own wrongs (fr. 55; 81; 84N; col 10b; 15b; 
18b); he is not driven to anger (e.g., fr. 12; col 2a); he is not envious (fr. 62; col 1b; 21a); the 
teacher is willing to forgive (fr. 20); the teacher enduringly attempts to cure the immature, 
hoping for success, even when faced with failure and personal mistreatment (fr. 4; 11; 12, 
37n38; 63n64; 69; 85). Allowing his own framework to provide the details, Philodemus 
would affirm that the sage exhibits the qualities of love as expressed in 1 Cor 13:4n8a.
 Paul, however, championed the exercise of love ‘beyond’ one’s own moral character 
and knowledge. Philodemus could follow no further when Paul contrasts love and present 
knowledge in 13:8bn13. For Paul, love is not less than a human moral disposition, but it is a 
disposition ordered to participation in relationships beyond oneself with others, and ultimately 
with God. This love operates not from the assured stability of one’s knowledge or character, 
but from an acknowledgement of the ways in which relationships with God and others 
relativise and condition one’s own partial knowledge. Even believers’ acts of love are ‘in 
part’. By acknowledging the limitations of one’s own knowledge in these ways, a believer acts 
in love, aligning with and participating in God’s love for others by the Spirit. ‘Love beyond 
knowledge’ derives from God’s own love in that his love is prior, his love norms human love, 
and his love empowers human love by the Spirit. 
 Because love beyond knowledge participated in God’s love, love played an expanded 
role in relation to formative speech. Love was not only necessary for the success of formative 
speech. Love was also necessary for such speech to be of any value at all, including the 
knowledge represented in the speech’s content (1 Cor 13:1n3). There is no moral resource or 
knowledge, nor even a moral self, that exists apart from its engagement in love for others. 
Because Paul’s conception of love is a love beyond one’s own knowledge, this means there is 
no moral resource or self apart from participation beyond oneself in relationship to God and 
his love for others by the Spirit. A believer’s moral knowledge derives from the revelation of 
God in Christ by the Spirit, and persists in the believer’s continual participation in Christ by 
the Spirit. Moral knowledge is not empirically discovered apart from direct divine 
involvement, nor can it be possessed self-sufficiently, i.e., apart from ongoing participation in 
God’s love toward those whom God has loved.
 Paul’s ‘love beyond knowledge’ underwrites different formative practices than 
Philodemus’ ‘love in accordance with knowledge’. Already we have reviewed differences in 
the qualifications by which all believers offer formative speech, and differences in what 
adaptation entails, both of which are oriented to ‘love beyond knowledge’. The same 





With respect to practices of receiving formation, Paul and Philodemus again appear similar in 
two respects. First, both assume that all members regularly receive moral formation from 
others. Second, both consider active reception of formative speech a necessary part of 
formation; neither conceive of moral formation as somehow automatic apart from the agency 
of the recipient. I take these two in turn. 
 First, with respect to the practices of receiving formative speech from others more 
generally, Philodemus affirmed that all members, regardless of maturity, would receive frank 
criticism from others, for all are human and will err, even the sage. Yet, based on one’s 
maturity level, one received relatively more or less. The beginning Epicurean student 
overwhelmingly received formative care. He only occasionally might succeed in offering 
something of benefit to others insofar as he had matured enough to do so, and insofar as the 
recipients were of sufficient immaturity to need his care (e.g., other students). It was forbidden 
for the immature student to speak critically to his teacher. The sage, on the other hand, only 
received critique from others occasionally, and only insofar as others had sufficient maturity 
to do so. The sage would not receive critique upon his grasp of fundamentals, for he had 
mastered them. Along the path from immature student to sage, one grew to receive formative 
benefit from others less, to develop one’s capacity for self-critique, and to give formative 
benefit to others more.
 Paul likewise affirmed that all receive formative speech, but had a different 
understanding of what this entailed. Paul envisioned that each member continually received 
from every other member of the community, like members of a body. Protocols ensured that 
each instance of speech was given individual attention by all, and that no one could effectively 
muzzle another’s speech. It may be that leaders (e.g., Paul) played a predominant role in 
offering formative benefit, but this was not to the exclusion or redundancy of the benefit 
others might give. All were indispensable to all others in that they revealed God for necessary 
formative benefit. These practices aligned with ‘love beyond knowledge’.
 Our second point of comparison concerns what kind of activity was required by the  
recipient of formative speech. For Philodemus, frank criticism was not deliberative, but its 
reception nevertheless required active engagement in the recipient. A large part of this 
engagement was essentially the openness to receive and appropriate correction. Yet it was also 
the case that other members observed the treatment and could intervene if they discerned 
erroneous care. Moreover, the recipient likely had to exert some level of critical reflection on 
the treatment in order to appropriate it fully. Two possibilities can explain the failure of a 
sage’s use of frank criticism: the defective moral state of the recipient (in most cases 
discussed), or the sage’s unavoidable errors in perceptual judgement in the diagnostic process. 
For less mature Epicureans, there is a third possibility that their own vice has infected their 
frank speech. If a sage offers critique, therefore, discernment concerns only whether the 
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speech has properly diagnosed the state of the recipient. Discernment is not exercised over 
whether the speech itself is conceptually correct (because the sage’s understanding is 
infallible). If a less mature member offers criticism, however, those mature enough to do so 
would assist the recipient to discern its validity as well as its proper application. 
 For Paul, formative speech made a claim to speak for God, and was also not simply 
deliberative (and its form and content is not always a direct critique of another). Like 
Philodemus, no person’s speech was beyond necessary discernment by other members of the 
community. Yet the discernment exercised pertained not only to the right application of what 
was said, but to whether and how this speech, with its particular content and character, was in 
fact God’s speech to the community. No one’s speech transcended the need for this 
thoroughgoing discernment. Moreover, all members engaged in this discernment process 
regardless of personal maturity, for all took part as a gift by God’s spirit, though there were 
individuals who led in this process. This difference in discernment practice exemplified ‘love 
beyond knowledge’ by recognising the ‘in part’ nature of all speech, and recognising the claim 
that all have to participate in such discernment by God’s spirit. 
8.4. Interdependence in Moral Formation
Both Paul and Philodemus envisioned community members’ necessary, reciprocal 
participation in one another’s salvation through processes of giving and receiving moral 
formation. However, Paul and Philodemus had qualitatively different conceptions of this 
interdependent, reciprocal formation. The previous discussion of similarities and differences 
in socio-economic location, theology, and formation practice provides vital assistance toward 
understanding these different conceptions.
 The immature Epicurean initiate, being unable to cure himself, was dependent upon 
others for formative intervention in even the most fundamental aspects of the Epicurean life. 
His salvation consisted in his own freedom from pain by means of moral progress out of 
immaturity into a self-sufficiently virtuous and pleasurable life. Some persons were naturally 
gifted only to need minimal criticism to attain maturity, while others needed far more, but all 
needed some degree of help. As one grew, one came to need the formative intervention of 
others incrementally less, for one gradually became morally self-sufficient, coming to possess 
in one’s own character and knowledge sufficient moral resources for virtuous and pleasurable 
living. One came to internalize the model of the gods’ own moral perfection, as exemplified 
by the sage (above all, Epicurus). This gradual acquisition of moral resources meant that one 
grew to need others for formation only insofar as they had moral resources one had not yet 
assimilated. The possibility always remained open for further formation, even for the mature 
Epicurean. No one absolutely transcended the need to receive formative intervention from 
another. Epicureans would continually be formed by the wide range of their philosophical 
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activities together throughout their lives, not simply by the practice of frank criticism. Yet 
Philodemus also indicated that the sage was relatively self-sufficient in his moral maturity, 
and would only occasionally need formative intervention, and only on small matters. In 
general, for the more mature, only other equally mature Epicureans could give needed moral 
resources not already possessed, making unnecessary all less mature Epicureans who did not 
have these resources. Rather, the more mature overwhelmingly gave formative benefit to the 
less mature, rather than receiving it. In maturity, there was only a limited need to receive 
moral formation from others due to personal moral deficiency. Even if a mature Epicurean 
still needed others to constitute his pleasurable life in a variety of other ways, these needs 
would not contradict his relative moral self-sufficiency.
 This goal of moral self-sufficiency, entailing the gradually limited need to receive 
formation from others, dovetails with Philodemus’ economics and theology. Philodemus 
conceived the mature Epicurean’s need for formative benefit from others in the same way that 
he conceived his need for others’ economic assistance: the mature Epicurean unavoidably 
needs others due to minimal personal deficiency, but only occasionally and in a limited way. 
The analogy breaks down in that the sage’s character is far more secure than his economic 
stability; the sage’s character can actually protect him from disaster even in the direst of 
circumstances (e.g., his character can securely provide him pleasure even in the face of 
immense, enduring pain). Nevertheless, Philodemus conceived of ideal moral and economic 
interdependence from a position of relative individual self-sufficiency.
 The model provided by the gods also aligns with Philodemus’ conception of moral 
self-sufficiency. The gods partake in friendship with one another from a position of absolute 
self-sufficiency, made possible by their divinity. A god, by definition, does not have a need for 
other gods due to some personal deficiency, yet they engage in friendship with other gods for 
its unspeakable pleasure. Philodemus’ conception of the limited need to receive moral 
formation from others is precisely an attempt to model human friendships upon divine 
friendships. The goal for all Epicureans is to grow out of their moral need to receive from 
others into morally self-sufficient, pleasurable friendships. Indeed, moral self-sufficiency is a 
precondition for ideal friendships, for it protects such friendships from pain.
 Paul, on the other hand, operated with a qualitatively different understanding of 
interdependence in moral formation. This difference in understanding aligns with the wider 
differences in theology and socio-economic location already examined. The entailments of 
this different understanding emerge in the differences in formative practice, reviewed above. 
 Believers need others for moral formation like they need others’ economic help. Paul 
conceives of moral interdependence as though each member participates from a position of 
relative individual lack. The group lives morally through continual exchange of needed moral 
benefit, toward which no person can claim self-sufficiency. Even though the analogy does not 
fit in a number of ways, the general correspondence between needed participation in economic 
and moral interdependence out of individual deficiency lends plausibility to my 
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reconstruction. The two conceptions of interdependence seem to mutually support one 
another. In order to more deeply understand Paul’s conception of the need to receive moral 
benefit from others, however, one must go beyond this conceptual link between moral and 
economic interdependence.
 Two of the ways in which this analogy breaks down are instructive for the present 
question. First, one should not conclude from it that believers’ moral lives are simply more 
impoverished by comparison to Philodemus’ morally rich friends. One might think that there 
is only a quantitative difference between the two vis-à-vis the need to receive formative 
benefit from others. On this view, Paul simply set the limit for what can be achieved by 
personal maturity lower than Philodemus did. Believers gradually become morally self-
sufficient as they receive from others, but to a lesser degree than their Epicurean counterparts, 
resulting in a greater degree of need to receive from others. Such a view is partially correct in 
that Paul does not share Philodemus’ anthropological optimism, but it overlooks important 
differences in Paul’s conceptions of formative benefit, of the moral life generally, and of the 
relationship between moral progress and one’s need to receive benefit from others. 
 Second, unlike poverty, lacking moral self-sufficiency is not a periodically life-
threatening problem to be overcome, but a fundamental reality of faith to be embraced by all 
believers. Paul does not call all believers to embrace destitution, but he does call believers to 
embrace their lack of moral self-sufficiency as a positive feature of faith.1
 As observed above, the formative benefit which believers give to one another is 
different in kind than that which Epicureans share (and different in kind than economic 
resources). Believers do not simply give moral resources to be internalized by others, but 
mediate for one another interaction with the transcendent God. There is no quantity of human 
moral goods in themselves that can replicate a formative interaction with the transcendent 
God, on Paul’s view. All such goods are ‘in part’, to be abolished in the eschaton. 
 This difference in conception of formative benefit entails a different conception of the 
moral life, one in which formation derives from ongoing, faithful response to God, not simply 
from the internalization of moral resources. A believer does not simply need others for their 
moral resources, which by receiving he gradually becomes more self-sufficient and less 
dependent on others. Rather, a believer needs others because his relationship with God, and 
thus his moral life, is and always will be constituted by his interdependent relationship with 
other believers through whom God reveals himself. There is no possibility of rendering one’s 
ongoing relation to God through others into a form of self-relation, into an exchangeable 




1. By ‘lack of moral self-sufficiency’, I do not mean, e.g., that believers could not act as moral agents 
at all as individuals, but that the moral life of a believer is always conditioned by relationship with others beyond 
oneself, ultimately with the transcendent God.
the moral life is what allows Paul to hold that there is no inverse relationship between moral 
progress and the need to receive formative benefit from others.
 In sum, Paul’s conception of the need to receive formative benefit from others is 
qualitatively different than Philodemus’, because the two conceptions of formative benefit and 
of the moral life are finally incompatible. Believers do not need one another for mutual 
assistance in achieving self-sufficiently secure self-relation, as Philodemus conceives. 
Believers need to receive formative benefit from others because to do so continually 
constitutes their moral lives in relation to God. Moral interdependence is built into believers’ 
moral lives from first to last, for God has chosen continually to reveal himself for formative 
benefit through each other member of the community. 
 Believers participate necessarily in one another’s salvation not by helping each other 
attain to moral self-sufficiency by the exchange of moral resources, but by helping each other 
to respond to God’s self-revelation faithfully over the course of their lives. Believers cannot 
actually be said to ‘save’ one another in the same sense that Epicureans can, for (1) believers’ 
agency is encompassed within the prior agency of God, and (2) believers’ formative 
interactions do not save by their own moral resources alone, but by God’s self-revelation. 
Believers do not point one another to faith in themselves, but to faith in God. Moreover, 
growth in moral character is involved in salvation, but salvation can never be reduced to such 
growth. By God’s design, the entailments of believers’ faith in God emerge only over time as 
one learns to respond faithfully to God in and through loving relationships with other 
believers who are part of oneself in Christ’s body.
8.5. Conclusion
Despite the apparent similarities between Philodemus and Paul, the two have qualitatively 
different understandings of moral formation and moral interdependence. These qualitative 
differences in conception emerge from attention to the differences in their socio-economic 
locations, theologies, and formative practices.
 If my comparative analysis is correct, the fruit that emerges from attention to 
differences alongside similarities speaks against the comparative enterprise as conducted by 
Malherbe and Glad. Both scholars effectively minimize differences in order to make the case 
for Paul’s similarity with Philodemus and Hellenistic moral philosophy in general (esp. via the 
category of psychagogy). Both scholars do not robustly consider how differences in socio-
economic location, theology, and practice cast Paul’s understanding of moral formation 
among believers into a qualitatively different form than that provided by the analytical mould 
of psychagogy. By bracketing the sources of these differences from the comparative frame 
(esp. theology), their work produces a distorted picture of Pauline moral formation, one that 
practically assumes that Paul operated according to, e.g., Epicurean theology, anthropology, 
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and epistemology. My argument is not simply that there are some aspects of Paul’s vision that 
resist explanation by psychagogy, while other aspects are sufficiently explained. Rather, I have 
argued that the proper consideration of differences alongside the proposed similarities leads to 
the conclusion that Paul and Philodemus have qualitatively different understandings of moral 
formation as a whole. Some practices of moral formation are not qualitatively different (e.g., 
the use of speech, adaptation to others), but these practices find their distinctive shape in 
qualitatively different systems of moral formation.
 The intention of the comparative work exhibited in this thesis is not to shut down 
comparison between Paul and Philodemus, but to contribute to the project anew. Identifying 
qualitative differences does not signal the end of comparison. By attending to differences 
alongside similarities, this thesis offers an alternative and, arguably, more complete form of 
‘redescribing’ Paul and Philodemus in light of each other, to use again the language of J. Z. 
Smith. The results of this redescription lead to the need for a ‘rectification’ of the category by 
which the two visions of moral formation have been compared, i.e., psychagogy. This 
category, as used by Malherbe and Glad, is too heavily freighted with assumptions about the 
nature and practice of moral formation. Psychagogy might still be useful as a comparative 
category, but only if its limitations are properly observed. It seems better to abandon 
psychagogy and instead use a polythetic category that allows for greater flexibility in 
individual conception and practice (as this thesis has used ‘moral formation’).
 While the primary disciplinary environment of this thesis is the study of Paul, the 
comparison makes a contribution to Philodemus scholarship as well. Though this thesis has 
not provided a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of Philodemus, it has provided further evidence 
to establish and specify the current scholarly portrait of Philodemus’ moral formation (as 
found in, e.g., Gigante, Tsouna, Glad). The thesis does this by (1) the coordination of 
Philodemus’ socio-economic location and theology with his conception of moral formation, 
and by (2) the detailed comparison with Paul reviewed above. This thesis has also argued for 
the adjustment of certain details in our portrait of Philodemus, particularly, that Philodemus 
restricted participation in reciprocal formation for immature Epicureans (contra Glad), and 
that he indirectly restricted the poor from participation in the community of friends (contra 
Asmis).
 With respect to Pauline studies, this thesis serves to confirm the validity and 
usefulness of comparison between Paul and ancient conceptions of moral formation as an 
exegetical tool for Paul’s texts, particularly for understanding both 1 Corinthians 8n10 and 
12n14. While it would perhaps be possible to arrive at a generally similar understanding of 
these texts apart from the discussion in this thesis, the comparison with Philodemus provides 
analytical specificity and depth that is not available apart from the ‘conversation’ hosted 
between these two figures. Through similarity and difference, Philodemus’ conception and 
practice of moral formation help to define the particular shape of Paul’s own conception and 
practice, and vice-versa. 
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8.6. Implications for Wider Research 
Currently there are many other comparative projects designed to shed light on Paul in relation 
to ancient philosophy. The results of my comparison contest some of the comparative 
conclusions made by others concerning Paul’s conception of the moral life. The results I have 
specifically in mind are my interpretations of a qualitative distinction between God and 
believers’ moral character, and of the nature of interdependence among believers. The 
following discussion cannot do justice to the complexity involved in other projects. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that some scholars’ comparative readings, like those of Malherbe and 
Glad, fail to account for the implications of Paul’s theological claims, particularly those in 1 
Cor 12n14.
 Troels Engberg-Pedersen has recently compared Epictetus and Paul with respect to the 
relationship between divine and human agency in the moral life.2 For Epictetus, God 
ultimately is the rationality of the cosmos. As Engberg-Pedersen notes, ‘The only difference 
between the rationality of the true human self and that of God is one of scope.’3 There is thus 
a qualitative identity between God’s rationality and mature human rationality.4 Thus there 
cannot be self-sufficiency in relation to God, nor dependence upon God: ‘A local case of 
understanding [i.e., human rationality] cannot be ‘governed’ or ‘directed’ or in any way 
constrained against its will by the wider rationality of the world’, i.e., God.5
 Despite noting a key difference in their two theologies, Engberg-Pedersen claims that 
Epictetus and Paul align conceptually in the relation of divine and human agency and its 
implications for the moral life. The key difference is that Paul’s God is more ‘unpredictable’ 
than Epictetus’ God, because his ways are inscrutable (citing Rom 11:33n36), and because he 
delivers knowledge of himself through revelation rather than through reason and 
demonstration.6 However, while the two differ in the way that knowledge of God comes 
about, Engberg-Pedersen claims that the basic shape of the moral life in relation to God is the 
same. Once believers’ have knowledge of God by revelation, they possess qualitatively the 
same knowledge that God himself has.7 Engberg-Pedersen roots this claim in 1 Cor 2:10n16, 
where Paul claims that believers have the mind of Christ by the Spirit: ‘Sophia and nous: 
through the pneuma, received directly from God, believers are now in a state that is one of 




2. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 106–38.
3. Ibid., 116.
4. Ibid., 117.
5. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 117, emphasis original. Philodemus 
seems to have a stronger notion of the gods as distinct from human beings, but would agree that the mature 
Epicurean’s knowledge and moral character are on the same qualitative plane as the gods.
6. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 132–35.
7. Ibid., 135.
understand; they have God’s knowledge.’8 While God is an unpredictable God, ‘once human 
beings have acquired the proper knowledge ... they will have a knowledge that will either 
dissolve this unpredictability or at least push it into a subsidiary position.’9 Believers with the 
mind of Christ are not dependent upon God for knowledge, because they possess in 
themselves God’s own knowledge by his Spirit. They show the same lack of dependence upon 
God that Epictetus does, because they have qualitatively the same knowledge that God has: 
‘the understanding of self-sufficiency in connection with this knowledge [of God] that we 
elaborated in our analysis of Epictetus may be brought over wholesale into Paul.’10
 Though Engberg-Pedersen cites 1 Cor 13:12 as a witness to the priority of God’s 
agency for human knowledge of God, he fails to reckon seriously with the epistemological and 
theological claims of these verses.11 Engberg-Pedersen elsewhere claims that there is indeed a 
dimension of progression in knowledge of God in Paul, but one that follows after an initial 
‘complete cognitive transformation’, a progression that presupposes and expands qualitative 
identity in one’s physical and cognitive characteristics with God (by the Spirit).12 
 One finds a similar perspective in David Litwa’s recent interpretation that the Pauline 
moral life in relation to God is best described in terms of deification.13 Litwa claims that 
believers do not assimilate only to the humanity of Christ, but become divine by sharing 
Christ’s divine characteristics. Deification does not mean a ‘fusion with the Godhead or loss 
of personality’,14 nor only a development in likeness to God, but involves ‘sharing in those 
distinctive qualities which make (a) God (a) God.’15 Litwa argues that believers become 
morally divine (one among other modes of deification) insofar as they adopt Christ’s divine 
moral character, particularly his humility and self-subordination (drawing upon, e.g., Rom 
15:1n8; Phil 2:6n8; 2 Cor 8:9). Humility is ‘just as basic to the divine identity of Christ as is 
immortality’,16 and so believers become God insofar as they assimilate to his moral character, 
no less than when their bodies are transformed into the same substance as God’s in the 
resurrection. Unlike the bodily transformation that occurs only in the eschaton, believers are 




8. Ibid., 136. Emphasis original.
9. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 136 Emphasis original.
10. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 132.
11. He seems to puzzle honestly over 1 Cor 13:12: ‘Paul has apparently already been fully known, but 
will only himself come to know fully in the future. What does that mean?’ (emphasis original; Engberg-Pedersen, 
Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 238, n. 35).
12. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Complete and Incomplete Transformation in Paul n A Philosophic 
Reading of Paul on Body and Spirit’,” in Metamorphoses: Resurrection, Body and Transformative Practices in 
Early Christianity, eds. T. K. Seim and J. Økland (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 123–46. See the same notions of 






on the present tense of µεταµορφου' µεθα in 2 Cor 3:18).17 One should not understand the 
Spirit’s involvement in the believer’s moral life as a transcendent, divine agent that is 
qualitatively distinct from human moral agency, because believers have ‘the mind of Christ’ 
(1 Cor 2:16);18 they have come to share the same Spirit with Christ; they are no longer merely 
human because the Spirit has come to possess them (1 Cor 3:4; 6:17; Gal 2:20).19 Litwa does 
admit that Paul has a notion of moral progression, drawing on Engberg-Pedersen, but this is 
best understood as an expansion of moral character that is already qualitatively the same as 
divine moral character by the Spirit.20 Against those who would deny a qualitative identity in 
divine moral character between the believer and Christ, Litwa asks, ‘Does sharing in Christ’s 
self-subordinating humility not mean sharing in Christ’s divine identity? And does not 
Christ’s divine humility define the nature of Paul’s God? ... If, for Paul, Christ’s virtue of self-
subordinating love defines the identity of God, can one with the same virtue as Christ 
participate in Christ’s divine identity?’21
 I argue, however, that one most plausibly interprets Paul’s radically positive 
epistemological statements, such as ‘we have the mind of Christ’ (1 Cor 2:16) in dynamic 
relationship with those that stress the radical transcendence of God (1 Cor 13:8n13; Rom 
11:33n36). The latter texts seem plainly to contradict Engberg-Pedersen’s and David Litwa’s 
claims that believers presently possess ‘God’s own knowledge (of himself)’,22 or the ‘same 
virtue’ that Christ himself has23 without qualitative distinction.24 Present knowledge and 
moral character as a believer, while empowered by the Spirit, is qualitatively other than God’s 
own knowledge and character. There is no qualitative identity between divine and human 
moral character, nor progression into it prior to the eschaton (though there is a notion of moral 
progress, in my view). Rather, there is an abolishment and replacement of present knowing 
with God’s own knowing yet to be revealed.
 Moreover, by acknowledging a qualitative distinction between God and believers’ 




17. Litwa, Transformed, 221–23. At other points Litwa claims that Paul’s understanding of deification is 
distinctive in that it occurs post-mortem (e.g., Litwa, Transformed, 206, 287, 290), but here he seems to leave 
room for the idea of pre-eschaton deification in terms of moral character.
18. For a sophisticated and detailed treatment of 1 Cor 2:6n3:4 in the general interpretive trajectories of 
Engberg-Pedersen and Litwa, see Dingeldein, “Gaining Virtue, Gaining Christ,” 273–320.
19. Litwa, Transformed, 211.
20. Ibid., 210.
21. Litwa, Transformed, 223 While van Kooten does ascribe an explicitly platonic sense of moral 
assimilation to Christ in Paul, he does not go as far as Litwa in claiming deification by moral assimilation (van 
Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 180–81).
22. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 125.
23. Litwa, Transformed, 223.
24. In other words, I would deny that Paul has any notion of ‘essential deification’, according to 
Blackwell’s categorisation and discussion. See Ben C. Blackwell, Christosis: Engaging Paul’s Soteriology with 
His Patristic Interpreters, Rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), xix-xxix, 99–110.
construction.25 If there is no such qualitative distinction, this would undermine the need to 
receive moral construction from all other believers on the basis of God’s self-revelation 
through each one.26 Moral self-sufficiency in relation to other believers and to God would be a 
real possibility in some sense (or at least a lack of dependence based on qualitative identity 
with God).27 Epictetus or Philodemus would champion such a perspective on the moral life. 





25. Litwa acknowledges that he does not account for the communal nature of the moral life in Paul in his 
monograph (Litwa, Transformed, 290).
26. Volker Rabens and Susan Eastman lead the way toward a more robust, relational understanding of 
the moral life for Paul, as argued in this thesis. See Rabens, Holy Spirit and Ethics; Eastman, Paul and the 
Person.
27. For example, in Dingeldein’s view, Paul aligns best with a middle Platonist perspective on the moral 
life, in which the more mature believers predominately care for the less mature, leading them into moral self-
sufficiency. Dingeldein briefly treats 1 Cor 12n14 as witnessing to moral hierarchy in Paul’s communities, but 
does not reckon with these chapters’ witness to interdependent moral formation. See Dingeldein, “Gaining 
Virtue, Gaining Christ,” 254, 258. 
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